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Abstract 
 
The assumption that interpretation is widespread and must be tamed is 
illustrated in the ambition for a touchstone capable of showing the authenticity, 
or veracity, of certain entities. Such touchstone would have the capacity to help 
us distinguish friends from enemies, of identifying the quality of particular lines, 
and of bringing the truth to light. This touchstone, used for the comprehension 
of others, may be an object, a form of test, or a person. It will, however, be seen 
that accurate judgments do not derive from the use of the touchstone itself, but 
from a technical understanding of interpretation conducted by accomplished 
individuals. Precise forms of judgment are, thus, the result of a combination of 
factors that include good intuition, or conviction, the ability to learn a specific 
method or technique, to show something, detect errors and ask questions.  
 Resumo  
 
 
Esta tese descreve a ambição por uma pedra de toque que demonstre a 
veracidade, ou autenticidade, de certas entidades. Esta pedra de toque, que pode 
ser um objecto, uma pessoa ou um teste, teria a capacidade de nos auxiliar a 
distinguir amigos de inimigos, de identificar a qualidade de alguns versos e de 
iluminar a verdade. Argumenta-se, todavia, que juízos precisos não derivam 
unicamente do uso da pedra de toque, mas de um entendimento técnico de 
interpretação conduzida por indivíduos hábeis. Bons juízos sobre terceiros são, 
assim, o resultado de uma combinação de factores que inclui boa intuição, ou 
convicção, a capacidade de se aprender um método ou uma técnica específica, de 
detectar erros e de fazer perguntas.  
      
 
  
If circumstances lead me, I will find  
Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed  
Within the centre. 
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 157-159)  
 
Construct, then, a mousetrap that will catch a sublimer evidence.  
 Geoffrey Hartman, The Fate of Reading and Other Essays 
  
 Introduction 
 
 
Picture a suspect of knowing a bomb’s location; a foreigner blamed for robbery in 
medieval times, but claiming to be innocent; a woman wishing to apply for a supermarket 
position, but unwilling to confess she had robbed before. In these cases, liable to skeptical 
doubt, the affirmations of the accused may not be taken in consideration, since their word 
has no value. Someone wishing to place a bomb would not be eager to confess its location; a 
foreigner’s word in medieval times had no judicial value; and no one applying for a job 
position would confess to previous robbery. There is no way of knowing if the suspect can be 
trusted, either since the accused is not considered honest or because there is no one able to 
testify as to whether he may indeed be relied upon. Thus, presumably and with good reason, 
one may assume the CIA, the medieval jury and the supermarket’s owner would prefer a way 
of finding the truth which would not depend on the suspect’s word. In many of the cases 
discussed, however, the only one capable of enlightening his interlocutors is the suspect.  
The modes of proof here described – some forms of literary criticism, the medieval 
judicial ordeal, the polygraph and torture (in its various forms and historical periods1) – 
presume that certain entities enclose the key to their comprehension, which may come to 
light if the appropriate method is employed. The presumption that the body is a vessel with 
hidden contents has implications when applied to ways of determining the truth. When there 
                                                           
1 The use of torture and its techniques varies substantially according to the historical context, the country in 
question and whether it is, or not, a judicial practice. For this reason, I will discuss, throughout this dissertation, 
specific cases and underline particular aspects of torture. For a historical narrative see, for example: Henry C. Lea, 
Superstition and Force: Torture, Ordeal and Trial by Combat in Medieval Law, 1870. New York: Barnes & 
Nobles, 1996. Piero Fiorelli, La Tortura Giudiziaria Nel Diritto Comune, vol. Primo. Varese: Giuffré, 1953. Allec 
Mellor, La Torture – Son histoire, son abolition, sa réapparition au XX siècle. Tours: Maison Mame, 1961. Malise 
Ruthven, Torture – The Grand Conspiracty. London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1978. Edward Peters, Torture, 
1995. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. 
Introduction 
13 
 
is a problem requiring a preferably definite solution, and the key to the problem appears to 
be inside a certain person, it seems necessary to find a way to bring the answer forward. It is 
assumed that the individual’s body, for one reason or another, holds the way out of the 
predicament, and it is therefore compulsory to extract it. However, in most of these cases, the 
suspects are unwilling to let their bodies be examined. They claim they are innocent or that 
they have been falsely accused and refuse to cooperate.  
Curiously, literary works often cause us problems similar to those enunciated. 
Although a book may not be compared to the bomber, the medieval foreigner or the woman 
with a prior conviction, there is a complexity in many works that make us doubt if the words 
we read do mean what we firstly assume them to mean. In many situations, intricate 
passages seem to be doing to us the same as the person who placed the bomb and does not 
wish it to be found: withholding the actual meaning of their statements. In these cases, 
speaking with the author is not much of a help, which puts critics in a somewhat comparable 
position to that of the CIA: the person who could help them decipher a literary passage, or a 
state of affairs, cannot, or will not, do it. These are problems where, for any number of 
reasons, the objects in hand cannot be as cooperative as we would like them to be, which puts 
us in the position of having to be creative, or even violent, when dealing with them. In the 
case of books, as happens with unwilling subjects, it is necessary to discover if they are being 
purposefully deceitful or not, a determination that may settle the type of conclusions we 
draw. At the same time, it is difficult to know what exactly could be special signs needing 
analysis. Some authors point out the possibility of using certain passages and contrasting 
them with those requiring interpretation; for others, quoting from a text is a way of 
illuminating its meaning; while describing also appears to be a form of clarifying analysis. 
The abovementioned examples have yet another feature in common. They portray 
guilty persons and their unwillingness to confess. Nevertheless, an innocent subject would 
also, in the same circumstances, deny having taken any part in the diverse affairs. From this 
viewpoint, to be innocent and to claim it is very similar to being guilty and claiming to be 
above suspicion. Both forms of verbal enunciation are identical. The main presumption of 
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modes of proof such as torture, the ordeal and the polygraph is that even if the suspect is 
unwilling to admit his knowledge or his guilt, there are signs of his culpability that may be 
evaluated. Thus, inquisitorial torture seemed to be able to make the suspect confess, while 
simultaneously providing valuable signs of guilt through the observation of his expressions.  
The medieval ordeal was considered a way of proving the truth in difficult cases, through the 
evaluation of bodily signs, whereas the polygraph is an instrument frequently used to 
uncover facts about a person that she does not wish others to know. It is presumed that the 
truth is discovered through the analysis of unintentional signs, the body’s physiological 
response to the guilt of its owners. Although differences between modes of proof will be later 
surveyed, it is relevant to point out that, for these methods, signs such as perspiration or a 
burned arm are considered to be more truthful than verbal statements, due to the fact that 
they are unintentional and difficult to control. While many persons lie intentionally without 
being caught, only experts are considered capable of managing their physiological reactions 
when put to the test. These procedures share, therefore, the assumption that each entity’s 
interior is veiled by its exterior, which is, paradoxically, also the place where the revelation 
will occur. It will be seen how this is a peculiar way to understand the relationship between 
the body’s interior and its signs of exteriority, described as bodily proof. 
These modes of test rely on the idea that if the appropriate method is employed and 
properly applied, there is the possibility that the correct answer to the problem at hand will 
appear. Although methods vary, these interpreters share the ambition for a touchstone that 
would allow us to distinguish these entities’ authenticity. In certain cases, the touchstone is 
an object such as a stone or a painting, while in others it may be a Shakespearean line, some 
sort of test, or even a person. The ability to obtain results depends on the quality of the 
touchstone, the use given to the object, the ability to follow a procedure and to learn with 
experience. In some cases, the interpreter only needs to look at self-evident proof and to 
show it, something certain observers admire and others fear, whereas in other circumstances 
it is necessary to complement the results of the test with an adequate description. Those 
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evaluating these modes of proof must, therefore, possess a degree of expertise making them 
able to either discover or be the touchstone with which to judge others. 
The outcome of the proof is deemed univocal. In fact, one way to characterize these 
modes of proof is to say they presume that if the correct protocol is followed, the desired 
outcome will surface. A point in Philip Roth’s novel, The Dying Animal, illustrates this type 
of procedure. The narrator, a literature professor, explains his theory about relationships. 
According to him, persons mistakenly consider that conversation is required during the 
seduction process, assuming the woman is interested in who the man is and vice versa. 
However, attraction determines a priori the outcome of the process and, contrary to what 
happens when one goes to the doctor or the lawyer, the conversation during the seduction 
phase does not alter its ending. Both parties know they will end up having sex, and the 
discussion on Kafka and the interest in Velasquez are only detours with the purpose to justify 
the initial lust, a necessary means towards the intended ending. The unromantic perspective 
of Roth’s character relates with this thesis’ subject in more than one-way: it characterizes 
what is generally conceived as an interior process (the feelings of desire for another), and 
describes the public “symptoms” of that attraction. It also reveals a case where, although the 
outcome is deemed pre-determined, it seems necessary to follow the proper protocol. If 
Roth’s literature professor is correct, there is a tacit acknowledgment between those involved, 
the protocol has a pre-established ending and it serves the purposes of both parties.  
When the professor, a skilled interpreter, looks at his female students, he needs to 
find which of them attracts him. Quoting his words: “They come to my first class, and I know 
almost immediately which is the girl for me”2. This type of knowledge is compared in the 
book with that of the bull in Mark Twain’s story, who, when looking at the author thinks: 
“You are my meat, sir”3. The professor’s predatory self-description presents some 
presuppositions worth mentioning, such as the fact that in a class full of students he is always 
interested in one of them. This is presented as a procedure that repeats itself through time, 
                                                           
2 Philip Roth, The Dying Animal. London: Vintage Books: 2002, p. 2.  
3 Op. Cit., p. 2. 
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and although the text is not clear in this particular point, one has good reasons to imagine 
that his abilities to discover the girl have improved. This type of intuitive knowledge 
enhanced by experience also characterizes examiners whose work, even if depending on a 
somewhat scientific analysis of charts, as happens in the polygraph test, is influenced by 
personal relationships and the individual ability to judge others. At the same time, what 
could be seen as the obligation to like one of the students finds its equivalent in the necessity 
to provide a verdict about someone or something in the aforementioned modes of proof.  
The specificity in the professor’s theory resides in the fact that he does seem to know, 
when he looks at the desired student, whether she will correspond to his feelings. This may 
be explained by the professor’s experience in life, by the fact that his numerous adventures 
lead him to develop an intuition, making him more capable than most to assess his own 
intentions, as well as other persons’, or at least his female apprentices. The professor’s use of 
the word “almost” reinforces this idea, as his gaze stares at the universe of students, firstly 
eliminating the male elements of the class, and then progressively reducing the female pupils 
to the desired one, until he is able to see “right away that this was going to be my girl”4. It will 
be seen throughout the thesis how some persons seem to have this type of ability, how they 
are touchstones to the character of others, which may rely on their judgment. Being such an 
interpreter may not, though, be beneficial to one’s health and it will be seen how some of 
these interpreters experience the secondary effects of the tasks they perform.  
One way to characterize these procedures is to claim that they attempt to diminish the 
amount of talk in certain situations. After the classes end, so as to avoid sexual harassment 
claims, the Professor prepares things, such as arrange the adequate context, so that events 
can follow its normal course:  
Talking this talk, you have a misguided sense, as does she, that you know what you’re dealing 
with. But it’s not as though you’re interviewing a lawyer or hiring a doctor and that whatever’s 
said along the way is going to change your course of action. You know you want it and you 
know you’re going to do it and nothing is going to stop you. Nothing is going to be said here 
that’s going to change anything5. 
                                                           
4 Op. cit., p. 5.  
5 Op. cit., p. 15. 
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What is interesting in this case is that, for the professor, the malfunctioning of the 
procedure is a surprise for the parties; the protocol is supposed to work and, if everyone 
behaves as anticipated, there does not seem to be a reason for it not to produce the expected 
results. Nevertheless, contrary to the professor’s assumptions, the set of rules may not help to 
obtain the estimated results, for example, to follow the protocol one has to be acquainted 
with it. Moreover, one of the parties may discover that the other does not like Velasquez, thus 
deciding that lack of taste to be unappealing. The etiquette would be thus interrupted by the 
discovery of an unknown factor, which changes the expected outcome of the situation. For 
the professor, talking is only a protocol (this being the reason why he makes calculations in 
order to attempt to determine which is the required duration for the procedure), but the 
student assumes, as the professor notes, that she is letting him know who she really is. There 
is a disparity between interlocutors in this conversation, which, as will be seen, is a condition 
for the mentioned modes of proof to work. At the same time, if more of his putative 
interlocutors shared his seduction kit they would be able to save the Professor a lot of effort 
and go straight to the point. The thought that one may be more expedite, present in modes of 
proof such as the ordeal and torture, is contradicted in literary criticism, which seems to be 
characterized by being an activity that cannot be rushed. This means that the Professor is 
ignoring that his ability to discover students and to depend on a type of protocol is the result 
of experience, which is precisely what his students lack.  
On closer inspection, another relevant feature in the Professor’s theory comes into 
view. Namely, the fact that he does not consider that, in his predatory relationships, there is 
anything separating him from the desired subjects. Roth’s professor assumes that when one 
is a lawyer there is something between the professional and the object he aims to study, and 
vice versa (as was seen before, what one hears the lawyer say might change one’s will to 
employ him). On the contrary, there is nothing between the object, the Professor and his 
image of things, as the only information in need is the one he, as an interpreter, already 
possesses. As a consequence, the Professor portrays two types of persons, or professions, 
those that accede to universal desires, wishes or truths, and therefore are not in need of 
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anything exterior to help them analyze objects, and those in which interpreters need to be 
specially trained in order to understand the world around them. Contrary to what happens 
with the Professor, the modes of generating evidence that will be here described are said to 
require this effort to understand others. Objects and persons either are unwilling to be 
understood, or the regular methods for their comprehension are not producing the desired 
outcome. Therefore, as will be seen, the literary critic, the polygraph examiner and the 
medieval judge, unlike Roth’s Professor, see themselves often in the position of having to 
understand an object with the use of a technique.   
While the professor sees the procedure as a set of rules for something that had been 
previously established to appear, these modes of proof consider that the modus operandi 
helps to determine the correct outcome of the test, this being the reason why the procedure 
has to be thoroughly followed. However, these ways of testing entities also attempt to predict 
what will happen if the method fails to produce accurate results, and provide solutions for the 
problem (results from these tests may appear in the form of a conclusion, a verdict or an 
essay about a poem). 
There is little certainty to whether these modes of proof are, in fact, able to lead us to 
the truth. Critics often deride these procedures, portraying them as offering little of the 
truthfulness they wish to highlight. Some of these methods are difficult to defend from an 
ethical point of view, as it is not easy to argue in favor of burning other persons’ arms or 
submitting them to water torture. Although I tend to agree with those who are critical of such 
procedures, these methods, whose use would not be deemed appropriate, do allow us to 
obtain verdicts (even if not truthful ones) and do seem to have the advantage of being able to 
give us what may be considered definite replies to some questions. These modes of proof 
entitle us to put a stop to interpretation and to obtain a final verdict. In the case of critics, the 
use of these methods is unable to provide us with what they consider truthful or authentic 
solutions to certain literary problems. Still, they allow for the writing of insightful essays (in 
the case of criticism the value of the procedure seems to lie in its ability to sanction the 
discussion).  
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It should be mentioned that these forms of test have been used in diverse societies, 
contexts and systems of belief. The medieval society in which the ordeal worked as a judicial 
way of solving conflicts has little to do with the way contemporary methods of truth inquiry 
deal with the polygraph, or even with torture. This thesis’ aim is not to historicize such 
practices but to expose their similarities and differences within this problem’s context. 
Therefore, I will invoke specific ways of producing evidence when particular interpretative 
problems are brought to light.  
When one speaks of torture, medieval ordeals and polygraph tests, two possibilities 
emerge. Those who argue against these modes of proof seem to share the professor’s theory, 
which means that they consider the result is previously determined and the purpose of the 
mode of proof is but to confirm it. On the other hand, those in favor of the truth tests assume 
the result depends entirely on the ability of those involved in the process to follow the proper 
procedures. To ascertain which of them is correct is cause for wonder, but it is not the aim of 
this thesis. Its purpose is to attempt to reflect on their particularities, ways of functioning, 
common presuppositions and dissimilarities, as well as to include them in a group of other 
methods sharing, in Dewey’s terms, the quest for certainty. 
  
Chapter I 
A Tribunal of Interpretation 
 There’s no art  
To find the mind’s construction in the face:  
He was a gentleman on whom I built  
An absolute trust 
 (Macbeth, I, iv, 11-14) 
  
 This chapter discusses three plays, Hamlet, Macbeth and Othello, which describe a 
tribunal of interpretation where emotions perform the central role, either because they are 
being tested, or concealed. According to the perspective presented in these plays, as well as in 
the modes of proof which will be described, human beings possess an inner truth that may be 
clarified under proper observation, or if a physical test is applied to the body. Concomitantly, 
persons seem to be compared and included in a larger group of entities where we may find 
objects, situations or texts having in common the fact that they are considered to be 
particularly introverted, or impervious to analysis.  
 Knowing how to identify someone’s murderer, whether one is being betrayed, how to 
distinguish a friend from an enemy, or try to avoid being exposed, are questions that compel 
the main characters in the plays discussed. The credibility of a trial, one in which the 
sentence does not precede the verdict, is contingent to a set of procedures: an investigation, 
in which valuable proof is gathered, must take place, a suspect is found, witnesses are called 
upon, accusation and defense present their case and a reliable jury evaluates the results. 
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Although these characters pursue the truth, and sometimes find effective forms of testing it, 
the examination is seldom distinguished from the tribunal itself, as if the inquiry and its 
assessment were one and the same. In fact, the formulation of the mode of proof and the 
discovery of evidence absorb these interpreters. These evaluations are a way of justifying 
beliefs, obtaining certainty about supposedly reluctant objects, and being able to say that 
some entities are untrue, or inauthentic. Although to clarify a meaning is an interpretative 
act, it will be seen that the modes of proof discussed here identify the interpreters’ 
conclusions as a way to discover the truth. However, as will be seen, interpretation is always 
at the root of both processes, even if the latter like to present themselves as objective 
procedures for uncovering falseness.  
 1. Devising a Truth Test 
 Hamlet illustrates the conviction that there is a truth to be tested inside the human 
body. In the third act, the Prince of Denmark seeks for a solution to end suspicions about the 
presumed murder of his father. He thus stages a play in which the crime supposedly 
committed by his stepfather, Claudius, is represented. The Murder of Gonzago has the 
purpose of catching the conscience of the King through the observation of Claudius’s 
reactions to the performance. Hamlet’s test is based on the assumption that a criminal, when 
confronted with his deeds, confesses his guilt through visible physical responses. 
Consequently, the way Claudius behaves, rising in the middle of the play and calling for the 
lights to be lit, seems to be the proof Hamlet needs to be sure the Ghost’s accusations were 
true. When the play is interrupted, the dialogue between Hamlet and Horatio, to whom the 
Prince had told his plan and asked to closely survey his uncle, seems to prove that both 
witnessed a transformation in the King’s physiognomy. However, before the play began, a 
dumb show had been performed, in which the story was presented for the first time, and 
towards which Claudius did not react.   
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 The explanation of what constitutes proof has its classical places in the critical 
literature on Hamlet. It was W.W. Greg who, in “Hamlet’s Hallucination,” began the debate 
about the dumb show’s relevance, when he considered it was unlikely for the King not to 
respond the first time the action was presented:  
If the King could seat unmoved through the representation in pantomime of these events there 
is no imaginable reason why they should move him when acted with words. For the language of 
the play adds nothing to the pointedness of the allusion: the sideglances at the Danish court are 
all aimed at the marriage of the Queen, not at the crime of the usurper. The actual speech of the 
murderer, which is interrupted by the King’s rising, is mere bombast that could not possibly 
discompose the tenderest criminal6.  
 Three theories, in the discussion of the play-within-the-play, are sustained: firstly, if 
the King did not move during the dumb show he would not also have reacted during the 
Player-speech; secondly, the supposition that the court is looking at the Queen and not the 
King; and thirdly, that the Player’s speech would not have any effect on a minimally hardened 
criminal. The fact that Claudius was unperturbed during the dumb show indicates, according 
to Greg, that, contrary to Hamlet's presupposition, although the King is indeed guilty of 
murder, he did not poison his brother and, therefore, could not recognize himself in the 
particular action being mimed. The Ghost’s narrative of how he had been poisoned could not, 
therefore, be true, we now realize, but is rather the product of a hallucination in Hamlet’s 
mind. Claudius’s abrupt interruption would, then, be due to the fact that the play itself, as 
well as Hamlet’s improper behavior during the performance, was a direct challenge to the 
Queen and, consequently, to the King and its court.  
Greg surmises that the actors probably improvised the dumb show, which explains 
Hamlet’s surprise and justifies his affirmation “Marry, this is miching malicho. It means 
mischief” (III, ii, 135). The unexpected performance has a profound effect on Hamlet, who 
knows Claudius has been warned, and is therefore determined to make him give himself 
away. This gradual "change in intention" justifies Hamlet's offensive behavior towards 
Ophelia, the Queen and King during the dumb show, which would be why Claudius does not 
                                                           
6 W. W. Greg, “Hamlet’s Hallucination,” The Modern Language Review, vol. 12, n.º 4, Oct. 1917, p. 398. 
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leave when the Player poisons the King, but during Hamlet's remarks. The thought that 
Claudius did not murder his brother using poison would also help to explain the unlikely 
similarity between plots (Hamlet had heard the play before and his perturbed mind could 
later appeal to it, associating it with his suspicions towards Claudius and providing the 
justification he was looking for). 
John Dover Wilson, in What Happens in Hamlet, concurs with W. W. Greg’s case, 
equally rejecting “the second tooth theory” sustained by authors such as Alfred Pollard and 
W. W. Lawrence, according to which Claudius would have been able to resist emotionally to 
the first enactment of the crime in the dumb show, but not to the onslaught of the second 
enactment in the play that follows. Wilson observes that there are no indications in the text to 
prove this theory, considering that the play’s repetition on stage would be less efficient 
dramatically. But, unlike Greg, for Dover Wilson the Ghost is not a figment of Hamlet's 
imagination and the King did murder his brother, as the play suggests. To Wilson, the scene 
discloses the facts to the audience, given that the dumb show contains the argument of the 
play, but not to the King, said to be otherwise engaged. According to Dover Wilson, it only 
works if “He [the King] must not know nothing, but they [the audience] must know 
everything”7. The explanation for what Dover Wilson supposes to be the King's lack of 
reaction during the dumb show follows Halliwell-Philips, for whom the King was busy 
exchanging views with the Queen and remained unaware of the dumb show. The author 
considers that the King’s conversation begins with Polonius, and that they are both speaking 
about Hamlet’s improper behavior when he throws himself at Ophelia’s feet with his lewd 
badinage (only afterward does the King turn his attention to the Queen). Wilson maintains 
Greg's point on how the dumb show was unexpected to Hamlet and argues that this 
perspective is emphasized when one reads Hamlet’s declaration to Ophelia, according to 
which “The players cannot \ keep counsel: they’ll tell all” (III, ii, 137-138). 
Both W. W. Greg and Dover Wilson’s views are criticized by W. W. Lawrence who, in 
“Hamlet and the Mouse-Trap,” argues that the problems pointed out by these critical 
                                                           
7 John Dover Wilson, What Happens in Hamlet, 1935. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 146.  
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readings of the play are, in fact, inexistent both to those who stage it and to the spectators in 
the theatre. To Lawrence, both authors erroneously consider that Claudius would not have 
been touched by the dumb show, since there is no evidence in the text to prove this. Only 
those who were looking for Claudius’s emotions, such as Hamlet and Horatio, would have 
been able to find them, since all the others were watching the play. When the King realizes 
his secret was found, he is careful not to respond, waiting for an adequate time to do it. 
Therefore, he leaves the play abruptly, but without losing his dignity. According to Lawrence, 
both the dumb show and the prologue have the function of giving the public the idea that a 
real play is starting and explaining what the plot is, which avoids the whole representation of 
the action. For Lawrence, the three functions of the dumb show are: to increase the illusion 
that the play is real, to reveal to Claudius that Hamlet knows the motives of the crime, and to 
pose the question, can the King endure it?8  
The aforementioned authors provide the framework for the discussion that follows, 
which will focus on the question of the double test (as well the interrogation about Hamlet's 
prior knowledge of the dumb show) and on Claudius's reaction to the play-within-the-play9. 
Hamlet needs to attempt to “catch the conscience of the King” and assumes Claudius will not 
be able to hide the truth before the theatrical representation of his dire deed: 
 
 
 Hum – I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play  
Have, by the very cunning of the scene,  
Been struck so to the soul that presently  
They have proclaim’ d their malefactions.  
                                                           
8 W. W. Lawrence, “Hamlet and the Mouse-Trap,” PMLA, vol. 54, n.º 3, Sep. 1939, p. 709-735. 
9 It should be mentioned that Hamlet’s performance does not appear in the main sources for the play, Saxo 
Grammaticus’s book, Historiae Danicae, which probably Shakespeare did not read, but which influenced his 
mainsource, Belleforest’s Histoires Tragiques. There are several mentions to a play which would be the origin of 
Hamlet, a so-called Ur-Hamlet, whose text was never found, and there is, of course, much debate about the 
relation between Shakespeare’s play and Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy. The Murder of Gonzago appears both in 
folios Q1 and Q2, and Geoffrey Bullough, in his study of the play’s narrative sources, argues that it contains 
elements of a description of the murder of Francesco Maria I, Duke of Urbino, as well as allusions to the War of 
the Theatres. The player’s speech would be influenced by Seneca’s Troades and Agamemnon, while the idea of a 
murderer who betrays himself during the performance of a play could be inspired in Warning for the Faire 
Women (1599), which Shakespeare’s company had recently performed. Cf. Geoffrey Bullough, ed., Narrative and 
Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 1973. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.  
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For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak  
With most miraculous organ. I’ll have these players  
Play something like the murder of my father  
Before mine uncle. I’ll observe his looks;  
I’ll tent him to the quick. If a do blench,  
I know my course. The spirit that I have seen 
May be a devil, and the devil hath power  
T' assume a pleasing shape, yea, and perhaps, 
out of mine weakness and my melancholy,  
As he is very potent with such spirits,  
Abuses me to damn me. I'll have grounds  
More relative than this. The play’s the thing  
Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King10. 
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 584-601) 
 
 
An analysis of Claudius’s features would allow access to the hidden contents of his 
mind, the face being the place where private emotions are made public. If the King reacts to 
the reenactment of the crime, Hamlet’s doubts as to the authenticity of the Ghost will vanish 
and he will be certain Claudius is guilty. The test is twofold, as it aims to verify the Ghost's 
words, confirming that they are not the action of the Devil, and to test Claudius's actions11. In 
Hamlet’s pragmatic resolution of the problem of other minds, the expression "If a do blench \ 
I know my course" has a double meaning, as it refers to the sign of Claudius’s guilt and the 
course of action Hamlet will have to pursue once he discovers the perpetrator of the 
assassination. However, "course" could also stand for corpse, which means that Hamlet 
would finally be able to understand what happened with his father's body (the expression 
relates to "murder will speak with most miraculous organ,” and it shall be described later on 
in the chapter).  
For Hamlet to unveil Claudius’s guilt, it was necessary to be particularly careful with 
what would be played. This explains his advice to actors about the best way to enunciate each 
word, as well as his description about the dangers of overacting. Hamlet’s zeal is similar to 
                                                           
10 Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden Shakespeare, 1990. 
Quotations follow this edition. 
11 Regarding Hamlet’s test to the Ghost see: Miriam Joseph, “Discerning the Ghost in Hamlet,” PMLA, vol. 76, n.º 
5, Dec. 1961, pp. 493-502. Joseph holds the view that several witnesses test the Ghost according to the theory of 
the discernment of spirits. Hamlet believes in the Ghost the first time he sees him, but he naturally doubts his 
conviction after he has time to think. Therefore, he seeks “evidence more reliable than his initial spontaneous 
conviction” (p. 497). Hamlet’s doubts are reasonable and his test, as well as the way he asks for Horatio’s help, 
serves the necessity to double-check the Ghost.   
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that of a theatre play director who desires to thrill the audience, but it also reminds us of 
formal judicial procedures through which a criminal’s guilt is uncovered. In this sense, 
Hamlet’s mode of proof may be compared to a technical truth test such as that effected by the 
polygraph.  
The polygraph is a version of a series of instruments developed over time with the 
purpose of identifying a liar. However, both those who argue for and against the polygraph 
maintain that it is not a lie detector. In reality, it measures physiological transformations in 
the nervous system that appear when someone is emotionally upset, and which require 
interpretation. Instruments such as the polygraph have the function of recording involuntary 
bodily reflexes through the evaluation and analysis of physiological patterns, recording 
transformations in breeding patterns, heart rate and pulse rate, blood pressure and galvanic 
reflexes, while pre-established questions are being asked. In order to record this 
physiological activity, sensors are placed to measure breeding patterns, while a galvanometer 
measures the electrodermal system, and a blood pressure cuff records blood pressure and 
cardiac activity. The polygraph examiner analyzes the ensuing charts. There are different 
ways to administer the polygraph test, which depend on the model of questions used. The 
exam is generally preceded by an interview with the purpose of obtaining the subject’s verbal 
and written consent to the test, as well as a summary of his biographical information and a 
brief health history. This initial interaction is completed with the description of the 
polygraph, made by the examiner. According to Dennis C. Mitchell, the pre-test interview has 
three objectives: to persuade the suspect that the test’s results are always true; to select the 
questions which will serve as comparison during the interrogation; and to evaluate the 
suspect’s behavior, analyzing his emotional state before the test12. After this, a simulation test 
is applied to persuade the suspect of the reliability of the instrument.  
The practice of introducing a certain mode of proof before its execution is not recent, 
and it is one of the aspects relating the polygraph with other methods used to ascertain the 
                                                           
12 Dennis C. Mitchell, “The Pre-test Interview, a Preliminary Framework,” in Handbook of Polygraph Testing, 
Murray Kleiner, ed.. London: Academic Press, 2002, p. 183-209. 
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truth. In Traité de la justice criminelle (1771), a relevant judicial French manual, Daniel 
Jousse advises interrogators to precede the question, or torture, with an exhortation made to 
the suspects about the importance of telling the truth13. The same author refers to how 
sometimes the Parlement controlled the use of torture with the retentum, an instruction 
demanding the description of the torture’s procedures to the accused, with the instruments in 
view to obtain a confession. As Lisa Silverman argues, in these cases it was required “that the 
question be ‘presented‘ rather than performed, so that the accused be prepared in every way 
for torture but that the torture not be physically performed”14. Torture would follow if the 
suspect were not persuaded by this anticipation of pain.  
There are similarities between the medieval ordeal ritual and inquisitorial torture 
procedures, since the legislation of torture follows the medieval ordeal conventional 
tradition15. In an ordeal, it was assumed that God, who had witnessed it all, would give his 
testimony on the trial, making Himself present by altering the natural elements. This was 
why, for example, someone could walk a certain distance with a hot iron in his hands and not 
get burned, or have only minor injuries16. According to Theodore Plucknett, the incorporation 
of the medieval ordeal in a set of Christian ceremonies heightened the moral efficacy of the 
                                                           
13 Daniel Jousse, Traité de la justice criminelle de France, 1771, 2 vol., Paris, accessed Feb. 2009,  
http://books.google.com/books?id=G7QWAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=daniel+jousse+traité+de+la+ju
stice&ei=vf9dS8L6I4LmzATT5YDBBQ&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false.  
14 Lisa Silverman, Tortured Subjects – Pain, Truth and the Body in Early Modern France. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001, p. 75. 
15 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, 1975, trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin 
Books, 1991.  
16 The word “ordeal” derives from the Latin term ordalium, or “judgment”. The concept was later used in the sense 
of “divine judgment” and, as Federico Patetta, in Le Ordalie: studio di storia del diritto e scienza del diritto 
comparato (1890), sustains, ordeal corresponds in medieval Latin to the following expressions: iudicium, Dei 
iudicium, paribile iudicium, probabile iudicium, purgatio, probatio, examen and examinatio. The ordeal existed 
in different cultures and civilizations, in different moments of History, and the diversity of practices is 
extraordinary. One may find descriptions of ordeals from Ancient India to Egypt, from Africa to Japan, from Tibet 
to Polynesia. In the Hammurabi code, the use of the ordeal is mentioned twice (2 and 132), and one may equally 
find examples of ordeals in the Laws of Many and the Old Testament (Num. 5: 11-31). In Europe, Robert Bartlett, 
in Trial by Fire and Water – The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (1986), divides the history of the ordeal in two 
periods: the first takes place before 800 a. C. and is characterized by the almost inexistence of documents, and the 
second one, which the author names “proto-history of the ordeal,” may be placed from 800 a. C. onward, since 
from that date on there is a profusion of judicial descriptions on the theme. Cf. Federico Patetta, Le Ordalie: 
studio di storia del diritto e scienza del diritto comparato, Fratelli Bocca, 1890, accessed Feb. 2009,  
http://www.archive.org/details/leordaliestudio00pategoog. Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water – The 
Medieval Judicial Ordeal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
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test and, eventually, its practical value as a psychological truth test17. One of the purposes of 
the ordeal ritual was, similarly, to appeal to the conscience of the guilty person, making him 
confess before the proof took place.   
Thus, both the pre-test interview, the simulation test in the polygraph, the 
presentation of torture objects before the procedures begin, and the ritual which takes place 
before the ordeal, are relevant modes of contextualization of the proof, as well as an attempt 
to liminally coerce the accused. If Hamlet’s play can be compared to a physiological exam 
with the purpose of inducing a nervous reaction in the suspect, the dumb show would equal 
the pre-test interview, in that its purpose was to prepare Claudius for what would follow, as 
well as to exacerbate his emotional response. It makes sense to think that Hamlet would want 
to evaluate Claudius’s behavior before and after the test takes place, to persuade him that he 
would find the truth, and to appeal to his conscience (which, as Claudius’s confession proves 
to the audience, Hamlet was able to do).  
Putting someone to the test seems to be an exercise requiring a rigorous set of 
procedures, as the accused must feel enormous pressure in order to confess. The threat of 
being discovered, as well as the menace of further punishment, are powerful mechanisms of 
persuasion. Such persuasive constraint must, however, be gradual, so as to give the guilty 
conscience time to feel remorse. Take, for example, Hamlet’s "I'll tent him to the quick," 
which may refer to an impatient or hot-tempered personality, that, if shown during the 
experiment, would thus reveal itself. Claudius’s reaction, leaving the room, seems to point to 
that conclusion. However, the King is not an irascible man and he never reacts when he is 
first provoked, as previous conversation with Hamlet showed. The adequate meaning of 
“quick” would be "fig. with ref. to persons, chiefly in phrases denoting acute mental pain or 
irritation, as touched, galled, stunt, etc. to the quick"18, as it does not refer to Claudius’s 
personality, but to Hamlet’s capacity to taunt him. It should be noted, as the Arden edition 
                                                           
17 Cf. Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 1929. London: Butterworth & Co., 1948.  
18 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VIII, 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961, p. 51-54. 
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explains, how tent "was an instrument for examining or cleansing a wound"19. Incidentally, 
the expression “to the quick” also names, as described by the OED: "The tender or sensitive 
flesh in any part of the body, as that under the nails or beneath callous parts, also, the tender 
part of a sore or wound"20. Today, the examination of the flesh under the nails could be read 
as an allusion to the torture of unwilling suspects, as in the nail torture method pointed 
objects are inserted under the finger, and toenails or nails may be torn off. Practices include 
placing needles under fingernails or removing nails with pincers, and these are very effective 
ways of “invisible” torture, since the nails grow again, which makes the procedure hard to 
detect (I will make an argument about “clear” torture later in the chapter). Even if this is not 
the primary meaning of the expression in Shakespeare, the careful examination of a wound is 
usually a painful activity, which is why persons respond to it. Hamlet knows, and the King’s 
confession will prove that he was correct, that the assassination left its marks on Claudius’s 
conscience and this is the wound that Hamlet hopes to look at, “to tent.” 
While the double test has the purpose of extinguishing the guilty one’s hopes of 
remaining undiscovered, it also gives him the possibility of telling the truth without 
undergoing the ordeal or torture, saving him from what could be considered unnecessary 
pain. From this perspective, the duplication of the test in Hamlet could have the function of 
helping to show Claudius’s guilt without inflicting further agony. This is not, as will be seen, 
the Prince’s purpose. The procedure has, rather, the objective of reinforcing the conviction of 
all those involved in the mode of proof in the certain outcome of the test (a particularity 
especially relevant in Hamlet’s case, as he needed to be sure that this was the correct way to 
test the Ghost’s words, as well as his stepfather’s guilt). I am not claiming that Hamlet was 
aware of the existing complexities in the modes of proof and it is very unlikely that he (or 
Shakespeare, for that matter) pondered the subtleties of judicial procedure. The examples 
given show situations ranging from the medieval ordeal (and later it will be seen how 
Shakespeare knew at least one type of ordeal), to the usual methods of torture and 
                                                           
19 Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden Shakespeare, 1990, p. 273. 
20 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. XI, 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
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interrogation (in different historical periods and contexts), which has merely the purpose of 
showing how such different methods may share assumptions which are unknown to, say, 
literary critics and the like, but common to those who find themselves in the position of 
having to put suspects to the test.  
 Words, in these modes of proof, possess a limited value, as they are considered virtual 
instruments of deceit, which the suspect can control. Claudius, a diplomat, would be 
particularly virtuous in their use, which is the reason why Hamlet seeks for an alternative 
way to discover the truth. If the suspect’s words may not be considered veracious, the 
analysis must lie in unintentional bodily reactions, seen as the body’s response to guilt. 
Another relevant particularity of these modes of proof is the idea that the person must know 
he is a suspect, so as to increase the anxiety about the test. From this perspective, when 
critics underline the importance of Hamlet’s play-within-the-play as a surprise element, they 
are erroneously considering that it would be better if the subject did not know he was being 
suspected beforehand. Even in cases such as inquisitorial torture, where the precise nature of 
the charges was obscure, a significant part of the examination relied on the fact that the 
suspect knew he was being put to the test. Such was Hamlet’s purpose, which is why W. W. 
Greg's point of view does not seem sensible:  
 
The point of the Mouse-Trap is that the sudden and unexpected shock of the disclosure shall 
cause the King to betray his guilt: if he withstands one shock he will be less, not more, likely to 
give himself away on a repetition21.  
 
 Or Dover Wilson’s: 
Had there been too much parallelism in the spoken play, or indeed any clear hint of the coming 
murder, the King would have seen the trap, and would either have prematurely taken fright or 
have had an opportunity of screwing himself up to endure the spectacle of his crime and so 
perhaps have avoided giving himself away in Hamlet's eyes. He must be lured gradually and 
unconsciously into the trap, and then caught – squealing22.  
 
 The sentences above ignore tried procedures for finding the truth, as the idea that a 
                                                           
21 W.W. Greg, “The Mouse-Trap: A Postscript,” The Modern Language Review, vol. 35, n.º 1, Jan. 1940, p. 8.   
22 Dover Wilson, Op. cit., p. 145. 
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sudden shock (as opposed to the increase of pain, or intensity during the questioning of the 
suspect) will make someone confess is counter-intuitive. On the contrary, to those testing the 
truth the repetition of the procedure is indispensable to obtain a confession (which generally 
no single shock can bring about). Dover Wilson’s idea that the King would be caught 
squealing is not sensible. As many critics argue (W. W. Lawrence among them), Claudius was 
an intelligent man, capable of deceiving an entire court, and not prone to sudden rash 
emotional reactions. A. Hart, for example, insists that Claudius did not “blench” during the 
dumb show. In his account of Claudius’s behavior during the play, the author describes the 
King as “an energetic and efficient monarch, [who] thinks quickly, acts promptly,” but also a 
“smiling villain, a seducer, poisoner, and usurper”23, a “tough guy, and nothing but 
continuous ‘third degree’ methods will break him”24. That Claudius would not easily confess 
is a very reasonable notion (this is something known to Hamlet and which could explain the 
delay of his actions, as he knows he needs to devise the perfect plan). Nevertheless, Hart fails 
to see that he is in the presence of a “third degree method” which does not involve the beating 
of the suspect, but does inflict such psychological pain that he will not be able to resist it (I 
will later claim that the pressure applied on Claudius’s mind was continuous). This signals 
indeed Shakespeare’s (call it Freudian) knowledge of the human mind. If we accept the 
theory that the dumb show follows judicial procedures where the presentation of the proof is 
fundamental, then there would be a considerable difference between the demonstration of 
the test and the test itself, as the King would know, from the beginning of the dumb show, 
that what he feared the most, i.e. public exposure and the pain of seeing the reenactment of 
the crime, would soon follow.  
 One should now return to the process in which interrogators show their suspects details 
of the crime before a real accusation. This practice has the double purpose of evaluating the 
suspects’ reactions to the idea that the precise nature of the crime was discovered and of 
building up psychological tension. Hamlet did not wish to cause a sudden shock but, as the 
                                                           
23 A. Hart, “Once More the Mouse-Trap,” The Review of English Studies, vol. 17, n.º 65, Jan. 1941, p. 16. 
24 Op. cit., p. 17.  
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title he gives his play suggests, The Mouse Trap, to lure and ensnare the King, to let him 
know that there was someone who knew what had happened and that revenge would follow. 
Accordingly, Hamlet had the intention of gradually exercising psychological pressure upon 
Claudius until the climax, in the King-player speech. As in the judicial tests described earlier, 
repetition is of the essence here. The King is an intelligent man, used to the machinations of 
the court, and it becomes clear, from the beginning of the play, that he is paying close 
attention to Hamlet. The King's conversation with Polonius before The Murder of Gonzago 
begins reveals how he was already determined to send Hamlet away to England. That 
Claudius was observing Hamlet's doings, and that he would be very much alert during the 
performance of the play, may be perceived when the King tells Polonius: "Madness in great 
ones must not unwatch'd go" (III, i, 190). Not only is Claudius recognizing Hamlet's 
astuteness, but he is also explicitly saying that he will continue to closely survey him. W. W. 
Lawrence argues that Rosencrantz and Polonius have mentioned to the King and Queen that 
it is Hamlet’s desire that they should watch a play and quotes the following verse: “And he 
beseech’d me to entreat your Majesties \ To hear and see the matter.” (III, i, 22-23). 
Lawrence is right to sustain: "Claudius would be a dreamy simpleton indeed if he did not 
realize that the facts of the murder have been discovered”25. Everything points to the fact that 
the King will be in suspense about what will be played.  
If the double test is taken to be Hamlet's original intention, then both W. W. Greg and 
Dover Wilson's analyses of the passage "Marry, this is miching malicho. It means mischief." 
(III, ii, 135) have to be reinterpreted. According to both authors, this passage is proof that the 
dumb show was an unwelcome invention by the players and it represents not Claudius’s 
crime, but "the skulking iniquity of the players, who have introduced this unauthorized and 
ridiculous dumb show, and so have almost ruined the whole plot”26. When echoing W. W. 
Greg's words about the dumb show, Dover Wilson repeats the mistake of considering that the 
plot would be ruined by what (should) be considered the technical presentation of the proof. 
                                                           
25 W. W. Lawrence, “The Play Scene in Hamlet,” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, vol. 18, n.º 1, 
Jan. 1919, p. 10. 
26 Dover Wilson, Op. cit., p. 157.  
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One only has to substitute dumb show for the introduction of the torture instruments before 
the proof takes place to understand that there is nothing ludicrous in these very effective 
psychological forms of pressure. Despite the OED, which considers that there is no other 
occurrence for the expression "miching malicho,” in Shakespeare or anywhere else, and 
assumes it to be "of uncertain form, origin and meaning"27, the Arden edition’s much fuller 
notes provide an apt justification for the use of the phrase. "Miche" is interpreted has "to 
shrink or retire from view, to lurk out of sight"28 and "malicho" probably comes from the 
Spanish “mallecho,” wrong doing. Hence, Hamlet was referring to the actions played by the 
actors (the plot itself was mischievous). Moreover, "with a play on the word means, the dumb 
show, by revealing what is to come, also 'means mischief' for the King"29. Let me suggest how 
such a view is congruent with the theory of the double test.     
One other aspect is still left to be explained: the reason why Hamlet, while devising 
the plan to catch the King, asks the players, in front of Rosencrantz, Guildenstern and 
Polonius, if the player can “study a speech of some dozen or sixteen lines, which \ I would set 
down and insert in't…?" (II, ii, 534-536). If the roles were reversed, Hamlet would surely 
suspect that the affair was dubious, consequently making the King, at the very least, as 
suspicious as he was. Has Hamlet so little consideration for his friends’ and Polonius’ 
intelligence that he assumes they will not understand the framing of a cunning plan? It is 
clear that Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern's are not the sharpest wits in Denmark, but could 
the same be said of Polonius? Even if it were so, would none of the three find the episode 
noteworthy? There is no evidence in the text pointing to the idea that any of them told 
Claudius of Hamlet's endeavors. Yet, previous episodes showed us how Rosencrantz, 
Guildenstern and Polonius sent word to the King even at moments when they hadn’t fully 
understood the intentions behind Hamlet's actions.  
If they had told Claudius about the speech, if Claudius had known not only that 
                                                           
27 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VI, 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
28 Harold Jenkins in Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden 
Shakespeare, 1990, p. 506.  
29  Op. cit., p. 506.  
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Hamlet had staged a play, but that he had also added a few lines to it, this would mean that 1) 
there was more than a double test being framed, as Hamlet was pressuring the King before 
the play had begun, 2) that his advice to the actors, generally portrayed as a meta-reflection 
about theatre, is a warning to the King and the first move in Hamlet’s strategy and 3) that the 
King would understand that the dumb show was a further warning for the speech to come.  
It is helpful to seriously consider the first possibility, given that, if Hamlet really 
wanted the King to know about the play before it had even begun, then the question of the 
double test loses its relevance, as Hamlet was not aiming to surprise the King, but to pressure 
him unremittingly (and, contrarily to what Hart claims, the idea of a “continuous third 
degree” finally makes sense).  
Regarding the second hypothesis, one could, obviously, wonder why the King didn't 
end the play before it even began, if he was aware of Hamlet's intentions. But isn’t it true that 
diplomatic cunning knows that it is better to understand what the enemy is thinking than to 
take sudden action? If Hamlet hopes to irrevocably comprehend, by means of the 
performance of The Mouse Trap, whether Claudius is guilty of murdering his father or not, 
the same may be said about the King (he had already decided to send Hamlet to England, so 
there would be no harm in waiting a little bit longer). A chess game indeed: both Claudius 
and Hamlet in a gambit for each other’s intentions, in order to be able to respond to the 
attack that they knew would soon arrive.  
W. W. Greg questions the literary quality of the speech, maintaining, as previously 
quoted, "it is mere bombast that could not possibly discompose the tenderest criminal"30. In 
fact, the King-player speech should not be compared to the literary virtuosity of the rest of 
the play. But Greg does not seem to bear in mind that literary quality is not, unlike what is 
expressed in the source of the play, Hamlet’s main concern. Notice the differences between 
what has been taken as the origin of the passage and Hamlet’s remarks.  
 
A woman that had made away her husband,  
                                                           
30 W. W. Greg, “Hamlet’s Hallucination,” p. 398. 
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And sitting to behold a tragedy  
At Linne a towne in Norffolke,  
Acted by Players travelling that way,  
Wherein a woman that had murtherd hers  
Was ever haunted with her husbands ghost:  
The passion written by a feeling pen,  
And acted by a good Tragedian,  
She was so mooved with the sight thereof,  
As she cryed out, the Play was made by her,  
And openly confesst her husbands murder31.  
 
 Hum – I have heard  
That guilty creatures sitting at a play  
Have, by the very cunning of the scene,  
Been struck so to the soul that presently  
They have proclaim’d their malefactions. (...)  
 I'll have these players  
Play something like the murder of my father    
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 584-591) 
 
The first quotation belongs to the source, a play called A Warning for Faire Woman, 
which, as Bullough states, had been represented by Shakespeare’s company and published in 
1599, where examples of “murders strangely revealed”32 are discussed. In this case, as in 
Claudius’s, both the guilty woman and the woman in the play have murdered their husbands 
(even if the eventual similarities between their crimes are not described). The woman’s 
confession is a result of the value of the play being represented, the feeling with which it had 
been written and the excellence of the performer. Therefore, the source passage underlines in 
more than one way the quality of the representation.  
This does not happen in Hamlet's lines. In the soliloquy (second quotation) there is 
no reference to the merit of the players (Hamlet's advice to the actors is, as seen, a warning to 
Claudius and not a show of lack of faith in the first player), to the quality of the text or to the 
overall performance. In fact, Hamlet only mentions “the cunning of the scene”. The Arden 
edition asserts that "cunning" is here being used in the sense of "art," which would be 
consistent with the meaning of the source of the passage33. However, neither Hamlet’s 
soliloquy nor his remarks to Horatio seem to warrant this. Much on the contrary, it seems 
                                                           
31 Geoffrey Bullough, ed., Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, vol. VII, 1973. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 181.  
32 Op. cit., p. 38.  
33 Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden Shakespeare, 1990, p. 272. 
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that its sole “artistic” advantage is its similarity with his father’s murder. Here’s Hamlet to 
Horatio, and Hamlet’s own, further elaboration thereof:   
 
There is a play tonight before the King:  
One scene of it comes near the circumstance  
Which I have told thee of my father's death. 
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 75-77)  
 
 What would he do  
Had he the motive and the cue for passion  
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears,  
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech,  
Make mad the guilty and appal the free,  
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed  
The very faculties of eyes and ears.  
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 554-560)  
 
The first quotation is also characterized by the absence of references to the quality of 
the play, as Hamlet’s advice to Horatio underlines his main concern: the similarity with the 
plot. In the second quotation, "cue," "the concluding word or words of a speech in a play, 
serving as a signal or direction to another actor to enter or begin his speech"34, leads to the 
reaction of the other player as Hamlet ponders what would the first player do if he had 
Hamlet's motive, if he were Hamlet. The player's skill, his horrid speech, would allow him to 
"make mad the guilty" and "confound the ignorant" (II, ii, 558), meaning that those who 
know nothing about the crime are not able to make sense from the action on stage. The 
"horrid speech" would, certainly, be an artful one, but the difference between the subtlety of 
this reference and the way the source so often underlines the excellence of the performance 
should be noticed. Notwithstanding, this notion may not be solved without considering 
Dover Wilson's keen analysis of Hamlet's piece of advice to the main actor.  
 
Speak the speech, I pray you, as I pronounced it to 
you, trippingly on the tongue; but if you mouth it as 
many of your players do, I had as lief the town-crier  
spoke my lines. Nor do not saw the air too much with 
your hand, thus, but use all gently; for in the very  
torrent, tempest, and, as I may say, whirlwind of  
                                                           
34 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VI, 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
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your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance  
that may give it smoothness, O, it offends me  
to the soul to hear a robustious periwig-pated fellow  
tear a passion to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears  
of the groundlings, who for the most part are capable  
of nothing but inexplicable dumb-shows and noise.  
(Hamlet, III, ii, 1-12)  
 
 According to Dover Wilson, the first passage shows the actors that Hamlet was not 
thinking about Claudius, he was concerned with the lines he had given to the player and with 
the actor's ability to perform them adequately35. The lines deal mainly, as Wilson contends, 
with the speech Hamlet directed to the players. But is Hamlet underlining the need for “a 
passion”? Or are Hamlet’s teachings on how to act properly mainly about the concern for 
restraint? “Passion” is mentioned as a characteristic in the art of representation (one which 
the actors cannot do without), and it is related with the already quoted “the cue for passion,” 
i.e., with the reasons that lead us to action. Nonetheless, what is being highlighted here is the 
necessity to suppress excessive emotional gestures (which ought to be countered, using the 
hand gently, for instance), affected modes of speech, and, most of all, endow every speech 
instead with “a temperance that may give it smoothness”. More importantly, what Dover 
Wilson considers to be Hamlet’s contempt for dumb shows is only disdain for those deemed 
“inexplicable”. And, if anything, there could be no doubt that this dumb show is far from 
leaving anything untold. That Hamlet even mentions dumb-shows should be proof both of 
his knowledge of their existence in general and of his use of the pantomime in this play in 
particular, as well as representative of his warning to Claudius.    
Hamlet would, then, be using “cunning” in the sense of skill or, as the Oxford 
Shakespeare edition sustains, to the “skillful realism of the performance”36. Additionally, it 
would equally make sense for Hamlet to use “cunning” in its earlier sense of “knowing”37. 
                                                           
35 Hamlet's words show that his inserted speech, which is of course now written, is to be one of “passion”, and 
“that the passion referred to is not love but anger or crime – the passion of the torrential, tempestuous, whirlwind 
species, which the Herods and the Termagants of the old plays had so grossly exaggerated”. Cf. Dover Wilson, Op. 
cit., p. 154.  
36 Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. G. R. Hibbard, Oxford Shakespeare Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 235. 
37 The Oxford English Dictionary, 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
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This would mean “That guilty creatures sitting at a play \ Have, by the very” knowledge “of 
the scene, \ Been struck so to the soul that presently \ They have proclaim’d their 
malefactions.” (II, ii, 585-588). The comprehension of the performance could then be both 
applied to the act of watching the episode and learning its content, but also to the 
understanding that it duplicates the action of the murder. The “knowledge of the scene” could 
then indicate not only the player-speech, but also the dumb show. The main purpose of the 
play-within-the-play is to build a mousetrap, not to create a work of art.  
 Previous pages described procedures for discovering proof about a suspect’s culpability. 
It was seen how, in order to produce evidence, a group of thorough techniques with the 
purpose of pressuring the subject must be performed. Although the precise nature of the 
accusation may take time to be revealed, it was seen how it is required for the suspect to 
know he is being accused. It was equally exposed how to prepare the suspect for the 
evaluation which follows is more effective than conducting a double test, and contended that 
Hamlet’s main purpose was not to surprise Claudius, but to make the King realize he knew 
the truth about the assassination. It should not be forgotten that the test has also the purpose 
of trying the Ghost’s words and that, although Hamlet has great expectations regarding the 
outcome of the examination, he also needs to discover the truth. It is now necessary to 
understand the nature of the proof originated by the test, as well as to comprehend its mode 
of assessment. 
2. Evaluating the results  
The inquiry about the supposedly public or private nature of the test must be 
described. In the modes of proof I have surveyed, experts analyze the test’s results, so it is 
necessary to inquire whether Hamlet wished to expose publicly the outcome of the test or, on 
the contrary, if he only wanted to evaluate the King’s guilt for himself. It should be 
considered that the results from this type of procedure are deemed to be clear and 
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unequivocal to the experts judging it (even if those observing the procedure, but without the 
necessary talent, are unable to comprehend what they are seeing). Horatio and Hamlet 
would, then, be skilled judges, whose virtues of character complement each other so as to 
produce a balanced and truthful verdict. In the already quoted source passage from Bullough, 
not only there was no one looking for the woman’s reactions, but she also plainly confesses 
her crime (one may only guess that she does it during the climax of the play). The use of 
“presently” could indicate that Hamlet was equally intending for Claudius to publicly confess. 
Nevertheless, Hamlet does not seem to contemplate the possibility that that would happen to 
Claudius, and he prepares everything so that if a confession is visible in the King’s facial 
expressions, he may be able to see it. Contrary to what has been argued, Hamlet does not 
seem to anticipate, or want, an outcome for all to see. His is not a public denunciation, but a 
private one, only to be detected by those closely observing Claudius (the skills of talented 
interpreters will be later discussed). Once more, Hamlet’s conversation with Horatio gives us 
an explanation about his intentions:  
  
I prithee, when thou seest that act afoot,  
Even with the very comment of thy soul 
Observe my uncle. If his occulted guilt  
Do not itself unkennel in one speech,  
It is a damned ghost that we have seen,  
And my imaginations are as foul  
As Vulcan’s stithy. Give him heedful note;  
For I mine eyes will rivet to his face,  
And after we will both our judgments join  
In censure of his seeming.  
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 78-84) 
 
Hamlet is here asking Horatio to let his soul (where passions and reasoning work in 
unison) observe his uncle. In this passage, he makes clear that he is not expecting everyone 
will see the reaction. On the contrary, knowing how careful Claudius is, Hamlet is rather 
looking for an almost unnoticeable small expression in the King’s face. At the same time, 
conclusions to be taken from the experience will be the product of a comparison of 
judgments, and not the interpretation of a single observer.  
As was seen, Hamlet and Horatio presume that a transformation took place in the 
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King’s face, and it is now necessary to describe the nature of the emotions revealed. W. W. 
Lawrence criticizes the idea that the King endures the play without flinching and argues that 
Hamlet’s remarks to Horatio, and the latter’s replies, show that they observed something in 
the King’s features: “I maintain that there is no valid evidence that Claudius is not affected, 
and deeply so. His motion, if he reveals it, is perceived only by Hamlet and Horatio, who are 
watching him, and not by the courtiers, who are intent on the stage”38. Hamlet and Horatio 
do seem to compare judgments at the end of the play, both concluding that there was a 
transformation in the King’s facial features. Although Lawrence’s viewpoint is accurate, he 
fails to account for the nature of Claudius’s emotion. Hamlet is determined to catch a subtle 
physiological reaction. In fact, the observation of the face requires experience and 
concentration and although Hamlet is well trained in the evaluation of others, not all are, 
however, equally skilled at discovering and concealing their natures.  
The description of Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern’s inadequate attempts to discover 
Hamlet’s intentions illustrates this point, as his conversation with his friends, in the third act 
of the play, shows his dislike of those attempting to sound him.  
 
Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you 
make of me. You would play upon me, you would  
seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the  
heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my  
lowest note to the top of my compass; and there is  
much music, excellent voice, in this little organ, yet  
cannot you make it speak. ‘Sblood, do you think I  
am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call me what  
instrument you will, though you fret me, you cannot  
play upon me.  
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 354-363) 
 
Hamlet sees his friends were brought by the King and Queen to find out what is the 
matter with him and resents the idea that they are putting their friendship to the King’s 
disposition in order to determine the causes of his instability. To use Hamlet makes him 
“unworthy,” not only because it means he is allowing others to take advantage of him, but 
also because Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are doing it with lack of skill. They are assuming 
                                                           
38 W. W. Lawrence, “Hamlet and the Mouse-Trap,” p. 720. 
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their friendship will naturally make him speak, which, as Hamlet points out, is an inefficient 
way of manipulating him. In fact, Hamlet is teaching a lesson to his friends (one they will 
unfortunately be unable to understand). When he asks Guildenstern to play the pipe, his 
friend replies: “But these cannot I command to any utterance of \ harmony. I have not the 
skill.” (III, ii, 352-353). Guildenstern comprehends that talent is necessary for an instrument 
to be played, but fails to see that a similar degree of expertise is required when we try to 
understand other persons’ thoughts or intentions. Hamlet’s lesson should have been clearer, 
stating not only the need for a specific skill, but describing the particular talents such 
technique would require. Thus, although both friends are able to make Hamlet speak, they 
cannot entirely comprehend him, as his words deliberately evade interpretation. Although 
they understand the type of skill required for one to play the pipe, they are unable to perceive 
the type of qualities which would make a good interpreter.  
This discussion echoes Hamlet’s first encounter with his friends in the second act of 
Shakespeare’s play. However, earlier on Rosencrantz and Guildenstern had found a polite 
Hamlet, both willing to exchange amiable words with them and to ask them frankly what 
their reason was for coming to Denmark. To this, after some pressure from Hamlet, 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern reply honestly, confirming the King had sent them. Hamlet 
acknowledges their sincerity and in the end of the conversation gives them a hint about what 
is happening with him:  
   
 You are welcome.  
But my uncle-father and my aunt-mother are deceived. (…) 
I am but mad north-north-west. When the wind is  
southerly, I know a hawk from a handsaw. 
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 371-375) 
 
Thus, he tells them his was a conscious lunacy. Hamlet is only mad when the wind is 
not favorable to his predisposition (and one may assume this north-north-west wind is the 
one blowing in Claudius’s presence39). On the contrary, when the wind is southerly, Hamlet 
                                                           
39 In Bleak House, Dickens echoes this passage in his description of one of the novel’s main characters, John 
Jarndyce, an amiable man, prone to melancholia when the wind does not appear favorable, i.e. when people do 
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knows how to distinguish different entities, such as the hawk from the handsaw. At the same 
time, both the hawk and the handsaw have violent connotations, the hawk being a predatory 
bird and the handsaw a cutting tool. The Arden editors pointed out that handsaw could be a 
misprint or even a corruption of a traditional proverb, the original word being hernshew, a 
young heron, which would mean that although Hamlet seemed lunatic, he was still able to 
distinguish both birds. Yet, the sentence’s meaning does not depend on the characteristics of 
the chosen kinds. At this point, Hamlet seemed willing to confide, even if ambiguously, that 
he is not crazy, but none of his friends understood him.  
As a consequence, when the King and Queen ask Rosencrantz and Guildenstern what 
is the reason for Hamlet’s doings, they confess they do not know the causes of his distraction. 
More importantly, Guildenstern explains: “Nor do we find him forward to be sounded, \ But 
with a crafty madness keeps aloof \When we would bring him on to some confession \ Of his 
true state.” (III, I, 7-10). He understands Hamlet’s madness is crafty and useful to keep them 
away, but he does not describe its craftiness as being intentional, nor fathoms its causes. 
Guildenstern only acknowledges Hamlet’s lack of interest in confessing himself to them. It is 
meaningful that Guildenstern uses the word “sounded,” which will be later employed by 
Hamlet to accuse them of trying to play him. Hamlet’s later resentment towards his friends 
might be better understood if we consider how, upon their arrival, he had asked them to be 
plain with him, without deceiving the King. Hamlet’s request underlined the importance of 
friendship:  
 
 But let me conjure you,  
by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of  
our youth, by the obligation of our ever-preserved  
love, and by what more dear a better proposer  
can charge you withal, be even and direct with me  
whether you were sent for or no. 
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 283-288)  
 
Hamlet is depicting what they have in common, such as youth and a past, but he is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not react decently. In Jarndyce’s case, other persons’ follies make his mood swing, but as he does not like to 
acknowledge others’ misdeeds, he just describes a change in the wind. Cf. Charles Dickens, Bleak House, 1853, 
introd. Doreen Roberts. London: Wordsworth Classics, 2001, p. 655.  
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also describing their rights and obligations, as if, at this point, he still hopes they will rise to 
the occasion. Even if Rosencrantz and Guildenstern comply this time, they fail to do so 
afterwards, and, in the fourth act, Hamlet’s animosity towards both his friends has grown. He 
now accuses them plainly of not keeping others’ secrets, as well as of being only officers (i.e., 
pawns) at the King’s command. As Hamlet contends: “Do not believe it. \ (…) That I can keep 
your counsel and not mine own. \ Besides, to be demanded of a sponge – \ what replication 
should be made by the son of a king?” (IV, ii, 8-12). Those who can keep secrets are 
distinguished from those who are nothing but a sponge “that soaks up the King’s 
countenance” (IV, ii, 14). It should be noted that the main function of a sponge is to rub dirty 
surfaces, or remove marks, which would here imply that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are 
taking off a stain, i.e. Hamlet, who is bothering the King. However, to be a sponge could also 
mean that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern absorb other persons’ points of view, lacking ideas 
of their own. In reality, when someone holds and squeezes the sponge all that it had absorbed 
vanishes, leaving only a void structure. The best characterization of both friends appears 
during Hamlet’s play, in the Player-King’s lines:  
 
And hitherto doth love on fortune tend:  
For who not needs shall never lack a friend,  
And who in want a hollow friend doth try   
Directly seasons him his enemy. 
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 201-204) 
 
Those who are not in need have plenty of friends, unlike those whose fortune failed 
and are only left with enemies (such as Hamlet). If those in distress call for the help of a 
hollow friend an enemy will stand before them, thus failing the test of friendship. The hollow 
friend, the sponge, would then be, unlike Horatio, the one oozing others’ intentions, the one 
without a mind of his own.  
This topic, as well as both friends’ void personality, was delineated when they met 
Hamlet for the first time in the play. After being asked how they were, Rosencrantz replied 
“As the indifferent children of the earth” (II, ii, 227), while Guildenstern observed “Happy in 
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that we are not over-happy: on \ Fortune’s cap we are not the very button” (II, ii, 228-229). 
In the first remark the adjective “indifferent” points to a regular life without too many 
aspirations, wishes or desires, whereas Guildenstern’s comment describes Fortune’s button, 
which, as the Arden edition contends, is at the top of the cap, its highest point. Yet, button 
may sound like bottom, which would underline the idea that they are neither on the top, nor 
at the bottom (they are common men). This double meaning of button would be supported by 
Hamlet’s reply, “Nor the soles of her shoe” (II, ii, 230) which would mean, as was said, that 
they were not also at Fortune’s feet. Moreover, Hamlet, well acquainted with them, asks: “Let 
me question more in particular. What have you, \ my good friends, deserved at the hands of 
Fortune \ that she sends you to prison hither?” (II, ii, 239-241). “Fortune” stands for 
Claudius, as he is the one who asks Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to inquire about Hamlet 
and is ultimately responsible for their change of behavior towards him. It should be noted, 
however, that Hamlet knows them well, which means that his anger both acknowledges and 
ignores the fact that if they are both hollow their character will reverberate eventually, even 
without the King’s demands. 
In fact, Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern’s friendship finds its opposite in the feeling 
that unites Hamlet to Horatio, as the metaphor of the pipe is equally applied to Horatio, but 
to prove how worthy he is of Hamlet, in a disavowal of the metaphor’s tenor:  
 
Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice,   
And could of men distinguish her election,  
Sh’ath seal’d thee for herself; for thou hast been  
As one, in suff’ring all, that suffers nothing,  
A man that Fortune’s buffets and rewards  
Hast ta’en with equal thanks; and blest are those  
Whose blood and judgment so well commeddled 
That they are not a pipe for Fortune’s finger  
To sound what stop she please.  
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 63-71)  
 
In Dover Wilson’s What Happens in Hamlet, this passage is analyzed. The author 
supposes that Hamlet is here admitting (pathetically, is the adjective used) “that he is himself 
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‘passion’s slave’, and ‘a pipe for Fortune’s finger’”40. Yet, this view ignores the fact that 
Hamlet is establishing a comparison between Horatio and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, a 
perspective underlined by the fact that he applies the same metaphor to both types of friends. 
The passage aims at portraying Horatio and the way his blood and judgment (his passions 
and his reasoning) are so well balanced that he is not subdued by Fortune’s wishes, which 
indicates Horatio is not an instrument to be played by others. Hamlet’s words hold two 
important perspectives: firstly, that he is a good evaluator of character and therefore knows 
how to distinguish those permeable to let themselves be transformed by worldly events (this 
is the faculty that leads Hamlet to identify Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern’s motives) and 
secondly that a harmonious character will not be played by Fortune’s demands (Horatio 
being even steadier than Hamlet, who is, as himself claims and Dover Wilson notices, prone 
to melancholy).  
It could be argued that Horatio, who is here being described as a virtuous character, 
also has something to conceal. Although he knows that the Ghost appeared, he did not say 
anything about it to the King, to whom he should now own his loyalty. He is also acquainted 
with Hamlet’s plan and, again, fails to report it to the King or to the Queen. This could point 
to an ambiguity in Horatio’s character or, at least, to the fact that, just like Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, he, too, is disguising something. Yet, the play distinguishes Horatio and the 
other characters, as his dedication is unequivocally to Hamlet. For instance, when Hamlet 
tells Horatio about his plan, he replies: “If a steal aught the whilst this play is playing \ And 
scape detecting, I will pay the theft” (III, ii, 88-89). Even if Horatio is committing treason to 
the King while helping Hamlet, he describes his allegiance as belonging to Hamlet: if 
anything escapes recognition he will pay treason to Hamlet and not the other way round. 
Moreover, Horatio’s deception is found to be just and virtuous once the authenticity of the 
Ghost is proved and his words reveal the truth. Finally, no one ever questions Horatio about 
such matters, which suggests that he is never duplicitous, unlike Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern.  
                                                           
40 Dover Wilson, Op. cit, p. 215. 
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The comparison between the body and a flute, or a pipe, is important: the body is 
described as a hollow instrument with an exterior which, in Hamlet’s case, protects his 
secrets from being revealed, as Hamlet is too wise to let others understand the complexities 
of his character. Each body contains a soul (responsible for Hamlet’s feelings, his intelligence 
and for his unwillingness to be played by others). But when the body\instrument is described 
as shallow, there is the danger that it may be filled with someone else’s intentions (this is 
what happens with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern). But even though Hamlet’s friends are 
trying to discover his plan, roles will be reversed and it is Hamlet who will probe them. 
Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern’s purposes are easily revealed, and one could perhaps argue 
that shallow instruments, permeable to others’ ideas and suggestions, lack the strong exterior 
which would protect them from untimely disclosure. The play seems to establish a difference 
between difficult subjects to sound (such as Claudius and Hamlet, who have to conceal things 
and try harder to veil their interior); those who have nothing to hide, such as Horatio; and 
sponges, which absorb everything and cannot help spilling their true nature. 
Hamlet is, therefore, a good observer of physical features, and his evaluation of 
character through his expressions is not limited to Claudius. This is made clear when he 
discovers Guildenstern’s and Rosencrantz’s motives for coming to Denmark through an 
analysis of their looks: “You were sent for, and \ there is a kind of confession in your looks, 
which your \ modesties have not craft enough to colour.” (II, ii, 278-280). Hamlet knows how 
intentions may be made public in the face, and the difference between his friends and 
Claudius is that they are not good at hiding them. Claudius is, however, a different matter, as 
the King is used to exercise concealment, as to the manner born.  
 An important requisite for a truth test to be performed is the existence of those able to 
assess the procedures. It was seen how Hamlet considered Horatio a good judge, due to the 
fact that he proved to be reliable and constant. It may now be understood how Hamlet, even 
if lacking Horatio’s equanimity, may be deemed an adequate judge. Not only has he 
privileged access to information (he heard the testimony of a valuable witness), he is also a 
good observer of other’s features, which makes him a good interpreter.  
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 Recent analyses, such as Paul Ekman’s, seek to develop the study, initiated, among 
others, by the criminologist Cesare Lombroso, in L’Uomo Delinquente (1876), about how the 
suspect’s features provide evidence about his culpability. In books such as Telling Lies41  and 
Unmasking the Face Ekman upholds the idea that one may be able to learn to detect the 
truth in the face and distinguish seven types of emotions with proper training (according to 
his website, the basics may be learned in an hour by a keen observer42). According to the 
author, emotions are universal and when someone is trying to conceal or to repress them, a 
micro facial expression unconsciously appears. The transformation in the face is temporary 
and the observer has to rely in “rapid facial signals”. Although it lasts only for 1/15 to 1/25 of 
a second, it may nevertheless be perceived. Ekman claims that:  
  
Even the more usual macro-expressions frequently last only a few seconds. It is rare for a 
facial expression of emotion to last as long as ten or five seconds. If it does the feeling must be 
intense, so intense that the feeling is likely to be simultaneously shown in the voice through a 
cry, laugh, roar, or in words. Even if you are not looking at a person’s face, you would be likely 
not to miss these intense emotions, because you would hear them43.  
 
Wouldn’t Hamlet prefer to trigger an intense feeling as opposed to a macro 
expression that would only last for some seconds? To induce a strong emotion, one the King 
would be unable to restrain, it was necessary for Hamlet to generate a feeling visible both to 
him and to Horatio (there is, as told, no indication in the play suggesting that Horatio was as 
good an observer as Hamlet). The fact that a strong emotion seemed to emerge, and that the 
King was unable to suppress it, is clear not only by the fact that he gets up from his seat, but 
also from his confession afterwards.  
I would argue, in favor of the second tooth theory, that Claudius could not have been 
                                                           
41 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage, 1985. London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2001. Paul Ekman avowedly draws on Darwin’s idea that facial expressions are universal, but 
attempts to understand better the nature of deception in emotional expressions (a subject Darwin did not 
discussed at length in his classical book on the subject). See: Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotions in Man 
and Animals, 1890, ed. Francis Darwin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
42 Paul Ekman, ”Interactive Training by Dr. Paul Ekman”, F.A.C.E. training, accessed 11 September 2010, 
http://face.paulekman.com/default.aspx. 
43 Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, Unmasking the Face – A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial 
Expressions. Malor Books, 2003, [kindle edition], loc. 291.  
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surprised at The Mouse Trap. Before I proceed, let me delineate what Claudius’s face would 
look like if he were surprised. According to Ekman, when surprised, especially if the person 
startles, one’s eyebrows are lifted (they appear curved and high), the eyes are opened wide 
and the jaw drops. The (other) problem with those who reject the second tooth theory is the 
fact that they ignore that surprise is “the briefest emotion” and that it never remains in the 
face for long. Dover Wilson (after reading Ekman) might well argue that the emotion would 
be brief, but that it could be perceived by someone intently observing Claudius’s face, or even 
that, although surprise shows but for a brief moment, it is often followed by another emotion, 
which stays in the face for a longer period of time (in which case the face would show a fading 
of surprise into the subsequent emotion). But would someone, like Horatio, who does not 
make a living out of facial analyses, or who is not intuitive like Hamlet, be able to see such a 
quick transformation (an expression which would last, as was mentioned, for 1/15 to 1/25 of a 
second)? Probably not. More importantly, is there any indication in the text about what 
Claudius was feeling? Guildenstern’s comments after the play point us the right direction:  
 
Guildenstern: The King, sir (…) \ Is in his retirement marvelous distempered.  
Hamlet: With drink sir? 
Guildenstern: No, my lord, with choler.   
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 291-295)   
  
So, Claudius was choleric and both Hamlet and Horatio’s comments after the play 
and Guildenstern’s declarations seem to prove that he was not disguising it. What does this 
mean in terms of physiological expressions? According to Ekman: “Blood pressure increases, 
the face may redden, the veins on the forehead and neck may become more apparent. 
Breathing changes, the body may become more erect, the muscles tense, and there might be a 
movement forward toward the offensor”44. These reactions would be unintentional and they 
would probably not be perceived even by Claudius himself, whose main concern would be the 
play’s untimely disclosure. Apart from changes in bodily behavior, transformations must 
occur in three distinct facial areas during anger. If not, the feeling becomes unclear and open 
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to interpretation (this is not the case with Claudius, as Guildenstern remarks make clear). 
Anger is unambiguous when one displays the following signs:   
 
 
The brows are lowered and drawn together: vertical lines appear between the brows: the lower 
lid is tense and may or may not be raised; the upper lid is tensed and may or may not be 
lowered by the action of the brow; the eyes have a hard stare and may have a bulging 
appearance; the lips are in either of two basic positions: pressed firmly together, with the 
corners straight or down, or open, tensed in a squarish shape as if shouting; the nostrils may 
be dilated45.  
 
Hamlet and Horatio could easily perceive all of these expressions. It is also known 
that extreme anger (choler) intensifies these facial expressions. Furthermore: “in intense 
anger or rage, it may be impossible to stand still, the impulse to strike may be so very 
great”46. This is the keystone for the interpretation of the episode. The King was not, as Greg 
and Wilson sustain, waiting for the adequate moment to rise, and he did not, as Greg claims, 
endure the poisoner’s scene. 
Let me sum up the episode: Lucianus enters, Hamlet explains he is the King’s nephew 
and Ophelia notices that Hamlet knows the play so well he is “as good as chorus” (III, ii, 
240). Hamlet’s remarks during the play have the practical theatrical purposes of intensifying 
the dramatic action and of building suspense. It is not only important for the King to 
understand what is taking place, but also to fear he will be discovered before everyone. This is 
the fear that will make him act. The King, of course, who at this point already suspects of 
what is to come, understands the comments as menaces, designed to make him lose his 
temper. In fact, a little bit earlier, the King asked “Have you heard the argument? Is there no 
offence \ in’t?” (III, ii, 227-228), which could have two interpretations. Either it shows 
concern on the part of the King, as he was already affected by Hamlet’s test, or it would 
represent an attempt made by the King to maintain his poker face, to disguise his emotions 
and to show Hamlet that he was unshaken by the play. From this perspective, even if Hamlet 
was not defrauded, Claudius was able to mislead later critics.  
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Continuing with the episode’s description, before Lucianus gives his lines, Hamlet’s 
main, if oblique, menace to the King is proclaimed: “Begin, murderer. \ Leave thy damnable 
faces and begin” (III, ii, 246-247). An assassin possesses several faces (the line is a prelude to 
the analysis, which will follow, of Macbeth), but while murder is committed the masks fall 
and his true self is revealed. Lucianus finally says the first lines, “Thoughts black, hands apt, 
drugs fit, and time agreeing” (…) “Pours the poison in the sleeper’s ears” (III, ii, 249-254). 
Hamlet acts as chorus to the action, explaining how the King was poisoned in the “garden for 
his estate,” naming Gonzago (which confirms the theory that only the King was supposed to 
understand that the plot was for him to hear), and claiming that the murderer will now get 
the love of Gonzago’s wife. At this point, Ophelia notices the King rising. Observe how, if 
Hamlet’s intention is that of frightening the King, and if the play is to be heard, i.e. 
understood, by Claudius alone, it then seems that Hamlet is attacking his uncle in a similar, if 
figural, manner to that of his father’s murder: poisoning Claudius’s ears with the fear of what 
is to come.  
 What could be more contrary to the theory that Claudius is unaffected by the scene of 
the poisoner, if the King rises immediately after it takes place, unable to control himself, in 
intense rage? This is in complete agreement with the notion that, unlike what so many wish 
us to believe, Hamlet did not intend to surprise Claudius. On the contrary, Hamlet aimed to 
provoke a lasting emotion, ending with an explosion that would not briefly fade, as surprise 
would. The double test is used as a warning, as a way to build tension so that, when the King 
is unmasked, the transformation in his features is flagrant and impossible to control. His 
guilty conscience, as the confession proves, is unable to withstand the onslaught. Hamlet’s 
test succeeds in producing a reaction in the King and for Hamlet and Horatio the meaning of 
the alteration in unequivocal. The reason why others are unable to make sense of Claudius’s 
transformation and consider that he was offended by Hamlet’s behavior is due to two factors: 
they don’t know that King Hamlet was murdered; and the Prince did not want the result of 
his test to be public.  
Ekman’s perspective is helpful when one wants to accurately read the play, but it 
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should be mentioned that the play’s criticism also helps to discuss this author’s viewpoint. 
There is no doubt in Hamlet concerning Claudius’s anger, given that the nature of his 
emotion was properly identified by more than one character in the play. Generations of 
critics have, however, disagreed about the motives for the King’s wrath. In fact, dissent on the 
reasons for a certain emotion is common and represents a concern for the lie catcher, as 
portrayed in Ekman’s chapter on dangers and precautions. In Telling Lies, the author 
portrays two types of common mistakes when one is attempting to catch a liar. The first is 
“disbelieving-the-truth,” as Ekman calls it, which consists in interpreting the bodily and 
facial reactions of an innocent person and assuming they are signs of deceit instead of, for 
instance, indications of fear of wrongful punishment. The second is “believing-a-lie,” which 
may happen with natural liars, psychopaths, or with those who believe their own lies, as in 
these cases modifications in bodily behavior may not appear. Ekman’s research allows us to 
comprehend and to systematize types of emotions, to distinguish visible sentiments from 
those someone is trying to conceal, but the reasons for veiling the face are harder to explain. 
At the same time, preconceptions about someone, a certain context, absence of signs of deceit 
in persons who do not leak, or signs of emotion in anxious, but innocent, individuals are just 
some of the problems which may appear in this type of analysis.  
How, then, may we be sure that Hamlet’s test really did work and that its outcome 
was unequivocal? Unlike Hamlet’s assumption, his mode of proof is subject to interpretation. 
He knew Claudius well, so he was able to observe transformations in his pitch of the voice, 
bodily behavior, “manipulators” (the way someone unconsciously twists the ring on his or her 
hand, or plays with the hair), or “illustrators” (such as gestures used during speech). These 
are characteristics that may only be accurately explained when one knows the person and is 
acquainted with their usual public behavior. At the same time, the information the Ghost had 
given was correct (it will later be seen that this is not always the case), which means that 
Hamlet had a valuable witness. Also, Claudius’s confession paraded his guilt. This means that 
Hamlet conducted more than one test and that he had at his disposal more than a single clue, 
as well as Horatio as co-juror.  
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It is now possible to consider that the test has given Hamlet, as well as readers of the 
play, the possibility to know Claudius. Could we say the same about Hamlet? When the 
Prince gives the King the title of the play-within the play, he says the following: “’Tis a 
knavish piece of work, but what o’ that? \ Your Majesty and we that have free souls, it touches 
\ us not.” (III, ii, 235-237). The ironic remark, another gambit in this game of chess, implies 
that the play only touches those with a sinful soul, and that Hamlet considers Claudius 
sufficiently honest not to be troubled by it. In this unusual praise, his stepfather would find 
more reasons to be suspicious. Still, the observation points to a similarity between Hamlet 
and Claudius that was mentioned before: their souls are equal, not because they are free, but 
for the opposite reason. Both of them have souls possessing ulterior motives, and both are 
moved by the play, even if for different reasons. Hamlet, because he was finally able to prove 
to himself the Ghost’s words are true, and Claudius because he now knows he was 
discovered.  
 3. Difficult subjects to sound 
 Claudius has been portrayed as a secretive character, but what to say of Hamlet? In his 
case, such claim might seem counter-intuitive, as the Prince speaks incessantly during the 
play. Yet, language is for Hamlet a way to conceal intentions. His puns and riddles, his 
constant mocking, are a way to provoke others, to make them think about his hidden agenda, 
to make them doubt his sanity. Hamlet never stops talking and yet is a taciturn, secretive 
creature, whose true state of mind is not even known through his soliloquies, as so many 
contradictory critical perspectives have shown.  
 Hamlet’s inaccessibility to all, be they characters in the play, the audience in the theatre 
or literary critics, has to do with this queer impossibility of getting to know him. Even if the 
excess of language could sometimes make us think otherwise. I will describe the way other 
characters try to comprehend Hamlet, which is why an analysis of the soliloquies will not 
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take place, but Harold Bloom’s perspective on the subject will be briefly portrayed, as it helps 
to establish a difference between what was considered to be Rosencrantz’s and Guildenstern’s 
lack of mind, and what Bloom describes as Hamlet’s excess of consciousness.  
 It seems that, without portraying Hamlet’s play-within-the-play in detail, Bloom 
reproduces both Claudius’s and Hamlet’s experiments to enter each other’s minds through 
the attempt to externalize what is supposedly hidden in the recesses of the brain. For Bloom, 
“the play is Shakespeare’s longest because Hamlet speaks so much of it”47, which is accurate. 
Bloom advocates that the monologues are a window into Hamlet’s mind, contending that, in 
them, Shakespeare invented the human through the description of the internalization of the 
self (the monologues exteriorize what was previously hidden, unsaid, uncharacterized). In his 
essay, Bloom is depicting Hamlet’s inner conscience, relating it to the growth of a (now) 
global self-awareness and claiming “that Hamlet is Shakespeare’s own consciousness”48. 
Bloom seems to be replicating Hamlet’s test to Claudius, with the difference that instead of 
describing physical expressions, he is portraying the monologues as an expression of the 
mind. Hamlet’s analysis of facial expressions finds, therefore, its correlative in Bloom’s thesis 
about inferential reasoning. Consider the following quotation:  
 
Hamlet’s freedom can be defined as the freedom to infer, and we learn this intellectual liberty by 
attending to Hamlet. Inference in Hamlet’s praxis is a sublime mode of surmise, metaphoric 
because it leaps ahead with every change and circumstance, and inference becomes the 
audience’s way into Hamlet’s consciousness49.  
 
 Hamlet’s capacity to reason, to ponder contradictory arguments and discuss them with 
other characters and with himself, to continually change perspective, to resume a previous 
conjecture, is, as Bloom makes clear, probably his most relevant characteristic. But does it 
lead to knowledge? Does it allow us access into Hamlet’s mind? It probably does, but in the 
same way that Hamlet is able to describe Claudius’s mental space: through the observation of 
his features. In Hamlet, a keen interpreter may always externalize hidden thoughts and, 
                                                           
47 Harold Bloom, Shakespeare – The Invention of the Human. London: Fourth Estate, 1999, p. 423.  
48 Op. cit., p. 407. 
49 Op. cit., p. 419.  
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ultimately, interpretation derives from the analysis of public contents, whether they are facial 
expressions or modes of thought. However, Bloom’s complex theory is only a justification for 
the continuous misapprehension of the play. He is here describing his own (and our) 
inefficacy to read Hamlet and legitimizing that impossibility with the idea that the play is 
metaphoric, a metamorphic mode of surmise leaping with every change and circumstance. 
Thus, although we understand with Hamlet how to reflect and access his conscience when we 
learn to infer, inference leaps ahead, leaving us with a play of contraries: 
 
But that is typical of Hamlet’s consciousness, for the prince has a mind so powerful that the 
most contrary attitudes, values, and judgments can coexist within it coherently, so coherently 
indeed that Hamlet nearly has become all things to all men, and to some women50.  
 
 Hamlet’s antithetical positions are thought-provoking, they contemplate everything, 
divergent points of view, which is why they speak to everyone. While Claudius’s guilt makes 
him an unambiguous character (and easily interpreted, too, after the test takes place, 
Kittredge’s flattering view of the character notwithstanding), Hamlet’s monologues add 
enigma to the character. From this perspective, there is no test to Hamlet’s mind.  
 This proof that there is no proof, the idea that “Shakespeare created him to be as 
ambivalent and divided a consciousness as a coherent drama could sustain”51 becomes the 
motto for Bloom’s acceptance of Peter Alexander’s idea that Shakespeare himself wrote the 
Ur-Hamlet, when his work as a dramatist was starting, and never stopped rewriting it. This 
would mean that a first version of the play would be very close to Belleforest’s Amleth, but 
that it was later revised, as “Inwardness in Shakespeare’s plays does not assume its 
characteristic strength before the comic triumph of Falstaff”52. The play would, then, be the 
description, developed over time, of a “growing inner self,” which admits no ultimate 
explanations. As Bloom contends, “It is very difficult to generalize about Hamlet, because 
                                                           
50 Op. cit., p. 402.  
51 Op. cit., p. 387.  
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every observation will have to admit its opposite”53, or:  
 
There is no ‘real’ Hamlet as there is no ‘real’ Shakespeare: the character, like the writer, is a 
reflecting pool, a spacious mirror in which we needs must see ourselves. Permit this dramatist a 
concourse of contraries, and he will show us everybody and nobody, all at once54.  
 
 Hamlet’s and Shakespeare’s inaccessibility is the reason why we fail to describe them, 
as a mind made of contradictions allows more than one interpretation. Unlike Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern, whose mind is transparently filled with other person’s intentions, which 
makes them easily explainable, Hamlet’s reasoning is a “dance of contraries” (“everything 
and nothing” in Keats’ description, which Bloom distortingly echoes in the quoted excerpt). 
In a certain sense, Bloom is writing an essay about the impossibility of explaining the play 
(even if he is able to learn with Hamlet and conjecture about what could be its true sources). 
Few passages are quoted (only two monologues and some lines), and instead of being 
analyzed they are used to exemplify Hamlet’s personality and his singular use of language, 
that mode of freedom to infer. This lack of a detailed examination could be sustained by the 
argument of the essay; such analysis only shows a spacious mirror.  
 But Bloom does say that in a mirror (whether spacious or not) we see ourselves. And 
ultimately this is why Hamlet is a taciturn character. An analysis, which Bloom fails to do, of 
how the diverse characters in the play understand the Prince helps to prove the idea that 
Hamlet is a spacious mirror, since while seeking an explanation, they somehow project 
themselves into what they fear or wish is happening to Hamlet. Dover Wilson accurately 
sustained three explanations for Hamlet’s madness55. The author describes Polonius’s theory 
about how Ophelia rejected Hamlet, which led to his madness. He notices how Hamlet may 
have heard the King and Polonius demonstrate their plan to Ophelia, which would clarify 
Hamlet’s animosity towards her during the rest of the play. Secondly, Dover Wilson 
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55 Cf. Chapter IV, “Antic Disposition”, in Dover Wilson, What Happens in Hamlet, 1935. Cambridge: Cambridge 
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characterizes the industrious King’s “thwarted ambition,” sustaining that Claudius, being a 
usurper, would naturally be attentive to the crown’s rightful successor. Lastly, the Queen’s 
account is depicted, and it is explained that she considers that Hamlet’s melancholy is due to 
“His father’s death and our o’er-hasty marriage” (II, ii, 57). Notice how both the King’s and 
the Queen’s ideas about what is happening to Hamlet are intimately related with their own 
actions and personalities. But Dover Wilson’s point of view fails to mention how Ophelia’s 
and Polonius’s theories about Hamlet’s behavior are so intimately connected with their own 
desires and fears.  
 For instance, Ophelia ponders her own love, she is afraid of the effects her refusals may 
have had on Hamlet’s temperament. So, when Polonius asks her if Hamlet is “mad of love,” 
she replies: “My lord, I do not know, \ But truly I do fear it.” (II, I, 85-86). That Ophelia is 
here projecting her worst fears about what would happen to a spurned lover will be made 
clear when madness takes over her even if, as will be later seen, she had been the only one to 
accurately portray Hamlet’s concerns.  
 Polonius, like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, proves to be a bad interpreter of Hamlet’s 
words, analyzing all his remarks as if they proved his previously formed theory. For example, 
when he is speaking with Hamlet, who is clearly insulting him when calling him a 
fishmonger, Polonius remarks,” How say you by that? Still harping on my \ daughter” (II, ii, 
187-188). And he continues to project his own experience into the affair when he comments: 
“A is far gone. And truly in my youth I \ suffered much extremity for love, very near this.” (II, 
ii, 189-190). The recognition of young Polonius’ love affairs in Hamlet’s figure is stronger 
than any attempt at accuracy.   
And yet, it should be remembered how, at this time, the use of Hamlet as a mirror 
shows an untidy reflection, as his physical appearance alters substantially through the play. 
Do Hamlet’s looks add to the interpretative confusion of the other characters or, as in the 
theater play, they aid in the grasping of his motives despite his will? In other words, does, in 
this case, the exterior translate someone’s inner self? If, in the beginning of the play, before 
Hamlet sees the Ghost, the only alteration in him is the fact that he insists on using mourning 
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clothes (as the Queen’s remark makes clear: “cast thy nighted colour off,” [I, ii, 68]), soon 
other modifications appear. As the King declares to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern:  
 
Something have you heard   
of Hamlet’s transformation – so I call it,  
Sith nor th’exterior nor the inward man  
Resembles that it was.  
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 4-7)  
 
The exterior is taken to be a prolongation of Hamlet’s interior and both point to an 
unexplainable transfiguration. The exterior is related with his appearance, with his looks. The 
“inward man” suggests an alteration in Hamlet’s temperament, but one that is very likely 
related with the alternation between a melancholic character and his histrionic behavior. But 
if this is so, what difference is there between the exterior and the interior? Aren’t these all 
marks of external behavior? In the following lines, Dover Wilson considers that Polonius is 
diagnosing Hamlet’s medical history:  
 
Fell into a sadness, then into a fast,  
Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness, 
Thence to a lightness, and, by this declension,  
Into the madness wherein now he raves 
And we all mourn for.  
 (Hamlet, II, ii, 147-151) 
 
For the author, Polonius is describing different phases of a disorder known by all who 
observe Hamlet. Quoting Dover Wilson’s words: “dejection, distaste for food, insomnia, crazy 
behaviour, fits of delirium, and finally raving madness”56. Wilson claims: “the symptoms that 
Polonius records are all mental”57. Interestingly, he seems to be following closely the King’s 
(and Bloom’s) remarks and accepting the difference he postulates between interior and 
exterior. However, aren’t a fast, insomnia, or even manifestations of madness, public actions? 
What is there in Hamlet’s “antic disposition” that may not be observed by all? It seems that 
both the King and Dover Wilson are saying that a public, but unexplainable, behavior should 
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be considered interior. The interiority derives from the fact that others may not describe it, 
given its secretive nature. But even if Polonius cannot explain the transformation, he is able 
to describe Hamlet’s melancholy in detail.  
Ophelia, as stated before, misunderstands Hamlet’s words, despite the fact that her 
description of his looks is the most accurate in the play:  
 
Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other,  
And with a look so piteous in purport   
As if he had been loosed out of hell.  
To speak of horrors, 
 (Hamlet, II, I, 81-84) 
 
Here is the theory we were looking for and failed to acknowledge, for Ophelia’s 
remarks describe not only Hamlet’s looks, but also the reflection of his own father in his 
figure. In Hamlet’s features, Ophelia describes King Hamlet, temporarily freed from Hell to 
speak about his own murder. That Polonius ignored her intuition and that she was unaware 
of the context that would allow her to interpret it correctly, could reside part of the tragedy. 
Only Horatio and Hamlet could understand Ophelia’s remarks, as they mime the 
conversation between both friends, at the time Horatio depicted his encounter with the 
Ghost:  
 
Hamlet: Then saw you not his face?  
Horatio: O yes, my lord, he wore his beaver up.  
Hamlet: What look’d he, frowningly?  
Horatio: A countenance more in sorrow than in anger.  
Hamlet: Pale, or red?  
Horatio: Nay, very pale.  
Hamlet:  And fix’d his eyes upon you?  
Horatio: Most constantly.  
 (Hamlet, I, ii, 228-235)  
  
This would be the interpretative key for Ophelia’s observation. The Ghost’s face was, 
like Hamlet’s, “very pale” and he had his eyes fixed upon Horatio, just like Hamlet, miming 
his father’s behavior, laid his eyes upon Ophelia. Hamlet’s “piteous looks” exposed a sore 
mind in his distorted figure, but also his sadness, just like the Ghost’s, with a face showing 
more sorrow than anger. If Hamlet’s behavior is reproducing his father’s, then he too wished 
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to speak about the horrors that had taken place. However, the Ghost could not say anything 
to Horatio as Hamlet was also unable to speak with Ophelia.  
Hamlet’s paleness also replicates Horatio’s, when he saw the Ghost for the first time: 
“How now, Horatio? You tremble and look pale” (I, I, 56). And Ophelia’s reaction to Hamlet’s 
piteous looks seems to equal Barnardo’s and Marcellus’s response after seeing the Ghost. 
They had “Almost to jelly with the act of fear, \ Stand dumb and speak not to him.” (I, ii, 205-
206),” and Ophelia seems to quietly let Hamlet survey her looks (“As a would draw it,” II, I, 
91), not speaking with him and doing nothing else. Hamlet’s exterior seems to give the reader 
an explanation about what is happening with him: his looks help to reinforce the vision of the 
Ghost, when they underline the paleness that derives from it and show that what could have 
been considered sadness after the death of his father may not now be explained.  
It was an impossibility for Ophelia to know that Hamlet’s paleness was due to his own 
encounter with the Ghost and although her intuition was accurate and led her in the right 
direction, she could not guess King Hamlet had returned, nor understand the horrors in need 
of being spoken (this is a case, which will be taken up later, of how being able to describe a 
situation is not necessarily understanding it). So, when her father asks if Hamlet’s madness 
could be a result of unrequited love, Ophelia acquiesces, giving the only explanation that 
makes sense to her. As happened with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, the impossibility of 
describing Hamlet’s actions is a result of Hamlet’s puzzling remarks, a difficult context to be 
explained, but also of some incapacity on the interpreters’ part to realize  that they are unable 
to distinguish their own lives from Hamlet’s intentions.  
These characters’ inability to understand Hamlet, and the way they project their own 
sentiments onto him, seems to follow Bloom’s idea that Hamlet is a mirror where everything 
may be reflected. However, readers of the play will, in the end, understand how each of these 
characters’ interpretations is wrong. From this perspective, the monologues are indeed a 
doorway to Hamlet’s mind, as they will presumably allow us to understand him. There is, as 
seen, a difference between Hamlet’s test to Claudius and what happens to the rest of us, the 
readers of the play. Hamlet’s skillful test leads him to an unequivocal explanation of 
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Claudius’s guilt, as the observation of his face provides him with clear signs, corroborated by 
Horatio, of Claudius’s guilt, even though, as said, his monologues do not yield a (clear) 
incontestable explanation for Hamlet’s character. If each character’s projection of Hamlet 
tells us something about him or herself, it would be interesting to ask whether the same 
happens in the literary criticism of the play. If it were so, Bloom’s essay would be the mirror 
of his own soul, aiming to understand not only Hamlet, but Shakespeare himself, an illusion 
of knowledge, even if it is a knowledge made of contradictions. 
  
 4. Avoiding a tribunal 
 As Hamlet’s test seems to have proved, it is possible to gain access to the secrets of 
other persons against their will. Hence, The Murder of Gonzago seems to be the 
interpretative key allowing Hamlet a right of entry into the King’s guilt. If Hamlet’s exercise 
epitomizes an attempt to determine what someone is trying to conceal through the 
observation of his external behavior, in Macbeth the opposite is being represented, as we 
have the possibility of knowing what “criminals” experience, as well as the labors they go 
through in order to hide the symptoms of their deceit. 
The tragedy is prompted by the witches’ encounter with Macbeth, and their 
enunciation of the prophecy that will trigger his actions. The witches hail Macbeth as “Thane 
of Glamis,” which he is, “Thane of Cawdor,” which he will become, and finally, “King 
hereafter”. When the King promotes him to Thane of Cawdor, Macbeth assumes the 
prophecy may be relied upon, thus deciding that instead of waiting for the third prophecy to 
be fulfilled, he may act upon it, murder the King, and remain in power. The play portrays the 
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tacit agreement of a married couple towards the decision to commit murder, and their 
attempt to survive through what becomes a complex crisis. The motto for Macbeth becomes 
known in Hamlet, during the play-within-the-play, before the King is poisoned:  
 
Thoughts black, hands apt, drugs fit, and time agreeing,  
Confederate season, else no creature seeing,  
Thou mixture rank, of midnight weeds collected, 
With Hecate’s ban thrice blasted, thrice infected,  
Thy natural magic and dire property 
On wholesome life usurps immediately. 
 (Hamlet, III, ii, 249-254) 
 
The main themes of the play are represented in these lines. Black thoughts that lead 
to murder, hands that must do the deed which the eye does not wish to see, time agreeing to 
assassination and then being disrupted by it, Hecate, goddess of the magic arts, represented 
as having three bodies (i.e., Macbeth’s three witches) and, finally, the usurpation of the 
throne, wholesome life which, in the case of the Scottish tragedy, represents Duncan. In 
Hamlet, thoughts and hands working together point to the commitment of a unified self 
towards assassination. This is not the case in Macbeth, where there appears to be a 
distinction between the body, related with the will to murder (“I am settled, and bend up \ 
Each corporal agent to this terrible feat” (I, vii, 80-81), and conscience (“But in these cases, \ 
We still have judgment here;” [I, vii, 7-8])58. Yet, in their analyses of Macbeth, critics use 
expressions such as “true self,” “inner self,” “inner being” or “divided selves,” to portray the 
discrepancy between Macbeth’s nature and his actions, as well as the difference between him 
and other characters in the tragedy. 
The play seems to probe the relationship between mind and body. In a celebrated 
essay, A. C. Bradley grants importance to this aspect, when he describes Macbeth as a “bold 
ambitious man of action,” which has, “within certain limits, the imagination of a poet”59. 
While the body would be responsible for Macbeth’s deeds (a depiction that includes both his 
                                                           
58 Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. Kenneth Muir, 1951. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2001. Quotations follow this 
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59 A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy - Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth, 1957. London: 
Macmillan and Co, 1971, p. 295. 
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courageous nature in war and the King’s assassination), the sensitiveness of some 
impressions, as well as Macbeth’s supernatural fears, would be a result of imagination.  
 
His imagination is thus the best of him, something usually deeper and higher than his conscious 
thoughts; and if he had obeyed it he would have been safe. (...) The terrifying images which deter 
him from crime and follow its commission, and which are really the protest of his deepest self, 
seem to his wife the creations of mere nervous fear, and are sometimes referred by himself to 
the dread of vengeance or the restlessness of insecurity60. 
 
 Macbeth’s imagination seems to be the portrait of a submerged inner self, capable of 
sending signals to the host subject so that he could, if listening attentively, be driven to the 
right direction, thus avoiding the crime. The problem is that both Macbeth and his wife 
understand these signals as indications of nervous anxiety and they try to ignore, hide or 
overcome them. At the same time, while Lady Macbeth’s greatness resides in “courage and 
force of will”61, she lacks her husband’s imagination, which prevents her from anticipating the 
effect their actions will have. Macbeth’s terrible images, “productive of violent disturbance 
both of mind and body”62, differ from his conscious thoughts and are considered to be the 
revelation of his deepest self. According to Bradley: “His conscious or reflective mind, that is, 
moves chiefly among considerations of outward success and failure, while his inner being is 
convulsed by conscience”63.  
 In this description, the deepest self, a synonym expression of both inner self and 
consciousness, is accountable for terrible fears which are projected into the imagination, and 
which may be found both in the mind and in the body. The mind, however, is the reflective 
being, moved by ambition and the fear of failure, which is ultimately responsible for 
Macbeth’s actions. And yet: “The consciousness of guilt is stronger in him than the 
consciousness of failure, and it keeps him in a perpetual agony of restlessness, and forbids 
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him simply to droop and pine. His mind is full of scorpions”64. So, we have both a 
consciousness of guilt (the inner self?) and a consciousness of failure (the reflective mind?), 
the consequence of the first being a mind full of scorpions, such as sleeplessness and 
hallucinations. To this account, the idea of powerful, veiled forces, is added:    
 
Shakespeare has concentrated attention on the obscurer regions of man’s being, on phenomena 
which make it seem that he is in the power of secret forces lurking below (...) the writing on his 
face of strange things he never meant to show65.  
 
 The author is alluding to passages in the play where there is a difference between inner 
feelings visible in the face and someone’s wish to hide them (a possible example would be: 
“False face must hide what the false heart doth know,” [I, vii, 83]). Apart from an imaginative 
self and a reflective mind, Macbeth is possessed by these “hidden forces operating on minds 
unconscious of their influence”66, i. e., the witches’ power, a “presence of inchoate evil in the 
soul itself”67, described as terrifying. Therefore, in Macbeth we have an inner self, a conscious 
mind and hidden forces. The “location” of the hidden forces is unclear, but they seem to be 
linked to the self’s conscious mind. The witches’ prophecies represent “the union of the 
outward and inward,” where the “inward powers of the soul answer in their essence to vaster 
powers without, which support them and assure the effect of their exertion”68.  
 At this point, the whole representation seems unclear, as Macbeth’s inner self and 
conscious mind are linked to the interior powers of the soul and the outward faculties of the 
witches, an account in which the various parts of Macbeth’s body, mind, consciousness and 
soul seem to be intertwined. The reason why A. C. Bradley’s depiction of Macbeth uses so 
many different terms to sketch the relationship between his character and his actions is due 
to the fact that he describes his nature by dividing it into fragments, such as imagination, 
body, hidden forces, etc., each responsible for a certain state of affairs. I would claim that in 
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Macbeth’s case there is, as the play makes clear, an innocent self, but not a sole inner self.  
In fact, Lady Macbeth’s concerns point to what could be considered an important 
particularity of some modes of proof. Persons are described as if they possess two selves, to 
whom I will call, for clarity of exposition, the true self and the false self. Unlike, say, Bradley’s 
description, the designation true\false corresponds in this case to the relationship between 
each person’s intentions and their bodily reactions. Therefore, the untrue self makes us 
capable of deceit and of attempting to hide it, whereas the true self, due to guilt, attempts to 
show, through physical reactions, what the untrue wishes to hide. The true self manifests 
itself through visible bodily proof, such as perspiration, insomnia, nervousness, etc., and may 
be considered the body’s reaction to the mischief of the former.  
There are two points of interest in this description: firstly, the two selves coexist 
simultaneously, even if not peacefully, each attempting to deceive the other. Secondly, the 
fact that although body and mind act in unison in the case of the true self (both wish to say 
the truth and show it using the body), the same does not happen with the untrue self, since 
the mind has problems controlling the body (an extra effort of will is necessary to be in 
charge of bodily signs). This is not the classic representation of an interior world, one where 
the mind commands and the body obeys, but one where the untrue self is attempting to 
conceal something the couple body/mind reveals. The disparity between mind and body does 
not exist in the case of the true self, since consciousness seems to be directly linked to bodily 
signs, the public evidence of one’s acts. It should be noted that this description does not differ 
from the traditional image of a person possessing a devil and angel arguing with each other, 
each attempting to win an (im)moral victory over the other. The specificity of the case 
presented relies on the fact that the battle is not as balanced as one might, at first, assume, 
since the angel, or the true self, has at his disposal a group of bodily signs ready to intervene 
when necessary, which the devil has to conceal.  
In Macbeth’s conceptualization of the relationship between people’s faces and their 
inner feelings, those who are easy to read are differentiated from those who are not. The 
presupposition seems to be that virtuous persons naturally reveal their emotions, whereas an 
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evil character has to make an effort to conceal his or her hidden intentions. This 
correspondence between faces and thoughts takes place, for example, when the Thane of 
Rosse arrives, and Lenox claims: “What a haste looks through his eyes! So should he look / 
That seems to speak things strange” (I, ii, 47-48). Not only Rosse’s eyes, which represent the 
weird events he has seen, are easy to read, as it is considered that there is a proper way for 
eyes to look like at the moment of describing strange events. In this case, the body of those 
depicting peculiar affairs does not have to make an effort to resemble what the person is 
describing. On the contrary, that is seen as the natural bodily response to the events 
observed. Traitors, however, should be defined by their ability to conceal emotion. Likewise, 
Duncan’s ironic comment towards the treason of the first Thane of Cawdor shows how he was 
unable to anticipate treason: “There’s no art / To find the mind’s construction in the face: / 
He was a gentleman on whom I built / An absolute trust” (I, iv, 11-13). For Duncan, if the face 
could be the mirror of the soul, he would have detected the traitor through the analysis of his 
expressions, instead of trusting him. Duncan should probably consider the possibility that he 
is not a good judge of character, something which will be proven in his failure to anticipate 
Macbeth’s treason, a fact underlined, as Bradley notes, when Shakespeare places Macbeth’s 
entrance in the play after this comment. Duncan’s observation seems to suggest that traitors 
have the skill we admire in actors, who make an art out of constructing a (false) mind in the 
face, and that no critic would be able to distinguish the true nature of a good performer. 
Nonetheless, unless Duncan imagines, it should be considered that the ability to hide 
emotions is not a character trait, we all do it consciously or unconsciously, at one time or 
another. What distinguishes us is the skill to lie, as Lady Macbeth knows so well:  
 
    Only look up clear;  
To alter favour ever is to fear.  
Leave all the rest to me. 
  (Macbeth, I, v, 71-73) 
 
 
Your face, my Thane, is a book, where men  
May read strange matters. To beguile the time,  
Look like the time; bear welcome in your eye,  
Your hand, your tongue: look like th’innocent flower, 
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But be the serpent under’t.  
 (Macbeth, I, v, 62-66) 
 
Shakespeare is showing how Lady Macbeth first identifies the disparity between her 
husband’s feelings and the necessity to disguise them, as may be noticed in her repeated 
advice to him. These instructions make Lady Macbeth’s fears clear, while presenting an 
interesting parallel between her advice to Macbeth and Hamlet’s indications to his actors, 
different sides to the same story. The first quotation depicts her worries that Macbeth will not 
be able to disguise his face: if his appearance shows concern, the King may be able to 
understand their intentions before they have the chance to murder him. The second 
quotation also depicts Macbeth’s face which, given his inability to naturally hide it, is clear as 
a book where strangeness might be found. To deceive time (to be able to be King before the 
due moment in time arrives), Macbeth has to speak like the time, which means he may not 
give indications of his intentions.  
Additionally, he needs to give the impression of being like the innocent flower, but be 
the serpent under it, which is a variation upon the image, exemplified in Hamlet, of how a 
serpent had stung Duncan on the ear. This passage, as noted in the Arden edition, is a 
deviation of Vergil’s “latet anguis in herba” (a serpent is hidden in the middle of the grass). 
More importantly, the passage is an apt translation for Lady Macbeth’s purposes, since 
“flower” is a term for “trope” (the flowers of rhetoric). Lady Macbeth is in some way 
suggesting that rhetoric is an instrument of deceit, a beautiful surface but one used for 
perverse ends. This association with rhetoric is made clearer by the mention of “tongue,” 
which introduces both the flower and the serpent (note how Lady Macbeth is also using her 
tongue, i.e., her rhetoric, to persuade Macbeth to commit assassination). This is emphasized 
by Lady Macbeth’s initial speech, which takes place before Macbeth arrives, at a time when 
she is preparing herself to help her husband accomplish his purposes: “That I may pour my 
spirits in thine ear, / And chastise with the valour of my tongue / All that impedes thee from 
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the golden round,” (I, v, 26-28). Lady Macbeth’s spirits echo the witches’ power and 
Claudius’s “leprous distilment” poured into King Hamlet’s ears69.  
At the same time, to chastise is associated with uses of the tongue, Lady Macbeth’s 
persuasive instrument, which recalls the way she will threaten her husband, claiming he is 
not manly (for example, “quite unman’d in folly” [III, iv, 72]). Lady Macbeth’s spirits will seal 
her husband’s ears, and chastise his hesitations. These “Spirits \ That tend on mortal 
thoughts” (I, v, 40-41) will be those she will later on ask to unsex her. When she is speaking 
with Macbeth she is the one being chastised, with the intention to “fill me, from the crown to 
the toe, top-full \ Of direst cruelty” (I, v, 42-43). Thus, the golden of the crown binds both 
Lady Macbeth and her husband as a single element uniting their vaulting ambition70. Yet, at 
the same time, the crown also portrays Duncan’s murder and the disparity between him and 
Macbeth. While Duncan is represented as a good King, Macbeth is depicted as a tyrant whose 
“Golden opinions from all sorts of people, / which would be worn now in their newest gloss, / 
Not cast aside so soon” (I, vii, 33-35). This sentence, claimed by Macbeth when he was still 
undecided towards assassination, describes Macbeth’s life before the murder and afterwards. 
He was well thought of, but that will cease with Duncan’s murder71. Unlike “gold,” which 
represents perpetuity and cannot disappear or deceive, golden opinions may not last forever.  
Furthermore, Macbeth must be careful with his bodily behavior, a relevant indication 
of one’s intentions. Interestingly, Lady Macbeth refers eyes and hands, common signals of 
deceit, but also his tongue, meaning that she is frightened that his words will betray him. 
Lady Macbeth’s idea of bearing welcome in the tongue finds its echo in Hamlet’s lines, which 
have already been quoted, “For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak / With most 
miraculous organ” (II, ii, 589-590). Murder, left unspoken by the criminal, may still be 
discovered through the use of proof possessing a talkative nature (a point to be later 
                                                           
69 Cf. Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. A. R. Braunmuller. Cambridge: The New Cambridge Edition, 2008.  
70 See G. Wilson Knight, The Imperial Theme: Further Considerations of Shakespeare’s Tragedies, London: 
Methuen, 1963, p. 130.   
71 For an account of the imagery of usurpation read the following: Caroline F. Spurgeon, Shakespeare’s Imagery 
and what it tell us. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.  
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characterized). To Lady Macbeth, words that weren’t properly thought may denote guilt, 
while Hamlet’s lines imply that murder is an act whose authorship is not difficult to 
determine, since it has a tongue (it is, as will be seen, self-evident proof). For Hamlet, and 
somehow to Lady Macbeth, murder is an act so cruel that there is always the possibility that 
it will be spoken, even if not through the most usual channels. There seems to be a 
relationship between the criminal (who does not desire to speak, but may betray himself), the 
corpse (which, as will be later seen, has sometimes the ability to denounce its murderer), and 
the ones trying to determine who committed the crime.  
Also, the relationship between the murder and the tongue, or the ability to proclaim a 
crime, is made clear after Macduff discovers Duncan was murdered: “O horror! horror! 
horror! \ Tongue nor heart cannot conceive, nor name thee!” (II, iii, 62-63). An innocent man 
cannot picture murder, much less name it, but, most of all, the blameless heart and tongue 
work in unison, there is no discrepancy between organs’ intentions when the innocent is in 
charge (something that, we have seem, differs in the case of the guilty person). Although 
Macfduff believes murder should not be spoken, he ends up telling the others what has 
happened. When Lady Macbeth arrives, however, Macduff resists the idea of revealing the 
nature of events: “‘Tis not for you to hear what I can speak: / The repetition, in a woman’s 
ear, / Would murther as it fell” (II, iii, 82-84). These lines imply that a fragile woman would 
not be able to bear the description of an atrocity such as murder: so it was not for him, whose 
tongue cannot conceive murder, to repeat it to her ear. Macduff does not imagine, of course, 
Lady Macbeth’s degree of responsibility in the affair. She had been able not only to hear of a 
murder, but of devising its arrangements. In some way, Macduff’s sentence may be 
considered a prophecy of Lady Macbeth’s unfortunate destiny: hearing about a murder led to 
the loss of her mind and, consequently, to her death. 
Returning to the relationship between bodily signs and innocent persons, one may 
understand how, when the accused is not guilty, the body does not represent his ordeal. The 
innocent person’s true self has nothing to reveal, so his or her injuries do not manifest 
themselves in bodily signs (they heal faster than was supposed, for example). However, the 
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same does not apply in the case of the accused, and although he does try to control his body, 
his true self speaks louder, and causes physical signs to appear. When the suspect is guilty, he 
is unable to control the appearance of body expressions, thus leading to the manifestation of 
his guilt. However, what happens when physical signs do not seem to represent the body’s 
guilt? Nowadays, it is common for the body of the victim of torture to present no scars, or 
obvious bodily proof to prove torture has taken place.  
Contrast the following: a Brazilian police officer with a stun gun explains how “The 
main thing is not to leave any marks”72; whereas the European Commission of Human Rights 
argues that “[The falaka] if skillfully done, breaks no bones, makes no skin lesions, and leaves 
no permanent and recognizable marks”73. The sentences quoted portray two major forms of 
stealth, or clear, torture: electrotorture and falaka (or falanga). Commonly, in electrotorture 
an electric current is transmitted through electrodes that may be placed on any part of the 
body (the common areas being hands, feet, fingers, toes, ears, nipples, mouth, and genital 
area), producing excruciating pain. Unlike, for example, cigarette burns, which leave obvious 
visible traces, electrotorture may go unnoticed in an inspection, as this method leaves only 
visible small reddish patches, which are easily missed by those who are not experts in the 
detection of torture74. Electrotorture started being used relatively lately, given that it was 
difficult for torturers to administer shocks that would inflict pain without killing their victims 
(the main problem was to balance high voltage with low amperage) while, at the same time, 
have the existing techniques performed well. Early police devices used electrotorture in 
countries such as Spain, which applied the electric chair during the civil war; Portugal, which 
resorted to batteries from 1932 to 1939; and Brazil, which started applying electric wires in 
1935. In Argentina, the picaña electrica, used to prod cattle, was transformed into a portable 
device that could easily be employed in torture suspects. The magneto, a generator that 
produces a high voltage spark, was used by the French in Algeria. This form of torture was 
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easy to apply, as magnetos generated power for telephones, cars, refrigerators and planes 
(which means that, like the saw during the Inquisition, they were easily available for 
torturers, and could go unnoticed in an inspection by a humanitarian organization). Both the 
picaña and the magneto were soon popularized, being joined by other common electrotorture 
techniques, such as tasers and stun guns, useful, as they provoke intense pain, while hardly 
leaving any visible marks.  
Falanga, on the other hand, has been practiced worldwide, as testified by its various 
names (in Turkish, Arabic or Farsi, it is called falaka or falaqa, in Moroccan Arabic, karma or 
arma, while Europeans call this practice the bastinado, after bastón, bastóne or batons). Let 
me paraphrase Darius Rejalis’s description and distinguish long whips, used to rule groups of 
workers, cattle and carriages, from short whips, meant for controlling a single worker or 
domestic slaves, for exorcism and penance in the Catholic church (a practice that passed on 
from Roman judges), for disciplining children in school and British sailors. There is a large 
family of whips, whose members vary in size and material. Even if most of them scar the body 
permanently, there has always been a small tradition of clean whipping (which left bruises, 
but no scars as some slaves were too valuable to be damaged by the procedure). The falanga, 
therefore, belongs to the old tradition of whipping and consists on the prolonged beating of 
the victim’s feet, which causes acute swelling and pain, may produce chronic disability, 
muscle fatigue, among many other side effects, but does not leave visible traces to the 
untrained eye. As noticed in Instruments of Torture,  
 
(... ) although a very localized assault, the pain in fact reaches quickly though the body right up 
to the head. The torture is redoubled when, after the beating, the victim is made to walk on 
rough ground, perhaps giving the heaviest guard a piggyback. When administered by a master-
torturer, the lightest rhythmic rapping on the sole produces, over the course of a few minutes, 
the most maddening pain and mental anguish in the victim75.  
 
When there is a need for a clean outcome, torturers usually pour water into the feet, 
make the victim jump in a pool of cold water to reduce the swelling, or apply yogurt or anti-
inflammatory cream to the feet. After some days it is usually very difficult to identify that 
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torture has indeed taken place. Although the clean beating, as Rejalis argues, preceded the 
monitoring done by Human Right’s groups, it gained importance in stealthy torture regimes.  
The issue of identifying the victim of torture poses problems, such as the skeptic’s 
question, “Was he truly tortured?,” which is relevant, for example, when one is dealing with 
refugees who, if torture is proven, will gain political status and avoid being sent back to their 
countries. The question portrays the belief that visible proof rules out any skeptical doubts 
about other persons, as if every thought and occurrence that were exteriorized in visible 
evidence would not allow secrets. Medical organizations thus try to uncover what remains 
hidden and unexpressed, the exterior being used to pinpoint the interior’s existence (the 
implication seems to be that visible proof would manifest its causality, making interpretation 
unnecessary). Medical staff and humanitarian organizations attempted to solve this type of 
problem and provided a pragmatic reply to the question posed. This means that institutions 
such as the RCT (Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims), in Copenhagen, 
are always attempting to find new ways to diagnose stealth torture. Hermann Vogel, a 
consultant radiologist at a Hospital in Hamburg, Germany, travels the world in an attempt to 
diagnose claims of torture. In an interview, he says the following:  
 
The methods used in Turkey for torturing people with electric shocks have changed because of 
the efficient work of local activists in diagnosing torture. They used to apply one electrode to 
one of the victim’s fingers and the other to the penis or toes. This left cell damage that could be 
detected in tissue samples taken from the site of the electrode. Now they are soaking the victim 
in water and applying larger electrodes, which does not cause local damage to tissue. My 
Turkish colleagues have asked me to investigate whether it will be possible to detect any effects 
of the electric current when it is applied this way. I am confident that it will by using MRI 
scan76. 
 
 
This is one of many testimonies explaining how electrotorture may be observed 
through the use of radiographs or MRIs77. In fact, many studies concur with Vogel’s 
perspective, and maintain that although this type of torture does not leave open wounds or 
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fractures, it indeed causes alterations in the body. The same happens with falanga. Kirstine 
Amris’s study shows how this technique produces transformations in the musculoskeletal 
system only detected by specialists. According to this investigation, the bleeding, swelling 
and the oedemas in the soft tissues of the feet disappear after a few weeks (most lesions 
repair six weeks after torture has taken place), while ulcerations and fractures may be found, 
but are rare if the torturer is skilled. However, some vestiges of torture can still be traceable:  
 
(...) at clinical examination reduced elasticity in the foot pads, loosening of the skin, soreness 
and coating of the plantar fascia (aponeurositis), sensory disturbances in the soles, joint 
dysfunction, and myofacial changes in the lower extremities are reported as being 
characteristic. (…) The use of imaging in substantiating the clinical diagnosis and 
documentation of falanga is based on MRI and ultrasound studies showing morphological 
changes with a layered plantar fascia in torture victims exposed to falanga78. 
 
The two quotations show how torture may be proven through the use of a scan made 
to the body. Firstly, the medical staff (correctly) assumes that torture leaves physical traces, 
no matter how hidden they may be. Even if bodily proof was not left for all to see, it is hidden 
on the body, the vessel where events took place. This makes the body a place where secrets 
are buried, but still likely to be found by a skilled observer. It should be noted that although 
there are many differences between these doctors’ work and the activity of torturing, both 
presume that there are hidden secrets inside the human body that may come to light when 
the body is used as a place of inquiry. Secondly, techniques such as the MRI or the 
radiograph transform the idea of interiority in the body when their results are made public. 
From this point of view, different ways of scanning the body give a shared dimension to what 
were previously considered hidden contents. This means that physicians are attempting to 
externalize what the torturer tried so skillfully to hide, by turning visible the body’s interior. 
Therefore, from an interpretative point of view, these interior morphological changes are 
paired to easily detected exterior physiological signs, such as perspiration. 
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Even though scan tests can (and must) be interpreted, they do not show irrefutable 
evidence to those who look into them. A causal relationship between the morphological 
changes in the body and torture must be proved, and, in order to do so, doctors must show 
that the changes occurring in the body are a result of torture and not of prior injuries. Thus, 
for torture to be proven, the patient’s history must be told in detail; it becomes necessary to 
find the relationship between his country’s history of violence, his life previous to torture, his 
family and friends, as well as to thoroughly construe the story of his imprisonment and of the 
torture techniques used. Doctors must evaluate how the physical and psychological 
symptoms presented by the patient relate to the story patients tell and the knowledge of 
torture techniques applied in the country. When they do this, doctors are recognizing that the 
victim’s status evaluation may not be limited to an analysis of his or her body. From this 
viewpoint, to learn the truth about a torture victim means to be able to tell their story and not 
just to extract the truth out of the body. This is, in addition, an extremely important 
difference between those practicing torture and those attempting to denounce it. To the 
victim, however, the body is a place of betrayal, of pain that cannot be proved without the use 
of hardly accessible sophisticated technology. For the majority of the cases in which falanga 
was applied, for example, the subjects feel prolonged pain for many years, but not until very 
recently could the trauma’s marks be found, which means that victims remember what 
caused the pain, but are not able to point at it. The body in which no signs of torture are left 
visible is the one where no self (neither true nor untrue) of the victim is able to reveal itself.  
At the same time, contrary to what happens with the medieval judicial ordeal or with 
the characters that have been described, such as Claudius and Macbeth, torturers do no 
analyze bodily signs in contemporary torture. What other modes of proof consider to be the 
causal relationship between the subject’s culpability and his physiology is not taken into 
account in these cases, since contemporary torture is not based on an analysis of bodily signs. 
Torturers are not attempting to identify guilt through an evaluation of visible signs; they are 
trying to obtain a confession.  
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There is another relevant point when one considers stealth torture, which is the fact 
that although the invisible signs do not correspond in any way to the victim’s intentions (who 
cannot control what appears and disappears in his or her own body), it demonstrates the 
torturer’s wish to hide proof that torture has taken place. In the medieval ordeal the accused 
does not have control over his or her body, but either he committed the crime or not, so in 
some way he may be considered responsible for the outcome of the test. When one speaks 
about invisible signs in torture, one is describing the torturer’s intentions, as well as his skill. 
The torturer’s ambition of leaving no vestiges of what could be considered his crime equals 
Lady Macbeth’s concern in hiding the evidence. There is equivalence between Lady 
Macbeth’s efforts to mask her face and the torturer’s need to conceal the victim’s bodily signs. 
In fact, there is correspondence between the torturer’s labors and Lady Macbeth’s need to 
wipe away the intentions and the traces of murder from her husband’s face.   
While Lady Macbeth needs to control her own body and her husband’s, the torturer 
has only to manage one other person’s signs. Nevertheless, these modes of proof seem to 
imply that the difficulty in controlling one’s body is as complex as the calculation of what will 
happen with another person’s body. From this perspective, the criminal’s body is as alien to 
him as the victim’s is to the torturer. Another particularity is the fact that there is a waiting 
time required for each of these activities. The judges in the ordeal need three days in order to 
discover if the arm presents signs of the ordeal (if it is cured), whereas the torturer needs to 
wait for the tortured to heal before he discovers whether the signs of torture have scarred 
permanently the body (i. e., before he is able to move the prisoner). 
The recognition of torture when there are no obvious physical traces requires a new 
understanding of the body and also that the concept of pain as torture be used as a way of 
punishment leaving indelible memories, but not permanent visible physical wounds. There is 
dissociation between memories of events and physical signs. The victim is thus left with a 
severed body: the corporeality which perjures itself by providing no testimony of the events, 
and the remembered body, in need to be acknowledged. The acknowledgement involves 
therefore not only the gathering of empirical data, but acknowledged sensibility, which is to 
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play a pivotal role in the inquiries. Thus, rules should be followed when interviewing a 
torture victim, both for the purposes of asylum or compensation79. 
Macbeth, one might argue, as Charles Altieri suggests in his course about the play80, 
should be read having in mind Derek Parfit’s theory of the self. In his essay81, Parfit questions 
the notion of personal identity, and attempts to explain how questions related with it may be 
explained without the use of the concept. Parfit describes the case of a person whose brain is 
transplanted into another body, successfully divided, and transferred into two different 
persons; as well as the case of special beings looking exactly like humans, but reproducing 
through a dividing process. Parfit’s examples have the purpose of substituting the concepts of 
psychological continuity82 and psychological connectedness83 for that of identity. The author 
aims to show that the existence of several selves is not as impossible as one may think. Thus, 
a self may correspond to a continuous self throughout time, but also to different selves, as 
many transformations of character or in life-style in a person may produce. This explains the 
common idea that we are no longer the same, whenever we undergo some life-changing 
transformation. Each person may possess different selves through time, to which it refers as 
my “anterior self” or “my future self”. Parfit attempts to show that in the continuous 
existence of each person there are relations of degree between earlier selves and future selves. 
This is the reason why the author thinks that the person living with two halves of the brain of 
different persons, as well as those who possess the brain of another, may survive without the 
need to be described through the use of a principle of identity. Parfit uses the word “self” to 
designate the highest degree of psychological connectedness, claiming that the several selves 
                                                           
79 Cf. Physicians for Human Rights, Examining Asylum Seekers – A Health Professional Guide to Medical and 
Psychological Evaluations of Torture. Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2001.  
80 Charles Altieri, “Macbeth”, Berkeley University, accessed April 2009, 
http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details.php?seriesid=1906978525. 
81 Derek Parfit, «Personal Identity» in Personal Identity, ed. John Perry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1975, pp. 199-226. 
82 For Parfit, although persons generally use the language of personal identity to explain the continuity existent in 
a person, psychological continuity does not create identity criteria. The author suggests that psychological 
continuity is not logical and does not derive from a bi-univocal relation. 
83 Psychological connectedness, unlike psychological continuity, is not transitive, since the relations between 
different expressions of “q-characteristics” are not transitive either. Psychological connectedness needs direct 
psychological relationships and what Parfit calls “q-memories” and “q-experience”.   
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of persons whose brain was divided live just as a person who, after a violent emotional 
process, cannot describe herself as being the same. One would not find, in Macbeth, a single 
body and mind, but a series of selves which vary.  
Altieri claims that we are presently accountable for our various future selves, which is 
the reason why we must try to act responsibly. But, unlike us, Macbeth assumes to know who 
his future self will be. Bradley is right to notice that the “the words of the Witches are fatal to 
the hero only because there is in him something which leaps into light at the sound of 
them”84. The knowledge of the future makes it impossible for him to choose courses of action 
which do not involve a path towards what he considers to be his prophetic destiny, and which 
confirm his ambition. The witches’ insight not only eliminates other possibilities of action, 
but also presents the following dilemma: if Macbeth is meant to be King, why not become 
King (right now)? It soon becomes clear that Macbeth will not be able to delay the reward 
and wait for the proper time to come; he decides to transform his future self into his present 
self. The play debates usurpation, which critics have described as a jump in time, the desire 
to make instants elapse so that a distant future may be transformed into the present, an 
aspiration appearing in passages such as “We’d jump the life to come” (I, vii, 7) or “Away and 
mock the time with fairest show” (I, vii, 82), among so many others.  
Macbeth’s several selves are, of course, described by the witches during the opening of 
the play (he is Macbeth and Cawdor, he will become Glamis and King). After Macbeth 
becomes Thane of Glamis, and before the assassination is committed, his several selves 
coexist in what is (or seems to be) the unity previously represented by the three witches. 
When Macbeth and his wife start to plan Duncan’s murder, the dissociation between their 
selves’ conscience and bodily signs acquires importance. Murder will, finally, change things, 
as may be perceived by the following passage, “’Glamis hath murder’d Sleep, and therefore 
Cawdor \ Shall sleep no more, Macbeth shall sleep no more!’” (II, ii, 41-42). The various 
selves share the murder that has taken place and the impossibility of sleep, but the way 
                                                           
84 A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy – Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth, 1957. London: 
Macmillan and Co, 1971, p. 292.  
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Macbeth, Glamis and Cawdor are invoked indicates that there is not a single conscience at 
stake. Macbeth is dealing with the effects that his deeds have on his present and future self. 
Parfit’s theory allows us, therefore, to introduce a temporal dimension to the difference 
between true and untrue selves. The degree of continuity between selves (this temporal 
dimension) allows us to understand how the actions of someone’s anterior self have 
consequences in his present and future selves; whereas the concept of psychological 
continuity would explain the somatoform effects of murder, such as sleeplessness. After the 
assassination, therefore, there is a corporal continuity between Macbeth, Glamis and Cawdor 
(their body is the same), a causal continuity (the fact that Glamis murdered sleep makes both 
Cawdor and Macbeth suffer from insomnia), and a conscience which time transformed. From 
this perspective, Macbeth failed to anticipate the negative effects murder would have on his 
future self (he assumed his true self would deal with murder as he had dealt with 
assassination in battle before, and failed to realize that the nature of remorse resulting from 
usurpation would be very different). True and untrue selves, therefore, coexist through time, 
challenging each other and producing dilemmas on the person’s body and soul.  
This does not, however, solve entirely the problem, as Macbeth and his wife 
frequently seem to be a body and soul working in unison and suffering from a similar type of 
bodily pains. While there is dissociation between Macbeth’s anterior and present selves, there 
is frequently correspondence between Lady Macbeth and her husband’s consciences and 
bodies. Parfit’s essay presents an interesting alternative to the one which has been provided 
by critics who tend to evaluate the tragedy through the discussion of the variation of strength 
between the two main characters during the play. Critical accounts may indeed fail to explain 
the theory that they briefly state. For example, A. C. Bradley notices how, in the beginning of 
the play, Macbeth and his wife seem to be “of equal importance”85, and, more importantly, 
how “Her ambition for her husband and herself (there was no distinction to her mind) 
proved fatal to him”86. The significant section of the phrase consists in the idea that in Lady 
                                                           
85  Op. cit., p. 293. 
86 Op. cit., p. 317.  
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Macbeth’s mind there was no difference between what she envisioned for herself and for her 
husband. Bradley, however, considers each character separately, instead of taking them into 
account as a single entity. At the same time, Freud’s essay on Lady Macbeth (almost) 
provides the explanation we have been looking for, as the author briefly mentions Ludwig 
Jekels’ belief that Shakespeare divides a character into two personages “which taken 
separately, are not completely understandable and do not become so until they are brought 
together once more into unity”87. Freud claims:   
 
The germs of fear which break out in Macbeth on the night of the murder do not develop further 
in him but in her. It is he who has the hallucination of the dagger before the crime; but it is she 
who afterwards falls ill of a mental disorder. (...) Thus what he feared in his pangs of conscience 
is fulfilled in her; she becomes all remorse and he all defiance. Together they exhaust the 
possibilities of reaction to the crime, like two disunited parts of a single psychical individuality, 
and it may be that they are both copied from a single prototype88. 
 
 This is the reason why Lady Macbeth may not be understood without “considering the 
Macbeth who completes her”89. The relationship is, however, more complex than Freud’s 
depiction, as the author fails to see how both of them suffer physically from the crime. Not 
only does Macbeth experience sleeplessness but he also has hallucinations (in a scene, to 
which I shall return, in which Lady Macbeth’s role as his helper is determinant). This would 
mean that neither character would be entirely made of remorse or defiance; on the contrary, 
they both share similar feelings, even if at different times, as if they were the single prototype 
the author alludes to. Although Freud gives the interpretative clue and then inflects his 
argument, Parfit’s account helps to understand how Macbeth’s case seems to be similar to a 
situation where two people who were fused together have before them the difficult task of 
conciliating different desires, intentions and characteristics. They are not, unlike Freud’s 
considerations, copied from a single prototype; rather, they are a single individual, one 
resulting from what Parfit would call a fusion, with compatible desires and characteristics:  
                                                           
87 Sigmund Freud, “Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work,” On the History of the Psycho-
Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, vol. XIV, 1957. London: Hogarth Press and 
the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1973, p. 323. 
88 Op. cit., p. 324. 
89 Op. cit., p. 323. 
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To give examples – first, of compatibility: I like Palladio and intend to visit Venice. I am about to 
fuse with a person who likes Giotto and intends to visit Padua. I can know that the one person 
we shall become will have both tastes and both intentions. Second, of incompatibility: I hate red 
hair, and always vote Labour. The other person loves red hair, and always votes Conservative. I 
can know that the one person we shall become will be indifferent to red hair and a floating 
voter90.   
 
 The fusion of two beings “would involve the changing of some of our characteristics and 
some of our desires”91. This is a relevant point, for, at first, Macbeth’s conflicting selves made 
him unable, in Shakespeare’s words, to decide to go through with the deed, and what enables 
his actions is the incentive given to him by his wife (i. e. her rhetorical skills). This would 
explain why Lady Macbeth solves her husband’s hesitation towards murder and vice versa, as 
what made them compatible allows them to fight towards the same goals, share fears and 
intentions. Parfit is, though, also underlining the ambiguity in the fused subject’s behavior, 
making him become a floating voter with indifferent taste in hair. In Macbeth this would 
allow us to understand how the subject about to fuse has, like a couple to be married, little 
control over his (individual) actions. Interestingly, in Parfit’s terms, although each Macbeth 
is a unique individual, they seem to act as a fused subject with the degree of compatibility 
Parfit longs for. Macbeth is a case where two persons act as one and this is the characteristic 
that enables them to make decisions and overcome their individual anxieties. They are able to 
act in unison like a fused being, finding solutions to their problems. Shall we say they are the 
epitome of marriage?  
 Generations of critics argued that Macbeth’s fever of murder alters events. Charles 
Altieri, for example, considers that the tragedy begins, from the couple’s point of view, the 
moment Macbeth feels he should not share the details of the crime with his wife. If, in the 
beginning of the play, Macbeth received advice and emotional strength from his wife; if she 
sketched the murder plans for him, Macbeth ends up refusing to share his knowledge of 
events with her. Consider the following lines:  
                                                           
90 Derek Parfit, Op. cit., p. 212. 
91 Op. cit., p. 212. 
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Lady Macbeth: What’s to be done?  
Macbeth: Be innocent of the knowledge, dearest chuck,  
Till thou applaud the deed. 
 (Macbeth, III, ii, 44-46)  
 
For Altieri, something is said to have changed in the nature of their relationship, and 
she is expected to wait and applaud his actions, not to take part in them. Suddenly, Macbeth 
wishes not only for his wife to be unacquainted with the details of the crime, but also puts her  
in the position of having to applaud actions which she has not helped to devise. Another 
possibility should, however, be brought up, as Macbeth’s sorrow in the end of the play does 
not appear to show the lack of consideration for his wife that critics deem to exist. It could be 
argued that Duncan’s assassination makes Macbeth realize that such actions have 
consequences not only in his future self, but also in his wife’s (that they are inseparable). 
Macbeth knows that caring for his own body and Lady Macbeth’s is the same thing, which is 
why he realizes she will share the physical effects of the murder. He will, therefore, attempt to 
protect them both from further pain, which means safeguarding her from the knowledge of 
the other murders. This need for protecting his body (which is the same as Lady Macbeth’s) 
had started a little earlier, when Lady Macbeth gives her husband her usual advice, 
suggesting that he should disguise his thoughts before their guests: “Gentle my Lord, sleek 
o’er your rugged looks; be bright and jovial among your guests to-night” (III, ii, 28-29). 
Macbeth’s role was one of following her suggestions without commenting upon them, he now 
replies in a similar tone:  
 
So shall I, Love; and so, I pray, be you. 
Let your remembrance apply to Banquo:  
Present him eminence, both with eye and tongue:  
Unsafe the while, that we  
Must lave our honours in these flattering streams,  
And make our faces vizards to our hearts,  
Disguising what they are.  
 (Macbeth, III, ii, 29-35)  
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Macbeth wants his wife to be innocent of the details of the plans, but asks her eye and 
tongue to deceive Banquo. More than that, she has to use her memories, her fond 
remembrance of Banquo, to make him feel safe, so that he does not suspect their intentions. 
Their faces must mask the mendacity of their hearts. Macbeth had already attempted this 
dissociation, as before the murder is carried out he wishes for a separation of the senses, 
hand and eye must be alienated: “The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be, / Which the eye 
fears, when it is done, to see.” (I, iv, 52-53). If his eyes could but be closed while the murder 
takes place, when the hand is in charge, then his moral conscience would not be able to 
interfere. Macbeth longs for the sensation of leaving one’s body while the crime is being 
committed (a very common desire among torture victims, who often experience the sensation 
of being out of their bodies during torture92). Although the eye is afraid of murder, once it is 
committed there is, or so Macbeth thought, no longer the problem of seeing it. Lady Macbeth 
comments: “These deeds must not be thought / After these ways: so, it will make us mad” (II, 
ii, 32-33). Both share the erroneous assumption that if they somehow dissociate their 
conscious beings from their actions, murder will have no effect on them. The idea that 
thoughts may be stopped finds its parallel in Macbeth’s desire to close the senses during the 
time of the crime, different attempts to protect each other. In Parfit’s terms, this would be 
exemplary of the fused person thinking about herself in terms of survival and not of personal 
identity. The problem would be that Macbeth and his wife incur in what Parfit describes as 
one of the fallacies of self-interest. It is a case in which “what we ought to do can be against 
our interests. There is only the general problem that it may not be what we want to do”93. 
According to Parfit, both egoism and altruism stem from the assumption that personal 
identity matters. If, however, one understands that several selves coexist in a relationship of 
degree, then the concern for my particular and present self is a mistake, as I should be 
concerned with the implications my actions may have on my several selves. In Macbeth, 
                                                           
92 For a recent account of “out of body experiences” see: Maxwell J.F. Cooper, “Near-death experience and out of 
body phenomenon during torture – a case report”, Torture, vol. 21, n.º 3, 2011, accessed 10 Oct. 2011, 
http://www.irct.org/Files/Filer/TortureJournal/21_03_2011/Near-death-experience-3-2011.pdf. 
93 Op. cit., p. 220. 
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although the couple suspects that usurpation and further assassinations in the long run will 
be negative to their well being, they find excuses to do it, assuming it will fulfill their present 
desires. This would be a situation in which one goes against one’s best interest, hoping to be 
able to avoid the consequences of one’s own acts (and an act of egoism based on an erroneous 
assumption about personal identity). Had the couple realized this, they would have been able 
to avoid the tragedy.  
At the same time, from the moment Duncan is assassinated, Macbeth and his wife try 
to delay the tribunal of interpretation that would make them responsible for their actions. 
This point is an interesting parallel with Hamlet’s delay of Claudius’s death. While Hamlet 
wishes to catch his uncle’s reaction, Macbeth and his wife attempt to dissociate their bodies 
from their conscience, in the false assumption that 1) such a feat may be successfully 
accomplished, 2) that they possess a single body and mind, instead of a series of true and 
untrue selves fighting continuously through time, 3) that skill is not required to control 
bodily reactions, 4) that they are protecting each other, thus, safeguarding their fused being. 
Finally, they assume that to delay the tribunal is to avoid it entirely, which, as was seen, is not 
the case.  
5. Bewitched, bothered and bewildered 
One sits through Othello while successive inquests follow each other, the first in the 
play introducing a lesson on Venetian justice that the Moor will later reproduce when 
seemingly in doubt about Desdemona94. The thought that this tragedy may reproduce a 
tribunal is represented in Stanley Cavell’s essay, “Othello, The Stake of the Other,” where the 
author defies readers to prove the presumption that the play describes a witch trial, a form of 
inquiry in which comprehension is typically obscured by individual prejudices and erroneous 
                                                           
94  For an account of how Othello longed to be a part of Venetian society and live rigorously by its rules, read 
Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All. New York: Anchor Books, 2005.  
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theories about other persons. Such challenge is indeed the aim of the present text, and the 
author’s perspective sets the tone for the discussion that follows:  
 
I cannot think I am the first to say it out loud – to the hell and the demon staring out of the 
names of Othello and Desdemona. I mention this curiosity to prepare something meant as 
nearly pure conjecture, wishing others to prove it in one way or another, namely that 
underlying and shaping the events of this play are certain events of witch trials. Phrases such 
as “ocular proof” and “cords and knives \ Poison or fire, or suffocating dreams” (III, iii, 394-5), 
seem to me to call for location in a setting of judicial torture95.  
 
The skepticism in the trials of witches, each character’s need for visible proof, 
Brabantio’s accusations of bewitchment which echo throughout the play, the frequent 
mentions of devils, are portrayed in Othello, a play which problematizes the difficulty to 
acknowledge others. Although one could argue, against Cavell, that Othello’s mention of 
cords and knives, poison, fire or suffocating dreams seems to be the characterization of his 
doubts on how to assassinate Desdemona, and not his choice of a mode of proof, the play 
does portray the inability to test other’s minds and the skepticism which derives from this. 
The tragedy stages skepticism as the particular malady of an individual, but one which is 
reproduced by the Venetian State, which is why the ending of Othello consists in an argument 
favoring judicial torture.  
 Cavell diagnoses Othello’s disease as one of skepticism, arguing that the Moor’s 
surprise resides in the discovery that Desdemona is made of flesh and blood. The problem is 
not, as usually thought, the suspicion that his wife is unfaithful, but the incapacity to realize 
that she is not. The difficulty in dealing with such knowledge, with the way one is finite, 
incomplete and dependent on others, makes him choose to believe Iago’s accusations:  
 
I am claiming that we must understand Othello, on the contrary, to want to believe Iago, to be 
trying, against his knowledge, to believe him. (…) that the idea of Desdemona as an adulterous 
whore is more convenient to him than the idea of her as chaste96.  
 
 
                                                           
95 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, 1983. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, p. 140. 
96 Op. Cit., p. 133.    
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The torture of logic in his mind we might represent as follows: Either I shed her blood and 
scarred or I did not. If I did not then she is not a virgin and this is a stain upon me. Either way 
I am contaminated97.  
 
To Cavell, human sexuality in the play underlines what separates us from others, 
“turned toward splendor and toward horror, mixing beauty and ugliness”98. Othello’s 
supposed impotence is not characterized in its physical sense, but related with the Moor’s 
surprise regarding Desdemona’s sexuality, “I think of him, rather, as having been surprised 
by her, at what he has elicited from her; at, so to speak, a success rather than a failure”99. 
Othello is not, thus, moved by doubt, he did not lack certainty, “he knew everything, but he 
could not yield to what he knew”100. The tragedy consists in this failure to want to 
acknowledge Desdemona, in Othello’s startling arousal of female sexuality, and the way he is 
horrified by it. Skepticism is not defined as being the refusal of the world as it presents itself, 
or even the fear that it does not exist, but rather that its presence is undeniable. It consists in 
the thought that there are individuals we could get to know, but choose not to. The capacity, 
of certain persons, to avoid the presence of others, about whom they possess some theories or 
beliefs (which are probably wrong), is, for Cavell, tragic. This is the reason why Othello’s 
choice to believe Iago against his knowledge of Desdemona characterizes the “truth of 
skepticism”, also present in the trial of witches. In the biblical justification for these trials 
(“Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live,” Exodus), Cavell suggests one may find the explanation 
for Othello’s action and the reason why Desdemona is characterized as “a moth of peace,” i.e. 
a witch101. If Cavell’s assumption is correct, and Othello is trying to prove Desdemona’s 
culpability, then we must demonstrate how is this trial conducted and what is the nature of 
the evidence gathered.  
When, in the beginning of the play, Brabantio encounters the Moor, his first words 
are: “Down with him, thief!” (I, ii, 57), followed by an explanation, which will be repeated 
                                                           
97 Op. Cit., p. 135. 
98 Op. Cit., p. 137.  
99 Op. Cit., p. 136. 
100 Op. Cit., p. 141.  
101  Op. Cit., p. 140. 
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before the elders, of how Othello bewitched Desdemona, enchanting her with chains of 
magic, “That thou hast practised on her with foul charms, \ Abused her delicate youth with 
drugs or minerals \That weakens motion:” (I, ii, 73-75)102. Witchcraft appears as the 
explanation for the course of action one would not normally take, to portray what is seen as a 
deviation of behavior, an abnormality provoked by others. In Brabantio’s accusation, the 
proof to Othello’s mischief relies on Desdemona’s conduct, in what is seen as his capacity to 
manipulate her. While Brabantio, who, as most fathers in similar circumstances, seems 
determined a priori to consider that his daughter is innocent, sets his heart to accuse Othello, 
establish a sentence and have him imprisoned, the Duke introduces order in the procedures: 
 
To vouch this is no proof, 
 Without more certain and more overt test 
 Than these thin habits and poor likelihoods 
 Of modern seeming do prefer against him. 
  (Othello, I, iii, 108-110)      
 
While reflecting on what to do when the proof at his disposal is not clear enough to 
determine a verdict, the Duke claims that vouching for someone does not hold sufficient 
ground to determine a punishment, and so he mentions the necessity of a form of test that 
would allow him to control injurious accusations. The procedure seems to be fair, as those 
involved have the opportunity to make a claim about their case (accusation, accused and 
witness) and impartial judges provide a just verdict103. The relevance of the Duke’s words 
does not depend merely on the fact that they are sensible. It should be noted that his judicial 
theory relies on the thought that “thin habits,” i.e., “insubstantial outward appearances,” and 
“poor likelihoods,” i.e. “weak inferences, tenuous indications”104, should always be 
accompanied by other modes of explanation.  
                                                           
102  Shakespeare, Othello, ed. E. A. J. Honigmann, 1999. London: The Arden Edition, 2001.  Quotations follow this 
edition. 
103 Although Brabantio is not persuaded (“These sentences to sugar or to gall, \ Being strong on both sides, are 
equivocal.” [I, iii, 217-218]), he recognizes the authority of the procedures and allows matters of the state to 
proceed. 
104 Cf. notes in Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Norman Sanders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 83.    
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Circumstantial proof, as vouching for someone, requires further evidence or mode of 
testing. In the case of this type of evidence observers should, it seems reasonable to suppose, 
be careful in their evaluations and search, as happens in Hamlet, for definite ways to test 
hypotheses. Othello’s specificity in determining the truth derives from the fact that the Moor 
choses to believe that every word and visible proof stands for something else. This is not a 
case, unlike some authors argue, of erroneous interpretation, but one where the interpreter 
decides to supplement each bit of evidence in order to prove a pre-established theory. The 
idea, in Othello, that we may decide to imagine that the clues confirming our worst suspicions 
are everywhere is, thus, representative of a particular theory of interpretation. Brabantio’s 
incapacity to convict Othello will remind the Moor that one must collect the necessary 
evidence before making an accusation. This is the reason why, as will be seen, Othello will 
devise a causal explanation about Desdemona’s guilt that appears to make perfect sense. The 
Moor, like Hamlet, believes one’s conjectures may be proved through the analysis of exterior 
bodily signs, which point to an interior, hidden, truth. Showing Desdemona’s reactions as 
proof is conducting an exercise similar to that of Hamlet, but in Othello, as will be seen, the 
interpretation these reactions has been previously stipulated.   
The second query, determinant to the tragedy’s course of events, confirms Iago not 
only as a reliable witness, but also as one who knows much more than he is willing to say. In 
this inquest, also a result of Iago’s influence upon those near him, Othello is to be the judge. 
The Moor gives Cassio the opportunity, as one of the Senators had in his case, to explain 
himself, but he is too mortified to speak and merely asks for pardon. Montano, wounded and 
unable to testify, is then questioned, but is unable to speak. Iago appears as the main witness 
and the sentence appears to be righteous. Iago’s testimony is thought to be factual, and the 
idea that he sees others in a way that Othello does not, but fails to account for their true 
characters out of the goodness of his heart, will be present throughout the events that will 
follow: 
 
I know, Iago, 
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Thy honesty and love doth mince this matter, 
Making it light to Cassio.   
 (Othello, II, iii, 242-244)      
 
 
Nay, yet there’s more in this: 
I prithee speak to me, as to thy thinkings, 
As thou dost ruminate, and give thy worst of thoughts 
The worst of words.  
 (Othello, III, iii, 132-135) 
 
 
Why did I marry? 
This honest creature doubtless 
Sees and knows more – much more – than he unfolds.  
 (Othello, III, iii, 245-247) 
 
These lines reveal that Othello presumes that Iago’s words conceal something, as if 
his interlocutor is always explaining less than he knows, giving origin to gaps in 
interpretation that the interlocutor must fill. Iago’s sentences, from this perspective, are 
always circumstantial evidence, as they provide part of the explanation one is looking for, but 
veil that which would allow us to make sense of their whole meaning (something Marjorie 
Garber describes as being “crime by suggestion”105). In this respect, there is a correlation 
between the Ghost’s words in Hamlet and Iago’s suggestions. Although both characters’ 
words give origin to the inquest that will occupy the main characters in the play, King 
Hamlet’s accusations, unlike Iago’s words, are extremely detailed (he clearly describes the 
culprit, as well as the method of assassination used106). Hamlet’s doubts do not derive from 
incomprehension of the Ghost’s words, but from the necessity to understand whether the 
Ghost himself is truthful. Still, the Ghost provokes Hamlet’s quest, much like Iago’s words 
incite Othello’s dogged pursuit of proof. What Iago leaves untold, the Moor must 
comprehend. In Othello, therefore, interpretation is the decision to understand something 
not clearly spoken, as if reality were the equivalent of the worst of thoughts and it was never 
given its counterpart in words. The presumption is that Iago’s statements will never be 
properly understood if one does not supplement them with what he left unsaid, which is why 
                                                           
105 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All. New York: Anchor Books, 2005, p. 607. [Kindle version]  
106 Claudius words read as follow: “Now, Hamlet, hear: \ ‘Tis given out that, sleeping in my orchard, \ A serpent 
stung me. So the whole ear of Denmark \ Is by a forged process of my death \ Rankly abused. But know, thou 
noble youth, \ The serpent that did sting thy father's life \ Now wears his crown” (I, v, 36-40). 
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to have no doubts is to be able to see and know the extra others failed to mention (a 
presumption which, as will be seen, is common to other truth tests). Here lies an important 
distinction between making erroneous suppositions (I see or hear A and understand it to 
mean B) and wishing to discover the supplement for what it is said (I see or hear A and 
consider it must mean A, plus something else).   
Such theory of interpretation derives from the fact that Othello wishes to determine, 
in the presence of others, that someone’s true self is not visible, but well concealed. Othello’s 
vision about the self is slightly different from what was described in Macbeth’s case. In the 
Scottish tragedy, evil characters need to hide bodily proof of their deeds. Virtuous figures, 
however, either are vessels where emotions and thoughts coincide and become visible 
(someone is frightened by the sight of horrors and shows it in the face); or the absence of 
bodily proof implies there is nothing being hidden. To the Moor, though, both honest and 
deceitful characters veil their views, every word and bodily sign is representative of an 
unmentioned, and potentially monstrous, idea about other persons. Iago’s words, from an 
interpretative point of view, are thus very similar to the physiological signs that, for Othello, 
betray both Desdemona and Cassio’s guilt. In this tragedy, hands and smiles are also the 
visible expression for what is only partly explained: 
 
Give me your hand. This hand is moist, my lady.  
(…) 
 
This argues fruitfulness and liberal heart: 
Hot, hot and moist. This hand of yours requires 
A sequester from liberty, fasting and prayer, 
Much castigation, exercise devout, 
For here’s a young and sweating devil, here,  
That commonly rebels. ‘Tis a good hand,  
A frank one.  
 (Othello, III, iv, 36-44) 
 
 
Moist hands, for Othello, find its correlative in the eyes, which is why, before killing 
Desdemona, the Moor demands: “Let me see your eyes. \ Look in my face”. (IV, ii, 25-26). 
The incapacity to recognize “that some truthful people become emotional when suspected of 
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lying”107 is, according to Paul Ekman, “the Othello error,” exemplified in the murder scene 
and in lines such as “Out, strumpet! Weep’st thou for him to my face?” (V, ii, 76). For 
Elkman, Othello is unable to understand that the faces of innocent subjects, as Desdemona, 
may show the same emotions as those lying, due to the fact that they feel guilty about 
something else, have a “strong unresolved guilt;” “feel excitement about proving their 
accusers wrong;” fear the punishment that may follow, among other reasons108. Failure to 
analyze transformations in the pitch of voice, misinterpreting manipulators (movements in 
the body, such as massaging, pinches, scratches, etc.) or the manipulator’s actions (teeth 
biting lips, playing with pencils, etc.), and facial (squelched or micro) expressions, are all part 
of the “Othello error”. This is, as explained, a common fault in those catching liars, the 
“disbelieving-the-truth mistakes,” and the reason “why suspicious persons are terrible at 
understanding deceit, as they prefer to maintain that the subject is lying than to consider the 
alternative,” in Othello’s case, that he is “an unreasonable accusatory husband”109.  
In this respect, Ekman’s perspective should be related with the description about true 
and untrue selves. We have seen how the untrue self wishes to conceal the signs of deceit or 
mischief, which the true self, for a variety of reasons, longs to make noticeable (thus 
provoking a disparity between someone’s intentions and their unintentional bodily signs). 
But according to Ekman, Desdemona’s moist hands do not show her guilt, as she was 
innocent, but only fear, which, in fact, provokes physiological reactions such as those 
previously described. The fourth chapter of Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph 
deals with this question110. In the terms of its complex explanation we read that in the center 
of the brain lies one of its regulatory mechanisms, the hypothalamus, which controls the 
autonomic nervous system. The hypothalamus is responsible, among other activities, for the 
regulation of the endocrine hormonal system, while the autonomic nervous system controls 
                                                           
107 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies – Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage. NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001, p. 132.   
108 Op. cit., p. 170.  
109 Op. cit., p. 171.  
110 James Allan Matte, Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph, Scientific Truth Verification, Lie 
Detection. Lancashire: J. A. M. Publication, 1996.  
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the cardiac rhythm, the pulse rate and blood pressure. When the organism realizes that the 
body is being threatened, it sends a sign to the autonomic nervous system that, among other 
things, activates the sympathetic system, preparing the body for a fight and making the 
glands in the supra-renal medulla segregate hormones allowing blood redistribution where it 
is considered more necessary. At the same time, the salivary glands segregate different, 
thicker saliva, causing a feeling known as “dry mouth sensation”. The sweat glands are 
stimulated, which makes perspiration appear (thus provoking Desdemona’s moist hands). 
The sympathetic system makes the eye iris dilate, allowing more light to enter, in order to 
enhance vision and perception of what surrounds us (so a transformation could, indeed, be 
found in Desdemona’s eyes before she was assassinated). The autonomic nervous system is 
also composed of the parasympathetic system, which has the role to maintain the body’s 
homeostasis, necessary for it to work. Therefore, when the sympathetic system is activated, 
the parasympathetic follows it, reinstituting the body’s chemical balance, and avoiding blood 
pressure to increase in excess. This group of involuntary reactions makes persons react 
similarly when confronted by others. Desdemona was, therefore, reacting to Othello’s 
suspicions, whose nature she could not entirely understand. This could be a case where 
someone’s true self attempts to protect the person from harm through the appearance of 
bodily signs which are misinterpreted and lead to the subject’s death. Othello, according to 
Ekman, fails to understand how physical proof may be a symptom of fear and not deceit.   
Ekman’s characterization should be considered having in mind Othello’s theory about 
other persons. Desdemona’s hands may signal fear – as Ekman argues –, but also what 
Othello considers to be her lustful nature – as critics have noticed. The point, however, seems 
to be that Othello does not believe these physical signs to be deceitful. On the contrary, eyes 
and hands are portrayed as being frank, which, of course, they are. Even when Desdemona 
cries after learning of Cassio’s death, she is, in fact, feeling sorry for him, as well as for her 
own life. So tears and eyes reveal true emotions, while Desdemona’s hands may well show a 
licentious nature (at least according to Othello’s interpretation of lust). If one assumes 
Othello is interpreting correctly Desdemona’s emotions, this implies that, as Cavell argues, 
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Othello knows she is innocent, but is nonetheless determined to prove her guilty. From this 
perspective, Ekman is wrong to assume Othello is making a mistake. The beast in Othello’s 
jungle relies instead on the idea that every human being, i.e. all bodily proof, stands for what 
it appears to be and for an extra and well hidden horror. 
For a woman accused of witchcraft, the question of the knowledge of other minds, and 
the difficulty of proving other persons have a mind like ours, is a matter of life and death. 
Monty Python’s sketch “Burn the witch” allows a further understanding of this problem111. 
Cases of witchery were traditionally difficult to judge, as it was considered that witches were 
masters at disguising themselves, thus being able to conceal their true identity through the 
use of artifices. They were frequently targeted by the wrath of populations, to whom the 
ordeal or torture was the only way of making sure they were correctly identified. In the 
sketch, a group of villagers clamors that they have found a witch and that they should burn 
her. When Sir Bedevere asks them how do they know she is, in fact, a witch, the villagers 
claim that she looks like one. It does not take much time to discover that they had dressed 
her as one, giving her, for example, a false nose. The enunciation of “She is a witch” is, of 
course, accompanied by the fact that she looks like the stereotype of a sorceress. The detail 
that they have fabricated these similarities does not seem to matter. The villagers do know, 
therefore, that she is probably not a witch, but they still choose to consider her as one, which 
reminds us of Othello. Dressing this woman and making an accusation is a form of convicting 
her, the tortuous rhetoric being that if she was a witch in disguise it made sense to dress her 
as one, so that she could be properly condemned. And, of course, if she is dressed like a 
witch, she is a witch. From this perspective, it does not matter whether she was a sorcerer 
before the accusation, as she becomes one the moment the villagers determine to accuse her. 
The verdict is thus transformed into the accusation (an accomplishment worthy of Iago’s 
influence over Othello, as well as of Othello’s determination to convict Desdemona). Contrast 
                                                           
111 Monty Python and the Holy Grail, 1975, dir. Terry Gilliam, Terry Jones, in Monty Python - Almost Everything 
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this thought with Cavell’s description of Othello’s demand for proof, i.e. his way of dressing 
Desdemona as an adulterous:  
 
But what prompts my thought primarily is the crazed logic Othello’s rage for proof and for 
“satisfaction” seems to require (like testing for a woman’s witchcraft by seeing whether she will 
drown, declaring that if she does she was innocent but if she does not she is put to death for a 
witch)112.  
 
Cavell is portraying the request for evidence of those who know that some forms of 
testing others necessarily end in their conviction. From this perspective, claiming for 
evidence is a protocol with a predefined ending (either the woman is innocent and drowns or 
she is condemned as a witch). In Monty Python’s sketch, the fact that a succession of ordeals 
is presented is important. Firstly, the villagers long to burn the witch, after an illogic 
reasoning they decide to throw her into the lake, to then test her on the ordeal of the scales, 
change their minds, and return to the first solution and choose to burn her. The suggestion 
appears to be that, no matter what is the chosen form of proof, the witch will not be saved. 
Observe the reasoning that leads to the verdict, representative of Sir Bedevere’s claim that 
“There are ways of telling she is a witch”:  
 
1. 
a) witches burn; 
b) wood burns; 
c) the witch is made of wood. 
  
Therefore, in order to prove the woman is a witch, they must show she is made of wood.  
 
2.  
a) wood floats; 
b) ducks float; 
c) if the woman weights the same as a duck, she is made of wood.  
 
 
 These syllogisms depend on wild analogies and this does seem to be a case of faulty 
logic. Ordeals are not only portrayed as a form of imperfect reasoning, as Sir Bedevere 
appears to be suggesting that, when one knows what to do with the supposed witch, there is 
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no logic, either good or bad, that may save her. Even if the arguments of the villagers are 
biased, as shown by the clothes, the nose, etc. – Sir Bedevere, in a manner of speaking, 
attempts to conduct a rational trial (much like Desdemona’s hands and eyes). Interestingly, 
in this scene, the verdict does not appeal to a divine form of Judgment; on the contrary, it is 
shown as a scientific mode of reasoning. It is not a coincidence that, at the end of the sketch, 
it is asked: “Who are you who are so wise in the ways of science?” Wisdom is equivalent to a 
proper understanding of the logic of Sir Bedevere’s illogic rules. More importantly than 
understanding facts such as “wood burns,” it is determinant to realize that if the woman 
weights the same as a duck, she is a duck, and therefore a witch. At the end of the sketch one 
laughs at those who believe in witches, and those who choose to convict them arbitrarily. 
Still, the demand for proof is seen as the guarantee of degree of certainty to the accusation 
and to a process whose ending had previously been established. It is interesting how the 
sketch underlines the fact that sometimes one’s decisions are sustained in senseless analogies 
that, vehemently justified, appear to be evident.    
 Returning to Othello, consider the Moor’s quest for proof. Desdemona’s hand is frank 
in the sense that Iago’s words are truthful; they reveal her supposedly liberal heart, hot and 
moist standing for an immodest nature. Saying that the hand is humid is not considering it 
dishonest; on the contrary, it is a good hand for it is a clue to her character that may only be 
properly seen when considered with other information. A moist hand without Othello’s 
imagination is not representative, but with it, it stands for that needing punishment, fasting 
and prayer. Similarly, demanding to look at Desdemona’s eyes equals asking for Iago’s 
truthful inner thoughts, the eyes signaling that extra something which he wishes had 
remained untold. This is, thus, a case where what one sees or hears only provides a partial 
knowledge, and, to be justified, information requires an interpretative effort on the part of 
the observer, which must use his own knowledge in order to understand a certain state of 
affairs. It should be noticed how Iago’s insinuations are accompanied by the manner he 
skillfully handles his own physical reactions in a way that will make Othello mad:  
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In my whole course of wooing, thou criedst ‘Indeed’?  
And didst contract and purse thy brow together  
As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain  
Some horrible conceit. If thou dost love me 
Show me thy thought.  
 (Othello, III, iii, 115-119)  
 
To Othello, crying “Indeed?” and contracting the brows together have the same value, 
as he longs to consider them signs in need of interpretation. These expressions are the 
footsteps that indicate the horrible secrets inside a person’s mind. Othello desires what, in 
the next chapter, will be considered an ostensive mode of showing things, which departs from 
the presupposition that, in certain situations, it is possible to point at something and 
understand it completely, without the need for further explanations. For now, though, the 
lesson, courtesy of skepticism, seems to be the assumption that every term argues for 
something else:  
 
As he shall smile, Othello shall go mad.  
And his unbookish jealousy must construe 
Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviour 
Quite in the wrong.  
 (Othello, IV, i, 101-104) 
 
The pantomime created to make Othello mad (so similar to the way Hamlet deployed 
his Mousetrap) works because Iago knows Othello builds upon what he sees, instead of 
relying on his previous knowledge about Cassio. “Construe” means “to connect 
grammatically,” “to combine (words or parts of speech) grammatically,” “to admit of 
grammatical analysis or interpretation,” “to expound, interpret, or take in a specified way,” 
but also, “to explain or interpret for legal purposes”113. Smiles, gestures and light behavior, 
like Iago’s expressions and Desdemona’s hands and eyes, are the basis upon which Othello 
legally, and illogically, interprets affairs. To construe is the Moor’s form of completing the 
information he knows to be lacking, but which in his case acquires the negative sense of 
interpretative excess, as he attributes to Cassio intentions that exist merely in Iago’s 
insinuations.  
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From the Moor’s point of view, visible proof allows the avoidance of skeptical doubts 
about other persons, as if every thought and occurrence were exteriorized in observable 
evidence and did not allow secrets. But this type of proof, much like Iago’s words, leaves 
room for interpretation, as speech is used to suggest what remains hidden and unexpressed, 
the exterior being used to pinpoint the interior’s existence. The difference (one of many, 
needless to say) between Iago’s enunciations and full proof (that which leads to someone’s 
conviction without further doubts, such as a confession), derives from the fact that he plays 
with this opposition between what is supposedly hidden, and thus interior, and what is 
exterior, and would thus be visible. The way Iago conceals things from Othello does not 
derive from a particular use of grammar, but from the way he chooses to allude to things he is 
not willing to fully explain. Such technique consists in suggesting things which cannot be 
entirely clarified, so that an obsessive interpreter faces the need to fill those interpretative 
gaps. The implication seems to be that full proof would manifest its causality, making 
interpretation unnecessary, unlike circumstantial proof which the interpreter must complete. 
Othello’s necessity for exteriorization is represented in his quest for unequivocal evidence. In 
Othello, the aspiration for the interior’s exteriorization is sought out in his accounts about the 
need for full proof:  
 
No: to be once in doubt 
Is once to be resolved.  
 (Othello, III, iii, 182-183) 
 
 No, Iago, 
 I’ll see before I doubt, when I doubt, prove, 
 And on the proof there is no more but this: 
Away at once with love and jealousy! 
 (Othello, III, iii, 192-195) 
 
Villain, be sure thou prove my love a whore, 
Be sure of it, give me the ocular proof.  
 (Othello, III, iii, 362-363) 
 
We know, after Cavell, that Othello is lost the moment he asks for proof of 
Desdemona’s treason and chooses to believe Iago, instead of his wife. But, more importantly, 
when Othello asks for ocular proof he is assuming that what is visible would dismiss the need 
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for supplementary explanations. While doubt is to be related with undesired interiority, to be 
resolute would be the equivalent of settling a certain affair externally. Visible proof, thus, 
allows the denial of an inner state of doubt, but also of feelings generally portrayed as 
interior, such as love and jealousy. Evidence is, thus, the exterior element that possesses the 
ability to explain a certain state of affairs and to supposedly solve inner fears. Although the 
first and the second quotation seem to be contradictory, the initial lines describing how to 
doubt is to be certain, and the others the way uncertainty requires proof, the main thought in 
both passages is the assumption that suspicion must always be accompanied by further 
evidence or certainty. Even though the Moor seems to think otherwise, for him proof requires 
accessories. This is truly Othello’s mistake: the thought that what is visible and completely 
externalized does not compel further inquiry or interpretation, and the lack of understanding 
of his own mind and process of reasoning, based upon the idea that everything is 
accompanied by an inner and horrible truth which is left untold. In fact, it does not matter 
which is the type of proof Othello is given, as he will always attempt to transform it, following 
Iago’s advice, into an explanation about deception.  
 
An employee of the CIA for twenty-eight years wrote: ‘As a causal explanation, deception is 
intrinsically satisfying precisely because it is so orderly and rational. When other persuasive 
explanations are not (perhaps because the phenomena we are seeking to explain were actually 
caused by mistakes, failures to follow orders, or other factors unknown to us), deception offers 
a convenient and easy explanation. It is convenient because intelligence officers are generally 
sensible to the possibility of deception, and its detection is often taken as indicative of 
sophisticated penetrating analysis’114.  
 
In this representation, rationalizations about duplicity have the advantage of being 
more perfect than others, as they have the benefit of appearing to be orderly and rational. 
Such descriptions seem to be superior to other possibilities given the fact that they are never 
portrayed as a result of error, mistake or failure. This is, it could be argued, due to the fact 
that the interpreter outlines clearly the proof at hand, neglecting what does not appear to 
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make sense in this light, and favoring evidence which is in agreement with this previously 
established theory. One’s preference for conspiratorial theories, or what Cavell sees as 
Othello’s wish to prove his wife’s guilt, would justify the timeliness of these clarifications. The 
need for ocular proof is also related with Othello’s fallacious assumption that the explanation 
for all events is hidden in Iago’s mind, but may be ascertained if visible evidence is found. 
What he does not understand is that this is a truth that was previously determined, and that 
all proof will end up, as it depends on his biased interpretation, proving Iago’s words.  
At the same time, in his quest for an absolute certainty where inference would not 
play a role, Othello inaccurately assumes that visible proof is not circumstantial and that its 
prima facie validity does not require a supplement. In Othello, as mentioned, interpretation 
appears as a necessity due to Iago’s purposeful insinuations. Here, it is of great interest to us 
the thought that Iago, the figure of Vice, uses language as a form of insinuation, accompanied 
by Marjorie Garber’s description of how to imply is a form of pulling dark things out of 
people’s imaginations: 
 
For just as we noticed that he never does anything, but instead moves other people to do 
things, so he never really says anything, but uses language to insinuate, to imply, to pull out of 
people’s imaginations the dark things that are already there115.  
 
Garber maintains that “Iago is inside as well as outside Othello”116: as he uses 
language as a form of suggesting vile thoughts that are already present in each character’s 
mind, he echoes them, as Othello himself notices. In this form of insinuation relies Iago’s 
torture of Othello, which resides in highlighting the idea that there is an unbearable truth to 
be learned. Notice how to insinuate signifies “1. To introduce tortuously, sinuously, indirectly 
or by devious methods; to introduce by imperceptible degrees or subtle means”; “2. To 
introduce (a person) by sinuous, stealthy, or artful ways into some position or relation; esp. 
refl. to worm oneself in, or make one’s way sinuously or stealthily into the company, society, 
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favour, affection, etc. of another”117. The notion of insinuation in the play does not portray 
merely the way someone has introduced himself (as Iago has into Othello’s close circle of 
acquaintances in order to do him harm), but also how he tortuously gave voice to thoughts 
and fears in Othello’s mind. Notice how this aspect is similar to Hamlet’s pantomime, in the 
sense that he, too, was predisposing the suspect to the interrogation, emphasizing his 
emotional tension in order to obtain the required outcome (a mode of proceeding, you will 
recall, that appears to be similar to how a torturer obtains a confession from a suspect). From 
this perspective, returning to Garber’s sentence, if the act of torturing may be described as a 
technique of extracting dark things, such as confessions of crimes, from people’s minds, 
perhaps it is not an overstatement to deem Iago as Othello’s torturer:  
 
Avaunt, be gone, thou hast set me on the rack! 
I swear ‘tis better to be much abused 
Than but to know’t a little.  
(Othello, III, iii, 338-340)  
 
As it is commonly known, references to torture occur in Othello, as in other 
Shakespeare’s plays. Take the rack, one of the oldest and most common instruments of 
torture, is a rectangular wooden table, where the accused is placed with his arms and legs 
stretched and tied to weights or rollers. Once working, the torturers pull the strings, 
dislocating the articulations, bones and muscles of the accused, and leading the body to its 
breaking point. It is a particularly painful technique, accentuated by the cracking sound made 
by the disjointing of the limbs, which produces a devastating effect on the accused. When 
Othello argues that Iago has put him on the rack, he is complaining about how his own 
skeptical doubts are represented in Iago’s words. The rack appears as the skeptical 
instrument of truth, which provides the type of proof one is looking for. The fact that Othello 
is the one on the rack, and the way Iago is to blame for it, is telling, as Iago is helping him in 
this pre-established quest for certainty. In Othello, such dismembering may be perceived in 
the following passage, which is worth quoting, as is its analysis:  
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Handkerchief! confessions! handkerchief! – To confess and be hanged for his labour! First to 
be hanged, and then to confess: I tremble at it. Nature would not invest such shadowing 
passion without some instruction. It is not words that shakes me thus. Pish! Noses, ears, and 
lips. Is’t possible? Confess! Handkerchief! O devil!”  
(Othello, IV, 1, 41-43)  
 
 
The breakdown of Othello’s speech follows the loss of his faith in Desdemona. Iago’s 
manipulation of language through subtraction, insinuation, artful echo, pause, and silence – 
ultimately outlaws and outwits the grand speeches and resounding periods. (…) Othello says, 
‘It is not words that shakes me thus’- yet it is only words that do, Iago’s words 118. 
 
The idea that the language of Othello, his “music,” in G. Wilson Knight’s expression, 
collapses in this scene, is sensible. Marjorie Garber considers that the outcome of Iago’s 
maneuvering of language is the loss of Othello’s language, which, as in other plays, is deemed 
the emblem of his loss of humanity. Incoherence, “fragments of sentences about fragments of 
bodies,” signals the breakdown of Othello’s personality, and of what was important to him, in 
Garber’s words, his reputation, sense of soldier, diplomat, Venetian hero and husband. But 
Othello’s complaint that he is not being shaken by words must be read having in mind the 
way he argues that he has been set on the rack, which is why noses, ears and lips appear to be 
disjointed, and are followed by the word “confess”. What makes him quiver is the form of test 
he knows to be demanding and the way Iago’s words are a preview of what will happen to 
Desdemona. The confirmation of his skeptical doubts are those noises during torture that will 
end up producing his fit, the consequence of excessive pain in a subject who perishes during 
the torment. Confessions under torture are seldom great speeches, which is the reason 
Othello recovers his voice only after Iago is under arrest. For Cavell, in the previously quoted 
sentence, “First to be hanged, and then to confess: I tremble at it” (IV, i, 38-39), Othello does 
not know whether he is a torturer or victim. It may be argued that Othello is Desdemona’s 
torturer (he certainly is her executioner), but in this passage he is also the tortured one119. So, 
on the one side, Othello is Iago’s victim of torture, who leads him to the rack with the aim to 
extract from him the truth about Othello’s conviction regarding Desdemona’s culpability. 
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But, on the other side, Othello is indeed Desdemona’s torturer, in the sense that he construes 
the evidence leading to her guilt, and establishes his own tribunal of interpretation with the 
pre-determined purpose to convict her.  
Lastly, when speaking of “torment” it is fitting that the word derive from the Latin 
torqueo, to twist, while the tortor is the one who twists or tightens the ropes on the rack, 
which is a good description of Iago’s procedure, as Othello suspects. Insinuation appears, 
therefore, as the form that allows the rack’s ropes to be pulled, thus increasing the amount of 
pain to be inflicted on the subject. This is why even if, at some point, Othello understands the 
need for such a test, he threatens his torturer regarding the consequences of erroneously 
administering the proof.  
 
If thou dost slander her and torture me 
Never pray more, abandon all remorse; 
On horror’s head horrors accumulate, 
        (Othello, III, iii, 371-373) 
 
Torture appears as the form of manipulation Garber described, but also as a way of 
making someone believe, as was mentioned, that everything is what it appears to be and 
something else, those horrors that gather on horror’s head. Torturing, a form of twisting 
someone to give shape to his meanings, thus making a confession emerge, is here described 
both as a mode of inflicting pain, and as a way of twisting thoughts into ideas of jealousy. 
These horrors are also the threat which Othello, as a tortured subject, will wish to impose 
upon Iago, his torturer. This accumulation of terrors, or the collecting of inferred evidence 
that “may help to thicken other proofs” (III, iii, 433) is Iago’s manner of tightening the ropes, 
while making Othello be content with circumstantial proof: “But yet, I say, \ If imputation 
and strong circumstances \ Which lead directly to the door of truth \ Will give you 
satisfaction, you may have’ t. (III, iii, 409-411). Iago’s lines redefine Hamlet’s more 
reasonable words120, which aim to represent the possibility of finding favorable 
                                                           
120 Cf. “If circumstances lead me, I will find \ Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed \ Within the centre”. 
(Hamlet, II, ii, 157-159) 
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circumstances leading to the hidden truth. Othello, however, will be guided to the entrance of 
certainty, but left at its doorstep. This passage helps us consider the reasons of Othello’s 
failure to ascertain the truth: the fact that he, unlike Hamlet, did not wish to be a good 
evaluator of other’s bodily expressions, that he chose his Horatio thinking about the desired 
outcome for his trial, and that he devised his group of ordeals sustained in circumstantial 
proof. Othello’s tribunal of interpretation, unlike ordinary courts, departs from the idea that 
someone has a hidden self and that it may be put to the test. But it considered the judge’s 
function to supplement the information given with what he considers to be left untold, as if 
circumstantial proof obliges its interpreter to make sense of its meaning, to construe its 
sense121.  
As was seen, Othello's theory proves to be the result of someone’s interpretative 
excesses, but the play ends showing that the Moor’s malady is that of the Venetian state. 
Judicial torture is portrayed as allowing characters to control such excesses, punish the guilty 
one, and, hopefully, make him speak. Observe this argument in favor of the use of torture (it 
is unimportant whether it is Shakespeare’s or what the Venetian State deems to be a proper 
mode of solving difficult affairs): 
 
        For this slave, 
If there be any cunning cruelty 
That can torment him much and hold him long, 
It shall be his.  
     (Othello, V, ii, 330-333) 
 
(…) 
 
         To you, lord governor, 
Remains the censure of this hellish villain, 
The time, the place, the torture: O, enforce it! 
       (Othello, V, ii, 365-367) 
 
 The last scene, focused on Iago’s motivations, is an attempt to deny his words, “From 
this time forth I never will speak a word.”, to which Gratiano replies “Torments will ope your 
                                                           
121 Such thought, which Desdemona intuitively shares, but is unable to fully comprehend, is represented in her 
line, “O, my fear interprets!” (V, ii, 73), which in some editions appears as “O Feare interprets then…,” and is 
followed by “What he is dead?” (V, ii, 74). This verse, the best description of Othello’s theory of interpretation, 
exemplifies a way of analyzing situations that tends to extrapolate affairs.  
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lips” (V, ii, 301-302). Torture is not, however, being used to extract a confession, but as a 
form of punishing Iago. An admission under torture has the advantage of dismissing the need 
for other evidence (it is the “queen of proof”), thus making causal explanations unnecessary. 
A confession under torture would thus enable the truth to appear, the whole truth, leading to 
Iago’s conviction without further doubt. Torture, in Othello, has the value of Hamlet’s theatre 
show, and of blood, the witness Macbeth longs to avoid. At the same time, torture is the reply 
given by the Venetian state to the Duke’s initial critique of forms of obtaining the truth based 
on weak inferences. Torture appears, therefore, as a mode of obtaining certainty, dealing with 
intractable subjects and of controlling interpretation. 
In the ending of each play lies an important difference between Hamlet, Macbeth and 
Othello. Hamlet’s last lines portray his advice to Horatio: “I am dead, / Thou livest. Report 
me and my cause aright / To the unsatisfied.” (V, ii, 343-345) , or “If thou didst ever hold me 
in thy heart, / Absent thee from felicity awhile, / And in this harsh world draw thy breath in 
pain / To tell my story” (V, ii, 351-354). Horatio remains alive with the task of explaining the 
tragedy of Denmark to others, he needs to justify Hamlet’s actions and explain on whom laid 
the guilt of his father’s murder. On the contrary, Macbeth’s finale consists on the other 
characters’ unkind words to the diseased tyrant. According to Siward: “He’s worth no more; / 
And so God be with him! – Here comes new comfort” (V, ix, 17-19). Both plays conclude with 
the beginning of a new reign, but it is known that Hamlet will be perpetuated, while in 
Macbeth everyone aims to forget what has happened: measure, time and place are in order, 
so there is no need to look back and pay attention to what was an attempt to pervert time and 
power. Hamlet wished to make people acquainted with the truth and wanted Claudius to 
publicly confess, so he conjures a strategy to this effect. Macbeth and his wife, on the 
contrary, spend their time trying to conceal their actions and making sure no one will know 
them; they are trying to hide their story during the whole duration of the play. In Othello the 
case is slightly different, as successive inquiries follow each other, different attempts to 
fathom the characters' honesty. In the other tragedies, it was possible to realize what the 
truth was (considering Hamlet is able to provide the evidence in need, and Macbeth knows he 
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committed the assassination and understands the nature of the punishment which follows). 
In Othello, at first sight, characters tend to extrapolate and assume their worst conjectures 
are facts, failing to understand the evidence at their disposal and to test the truth. If this were 
so, Othello’s skill would differ from Hamlet’s and he could not be seen as an accurate 
interpreter. But when we consider Cavell’s theory correct, we understand that Othello was, 
indeed, trying to prove Desdemona’s guilt; we realize that his talent (as well as his 
misfortune) lies in the ability to construe a causal story of deceit from circumstantial 
evidence. In fact, Othello’s plot seems to conclude without a conclusive answer to the 
problems posed as, unlike the other plays, it ends with the threat of torture and the 
establishment of a court (as well as the interrogation on whether Iago’s motives will ever be 
clarified). 
There is another important point in Hamlet’s wishes for his saga to be told: while he 
knows that a truth test may help to uncover a criminal, he understands that sometimes to 
pronounce a verdict about someone’s culpability is a way of telling a story. When Hamlet, 
Macbeth and Othello are read and juxtaposed side by side, paying attention to the way bodily 
signs and physical reactions are described, one understands two things. Firstly, that it is 
assumed these signs do not need to be interpreted, they are considered to be so clear that the 
only thing to do is to look at them attentively. This is the reason why Horatio and Hamlet 
seem to see the same when they look at Claudius and, ultimately, why the Macbeths attempt 
to veil their faces. This type of evidence seems to demonstrate a dichotomy between forms of 
proof: if, on the one hand, they seem to work through an ostensive definition (pointing to an 
object and defining it), on the other, they also depend on the observer’s ability to tell, or 
justify, a story. Both forms of description will be object of discussion in the following chapter. 
  
Chapter II 
The Truth in a Nutshell 
 
A drop of patience; but alas, to make me  
The fixed figure for the time of scorn,  
To point his flow, and moving finger at!  
    (Othello, IV, ii, 54-56)  
  
Bleeding corpses, doll's houses for forensic use, some Shakespeare's lines or 
someone's bodily signs, will be the object of the following pages. Interpreters look upon these 
contradictory entities, which, at first sight, appear to be simultaneously secretive and 
talkative, both resisting and demanding analysis, as a key that allows the comprehension of 
intricate situations.  
The chapter deals with two complementary attempts to control interpretation. The 
possibility that a problem may be solved – if the observer is both attentive and skillful, if he 
possesses the ability to point to a certain object, or characteristic, and make (truthful) 
assertions about it – is considered. However, the act of pointing to something gives the 
impression that interpretation is not being used as a tool for the object’s comprehension, 
which, as will be seen, is not always the case. This way of understanding intricate problems 
considers that certain objects, used as touchstones, allow us to make truthful judgments. In 
such cases, the interpreter must manage the touchstone appropriately, thereby associating 
the technique of pointing to interpretative tools such as comparison and analysis.  
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The case of Frances Glessner Lee's nutshell models, small doll-houses built to help 
police investigators in their analysis of crime scenes, allows us to understand how 
observation and the ability to point to the features of a certain object may help to decipher 
complex enigmas. In Macbeth and Richard III, interpreters fear or attempt to ignore 
evidence which may be seen by all and denied by no one. For example, when, in the first act 
of the play, Lady Anne maintains that King Edward's corpse, her father-in-law, is bleeding in 
accusation of Richard of Gloucester's crimes, no one disagrees. This is a situation where the 
entity, i.e. the corpse; the one making the accusation, Lady Anne; and the offender, Richard, 
seem to be of a similar mind (even if, at first sight, the corpse does not seem to possess a 
mind). Entities considered as fluent as bleeding corpses are, as will be seen, used as a 
touchstone. This is exemplified by Hamlet's way of showing Gertrude the superiority of his 
father over Claudius, or by Matthew Arnold's defense of a touchstone critical method. The 
following pages deal with modes of pointing that seem to be more than a way of indicating 
something, rather a means of understanding and of proving the veracity or falseness of an 
accusation.  
1. Observing and pointing 
 
In a crime scene, the unexposed part of a pillow has marks of lipstick. Is this 
indication of natural death, suicide or murder? Learning how to distinguish different 
hypotheses will be the investigator’s task. Frances Glessner Lee, a wealthy woman with an 
unusual interest in death, forensic medicine, crime investigation and doll’s houses, searched 
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for a way to deal with such problems. Lee was responsible, among other feats, for the 
establishment of the Department of Legal Medicine at Harvard, in 1931. She is mostly 
remembered, however, for building “The Nutshell Studies of Unexplained Death,” a group of 
dioramas that reproduce crime scenes on a one-inch to one-foot scale. The “nutshell models," 
small doll's houses featuring gruesome details, have the purpose to teach policemen to be 
attentive, and to reflect upon the type of proof one may find in a crime scene122. Inside the 
nutshell called "Unpapered Bedroom,” one encounters a miniature doll lying dead in bed. In 
the police report, it is explained that Mrs. Bessie Collins had rented a room to a couple that 
identified themselves as Mr. and Mrs. John Smith123. On Monday morning the man leaves 
early, paying for the room and asking the landlady to leave his wife undisturbed, as she 
wished to sleep in. At three in the afternoon, Mrs. Bessie Collins asks the maid, Stella Walsh, 
to see if the area may be tidied. At five, the servant says something is wrong, as she is unable 
to wake Mrs. John Smith. Both women enter the room and discover the body is cold, 
therefore calling the police. Investigators find the place exactly as the landlady had left it.  
This educational tool has the purpose to train police officers, in order to improve their 
observation skills, avoid the destruction of valuable evidence, and notice small details, 
without which the crime scene would be misunderstood (policemen were given the 
information usually available in investigations, such as witnesses’ testimonies). Charles 
Dickens, in Bleak House, characterized Inspector Bucket as an intelligent man with a 
“cunning eye,” one who “mounts a high tower in his mind and looks out far and wide”124. In 
the diorama's case, police officers should possess intelligence and observation skills, but 
instead of looking far and wide, they had to concentrate on the particular elements of the 
                                                           
122 Composed over the years, and in obedience to the most rigorous principles of representation, the models were 
extremely detailed, as Glessner Lee considered that the policemen would only take the exercise seriously if they 
felt the crime scenes were real. Varying according to each crime, the dioramas contain, for example, droplets of 
blood on the floor or in a baby's nursery room wall, a dead miniature body in a cabin, a box of tiny chocolates 
beneath a bed, cigarettes, newspapers, an open window. All models have a calendar on the wall, which indicates 
the day of the murder. 
123 There is a calendar five years behind hanging on the wall (a sign that Mrs. Collins is not the most attentive 
housekeeper), the entry rug is showing signs of wear and tear, and simple fabrics indicate that this is a modest 
establishment. 
124  Charles Dickens, Bleak House. London: Wordsworth Classics, 2001, p. 655. 
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crime scene. Glessner explains the exercise by saying: “The inspector may best imagine them 
by imagining himself a trifle less than six inches tall. With that firmly in mind, a few 
moments of observation will then make him able to step into the scene and there find many 
tiny details that might otherwise escape notice”125. Whereas Dickens’s Inspector Buckley 
searched in his mind for an explanation, Lee’s investigators must concentrate their attention 
on each object. To properly see them, the viewer had to position himself in the correct angle, 
given that the puzzle proposed by Glessner Lee could only be solved if the observer were in 
the right place. This was not, however, the entirety of what the investigator had to envision: 
  
Because continuous actions cannot be represented, each model is a tableau depicting the scene 
at the most effective moment, very much as if a motion picture were stopped at such a point. 
(...) In presenting these cases the Nutshell laboratories are acting as a consulting agency, the 
time and date when a case is presented to them is not necessarily the same as the time and 
date when it is reported to the police. Each case is based on actual facts, altered to avoid 
identification and enlarged to create a more intricate problem126.  
 
Although the dolls' dresses, as well as their houses, obeyed to strict principles of 
verisimilitude, varying according to social status, the crime scenes were a modification of 
murders that had taken place. Not only were certain facts altered, as Lee felt the need to 
make the puzzle more complex (it is intriguing to consider how cases that troubled 
investigators for months were not deemed sufficiently elaborate to her eyes). Interestingly, 
the exercise seems to reproduce not the work of a police investigator, but that of the author of 
sleuth mystery novels, somewhat like Lee's friend, Erle Stanley Gardner, who devised murder 
stories and had to come up with a plausible explanation for them. Instead of writing a 
narrative, Lee chose a moment and used it to represent a problem needing to be solved. 
Another difference between the two friends had to do with the fact that, for Frances Lee, the 
crime's resolution was less important than the valuable lesson of teaching policemen how to 
be attentive. Here lies an important specificity of Glessner's method: although the crime 
scene is taken as a whole, each object represents a particular problem needing to be 
                                                           
125 Frances Glessner Lee, “Foreword to the Investigator,” in Corinne May Botz, The Nutshell Studies of 
Unexplained Death. New York: The Monacelli Press, 2004, p. 47. 
126 Frances Glessner Lee, Op. cit., p. 47. 
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disentangled and without which it becomes impossible to find the solution to the case.  
For this to be possible, it is necessary to have method127. Lee provided the material 
which would usually be at the investigators' disposal when approaching the crime scene, as 
well as initial statements from witnesses. It should be considered that a crime scene 
represents a place where something extraordinary takes place. The occurrence of a murder, 
whose meaning has to be disclosed, is frequently compared with an enigmatic site that resists 
interpretation. Yet, the crime scene is also a location where, unlike the coffee you order every 
morning at the usual coffee shop, a problem is presented, thus calling for interpretation. The 
difference between both places seems to reside in the fact that, although I may look for 
inordinate things in the former, and even find them, ordering a coffee daily is not a problem 
that requires a solution. Perhaps a reasonable account for this would be to consider that 
crime scenes and, consequently, the objects inside them, are difficult to explain, but do 
demand explanation. In her "Foreword to the Investigator,” Lee observes:   
 
It will simplify the examiner's work if he will first choose the point at which he enters the scene 
and, beginning at his left at the place, describe the premises in a clockwise direction back to the 
starting point, thence to the centre of the scene and ending with the body and its immediate 
surroundings128.   
 
 Each article presents a problem needing to be solved. Lee's skilled observer should 
point carefully to an object, in an attempt to underline otherwise unnoticed features, which 
exist, and are potentially visible, only to be seen by particularly good observers or specialists. 
This perspective results from the idea that the interpreter’s surveillance brings forth hidden 
characteristics of things or situations. Such mode of understanding assumes that doubtful 
things can be exhaustively analyzed through observation. The description of the scene in a 
clockwise direction turned police officers into systematic analysts, and had the purpose of 
                                                           
127 In the Harvard Department of Legal Medicine, the nutshell models were included in the curricula of the 
seminars for training policemen (the dioramas, now in Baltimore, are still used to improve investigators' skills). 
Glessner, who paid for the sessions, was the only woman present, and would give examiners a limited amount of 
time to take notes of the crime scenes and then tell others what they had seen (achievement was always rewarded 
with a dinner at the Ritz Carlton, where policemen were taught to be at their best behaviour, while enjoying the 
exquisite china Glessner had especially bought for the occasion). 
128 Op. cit., p. 47. 
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making them acknowledge every article in the room, whether the item had, or not, relevance. 
Assumptions should only be made after the categorization of the objects had taken place, as 
every detail could be of importance for the solving of the crime. To see a scene clockwise 
implies, firstly, the act of collecting information and, secondly, the transformation of that 
information into proof. Lee does not, however, portray this as an explanation of evidence. 
Her aim with the nutshells is to observe something and not to interpret it (as will be later 
seen, in these modes of proof interpretation seems to be considered something the observer 
adds to the facts previously analyzed, which should be dismissed in accurate evaluations).  
A point in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations helps to enlighten Glessner 
Lee’s theory of observation, as the possibility of showing an object without explaining it is 
perhaps better understood if one considers ostensive definitions129.. Wittgenstein argues that, 
to understand what “red” is, we do not need to hear an explanation of what red means, but 
only to point to a red object or to say: “That is red”. Hence, the color may be demonstrated 
through the application of the word “red” to a red object (to understand an object is to be able 
to name it and to comprehend its use). P. M. S. Hacker refers that ostensive explanations 
may appear in the form of: “a deictic gesture; something pointed at; a verbal formula that is, 
or that is called”130. These definitions are not, though, a description or a justification, “what it 
does is provide a standard of correctness for the use of the word red”131.. There are important 
differences, which will be later discussed, between Lee’s perspective and Wittgenstein’s 
claim, thus abruptly abridged. Still, the notion that “an ostensive definition explains the 
use”132 of a certain word accurately represents these investigators’ ambition, as their main 
purpose in a crime scene is to be able to point to some objects and determine what their use 
was in that context. This process may be learned through what Wittgenstein calls “ostensive 
teaching of words”: 
                                                           
129 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, 1953. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001, § 27 to § 39, p. 11-17.  
130  G. P. Baker, P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning, 1980. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005, p. 85.  
131 Op. cit., p. 91. 
132 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Op. cit, § 30, p. 12.  
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An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to objects, directing the 
child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word ‘slab’ as 
he point to that shape. (I do not want to call this ‘ostensive definition’, because the child 
cannot as yet ask what the name is. I will call it ‘ostensive teaching of words’. – I will say it will 
form an important part of the training, because it is so with human beings; not because it 
could not be imagined otherwise133.  
  
Wittgenstein is describing the way children may learn to relate a certain object, color 
or shape with its name, thus associating “the word and the thing”. Unlike an ostensive 
definition, which requires someone to acknowledge and understand what names are, this 
introductory process merely aims to teach students to name objects. Such procedure, which 
in Lee’s theory of observation would consist of the making of a list with the name of the 
objects in the crime scene, is the first step in Wittgenstein’s process of learning. After this, 
one could be taught how to describe them, as:  
 
“naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for 
description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game – any more than putting a 
piece in its place on the board is a move in chess”134.  
 
This separation between naming and describing is what Lee aims to highlight, even if 
policemen, unlike children, already know the names of objects. They must, however, return 
to a state in which the eye is trained to point to something and label it without further 
considerations. This is why, I think, Lee would appreciate the idea that giving a name is 
placing the object on the board, a preparation for what follows, as relating that object within 
a description would be, as for Wittgenstein, step two. Theoretically, the role of interpretation 
must be limited, since the viewer should only apprehend what he observes in an attempt to 
understand which features are relevant to the object’s perception. Consider that, to portray 
the dioramas’ main attributes, the investigator will have to categorize the hierarchy of details 
as relevant, which will lead to a redefinition of the object as it was initially observed. It would 
be necessary to point to a group of traces that could have been previously ignored and fit 
                                                           
133 Op. cit., §6, p. 4. 
134 Op. cit., §49, p. 21. 
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them in the object’s perception, adding such information to what was later found. The facts 
presented should be self-explanatory, so that different persons could understand them in a 
similar way. Unlike what happens in Wittgenstein’s discussion of ostensive definitions, Lee is 
concerned with the necessity to give police officers technical tools. Pointing to something is, 
therefore, not only a way of understanding the object but also of showing others what was 
perceived.  
Although listing the objects in the nutshell consists in the enumeration of what was 
found, step two in Lee’s proposal would be to advise investigators to employ them as what 
Wittgenstein would call “samples”. This vast group of entities includes colors, actions, 
objects, events, shapes, among many others, depending on how they are used, and which may 
acquire a different function135. They are, thus, an example for something else.  
 
The observer must therefore view each case with an entirely open mind. The Nutshell Studies 
are not presented as crimes to be solved – they are, rather, designed as exercises in observing 
and evaluating indirect evidence, especially that which may have medical importance136. 
 
The type of indirect evidence that can make a difference in investigative decisions 
could, then, be considered a sample with an unusual role. The occurrence of a murder 
transforms the common meaning of the objects that lie inside the crime scene; and they are 
often described as possessing something that needs to be reinterpreted, so that they may be 
understood. Each diorama presents a fiction requiring a justification and, more importantly, 
endows objects with a secondary, but highly important, meaning. In Lee's doll's houses, some 
coffee cups and bloodstains have a double function: as certain objects obey the particular 
purpose with which they were made, they are also evidence for something else. Although the 
use of the objects does not change in itself (a pillow is still a pillow), they acquire an 
additional function, their place in the scene is transformed in this context where they work as 
proof.  
                                                           
135 As P. M. S. Hacker notices: “When used as samples, functional objects typically do not have their usual 
functions nor actions their standard roles”. G. P. Baker, P. M. S. Hacker, Op. cit., p. 99. 
136 Frances Glessner Lee, Op. Cit., p. 47. 
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In the models, therefore, evidence is distinguished from regular objects, given that it 
is, somehow, dissonant. The strangeness of the clue may derive from diverse reasons. An 
object may, for example, be misplaced, as happens in the nutshell "Attic,” where policemen 
should understand why, if the victim committed suicide by hanging herself, is one of her 
shoes on her foot and the other on the stairs that lead to the attic? Attention should be paid to 
the doll's face, which presents scratches and bruises that could suggest murder. There is 
equally proof which contradicts other evidence. In "Attic,” the love letters on the floor could 
reveal nostalgia for a lost past, but the scratches on the woman's face indicate violence, which 
means that when all the evidence is taken into account homicide makes more sense than 
suicide. Missing clues are also significant. If a man was shot and the bullet is not in his body, 
police officers should search the premises for it until it is discovered, as the bullet trajectory 
gives indications about the location where the murder took place.  
The establishment of a hierarchy of evidence is relevant in the “nutshell models”. 
Objects, such as alcohol bottles and shoes, are different from fingerprints or spots of blood, 
which are a consequence of the crime. Likewise, shoes and spots of blood should also be 
distinguished from the corpse, a body which had an existence prior to the crime, but which 
has become something else with it. One could argue that, from this perspective, the corpse 
would equal the first type of objects mentioned, but the fact is, while other objects are 
considered proof, the corpse is taken as a testimony of events. The same happens with the 
murder weapon, which may be portrayed as an everyday object, such as a knife, or a rope, 
whose function mutated with the crime. The murder weapon, like the corpse, seems to be 
more similar to the case of a witness, not only because it possesses forensic evidence which 
could lead investigators to identify the murderer, but also because it helps to make clear how 
the murder was committed. The police officer could be considered the expert at evaluating 
and distinguishing types of objects according to their function in the crime scene. 
Investigators would, then, have to put those everyday, but misplaced, objects, in a context 
where they could be explained. But, while Wittgenstein’s samples have “a normative role” 
(they are “standard of comparison”), Lee’s objects can only be associated within a theory 
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about murder. They may not be combined in the category of green objects, but may perhaps 
be considered like specimens in a museum, i. e., models which are associated, by comparison, 
in a certain group and used as examples.  
In the diorama's case, objects are only significant when Lee wishes them to be so, as 
they translate her deliberate intentions in the construction of the models. As it happens with 
a riddle, policemen have to discover Lee's intentions and explain them. In a crime scene, for 
example, when both criminal and victim touch these entities, they bestow meaning on them. 
Not only would assassination be responsible for endowing objects with new, and talkative, 
features, the investigators' interpretation also plays a significant role in their explanation. Lee 
devised the objects and the investigators interpret them. The query here is, however, to 
understand how they distinguish truthful and untruthful entities, so that it becomes possible 
to parenthetically dwell upon the possibility that those who endow these things with meaning 
may be speaking the truth, lying or attempting to mislead us. 
This type of proof would, therefore, be taciturn due to its complexity, but talkative as 
it reveals someone's actions and intentions in a certain situation. In the case of the dioramas, 
while objects speak as they reveal Glessner Lee's intentions, the models only tell us what she 
wished them to say, they are intentional objects. If the same could be said of a crime scene, 
then each object could be explained according to the way it had been handled by the 
murderer, the victim, or both. The explanation for their transformation of status could not be 
found in the object itself, but through the way someone had manipulated them. Pointing to 
objects and writing lists are, after all, forms of making choices, of picking something from a 
context and underlining it. The objects in a certain museum, returning to Wittgenstein’s 
samples, were chosen by someone, most likely an expert, who considered them, for example, 
illustrative of the art of a given period. These choices are often reason for disagreement 
between connoisseurs, who must also find factual evidence for not accepting others’ point of 
view. The reason why disagreement and erroneous conclusions are limited in Lee’s doll’s 
houses results from the fact that she is responsible for the writing of a history of each object, 
she is able to distinguish those which have, or not, a relation with the crime and she may 
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correct the investigator’s conclusions. Although it makes sense to assume that our 
observation skills improve with experience, it should not be presumed that pointing to 
something is an act which does not involve interpretation or require previous judgment (in a 
literary text, as will be seen, the critic may point to a certain passage and underline it through 
the use of quotation, but this does not, in itself, help to elucidate his thoughts about the text 
or even the text itself). Neither the act of observing nor that of “describing the premises” may 
be considered neutral activities; they rely upon a worldview and prior experiences which so 
often determine our gaze. Lee recognizes this, which makes her understand the need to 
systematize observation and, still, when depicting the necessity to “evaluate indirect 
evidence” she seems to consider that this assessment will be mainly factual.     
Not all cases are, however, like the models. Evidence which is considered self-
sufficient, requiring no other proof or explanation, is seldom, if ever, refuted as falsely 
inducing or mistaken by interpreters. The correlation between innocence and clear bodily 
signs is ancient, as the ordeal proves. Although there is critical disagreement regarding the 
purpose, or social function, of the medieval ordeal, it may be considered that one of its 
relevant characteristics is the idea that God interferes in the proof’s outcome so that self-
explanatory marks may appear in the guilty one’s body137. The ordeal’s execution obeyed to 
rigorous principles, described by Eberhard of Bamberg138. In the hot water ordeal (judicium 
aquae ferventis), three days before the proof took place the accused was blessed and began 
his fasting period, in which he would only eat bread, salt, herbs, and was required to pray. 
The priest entered the Church followed by the jury and the accused. While the others waited, 
the Priest chose the place where the fire was lit and blessed it, as well as the instruments 
which were to be used in the exorcism of the Devil’s presence, and he would then celebrate 
Mass. The suspect’s arm would then be cleansed with soap and observed by the jury while the 
                                                           
137 I am only portraying ordeals in which the proof’s outcome depends on involuntary body signs, such as burns, 
vomiting, blood or flotation in water. I will not deal with ordeals in which the outcome depends on the skill of the 
accused, such as in the duel, or battle ordeal, or endurance, as happens with the ordeal of the cross. John M. 
Roberts, defines this type of proof as autonomic ordeal. Cf. John M. Roberts, “Oaths, Autonomic Ordeals and 
Power,” American Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 67, n.º 6, Part.2: The Ethnography of the Law, Dez. 1965, p. 
187. 
138 The Breviary of Eberhard of Bamberg, ed. Zeumer em MG.LL. Sec. V, Formulae, p. 650, transl. in University 
of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1898, vol. 4, pp. 7-9. 
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water was boiled. If it was a simple ordeal, used to try misdemeanors, the accused would be 
asked to put his arm in the water at wrist length, or to take a ring or a stone from the water in 
a previously established distance. When the accusations were more serious, the accused was 
submitted to the triple ordeal, in which the whole arm was immersed in water until it reached 
the shoulder, whether there was, or not, an object inside the cauldron. When the proof ended 
the suspect’s arm was bandaged with a clean cloth and sealed with a seal of the church. After 
three days, the limb would be untied, and if the wound was clean and the injuries were 
healing well, he was considered innocent. Although there was a jury present at the ceremony 
which would, sometimes, disagree139, most ordeals were solved without further inquiry. The 
meaning of the bodily signs was deemed incontrovertible, and not the mere outcome of an 
observation which determined a state of affairs. The criteria presiding the application of the 
ordeal were based on the consideration that it was validated by Divine intervention, thus 
there was not a role for human interpretation in it. It was not supposed to be uncertain; it 
was an objective mode of proof based on fact.  
In Glessner Lee’s dioramas, the investigator’s skill relies on his capacity to observe the 
evidence. In the ordeal, the ritual needs to be thoroughly followed so that a clear result may 
appear. Failure to do so will produce dubious bodily signs, such as an arm which the jury is 
unable to evaluate with certitude. The inconclusive outcome of the proof is not related with 
the subject's eventual guilt, with God's role on the test, or the jury's evaluation, but with the 
inability to follow the procedure. In this case, the interpreter's role does not rely on his 
capacity to be a good judge. This means that observation is not considered a technical tool. In 
theory, if the priest followed instructions, the jury's role would only be that of claiming a 
verdict and making it clear to others (publicly showing an obvious result). 
As with Lee’s objects, the arm is a sample, proof of the test which has taken place. It 
is, however, a sample that may not and does not need to be grouped with other evidence; it is 
the single proof that allows the jury to pronounce a verdict and to dismiss all other types of 
evidence. Pointing to the limb follows its observation, and its importance is derived from the 
                                                           
139  Cf. Bartlett, Robert, Trial by Fire and Water – The Medieval Judicial Ordeal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
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fact that it is used as a way of distinguishing truthful and untruthful bodily signs, as well as 
proclaiming a verdict. In the ordeal, judges are not naming something, but reaching a verdict. 
This would, then, correspond to the type of proof which may be portrayed as talkative. To 
assume so, yet, is to ignore that ordeals were acts of God, and to disregard the idea that it is 
God who endows objects and limbs with uncommon abilities. Ordeals reveal God's 
intervention in the proof (the same way Lee devised her models) and they are, from this 
perspective, intentional objects. I would, thus, deny the notion that these things do, 
themselves, utter the truth. Ventriloquism, in this situation, is expressed by God's 
intervention in the proof.  
The idea that judgments sustained by factual knowledge should be encouraged seems 
to stem from another relevant point of view. As shown earlier, in the medieval judicial ordeal 
it is presumed that to put something on trial is to submit it to a physical test from which clear 
conclusions will ensue. This is to consider that ordeals are a nonintellectual way of 
determining the truth140. The implication seems to be that a judgment of fact is clearer than 
intellectual forms of proof, since is does not depend on human speculation, but on evidence 
based on facts that may be seen by all. While human reasoning is individual and may lead to 
differentiated conclusions, facts are universal. The ordeal is seen as a way to put something to 
the test, an experiment dealing with the purpose of making the truth appear and 
interpretation unnecessary.  
The similarity between the ordeal and Lee's models relies on the fact that pointing is a 
way to form a verdict, even if in Lee's case it is required than one should indicate more than 
one type of proof. The act of ostensively showing something in the ordeal is accompanied by 
the ambition of proving its truthfulness or falsity. Lee believes that if the investigator shows 
an object and establishes its correct use the truth is determined. In this context, the truth is 
                                                           
140  In the medieval cold water ordeal (judicium aquae frigidae) it was assumed, as Hincmar de Reims upholds, 
that water was a divine, purified element, which would not receive in it those who had been stained by a crime. 
After the ritual had taken place, the suspect would be tied with a rope and lowered into a pond or a reservoir of 
water. If Nature took its normal course, the suspect was innocent, for this form of proof differed from others in 
requiring a miracle to convict the accused. The outcome of the ordeal was self-explainable and did not require the 
use of complex intellectual judgments. The fact that a miracle was required for the accused’s body not to be taken 
in the waters made the verdict easy to justify. Hincmar de Reims, De Divortio Lotharii Regis et Theutbergae 
reginae, introd. Letha Böhringer. Hannover: Hahn, 1992, p.155.   
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not necessarily equivalent to the solving of the diorama (even if that is desirable), but to the 
depiction of the objects’ accurate use\meaning in the nutshell. Lee regards ostensive 
definitions as the ability to clarify ambiguous things, as they seem to solve the need for a 
definite, and unequivocal, mode of proof. Moreover, she seems to consider that if the true use 
of the object is found, then different persons will understand it in the same way (pointing 
allows us to dismiss further explanations). For Lee or, as was seen, in the ordeal, there is only 
one use for some expressions. 
For Wittgenstein, though, ostensive definitions regulate the use of a term, but are 
neither true nor false and can be subjected to interpretation and misinterpretation (just like, 
in fact, any other explanation). Accordingly, its meaning can be further specified. Lee’s 
procedure aims to depict the contrary: investigators claim to be pointing to the proper use of 
an object or a state of mind, when they are actually stipulating a state of affairs, by 
considering it to be true or false. There is always, of course, the possibility of an erroneous 
determination of the object’s use within the nutshell, but that would be considered a failed 
attempt to properly observe the object.  Wittgenstein argues:   
 
“We name things and then we can talk about them: can refer to them in talk” – As if what we 
did next were given with the mere act of naming. As if there were only one thing called ‘talking 
about a thing’”. Whereas in fact we do the most various things with our sentences141. 
 
 
Naming things gives us the possibility of talking about them, but Wittgenstein alerts 
us to the fact that the act of naming does not limit what we do next. He is being cautious with 
the idea that if we name things (if they have one name) we assume there is only one way of 
speaking about them, when in fact we may do diverse things with sentences. Without 
thinking, as Lee, about the truthfulness or falsity of certain enunciations, Wittgenstein 
advises us against the idea that definitions comprise all that may be said about a certain 
thing. What is curious about the forms of proof which have been depicted is that they seem to 
be a way to deal with bodily proof (and language) which departs from the presupposition that 
                                                           
141  Wittgenstein, Op. cit, § 27, p. 11.    
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some things, in the proper context, may only be described in one way. It probably seems now 
that the only similarity between ostensive definitions and the act of eliciting the verdict in the 
ordeal is the assumption that both interpreters point to something as a way of clarification. 
Still, the notion that some expressions, or samples, may be defined without the need for 
explanation is a common ambition in these procedures.   
In the ordeal, bodily proof is what allows us to determine someone’s state of mind 
despite his best efforts to hide it. One may understand how, when the accused is innocent, 
the body does not represent his guilt. The innocent person’s self has nothing to reveal, so his 
or her injuries do not manifest themselves in bodily signs (they heal faster than was 
supposed, for example). However, the same does not apply if the accused is the culprit, and 
although he does try to control his body, his guilt speaks louder, and causes bodily signs to 
appear. These modes of proof attempt to bring forward something the suspect tries to hide. 
This exteriorization has an ambiguous structure, however. On the one hand, interpreters 
believe in hidden matters to which they don’t have access, since there exists an exterior 
hiding them. On the other hand, the exterior is really the only surface for the revelation to 
occur. It seems peculiar to consider that that which we cannot control is true, the 
presumption being that intentional behavior is what makes us untrue. The body’s behavior 
contradicts the subject’s intentional actions (for example, his denial of having killed before) 
without his consent, and only so much can be done to control it. This means that, when one 
wants to discover the guilty person, involuntary bodily reactions are more valued than the 
subject’s intentional affirmations.  
In Lee’s dioramas, it is presumed that the way the objects were handled gives us 
information about a certain person’s behavior. In this case, it is necessary to understand if 
the subject intentionally manipulated an object in a certain way, or if, on the contrary, the 
object reveals unintentional actions.   
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He [the investigator] should look for and record indications of the social and financial status of 
the persons involved in each model as well as anything that might indicate their state of mind 
up to or at the time of the demonstration142. 
  
According to Lee's advice, there is little difference in discerning the social class of 
someone through the analysis of his or her objects and finding out what the deceased was 
thinking. Like Hamlet, Lee is looking for visible (and public) evidence of things that are 
usually considered inner properties of someone's mind. In her nutshells, police officers learn 
to distinguish someone's intention of committing suicide from that of murder. The reason for 
this lies, as Lee makes clear, in the fact that objects inside a house tell us things about the 
subject who lives there, about his daily habits, ways of living and (public) intentions. For 
example, "Unpapered Bedroom,” the first nutshell described, presents two problems: the 
investigators have to identify the woman and attempt to understand what caused her death. 
Lee explains how investigators were required to search the trash for evidence leading to the 
identification of the culprit. Likewise, they should look into a pillbox at the top of a table, 
where they would discover ten capsules of barbiturate (Seconal), a dangerous substance if 
mixed with alcohol. The empty bottle of rum would provide part of the explanation they were 
looking for. Lee equally sustains that, by examining the pillbox, it would be possible for the 
policemen to find out the apothecary that had sold the pills as well as the doctor's name, in an 
attempt to identify the woman. At the same time, attention should be paid to hidden clues, 
such as marks of lipstick on the underside of the pillow. A woman always removes her make-
up before going to sleep, so this could indicate that Jane Doe was "incapacitated to some 
degree and went to bed with her lipstick on"143. 
Unless it could be proven that Mrs. Smith frequently forgot to remove her make up, 
this was a sign that something out of the ordinary had presented itself. In the case which 
inspired Lee, the lipstick gave the medical examiner the clue he was looking for, as, despite 
the fact that there was no evidence of violence in Mrs. Smith's body, her eyes presented a 
strange color. Together with the lipstick, it was revealed that the spouse had drugged his wife 
                                                           
142  Frances Glessner Lee, Op. cit., p. 47. 
143  Corinne May Botz, Op. cit., p. 108. 
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and then placed a pillow over her head until she stopped breathing (the husband's confession 
would later prove that this had been the case). The lipstick on, then, made investigators know 
the state of mind Lee was speaking about. 
Interestingly, this perspective relates to Wittgenstein’s denial of the relationship 
between sensations, their names and the impossibility to define feelings such as “pain” 
ostensively. Contrary to what happens with a blue shirt, which may be a sample for the color 
“blue,” there is not, for Wittgenstein, a sample for sensations or memories of pain. Unlike 
colors, which are learned by association, expressions of pain may not be understood by 
linking a sensation, its memory, and the name given to the feeling. When one says “I feel 
pain,” this is not an expression of an inner phenomenon or of an inner experience, but a 
process of learning acquired through “expressive behavior”: “A child has hurt himself and he 
cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They 
teach the child new pain-behavior”144. Although Lee would probably agree with Wittgenstein 
in what concerns the notion that one could not define feelings or interior processes 
ostensively, she is looking for public samples of what are generally taken as mental states. 
The dioramas were based on the assumption that the objects found in the crime scene (as 
well as the objects that surround us) may be used as a criterion for the correction of what 
people consider to be private thoughts. These objects are not, in themselves, expressive, but 
they are a manifestation of the use we generally give them, and, therefore, allow us to 
distinguish someone’s intention of committing suicide from natural death, for example.     
For Lee, social status and states of mind may equally be understood through the 
evaluation of someone’s objects, samples which are deemed to be public indications of a 
person’s intentions. While not claiming that there is a correlation between private thoughts 
and some objects, I believe that when Mrs. Smith is numbed due to the joint effect of 
barbiturates and alcohol, she is unable to remove her lipstick, which produces a stain on the 
pillow. Evaluating this stain is not a form of gaining access to the hidden contents of Mrs. 
                                                           
144  Wittgenstein, Op. cit., § 244, p. 75. Cf. M. R. Bennett, P. M. S. Hacker, eds, Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p.102. 
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Smith mind, but of understanding that our behavior (which includes thoughts and 
sensations) may be depicted through public evidence. Understanding a “mental state” implies 
getting acquainted with the victim’s way of life, her use of the objects that surround her (if 
there were numerous bottles of alcohol in the apartment one could probably conclude that 
either the victim or someone else drank too much). Lee does not define emotions by referring 
to a sensation, but to a certain object, which she takes as a sample for something else. 
Glessner Lee's procedure to clarify crime cases does not presuppose that there is a 
specific key, or a single answer, with which they can be properly understood. But it does 
imply that the sense of these objects and situations depends on the viewer’s ability to 
decipher the riddle they present. After solving the enigma, the true meaning of the object, 
person or situation is supposed to emerge, and the problem-solver is then able to redefine 
what he had previously seen and to give a proper sense to what had been an obscure 
situation. Interpretation will be brought to an end. This idea being central to my text, it is 
relevant to consider that interpretation ceases after the solving of the diorama, as speculation 
generally stops once the murder has been solved and the culprit caught. 
The ability to categorize each object does not mean that the policemen understood the 
diorama or even that they were able to describe it correctly, but it does imply that they have 
succeeded in solving one of the problems posed by it. If, however, the investigator has the 
capacity to look adequately at the rest of the model’s different parts and to redescribe them, 
that would eventually signify that he is an accurate observer. The viewer’s purpose is, then, to 
depict the nutshell so accurately that in his explanation those crucial features become clear to 
others (in a poem this would be equivalent to describing it). Still, pointing to those previously 
unseen characteristics and highlighting them is, of course, an interpretative act, and I will 
later sustain that singling out something and underlining specific attributes is to give 
relevance to a particular trait, one which other interpreters would have failed to see. 
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2. Fearing, ignoring and misinterpreting self-explainable 
proof 
A singular link between Macbeth, Hamlet and Richard III consists in the fact that 
these three plays allude, even if briefly, to the ordeal as a mode of proof. Let me begin with 
Macbeth, where the reference to a bleeding corpse becomes known after the King's 
assassination, when Lady Macbeth sees her husband bringing the daggers back with him, and 
realizes she will have to return to the crime scene and place the instrument of murder near 
the grooms, so that they may be accused. Consider the following passage: "If he do bleed, \ 
I'll gild the faces of the grooms withal, \ For it must seem their guilt." (II, ii, 54-56). "He" 
refers to Duncan, and one might ask if it would not be natural for a man who was just 
murdered to bleed. Lady Macbeth is, however, referring to an unusual way of shedding blood, 
namely to the corpse that endows wounds with meaning in order to expose his slaughterer. 
Strange as it may sound, corpses have, indeed, been accusing their killers for 
centuries. Take the bier-right ordeal, the bier being "the movable stand on which a corpse, 
whether in a coffin or not, is placed before burial; that on which it is carried to the grave"145. 
In this ancient mode of proof, it was assumed that the corpse would hold its murderer 
responsible, so the victim’s body was put to the test. Thus, several suspects would take an 
oath testifying their innocence and then take turns visiting the body. When blood ran out of 
the victim’s nose or wounds, the judges knew they faced the guilty party and they would 
formally accuse him. In this mode of proof, the idea that the human body is the place where 
the truth is hidden seems to be explicit, for it was thought that the guilty party’s identity was 
encrypted in the victim’s corpse, which would denounce him. It was assumed, as in other 
medieval ordeals, that God, who knew all, would interfere in the test and blame the guilty 
one146.  
                                                           
 145 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. I, 1933. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. 
146 It should be mentioned that the Catholic Church formally forbade the ordeal in 1215, following the 
deliberations of the Fourth Lateran Council (in which canon 18 dealt with the ordeal), enacted by Pope Innocent 
III. Nevertheless, this way of judging persisted, and modes of proof such as the cold, hot water and bier-right 
ordeal, were known in Shakespeare’s time. Although, as George Lyman Kittredge notices, the importance of 
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Lady Macbeth’s dilemma reveals the concern to understand if bleeding corpses 
identify those physically accountable for their murder, or those who were morally guilty for 
it. She is anticipating the possibility that Duncan's corpse would identify her as being liable 
for the assassination, and claim that she would have used the accusative blood to imply the 
grooms in the murder. The scene takes place off stage, so one would suppose there would be 
no way of knowing whether Duncan's body had, in fact, accused her. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that in the end of the play Lady Macbeth, already delusional, will 
comment: "Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much blood in him?" (V, 
i, 37-38). The King, therefore, shed too much blood because he had been murdered and was 
determined to accuse his killers, a possibility reinforced when we recall Macbeth's reference 
to the "secret’st man of blood" (III, iv, 125).  
In fact, the auguries which Macbeth will describe in the third act as a mere possibility 
to bring forth the man of blood, are but a redefinition of Lennox's comments, in the second 
act, immediately before the revelation of the murder:    
 
Lennox 
The night has been unruly: where we lay,  
Our chimneys were blown down; and, as they say, 
Lamentings heard i'th'air; strange screams of death,  
And, prophesying with accents terrible 
Of dire combustion, and confus'd events,  
New hatch'd to th'woeful time, the obscure bird 
Clamour'd the livelong night: some say, the earth 
Was feverous, and did shake. 
  (Macbeth, II, iii, 53-59) 
 
 
It will have blood, they say: blood will have blood: 
Stones have been known to move, and trees to speak; 
Augures, and understood relations, have  
By magot-pies, and choughs, and rooks, brought forth 
The secret'st man of blood.  
  (Macbeth, III, iv, 121-125) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
James I’s Demonology has been exaggerated, use of the ordeal as a way of judging witches is proof of a way of 
thinking that, even if not legally applied as often as one would think, echoes common opinions of the period.  
Cf. John W. Baldwin, “The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals”, Speculum, vol. 36, n.º 
4, Oct. 1961, pp.613-636. Also, for a detailed discussion of the subject, vide Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and 
Water – The Medieval Judicial Ordeal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.  
Cf. George Lyman Kittredge, “English Witchcraft and James I,” Studies in the History of Religions, ed. D. G. Lyon, 
George Foot, Moore. N.p.: BiblioBazaar, 2009, p. 1-66.  
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This is Macbeth's fever of assassination, murder which follows murder. The passage 
also represents the horrid circumstances that accompany such a crime, all indications that 
the usual course of events has been disrupted. In this passage, the secrecy of the 
assassination is contradicted by the physical elements surrounding the crime, whose 
uncommon behavior, instead of hiding events, underlines them (something that, as was seen, 
occurs frequently in Macbeth)147. Despite the similarity between lines, Macbeth transforms 
Lennox’s impressions. Notice how he describes stones moving, while in Lennox we witness 
blown-down chimneys and trees speaking, i. e., laments heard in the air and screams of 
death. The obscure bird prophesying, usually considered to be an owl, could stand for either 
the magpie, an imitator of the human speech, or the chough, both birds of ill omen. While 
Lennox’s thoughts are put to an end by the idea that such unnatural behavior among the 
elements even made the earth tremble, a political metaphor for a Kingdom which has found 
its ending, Macbeth conjures up the man of blood. He is, therefore, transforming Lennox’s 
lines concerning an unruly night into an account of what took place, and we now understand 
how these entities have, indeed, brought forth the man of blood, as Duncan was assassinated 
and, I would claim, bled to accuse his murderers148. God reveals this secret murder as a 
Divine punishment for an unnatural crime (as if God himself points to the corpse and 
discloses its murderer)149.   
                                                           
147 The Arden edition quotes James I’s book, Demonology, as the source for this passage: “for as in a secret 
murder, if the dead carkasse bee at any time thereafter handled by the murderer, God hauing appoynted that 
secret supernaturall signe, for tryall of that secret unnaturall crime”. In William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. 
Kenneth Muir, 1951. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2001, p. 67.  
148 It should not be forgotten how, in the fourth scene of the third act, Macbeth, who had just killed Banquo, was 
in a good mood while entering the banquet room: “Now good digestion wait on appetite, \ and health on both!” 
(III, iv, 37). I would sustain that it is Lennox’s appearance, and his remark, “May it please your Highness sit?” (III, 
iv, 39), that brings to mind past assassinations and makes Banquo’s ghost occupy Macbeth’s seat. Not until seeing 
Lennox does Macbeth’s humor alter, thus assuming that the table is full, and trembling when Lennox points him 
to his seat. This is also the reason why Macbeth will (rightly) consider that the Ghost’s apparition was produced by 
one of the Lords present. None of them is, obviously, responsible for Macbeth’s guilty conscience, but Lennox’s 
presence is disruptive to such an extent that it will trigger his inner horrors (namely the fear of being caught for 
his first crime) and make him remember Lennox’s words in the morning of Duncan’s assassination. There then 
follow the aforementioned lines in Macbeth’s speech. 
149 Two things are exteriorized in the passage. Following Clarendon and Wilson’s perspective, as the Arden edition 
does, we assume the possibility that the stones are the entities covering the body, which would mean that their 
displacement would allow the corpse to be uncovered and, thus, made visible, a thought reinforced by the other 
elements in the passage, all moving or speaking, leading to the crime. At the same time, blood emerges from the 
corpse in a clear accusation, as if all other elements' movements had the unique purpose of producing unequivocal 
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The clear nature of some forms of proof leads to Lady Macbeth's commentary after 
the King's murder takes place: "Go, get some water, \ And wash this filthy witness from your 
hand." (II, ii, 45-46). This blood, so often mentioned both in the play and in its criticism, the 
one that will return to haunt Lady Macbeth, possesses such an ostensive character that it 
does not require interpretation; it is a witness. There is an undeniable link between blood as 
testimony, Duncan's body excess of it and auguries bringing forth the bleeding cadaver. Just 
like the trees, the blood in Macbeth’s hands has the ability to speak, not literally, I would say, 
since it is considered to possess an unquestionable nature. Notice how "filthy" is both being 
applied to the murder and to the possibility that the act is discovered through the use of a 
proof which needs not to be interpreted.  
The scene takes place after Macbeth notices the Ghost, a sight which makes the King 
nostalgically ponder how "the time has been, \ That, when the brains were out, the man 
would die, \ And there an end;" (III, iv, 77-79). Now, however, men die and "they rise again, \ 
With twenty mortal murders on their crowns, \ And push us from our stools." (III, iv, 79-81). 
Shakespeare's passage is clear, as it reminds Macbeth of a period, which most likely occurred 
in battle, where men would find definite death, in the sense of a justified ending that would 
not return to haunt them. The appearance of the Ghost reinforces the King's assassination, 
making Macbeth fear the double consequences of such murders, and not only his most recent 
one, as it is the memory of the first crime which still provokes sleeplessness, as well as the 
disorder of "natural events". Macbeth is, thus, afraid of these unjustified murders which 
return to accuse him, an expression related with the first quotation about a secret made 
public by "the secret'st man,” which uncovers himself to make Macbeth leave his royal stool. 
Such man is dangerous in the sense that it exposes simultaneously the crime and its 
murderer in a public way that will be understood by all. It is unclear whether Macbeth is 
lamenting the assassination or the numerous evidences of the accusation he is now being 
confronted with, thus bringing to our minds Macbeth's lines: “I'll go no more: \ I am afraid to 
think what I have done; \ Look on' t again I dare not" (II, ii, 49-51).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
proof and of disclosing the assassination. The fear of being discovered is accentuated by the notion that Macbeth's 
will of power is impotent before these uncontrollable forces.  
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The judicial nature of the proof, however, is never made clear. It takes place in 
secrecy, it is an affair between Lady Macbeth and Duncan, an affair which Macbeth both 
acknowledges and dreads, but which nobody else comments upon. It may not be doubted 
that Macbeth and his wife worry they will be exposed through the use of a proof so unyielding 
as the ordeal’s, still, such fear does not represent solely the possibility of being discovered. 
Self-evident proof is not only recognizable by other persons; its clarity accuses Lady Macbeth, 
bringing her nature to light, pointing to her. In the case of Lee’s nutshells, observers had to 
learn to identify evidence and make a claim about it. Duncan’s corpse seems to possess the 
capacity to be equally perceived by all observing it, but, more importantly, of letting its killers 
know things about themselves that they would prefer to ignore. From the moment Duncan 
was murdered, its corpse encloses the truth about the couple’s character; it describes them in 
a way they would both prefer to disregard, but know to be truthful. The problem with this 
type of proof, for Macbeth and his wife, is that there is no end to it, it may not be refuted, 
redescribed or, as will be seen, ignored.   
Such ambiguity, learned by Shakespeare after describing, in Richard III, a bier-right 
ordeal in detail, implies that there is no need for explaining Duncan’s accusation to his 
murderers, the allusion to the ordeal suffices for an audience familiar with the procedure to 
suspect, rather than claim, what in fact has taken place. Richard III, the story of a villain 
determined to be King, starts in medias res; initial malefactions in due course, devious plan 
in place. Before its analysis, let me dwell on Marjorie Garber’s essay, insightfully entitled 
“Richard III; The Problem of Fact”. This text portrays two main questions which are of 
interest to the present chapter, namely, the play’s debate between fact and fiction (or 
interpretation); and a description of “this double effect of inside and outside,” present in the 
soliloquies150. Let me begin with the latter:  
 
Richard of Gloucester’s soliloquies – especially those spoken before he becomes King Richard, 
when he will try to consolidate his inner and outer voices in the service of political power – show 
us something different, although something that could with equal persuasiveness be described 
as something “human”: manipulation, calculation, self-division as a strategy rather than a 
                                                           
150 Cf. Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All. New York: Anchor Books, 2005. [Kindle version]  
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metaphysical condition151.  
 
 Garber is differentiating Hamlet’s soliloquies, a conscience pondering life’s mysteries, 
from Richard’s demonstration of the ability to manipulate in order to achieve political gain. 
The essay represents the duality between an inner and outer voice, as the first is related to 
the soliloquies and the second to Gloucester’s ability to openly manipulate others. The two 
voices are, nonetheless, public. The inner voice represents not only Richard’s thoughts out 
loud, but also his conversation with the audience, his accomplice in the affair, whereas 
Richard, the other characters and the spectators all hear the outer voice. These voices cannot 
exist separately, as the inner voice is responsible for devising the plots that the outer voice 
will put into practice. Garber sees manipulation and calculation as self-division, in the sense 
that they require the inner voice to be disguised. As in other cases previously mentioned, for 
her the inner voice is the truthful one, as it illustrates Richard’s intentions and lets us know 
which course of action he will take.   
In this confession of intentions, one that only the theater audience will hear, Richard 
devises strategies to be used publicly as well. The soliloquies give meaning to a series of 
actions the spectator is already seeing on stage. Witnessing these deeds does not imply 
understanding them; the spectator may, as the other characters, fail to acknowledge them. 
The signs of Richard’s inner and outer voices, according to Garber, appear in lines such as 
those where he is being self-deprecatory to achieve favor from others. Lines such as “Because 
I cannot flatter, and look fair, \ Smile in men’s faces, smooth, deceive and cog,” (I, iii, 47-
48)152 are quoted as an example of the way Richard uses self-exposure in order to achieve 
political gain.  
 
Throughout the play Shakespeare has the character of Richard deploy both self-exposure (even 
what a modern audience might conceive as self-pity) and the mocking, ironical aside to create 
this double effect of inside and outside153.   
                                                           
151 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare and Modern Culture. New York: Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009, p. 114. 
[Kindle version]  
152 Shakespeare, Richard III, ed. James R. Siemon. London: The Arden Edition, 2009. Quotations follow this 
edition. 
153 Marjorie Garber, Op. cit., p. 115.  
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 I would argue that Richard is not using self-pity as a political advantage. His skill 
consists rather in anticipating the way others view him, and in telling them exactly what they 
are thinking, therefore vehemently denying their accusations. He knows he is able to 
persuade others, and his varying strategies are used to that effect alone. Richard perversely 
enjoys telling half-truths, which capable interpreters would understand and fear, but that 
those around him fail to comprehend (Clarence’s death, due to the prophecy beginning with 
G, would be one of the many examples which illustrate this point). Garber’s claims:  
 
“Now is the winter of our discontent” set out a double frame of reference from the beginning. 
(...) The first line seems for a moment to be declarative and confessional: now – “at the present 
moment” – we, or I, are, or am, discontented. But the second line rewrites or recasts the 
meaning of now retrospectively, turning it into a word that means “in view of what has 
happened”. Instead of “now I am discontented” we get “we [the Yorkish faction in England] used 
to be discontented but now we are pleased”. But in fact, of course, the audience hears both, gets 
both: I ought to be contented but (I am telling you privately) I am not. The effect is one of 
interior disclosure. Nothing makes us believe we are actually in touch with the “reality” of a 
character like encountering both inner conflict and secret motives154.   
 
This analysis of the opening of the play, Richard’s soliloquy, exemplifies a double 
frame of reference, which, according to Garber, will be present throughout the entire story. 
We thus find an inner voice that is not only continually being explained but, somehow, 
rewriting the contents of the outer voice. Both voices are heard by the audience, which is able 
to provide a meaning to Richard’s actions, and to feel identified with this character, due to 
the fact that his secrets are being made public. According to Garber, in the last line of the 
soliloquy, “Dive, thoughts, down to my soul; here Clarence comes” (I, i, 41), Richard is also 
speaking to us, the audience who has become “his confidants and coconspirators”. But 
Garber’s distinction between inner and outer voice presupposes that those of us who hear 
and understand the inner voice are closer to Richard and, hence, to the comprehension of the 
play. When Garber considers that “Richard’s startling modernity emerges out of his intimacy 
with us, his private thoughts, and his constant awareness of his own social performance,” she 
is portraying the inner voice as veracious, even when it does not tell us the truth, even when 
                                                           
154 Op. cit., p. 112. 
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she contemplates the possibility that we, too, are “Richard’s dupes,” even when she considers 
Richard’s art as stage management. In another essay, entitled Richard III, Garber considers 
the use of the voice in the soliloquies:  
 
Richard’s first voice is the voice of the Devil, the voice of the Vice. But this second voice, the 
voice in which he presents himself to the world, is, as we should perhaps expect, the voice of 
absolute virtue, the voice of Christianity, and the voice of the innocent child. A voice that claims 
“plainness” as its virtue, rejecting flattery, artifice, deception155.  
 
 Vice, a figure from the tradition of the morality plays, presents itself in the soliloquies, 
while the childlike voice comes across in public. Garber is, of course, analyzing passages such 
as “And thus I clothe my naked villainy \ With old ends, stol’n out of Holy Writ, \ And seem a 
saint when most I play the devil.” (I, iii, 335-337). And yet, even if we assume the inner voice 
is always truthful, how do we know we are not being deceived by Richard’s skilled use of 
words? I would claim that neither of Richard’s voices allows us to entirely comprehend him.  
These voices may only be understood with the help of the notion of “outward action,” 
an expression Garber quotes, but fails to analyze. In order to know Richard, it is not enough 
to be acquainted with his inner or outer voice: the play demands that we are able to make 
sense of his actions. One should think that Richard's skillful manipulation makes it 
impossible, either in private conversations or in the soliloquies, to ignore his charm. The 
audience, readers of the play, and literary critics such as Garber, are being maneuvered, just 
like other characters, by the notion that Richard is being sincere, that his inner voice is 
reliable, that they will not be deceived. Two things contradict this opinion: Richard’s 
behavior in public and the presentation of facts in the play are so strong that they become 
impossible to ignore. Notice, firstly, Gloucester’s advice to Prince Edward:  
 
Nor more can you distinguish of a man  
Than his outward show, which, God He knows, 
Seldom or never jumpeth with the heart.  
Those uncles which you want were dangerous; 
Your grace attended to their sugared words 
But looked not on the poison of their hearts.  
                                                           
155 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All. New York: Anchor Books, 2005, loc., 3441. [Kindle book]  
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God keep you from them and from such false friends.  
 (Richard III, III, i, 9-15) 
 
 Richard is describing, in words probably meant more to himself than to young Prince 
Edward, how one should not listen to sugared words and ignore the poison in the hearts of 
others; Edward is still unable to distinguish in a man more than what he shows, which 
seldom or never agrees with someone’s true thoughts. In the last line, God, and not Richard, 
is asked to protect Edward from those uncles and “such false friends” as, one would be 
tempted to say, Richard himself. The idea of “outward show” seems to be a continuation of 
the outer voice, one which disguises someone’s true intentions, but Richard is implying the 
following: if everyone is staging a show, then being able to understand what type of spectacle 
we are given to watch would be to comprehend the private and public nature of a certain 
person’s actions, i. e., getting to know that person. When in public, it is possible to observe 
Richard from afar, and understand the way others are being used, making therefore sense of 
his actions (the only character in the play who is able to do this is Margaret, who has nothing 
to gain and nothing to lose, and is, therefore, in the perfect position to consider Richard’s 
“outward show”). Such notion is shared by Iago, in Othello: 
 
In following him, I follow but myself:  
Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty 
But seeming so, for my peculiar end, 
For when my outward action doth demonstrate 
The native act and figure of my heart 
In complement extern, ‘tis not long after 
But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve,  
For daws to peck at: I am not what I am. 
 (Othello, I, i, 57 -64) 
 
 Iago is explaining to Roderigo how he is determined to make Othello believe he is 
complying with him when, in reality, he will be guided by his own wishes. Appearing to act in 
the name of love and duty, Iago will choose to consider his own particular ends. His outward 
action translates into what others consider to be his native self, the figure of his heart. In this 
passage, “outward show” is replaced by “outward action,” the first describing Richard’s 
theatrical abilities, the second pointing to Iago’s plots. In both cases, however, the expression 
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accounts for the difference between what men show, what they do, and their intentions while 
doing it. In Othello, Shakespeare ponders the consequences of our failure to understand that 
other persons may be presenting a spectacle, as, for example, characters never doubt Iago is 
an honest man. In Richard III, however, characters distrust each other. In fact, the play 
begins with a divided court, a dying King, in the aftermath of a civil war. That they are well 
aware of Richard’s vile nature may be understood, for example, in the Queen’s words.  
 
The King, on his own royal disposition 
And not provoked by any suitor else,  
Aiming, belike, at your interior hatred, 
That in your outward actions shows itself 
Against my children, brothers and myself,  
Makes him to send, that he may learn the ground.  
 (Richard III, I, iii, 63-68) 
 
 Although the Queen is unable to anticipate the extent of Richard’s plots, she perceives 
the general meaning of his “outward actions,” of his dislike of her family and friends. More 
importantly, the Queen does not need to distinguish between inner and outer feelings; she is 
implying that if attention is paid to Richard’s actions, they will be able to see him as he really 
is. These actions must, however, be differentiated from the previously mentioned self-
explainable proof. Unlike Duncan’s corpse, whose value as evidence was systematically 
represented as being unequivocal, observers do not equally interpret Richard’s actions. The 
distinction between both types of proof seems to rely on the fact that interpreters consider 
that the first dismisses interpretation, while the understanding of actions requires an effort 
from observers. To make sense of “outward actions,” therefore, implies the capacity to 
ponder what one has seen, and to be able to describe it thoughtfully. This means, of course, 
that while the possibility of error seems to be almost inexistent in the case of self-explainable 
proof, Richard’s actions are prone to misunderstanding. One of the reasons is due to the fact 
that Richard’s words are persuasive to the point that they may not be ignored, and characters 
invariably end up being misled. Those who ignore Richard’s actions and listen only to his 
words while observing his face are bound to a premature death. Take, for example, Hastings:     
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 Hastings 
His grace looks cheerfully and smooth this morning.  
There’s some conceit or other likes him well  
When that he bids good morrow with such spirit.  
I think there’s never a man in Christendom 
Can lesser hide his love or hate than he, 
For by his face straight shall you know his heart. 
 
 Stanley  
What of his heart perceive you in his face 
By any livelihood he showed today? 
 
 Hastings:  
Marry that with no man here he is offended, 
For were he, he had shown it in his looks.  
 (Richard III, III, iv, 48-57)  
 
If Hastings were able to understand Richard, he would have noticed how the latter 
was always joyful before someone’s death. Moreover, Hastings should have been careful. In 
an act which could have been performed by Richard himself, Buckingham had already 
advised him about the difficulties of knowing others’ hearts from their faces: “We know each 
other’s faces; for our hearts, \ He knows no more of mine than I of yours, \ Or I of his, my 
lord, than you of mine. (III, iv, 10-12). The face is not, in these villains’ case, the mirror of the 
soul156. Attentive interpreters should be aware of the divergence between the reactions 
conveyed by the face and the intentions of the heart.  
The second point in Garber’s analysis is Richard's historical figure, the way he was 
neither deformed nor unfinished, which she uses to consider whether facts are more powerful 
than fictions, and every era’s temptation to rewrite history. The debate, in the play, between 
fact and fiction, proof and persuasion, makes the author comment on how “the play suggests 
that literary truth and literary facts are, or can be, as compelling as historical truth and 
historical facts, or even biographical truth and biographical facts”157. According to Garber, not 
only did Shakespeare win the battle over History (a victory accounted for by Richard’s 
rhetoric, charisma and seductive personality), public and other characters ignore the most 
                                                           
156 In fact, the play systematically contradicts the idea that faces are truthful. For example, after learning Clarence 
had died, Buckingham asked: “Look I so pale, Lord Dorset, as the rest?" (II, i, 82). Even though all seem to be 
affected by the news, Richard will later redescribe the situation, implying that the Queen’s sons looked guilty: 
“Marked you not \ How that the guilty kindred of the Queen \ Looked pale when they did hear of Clarence’s 
death?” (II, i, 135). 
157 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare and Modern Culture. New York: Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009, p. 117.    
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obvious facts:  
 
The debate about truth and fiction, truth and lying, truth and interpretation, is staged within the 
play – and indeed, within Richard’s own soliloquies from the beginning of the play to the end. In 
this way, Shakespeare can be seen to have anticipated the tension between fact and fiction that 
troubles modern-day commentators: it is that very tension that animated both Richard III and 
his play158.  
 
 History aside, one should ask if the play stages a debate between fact and fiction, 
whether either of these sides win, if this is a play in favor of interpretation or, as I would 
maintain, a play about the legitimacy of fact over interpretation. I use Garber’s thoughts to 
highlight the contrast between Richard’s duplicitous voice and Henry’s body prerogative, as 
his wounds depict the case of an inner and outer voice working in unison (a device 
underlining the idea of a King with a single voice, as one who claims the rightful ownership to 
the throne should have). In one of the most significant, although often ignored, scenes of the 
play, Lady Anne, whose husband and father-in-law have been cruelly murdered by Richard of 
Gloucester, is seen accompanying the corpse of King Henry the Sixth. A group of men is 
carrying the body when Richard instructs the guards to put it down. While they tremble in 
fear, Lady Anne defends the corpse, which bleeds in accusation of Richard’s deeds: 
 
Foul devil, for God's sake hence, and trouble us not,  
For thou hast made the happy earth thy hell,  
Filled it with cursing cries and deep exclaims.  
If thou delight to view thy heinous deeds, 
Behold this pattern of thy butcheries.  
– O, gentlemen, see, see dead Henry's wounds 
Open their congealead mouths, and bleed afresh.  
– Blush, blush, thou lump of foul deformity, 
For' tis thy presence that exhales this blood 
From cold and empty veins where no blood dwells.  
Thy deeds, inhuman and unnatural,  
Provokes this deluge most unnatural.  
– O God! which this blood mad'st, revenge his death. 
O earth! which this blood drink'st, revenge his death. 
Either heav'n with lightning strike the murderer dead,  
Or earth gape open wide and eat him quick, 
As thou dost swallow up this King's blood,  
Which his hell-governed arm hath butchered. 
 (Richard III, I, ii, 50-67)   
 
                                                           
158 Op. cit., p. 110. 
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Before Richard’s entrance in the scene, Anne had commented upon the “untimely fall 
of virtuous Lancaster" (I, ii, 4), noticing how all that is left is the “key-cold figure of a King,” a 
“bloodless remnant of that royal blood” (I, ii, 7). Such lines have the purpose of singling out 
Henry’s death and making the audience see that the body has no life left in it, which, in turn, 
will isolate the phenomenon consisting on the shedding of blood by the corpse. Anne points 
to the body and claims it is bleeding due to the presence of his vile murderer, Richard, who is 
responsible not only for the murder, but also for the denunciation intended by the body of his 
victim. This passage, very similar to its source, Holinshead159, enunciates the way a lifeless 
body is substituted for a living entity, not exactly a human being, but rather an element 
empowered with the ability to produce a remark upon a given state of affairs. In Richard III, 
pointing to something and claiming that it is X effectively works, as interpreters concur with 
the meaning of the scene. Within the play, the contents of the accusation also seem very 
plausible, as both the guards and Richard accept Anne’s comments. 
In both cases, Anne's and Lady Macbeth's, the sense of the two corpses is never 
questioned. Blood is so strong an accusation that no one ever distrusts it; much to the 
contrary, the characters seem to share the notion that its appearance occurrs for a particular 
reason. This is why, in Richard III, this episode is so important. It is also why, although 
Richard has been considered a close relative of the Macbeths (hence enabling a series of 
correspondences between the two plays), this story seems to be the perfect counterpoint to 
Othello, not in the Bloomian sense that the figure of Richard acts as a precursor of Iago, but 
insofar as Othello enacts the seducer which would woe Desdemona into Lady Anne's destiny. 
Henry's corpse presents a dilemma for the readers of Richard III: namely, the fact 
                                                           
159 “The dead corpse (...) was conveyed with bills and glaives [halberds] pompously, if you will call that a funeral 
pomp, from the Tower to the church of St Paul, and there laid on a bier or coffin bare-faced – the same in the 
presence of the beholders did bleed - where it rested the space of one whole day. From thence he was carried to 
the Blackfriars, and bled there likewise, and on the next day after it was conveyed in a boat, without priest or 
clerk, torch or taper, singing or saying, unto the monastery of Chertsey, distant from London fifteen miles, and 
there was it first buried’. Cf. Holinshead, p. 324, in The Tragedy of King Richard III, ed. John Jowett. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000, p. 157.  
The origin of the story was tracked to that of Richard-Coeur-de-Lion and the way blood ran out of Henry II, his 
father, nostrils’ during the procession at Fontevraud, in accusation of Richard’s disobedience, considered to have 
lead to his father’s end. Cf. Henry C. Lea, Superstition and Force - Torture, Ordeal and Trial by Combat in 
Medieval Law, 1870. New York: Barnes & Nobles, 1996, p. 278. 
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that Lady Anne and the Duke of Gloucester alike ignore such an obvious manifestation of 
guilt. In Henry’s ordeal, the body clearly enunciates in a non-verbal way an accusation and, 
as in previous examples, the corpse's meaning is unequivocal proof. The body, which had 
already been modified by death, is now transformed during the ordeal, and while its exterior 
is "congealed,” the body's interior, its blood, is brought to life through the wounds. With no 
tongue, the King’s voice is unuttered, but its language is endlessly stronger.  
One of the points of interest in the corpse as an object of analysis is the fact that the 
mind\body distinction does not seem to work: the cadaver does not accuse its killer based on 
a process of mental recognition. While, for some, the medieval ordeal is a miracle, similar to 
that of the liquefaction of blood, for others it illustrates a soul in refusal of leaving its body 
until justice has been done160. It was, nevertheless, consensual to consider the corpse devoid 
of cognitive abilities: it was an intentional object manipulated by God so that justice could 
take place. God endowed the body with the ability to bleed, making it the most truthful 
testimony one could find, for a body without cognition is unable to lie. This notion is 
somewhat different from another one, previously described: that bodily reactions, because 
difficult to control, are more truthful than words. In the case of the corpse, one does not 
contemplate the possibility of enunciation, the wounds being the substitute for the tongue 
(the substitution of wound for mouth can also be traced in Macbeth's "twenty mortal 
murders,” even if, as Marjorie Garber notices, “The trope of wounds as speaking mouths was 
common in the poetry of the period”161).  
The discussion of unintelligent beings capable of truthful testimonies calls upon the 
mention of the case of torture in Ancient Greece. Although I will not dwell upon it, it is 
relevant to briefly contrast the importance of this truthful, but unintelligent, cadaver, with 
the Greek conception about slaves’ testimonies. In Torture and Truth, Page duBois, quoting 
from a variety of texts, both literary and political, from the tragedies to Aristotle's Politics, 
explains how the evidence provided by slaves was only accepted when given under torture, as 
                                                           
160 Cf. James Hastings, John A. Selbie, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. White Fish: Kessinger Publishing, 
vol. 18, 2003, p. 511.  
161 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All, loc. 3503.  
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“In the Greek legal system, torture of slaves figured as a guarantor of truth, as a process of 
truth-making”162. DuBois describes how slaves’ testimony would not be heard in court, as 
only the written statement produced under torture could be shown as evidence. Therefore, 
those wishing to obtain the slave’s testimony would write down the questions, which the 
torturer would ask (parties had also to agree to pay the slave owner if permanent damages 
were inflicted on his servant). One of the reasons given for this procedure was the fact that 
slaves, when not under torture, could be afraid to tell anything contrary to their master’s 
wishes. The point of interest here, however, is the notion that slaves’ testimony differed from 
other type of evidence, in the sense that it was considered more valuable and trustworthy 
than other witnesses’: “The basanos assumes first that the slave always lies, then that torture 
makes him or her always tell the truth, then that the truth produced through torture will 
always expose the truth or falsehood of the free man’s evidence”163. Basanos (Βάσαυος), the 
Greek word for test and torture (a pregnant term to which I will later return), portrays the 
ability to make the slave speak the truth without failing. The reason why it is presumed the 
slave always lies is due to the fact that: “Free citizen men will be deceived by clever 
arguments; slaves by nature will not be misled because they think with their bodies. Slaves 
are bodies; citizens possess logos, reason”164. So, while the master possesses logos, which 
makes him capable of reasoning in court, and of distinguishing truth from falsehood, thus 
understanding the consequences of lying, the slave is unable to anticipate rationally the 
repercussions of falsehood. Following Aristotle’s Politics, DuBois explains how the slave: 
“Unlike an animal, a being that possesses only feelings, and therefore can neither apprehend 
reason, logos, nor speak, legein, the slave can testify when his body is tortured because he 
recognizes reason without possessing it himself”165.  
In the slave’s case, we have a body without cognition, but which recognizes reason; a 
body which always lies, unless under torture, when it always tells the truth. It should be 
                                                           
162 Page duBois, Torture and Truth. New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 47. 
163 Op. cit., p. 36. 
164 Op. cit., p. 52.  
165 Op. cit., p. 66.  
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questioned whether telling the truth under torture was a physical reflex, something the slave 
could not control and which would explain why the outcome of the proof was truthful. 
Torture, from this perspective, would be the means enabling proper physical reflexes to 
appear, the verbal testimony of the slave being the physical recognition of reason. Physical 
reactions belong to the sphere of irrational behavior, irrationality (or merely that which is not 
thought upon) appearing as what allows us to be truthful despite ourselves.  
The slave’s wounds, unlike what happened in the ordeal, were not subject to analysis, 
the body being merely a vessel for the testimony to appear, and God was absent from the 
proof, as it was not assumed that it was He who endowed the body with the ability to be 
truthful166. Torturing the slave gives origin not to self-evident proof, but to the irrevocable 
truth itself which, when heard in court, will enable a verdict. Torture is not a form of 
punishment, but a way to extract the truth from a body possessing a knowledge that might 
not be recognized by its owner. In most ordeals, guilty subjects knew the reasons for their 
accusation (and the probability of being discovered by the proof). The body of the murdered 
one in the bier-right proof was acquainted with the identity of his assassin. But torturing the 
slave stemmed from the assumption that he might have seen or heard things whose 
importance he did not recognize, or did not consciously remember.  
This is not meant to contrast the Greek judicial system, or its notion of the body, with 
the medieval concept of justice, or even with the Elizabethans’ thoughts of either the body or 
justice. It is, however, relevant to point out how such different civilizations contemplate, 
firstly, the notion of a body which knows more than its subjects, secondly, the idea of a 
person without cognition, but which is a vessel for the truth, and thirdly, how the tested body 
may not be the one who was accused. Notice how in the medieval ordeal, especially in battle, 
ordeals, duels, or when the accused was a member of the gentry, it was common practice for 
                                                           
166 I would parenthetically add that this mode of proof subsists today in our structure of beliefs. The beginning of 
forensic science may be related with the ancient certainty that the truth about the crime is inscribed in the victim’s 
body. For example, Esther Cohen maintains that the bier-right ordeal entered directly in the judicial system at the 
time the ordeal was abolished by the Catholic Church. When torture was reintroduced as a procedure in the 
Italian and French judicial systems the orders to initiate it had to be preceded by previous indications of guilt, 
such as blood in the cadaver’s body. Cf. Cohen, Esther, The Crossroads of Justice – Law and Culture in Late 
Medieval France. Boston: BRILL, 1992. Silverman, Lisa, Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth and the Body in Early 
Modern France. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.   
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the suspect to ask a retainer to submit to the ordeal on his behalf. This represents an 
interesting alternative to the concept of bodily proof: since the body under scrutiny was not 
the suspect’s body, then its physiological reactions should not be the element that determined 
the proof. In some cases, we may think of the retainer as the person the suspect confided in, 
which means that the retainer would also have to know the truth, and, thus, that his body 
could be a proof. But often a champion was called upon, and it was unlikely that he knew 
what had really happened. This meant that the body presented to God need not be the body 
of the accused.  
In such cases, the body wasn’t exactly used as a testimony, but as an instrument to 
prove the truth. This point allows us to differentiate bodies that serve as witnesses of events 
from bodies that are used as instruments to prove facts. In ordeals, the body was a relevant 
form of proof and it actually didn’t matter which body was tested, because what was 
significant was the idea that God would act on the proffered body and produce evidence 
through it. As long as the ritual practice that belonged to the ordeal was strictly followed, 
God would give his true testimony about a given state of affairs. Accordingly, truth was found 
in the divine intervention of the retainer’s body, meaning that the body’s signs were always 
truthful and trustworthy. 
Nowadays, the murdered corpse is simultaneously seen as an intentional object (a 
responsibility belonging to the author of the crime) and as a testimony of events. It is 
assumed, in the tradition of the ordeal, that the corpse’s analysis will be factual and that the 
place attributed to its interpretation is limited. One of the corpse’s qualities as a factual 
object may be the fact that it seems more authentic than other living beings, for it cannot be 
intentionally false (even if the possibility that others may manipulate it should be 
considered). Death seems to crystallize, even if for a short period of time, a group of facts left 
at the investigator’s disposal, and the corpse’s bodily signs are considered true, because the 
subject may no longer control them, and fudge them if he will. From this perspective, 
forensic science helps us distinguish false corpses (belonging to those who wrote false 
suicide letters or attempted to fabricate their death) and forgers (those who manipulate the 
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victim’s corpse so that it does not point at its killer). Although there are considerable 
differences between the cadaver's interpretation in the medieval ordeal and forensic science, 
it should be noted that in both cases the corpse is the example of an entity that can only be 
properly understood by a skilled observer (in the medieval ordeal there was a jury appointed 
to make sure that procedures followed the rules, nowadays police and judicial experts 
analyze corpses).  
I have been describing the case of bodies that observers accurately interpret. A point 
in Euripides’s play, Hippolytus, illustrates the contrary, a failed attempt to discover the truth 
about the death of one of the main characters, Phaedra, through a determination of what is 
considered to be the main proof. While it is presumed that both Duncan’s body and Henry 
VI’s tell us the truth without need for further analysis, Hippolytus theorizes the question of 
proof which seems to be self-explainable, but that is, in fact, misinterpreted by those 
observing it. Theseus arrives home and discovers that his wife, Phaedra, is dead. When he 
finds a tablet in Phaedra’s hand (without knowing that Aphrodite had devised such plot as a 
way to punish his son Hippolytus for his devotion to Artemis), Theseus wrongly believes that 
Hippolytus is to blame for the tragedy. The letter is considered a true testimony of Phaedra’s 
last words, and proof of Hippolytus’s actions. Once the letter’s authenticity had been proved, 
as Phaedra’s golden signet validates it, Theseus does not doubt its value and considers it the 
highest form of proof available. As he states when confronted by Hippolytus: “This 
[Phaedra’s death] is the fact that most serves to convict you, villainous man!”167. For him, the 
letter cannot be differentiated from Phaedra’s corpse, both are unambiguous proof of his 
son’s actions. Theseus’s mistake is to presume that if the letter truly belongs to Phaedra, it 
must contain true words, never questioning the possibility that Phaedra might lie as, for him, 
there is an indissoluble relationship between the dead corpse, the letter and the guilty 
person. Theseus does not consider the possibility that the meaning of proof could not be its 
most visible sense, or the hypothesis that his wife’s letter could possess hidden meanings or 
intentions. 
                                                           
167 Euripides, Hippolytus, ed. and trans. David Kovacs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 217.  
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Father and son diverge on which would be the proper way to find the truth: Theseus 
looks upon the letter as a fact, disregarding Hippolytus’s oath, and asking him: “For what 
oaths, what arguments, could be more powerful than she is, to win your acquittal on the 
charge?”168. In this hierarchy of evidence Theseus considered Phaedra’s corpse to be the 
queen of proof, which allows him to presuppose that it is not necessary to conduct further 
inquiry. When Hippolytus inquires if his father will banish him without pausing to “examine 
my oath, and sworn testimony or the words of seers? Will you banish me without a trial?”169; 
Theseus replies: “This tablet contains no divination by lot, and its charge against you is 
convincing”170. Notice how Theseus intertwines “tablet” and “corpse,” as if they were 
synonyms and the single self-evident proof he requires to determine the truth. His 
perspective is opposed to that of Hippolytus, who mentions four procedures to determine the 
truth, such as the oath, testimony, the words of seers and a trial.  
Later in the play, when Hippolytus is dying, Artemis will also notice how Theseus gave 
more importance to Phaedra’s false words than to Hippolytus’s oath, and how he failed to 
seek other forms of proving the truth, such as instruction from the prophets or cross 
questioning. Artemis is condemning Theseus for assuming proof could be self-evident and for 
stipulating the truth instead of “put[ing] the charge to the proof nor grant[ing] Time the right 
to investigate it”171. According to Artemis, the burden of proof stands with the accusation, 
who should not only demand a test to what is considered evidence (the type of test Frances 
Lee Glessner was describing) but also an investigation throughout time. This is a particularly 
relevant point, as self-explainable proof seems to do without a period of research. Artemis is, 
however, underlining the thought that proof requires interpretation and analysis demands 
time. She is criticizing Theseus’s belief that all that is necessary to find the truth is to point to 
a single entity and show what one deems to be true.  
The play’s insistence upon the use of more than one type of proof seems to deny the 
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importance of self-evidence and to question the thought that we may always know how to 
distinguish regular proof from that which seems to be self-explainable. All other mentioned 
corpses were truthful in such a clear way to those observing them that they did not need to be 
understood, explained or discussed. What had been previously considered the main 
advantages of such type of evidence (the fact that it appears to be irrefutable or the quality of 
being fast ways to determine the truth) are here problematized as its main problems, that 
which precipitates tragedy. It should perhaps be questioned whether the problem relies on 
Theseus’s misjudgment of proof or if this is a particularity of the type of evidence itself. The 
corpse, if it had been properly understood, would reveal that Phaedra had committed suicide, 
but it would not, unlike Theseus assumes, provide the reasons that led her to kill herself. 
From this perspective, Phaedra’s corpse was truthful evidence, while her letter was 
erroneous, and thus we find, again, an opposition between a truth-telling body and an 
intentionally false testimony. In this case, saying “this is a corpse”, understanding it was 
suicide and finding a reason (or a culprit) are not the same. Theseus’s reasoning lacks 
systematization due to the fact that he considers the ability to identify truthful proof and to 
find a justification for it to be the same thing.  
The problem was not, unlike Artemis and Hippolytus presume, the fact that the 
corpse was not self-evident (Theseus was right in taking it as the main form of proof and in 
considering that it pointed correctly to suicide). But he believed the letter and the corpse to 
signify only one thing, he assumed they were interchangeable and ignored the possibility that 
the letter might lie. The play problematizes the notion that, unlike Theseus’s assumptions, 
there is a limit to self-explainable proof and suggests that understanding a piece of evidence 
(even a determinant one) does not equal comprehending the context where it appeared or 
giving reasons to explain it.   
In Richard III, however, Henry’s body represents the idea of truth in a nutshell. It 
narrates a story of usurpation and undue murder, while at the same time it accuses the 
responsible person for the assassinations. I would argue that the corpse could be taken as the 
most relevant fact in the play, since, one the one hand, it highlights the murders which have 
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taken place, and those which will follow, while, on the other, it also portrays Richard (and 
even Anne’s) failed attempt to ignore it. Although murder is taken as a fact, Richard is able to 
persuade Anne as to the reasons that led to the deed and imply her in the affair, making her, 
at least partially, to blame. Richard considers Anne’s beauty the cause of his wish to 
assassinate others: “Nay, do not pause; for I did kill King Henry, \ But ‘twas thy beauty that 
provoked me. \ Nay, now dispatch; ‘twas I that stabbed young Edward, \ But ‘twas thy beauty 
that set me on” (I, ii, 182-185). The idea that both King Henry and Anne’s husband were 
assassinated for love, the thought that only Anne would be able to regenerate Richard, will 
appear to make both characters ignore the murder. The corpse, which had been the main 
dramatic element in the play, lies now in the background. In the soliloquy which will follow, 
Richard states: “To take her in her heart’s extremest hate, \ With curses in her mouth, tears 
in her eyes, \ The bleeding witness of my hatred by,” (I, ii, 234-336). The corpse highlights 
Anne’s hatred and, unlike Richard’s personality, it is reliable in its physical manifestations. 
These instances make Richard’s victory extreme and, at this point, it seems as if persuasion 
will ply the starkest of facts.  
Other figures in the play, immobile bodies pointing to the truth, will highlight the 
corpse. These speechless entities denying Richard are the facts which will be opposed to his 
interpretations. That these are ignored until the very last moment, when it is impossible to 
keep dismissing them, only makes Richard’s fall more noticeable. A first example of the 
redefinition of the corpse appears when Richard and Buckingham need to understand if 
Hastings would be willing to play along with them: “If thou dost find him tractable to us, \ 
Encourage him, and tell him all our reasons, \ If he be leaden, icy, cold, unwilling, \Be thou 
so too.” (III, i, 174-176). Buckingham could be describing Henry’s leaden, icy, cold and 
unwilling corpse. The expression is anticipating what will happen to Hastings if he denies 
assisting Richard, but the relationship between someone’s refusal to participate in the plot 
and his coldness should not be ignored. The fact that, unlike Lady Macbeth, Richard does not 
seem to be afraid of either Henry’s corpse or those which will follow only shows his self-
deception, his belief that facts will not return to haunt him, or a jovial trust in his own powers 
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of persuasion. But Hastings, as Henry, will reappear as a Ghost: “Bloody and guilty, guiltily 
awake, \ And in a bloody battle end thy days.” (V, iii, 154-155). “Cold” could no longer be used 
to describe the nature of this bloody apparition, and if, in the aforementioned quotation, 
Hastings stood as a substitute to Henry’s corpse, the apparition highlights both blood and 
guilt. This body, like Henry’s, finds itself in the possession of a single, accusative voice. This 
topic is equally represented in the citizens’ lack of enthusiasm with the idea of having Richard 
as King:  
 
Richard:  
How now, how now, what say the citizens? 
 
Buckingham:  
Now, by the Holy Mother of our Lord, 
The citizens are mum, say not a word.  
(…) 
 
No, so God help me, they spake not a word, 
But like dumb statues or breathing stones 
Gazed each on other and looked deadly pale; 
Which when I saw, I reprehended them  
And asked the Mayor what meant this willful silence? 
(…) 
 
Richard:  
What tongueless blocks were they! Would they not speak?  
 (Richard III, III, vii, 1-28) 
 
 Unlike Richard and his allies, who know how to be persuasive, those opposing them do 
not speak, they are like statues, marble which breathes but does not talk. In both these 
passages, factual entities are irrefutable. Unlike other characters in the play, which were 
persuaded by Richard, these figures join the corpse, as cognitive entities without speech. The 
Mayor speaks for them, and Buckingham depicts the citizens as willfully silent, which 
reinforces the notion that they have made a conscious decision. Although Richard attempts to 
ignore and persuade them he does not yet fear them, which shows that, unlike Lady Macbeth, 
he has not yet learned the significance of factual entities. The allusion to the corpse appears 
in the notion that they are the tongueless blocks, a thought which will reappear in Richard’s 
last soliloquy:  
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My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, 
And every tongue brings in a several tale,  
And every tale condemns for a villain. 
Perjury, perjury, in the highest degree,  
Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree;  
 All several sins, all used in each degree, 
Throng to the bar, crying all, ‘Guilty, guilty!’ 
 (Richard III, V, iii, 193-199) 
 
 The topic of wounds as tongues reappears, portraying a conscience wounded by each 
killing, a reference to that initial body in blood. Each tongue, i. e. open wound, reveals and 
condemns Richard as murderer, they are the image of the Ghosts of those which were 
slaughtered and appeared in the tent to claim their revenge. Blood returns in Richard’s last 
moments to remind him of past actions, facts take over interpretations before the guilty one 
dies. Henry’s body works, as Anne had said, as a key figure for events and facts are, thus, 
responsible for Richard’s fall. Richard III, much like Macbeth, narrates the story of those 
who assumed that facts could be ignored, to learn later that they could not. The lesson in 
both plays differs from that in Hippolytus, as here murder returns to haunt the guilty ones. 
The discovery that these silent factual entities are descriptions of events, “as every tongue 
brings in a several tale, \ And every tale condemns for a villain” is more important.  
The idea of a body that leads to factual knowledge is associated with the notion that 
all that is needed in a situation like this is to point to the corpse (a fact) and to claim it as 
evidence. If the characters in the play had been able to do so, this case would not have 
required interpretation. Anne’s claim while showing the body illustrates this notion, and the 
act of pointing to something is thought to clarify something hidden inside and now 
exteriorized, or at least clarified with the enunciation of its nature. This is why I would argue 
that the play does stage the dichotomy between fact and fiction; at the end of the day, the 
certitude of facts wins over interpretation.  
In the aforementioned cases, it was seen how characters or investigators point to 
objects, as well as what their purposes are while doing it. Lady Anne is stating something 
which all perceive: "O gentlemen, see, see dead Henry's wounds \ Open their congealed 
mouths and bleed afresh." (I, ii, 53-54) and all interpret the scene similarly. The fact that the 
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corpse is bleeding is taken as evidence for its reliability. In this situation, pointing is more 
than a way of giving an example; it is an assertion that aims at depicting a fact. And yet, one 
would say there is a difference between stating this is a corpse, noticing it is a bleeding 
corpse, and considering it is a truth-telling corpse. Interestingly, in Anne's case, or in Lady 
Macbeth's fear of blood as a witness, is the fact that they ignore such distinction, they 
consider that stating something as a fact and being truthful is the same. Moreover, this type 
of evidence is truth-telling because human forces, or will power, may not control it. In plays 
where villains are continually deceiving others, certitude appears in the idea that facts such 
as these are, by nature, trustworthy. They may not be subject to discussion; they may not be 
redefined, nor misunderstood. 
Glessner Lee's dioramas show the investigators’ belief that if they point to a relevant 
feature of an object, and ascertain its meaning, truth will follow. Indicating is regarded as the 
ability to clarify ambiguous things, for it solves the need for a definite, and incontrovertible, 
mode of proof. Moreover, Lee considers that if the meaning of the object is found, then 
different persons will understand it in the same way. Contrary to what happens in Anne's 
case, the evidence in the dioramas must be looked for; it is not evident, or equally seen by all, 
it must be proven. Even though saying “this is a coffee cup” and claiming a certain object is 
proof seems to be more than just pointing or exemplifying. For Lee, showing is considered a 
form of proof and not as mere interpretation.  
4. Touchstones 
Wishing to be certain is not a rare ambition. Most persons enjoy being right, some 
making an actual effort to be accurate in their judgments, some setting their hearts at finding 
a method which allows them to diminish erroneous conclusions. Such need for organization 
may derive from an individual desire for orderliness, a difficult context, or a specific 
profession, among other reasons. These pages deal with entities that believe there are 
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considerable advantages in finding ways that allow us to dismiss, or at least diminish the 
need for multiple explanations. This way of understanding intricate problems considers that 
some entities may be used as a touchstone for the comprehension of the authenticity, or 
veracity, of other entities (whether they are persons, objects or texts).  
Such anxiety for an explicit and valid mode of proof which could be similarly 
understood by different persons was characterized in Euripides’s play Hippolytus. Theseus 
used Phaedra’s letter as indictment, but earlier he had grieved over the absence of a truth 
test, which would allow him to make a distinction between friends and enemies: “Oh, there 
ought to be for mortals some reliable test for friends, some way to know their minds, which of 
them is a true friend and which is not (…)”172. Theseus portrays the well-known ambition for 
a form of evaluation used to distinguish types of persons, to differentiate the meaning of their 
actions and intentions, so that one is able to properly identify friends and enemies. 
Paradoxically, the moment Theseus enunciates the absence of such a mode of proof 
corresponds to the instant where he misjudges the situation, accusing Hippolytus.  
I have mentioned how basanos (Βάσαυος) denotes torture and test. It should be noted 
that the word also refers to basanite, i. e., touchstone, as well as expressions such as “put to 
the test,” “question by applying torture,” “to be put to torture” and “touchstone”173. The 
analysis of the concept is the departing point of Torture and Truth, in which the classicist 
Page DuBois studies a group of literary, judicial and philosophical texts, in an attempt to 
delineate the evolution of the word basanos, and how it relates to the idea that the truth is 
hidden inside the human body. Basanos is a term at first exclusively applied in mercantile 
contexts to name the touchstone through which the purity of gold was tested, a stone which 
was generally fieldstone, slate or lydite. As DuBois points out, authors such as Aeschylus, 
Euripides and Sophocles used the word, as Theseus’ reference to “test” (in Greek basanos, 
Βάσαυος) exemplifies, to characterize a procedure meant to determine if someone or 
something was genuine. Later on, the term acquired the meaning of ordeal and torture. 
                                                           
172  Euripides, Hippolytus, ed. and trans. David Kovacs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 215.  
173 A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, 1843. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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The touchstone may be "a very smooth, fine grained, black or dark-colored variety of 
quartz or jasper (...), used for testing the quality of gold and silver alloys by the color of the 
streak produced by rubbing them upon it"174. As the dictionary makes clear, "touchstone" 
means the act of trying the authenticity of gold, but also, "That which serves to test or try the 
genuineness or value of anything; a test, criterion"175. The procedure consists in drawing the 
alloy across the surface of the stone being tested, the color of its trace being compared with 
the color left by the pure metals, thus obtaining, by simple ocular inspection, a relatively 
accurate knowledge of the purity of the alloy. Therefore, the use of a touchstone requires the 
right stone, the metals under analysis, and an observer of the results of the process. The fact 
that any observer is expected to reach identical results (to see what others witnessed without 
the need for further justification) is also relevant. In such cases, the interpreter must manage 
the touchstone appropriately, thereby associating the technique of pointing at to 
interpretative tools such as comparison and analysis. In the case of entities which are viewed 
as touchstones, but that are not quartz, the accuracy of the interpreters’ assumptions derives, 
in part, from prior experience and insight. It will, however, be seen how observers tend to 
focus on the method which allowed them to reach what they regard to be, and sometimes are, 
truthful conclusions.  
It should be noticed that using objects as touchstones is a way to give them a 
supplementary use, of transforming a stone, a painting or certain lines into a form of testing 
other entities. These objects are retrieved from their original context in order to be given the 
use of touchstone. In literary texts, selected passages to be used as criteria are contrasted 
with other passages, so that a conclusion may be reached. Objects employed as criteria for the 
value of others do not necessarily lose the features that made them apt for the purpose 
(quartz is still quartz after the test of gold takes place, in the same way certain Shakespearean 
passages remain unchanged). These entities do acquire, however, a supplementary function, 
as they are transformed into the vessel that allows us to test other things. While, in some 
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cases, objects may be used to try entities which are different from themselves, as the basanite 
exemplifies, others tend to be applied to test objects belonging to their own category, as it 
would be unusual for someone to use a literary passage to examine the quality of gold. As 
previously described, it is considered that these entities possess, in a condensed form, special 
features. Either they are considered genuine, which is the reason why they may accurately be 
used in contrast with other things; or they represent (or are the image of) someone who was 
authentic, and whose qualities were, somehow, transferred to the object.    
In some procedures it is necessary to evaluate whether the value of the different 
methods is to be found in the use of the touchstone itself, if it relies on the interpreter’s 
unique ability, or in the association of the two. It should also be inquired whether the result is 
pre-determined or if it derives from the use of the method. The case of basanite is relevant as 
it portrays the ambition for the identification of the substance’s authenticity, as long as the 
procedure is followed. Moreover, the result is not determined a priori, it is a consequence of 
the procedure, which the observer may not influence. To possess a touchstone, a touchstone 
method, or being a touchstone are, thus, considered techniques of putting entities to a test 
which will yield truthful results.  
While “using a touchstone” requires quartz, the golden alloy, the substance to be 
tested and someone to do the test and observe the results, the modes of proof to be surveyed 
here tend to compound some of these functions. Although the quest for certainty and 
authenticity is present, the way the procedure is systematized is often metaphorical, as the 
golden alloy is mistaken for the touchstone, the one observing the process considers himself 
to be also the stone validating the procedure, and the surface scratched by the test might 
(literally) be the subject.  
There is another interesting feature in the touchstone, as the stone allows to 
distinguish if what possesses the appearance of gold is, indeed, authentic. A similar ambition 
is to be found in those using literary touchstones, passages that are criteria for the value of 
certain texts, or those quoting lines of poetry as a self-sufficient argument about their value. 
Still, many other cases discussed represent the attempt to prove the contrary, namely, if 
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those we suspect to be untrue are, indeed, as conjectured, inauthentic. While in mercantile 
contexts substances had to be necessarily tested even if there was no suspicion of 
inauthenticity, in these modes of proof there is a prior assumption of guilt that must be 
demonstrated, or dispelled, by the test. 
Hamlet’s conversation with his mother in the closet scene exemplifies the way an 
entity, i. e., the portrait of his father, may be used to test the value of another entity, in this 
case (the portrait of) another human being, Claudius:   
 
Look here upon this picture, and on this,  
The counterfeit presentment of two brothers. 
See what a grace was seated on this brow, 
Hyperion’s curls, the front of Jove himself, 
An eye like Mars to threaten and command, 
A station like the herald Mercury 
New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill,  
A combination and a form indeed 
Where every god did seem to seat his seal 
To give the world assurance of a man. 
This was your husband. Look now what follows. 
Here is your husband, like a mildew’d ear 
Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes? 
Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed 
And batten on this moor? Ha, have you eyes? 
You cannot call it love; for at your age 
The heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble,  
And waits upon judgment, and what a judgment 
Would step from this to this? Sense sure you have - 
Else could you not have motion; but sure, that sense 
Is apoplex’d, for madness would not err 
Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thrall’d  
But it reserv’d some quantity of choice  
To serve in such a difference. What devil was’t 
That thus hath cozen’d you at hoodman-blind? 
Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight, 
Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all, 
Or but a sickly part of one true sense 
Could not so mope. O shame, where is thy blush?    
 (Hamlet, III, iv, 53-81) 
 
In this scene, which follows Hamlet's dumb-show and his failed attempt to kill 
Claudius, the Prince seeks to confront his mother, in the hope of making her understand the 
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difference between King Hamlet and Claudius. Critics have mentioned how frequent176 was 
the use of miniatures, small-scale detailed portraits, in the scene, while some illustrations 
suggest that in the Restoration two paintings were hanged on the wall. Both the Cambridge 
and the Oxford editions notice how either Hamlet drew miniatures from his pocket, or 
retrieved a locket of his father and placed it opposite Claudius's locket on Gertrude's neck. 
Regardless of the method used, it is interesting to consider that the representation of both 
Kings is a reduced image, but one which is considered to possess, in a condensed form, the 
most relevant features of both men, i. e. the truthful version about Gertrude’s two husbands. 
Hamlet is, as will be seen, assuming that these features are facts, and not descriptions or 
interpretations of affairs. 
While Lady Anne claims: "Behold this pattern of thy butcheries" (I, ii, 52), Hamlet 
asks his mother to "Look here upon this picture, and on this, \ The counterfeit presentment 
of two brothers" (III, iv, 54-55). In Anne's scene, there is equivalence between her statement 
and what she is showing, whereas Hamlet, presuming that what he observes may be 
perceived by everyone, sees in his father’s portrait what he considers to be his qualities. 
Although the procedure duplicates Anne's, in this case there is a distinction between what 
Hamlet sees, the object being looked at, and his mother's own look upon the paintings. The 
presentation of two brothers, a common act amongst families, generally with the purpose of 
underlining the existence of family traces, here aims at showing the superiority of one sibling 
over the other. When looking at King Hamlet's portrait, thus, one should see the combination 
of Hyperion’s curls and Jove’s front, eyes of Mars, a posture like Mercury. All of these divine 
qualities were sealed by the Gods "to give the world assurance of a man" that knew how to 
threaten or command.  
It was previously seen how Glessner Lee assumed that ostensive definitions could be a 
way to clarify problems during a crime investigation. At first sight, it seems that Hamlet is 
reproducing Lee’s method, or the ordeal, when he points to each locket and claims “This was 
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your husband”. The Prince, however, accompanies the gesture of pointing at with a 
description of what he is seeing, as if he is determined to avoid the possibility that, like an 
ostensive definition, the paintings could be subject to misinterpretation. Before the King’s 
description is portrayed, one should, nevertheless, examine Hamlet’s procedure and consider 
the possibility that both the act of pointing at and the verbal formula “that” are more than a 
mere introduction for the description which will follow.  
When, after describing his father, Hamlet claims “Look you now what follows. \ Here 
is your husband,” (III, iv, 63-64), he is claiming his mother misapplies the word “husband,” 
arguing that King Hamlet, unlike Claudius, has a claim to the proper use for the term. 
Hamlet’s mistake is to assume that an idealized version of a word’s meaning could be defined 
through ostension (and that a relational word such as “husband” may be ostensively defined). 
In fact, those who do not suspect that it was Hamlet's glorified version of his father that 
inspired the representation, just have to remember his comment on the first act of the play, 
in lines such as "So excellent a King, that was to this \ Hyperion to a satyr, so loving to my 
mother \ That he might not beteem the winds of heaven \ Visit her face too roughly" (I, ii, 
139-142). At this time, there was no locket to work as reference, which suggests Hamlet was 
not looking at the object and attempting to understand it, or to depict its main features. 
Hamlet’s conversation with his mother, therefore, depends on his prior assumption of what a 
husband should be; he is erroneously assuming that our ideals may be defined through 
ostensive procedures; that they are not subject to interpretation. Hamlet is representing King 
Hamlet's image as it existed in his mind's eye, as he had told Horatio in the very beginning of 
the play.   
There is, thus, a difference between what Hamlet thinks he is doing and his actions. 
The method with which he attempts to explain what he sees, as well as to persuade his 
mother, makes clear that he is determined to find truth in the representations of the two 
men. The act of pointing reflects the wish to state the obvious, in an attempt to persuade his 
mother. Hamlet aims to show there is a leap of judgment between her decision to marry his 
father and Claudius: “and what judgment \ Would step from this to this?” More importantly, 
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Claudius is described as infecting the idea of King Hamlet, causing him to wither away, 
preventing his growth. Hamlet was hoping that, similarly to other widows, the image of King 
Hamlet might flourish in his mother's heart, and that Claudius would be blamed for 
preventing it. This is the reason why Hamlet asks: "Have you eyes?" an expression referring 
both to the eyes which should be looking at the paintings, but also into her memory, in which 
King Hamlet should have played an important part. That Hamlet is able to produce the 
required effect may be seen in the Queen's reply:  
 
 O Hamlet, speak no more.  
Thou turn'st mine eyes into my very soul  
And there I see such black and grained spots 
As will not leave their tinct. 
 (Hamlet, III, iv, 88-91)  
 
 While, in other cases, pointing is used as a way to exteriorize hidden features, Hamlet is 
using it to get to his mother’s soul, to turn her observation inward. At this point, Hamlet 
seems indeed not only to be seeing more than others, but also to possess the ability to 
produce the desired effect over the Queen, as she appears to be seeing the same that he does. 
But the Ghost will enter the room, and Hamlet will try to point at him, as he had done with 
the paintings. If, however, in the first case he possessed a clear referent, even one he was not 
looking at, now the Queen is unable to perceive the image of the Ghost, and the act of 
directing seems to lose its validity:  
 
Gertrudes: Wheron do you look? 
 
Hamlet: On him, on him. Look you now how pale he glares.  
His form and cause conjoin’d, preaching to stones, 
Would make them capable. (...) 
 
Gertrude: To whom do you speak this? 
 
Hamlet: Do you see nothing there? 
 
Gertrudes: Nothing at all; yet all that is I see. (...) 
 
Hamlet: Why, look you there, look how it steals away.  
My father, in his habit as he liv’d!  
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Look where he goes even now at the portal. 
 (Hamlet, III, iv, 124-138)   
   
 In the case of the portraits, Hamlet was depicting qualities that could not, unless looked 
at with the mind's eye, be observed. His mother is able to see the same as he, because she 
recognizes an idealized description of King Hamlet. In the case of the portraits, even if they 
do not represent the opposition between Hyperion and a satyr, his persuasive use of language 
seems to provoke the desired effect. Paradoxically, in the case of the Ghost, Hamlet is indeed 
seeing an apparition, and cannot share what he is observing with the Queen, which makes 
her assume he is, indeed, mad. The fact that Hamlet uses the same strategy in both cases 
indicates that he believes there is no distinction between what he shows and what others are 
able to see. But the entrance of the Ghost changes the notion that all that is necessary is to 
point to something and make a claim, no explanations being required. 
 
 It is not madness 
That I have utter’d. Bring me to the test,  
And I the matter will re-word, which madness. 
Would gambol from.   
 (Hamlet, III, iv, 143-146) 
 
 He is willing to be put to the test, as he has the conviction that any mode of proof would 
allow him to show his was not madness. In this discussion, for Hamlet, his alleged madness is 
a matter of phrasing, so the test would give him the possibility of re-wording his sentences, of 
making matters clear. Yet, here Hamlet’s criteria seem to be duplicitous, as he is questioning 
the very same belief that guided him during the play. It was seen, in the previous chapter, 
how Hamlet assumed that to put someone or something to the test would lead to 
indisputable facts, those which required the observer to be capable of showing results. Here, 
however, failure to be understood produces obscurity, as Hamlet fails to understand that, 
without a publicly shared referent, he is unable to demonstrate a point of view.  
Hamlet's situation is ambiguous. When he is showing the portraits he seems to be 
using his thoughts about his father to describe what he considers to be the evidence revealed 
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by the miniatures. When Hamlet sees the Ghost afterwards, he is, in fact, pointing to a 
certain entity and attempting to indicate it, which somehow would be a case similar to saying 
“this is a corpse.” His mother’s inability to see King Hamlet's figure, however, will lead to the 
assumption that the act of showing should be supplemented. His evidence, since other 
interpreters do not share it, must be re-phrased, and transformed into a narrative. Both 
Glessner Lee and the medieval ordeal use the act of pointing as a way to reduce multiple 
explanations. Hamlet, however, feels the need to describe what he is seeing.  
Two contradictory justifications could, perhaps, be given for such a procedure: either 
the lockets are so eloquent that they produce excitability in the subject watching them; or 
these are objects that require explanation. The first justification leads us to assume that these 
lockets, unlike other objects, are communicative, that they possess special properties and 
produce effects on the subject, while the latter considers that the task of explaining objects 
relies on the person looking at them. While in the first hypothesis the interpretative work is 
done by the object, in the second, the effort relies upon the subject. The possibility that 
Hamlet is using King Hamlet’s painting as a way to test Claudius’s image and produce an 
effect over his mother clarifies the problem. The lockets do not produce excitement, nor do 
they need to be explained. But to merely show them does not, as in Claudius’s truth test, 
provoke the desired effect. It is required for Hamlet to utter the words that will make the 
difference. Interestingly, in both cases, Hamlet's interlocutor has the passive role of looking 
at the paintings and seeing the evidence he is showing. The act of explaining appears to be an 
intricate procedure; whereas to account for, or to perceive what is being shown, as long as 
there is a proper referent, seems to be simple.  
 Moreover, one realizes that one of the portraits’ description has primacy over the other: 
that Claudius’s miniature exists solely in relation to King Hamlet's portrait, a translation of 
Hamlet's perspective about both men, namely, the thought that one appears to have 
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importance only if it is contrasted with the other177. Hamlet's procedure seems to stem from 
the assumption than one of the paintings is authentic, that it is by looking at the first and 
comparing it with the second that the Queen would be able to discover the key to both men's 
character. In this case, King Hamlet’s painting reproduces the authenticity of its referent, 
which, as will be seen, seems to be a relevant condition for these procedures to work.  
 In the truth test being performed it is, nevertheless, unclear who the touchstone might 
be. There is no doubt that Hamlet is using his father's painting as a golden alloy for his 
uncle’s analysis. Claudius is the substance Hamlet wishes to test, but it is difficult to 
determine if the touchstone is his mother, King Hamlet’s portrait, or Hamlet. The line “These 
words like daggers enter in my ears” (III, iv, 95) seems to point to the fact that his mother is 
the touchstone being scratched by the procedure, and having both alloys contrasted on her 
surface. This could indicate that the Queen would accumulate the role of observer with that 
of the touchstone. This does not, however, seem plausible, as there is no indication that the 
Queen possesses the capacity of quartz (which, as mentioned before, requires special 
                                                           
177 In Elizabeth Gaskell's Wives and Daughters there is equally a painting being used as referent for the judgment 
of two brothers whose personalities are being compared, but a serious test is not conducted and the observer’s 
previous opinion is maintained after the comparison takes place.  
Molly arrives for the first time to the Hamley’s house, and she is shown a crayon-sketch featuring Mrs Hamley's 
two sons. Molly is told: “Tell me just what you think of them, my dear; it will amuse me to compare your 
impressions with what they really are”. Molly’s ability to judge others is here being tested, given that Mrs Hamlety 
assumes she holds the truth to the character of her sons (a perspective which readers will later discover to be 
erroneous). Although Molly adequately replies that she “can only speak about their faces as I see them in the 
picture,” her description will be influenced by Mrs Hamley’s not so subtle remarks.  
The eldest boy, Osborne, is considered to be very beautiful, even if Molly notices that his head is down and his 
eyes may not be seen. The key to Mrs Hamley’s opinion of her sons is, however, to be found in her remark: "He is 
not quite so handsome now; but he was a beautiful boy. Roger was never to be compared with him”. Mrs Hamley 
consideration of the drawings has the purpose to underline the physical and intellectual qualities of one sibling 
over the other. As in the case of the Claudius painting, one sibling is the alloy to which the other will be compared, 
in a test where one must be portrayed as superior. In this case, there is not a painting to be used as an alloy to 
contrast, both brothers are represented in the same picture, and the depiction itself seems to portray the 
differences between them. But judgment is not retrieved from the comparison between figures and the observers 
do not seem to be affected by the test. Even tough Molly politely agrees with Mrs. Hamley opinion, she is able to 
find qualities in Roger’s looks: “No, he is not handsome. And yet I like his face. I can see his eyes. They are grave 
and solemn-looking; but all the rest of his face is rather merry than otherwise”. Mrs Hamley replies: "He is a good, 
steady fellow, though, and gives us great satisfaction, but he is not likely to have such a brilliant career as 
Osborne”68. Readers of the novel will discover that Mrs Hamley’s opinions derived from her special appreciation 
of one sibling over the other, and not from accurate judgment, as Osborne is denied the Cambridge scholarship, 
while Roger's scientific work will be publicly recognized. In his own house, however, Osborne will always be the 
one used to judge Roger.  
Cf. Elizabeth Gaskell, Wives and Daughters, introd. Amy M. King. NY: Spark Educational Pubslishing, 2005, p. 
66.  
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characteristics). It is also difficult to know whether his mother is truly affected by the test or 
by Hamlet’s performance, i.e. the violence of his words, or the appearance of madness in his 
performance, as the sentence “Alas, he’s mad” would seem to prove (III, iv, 106).  
 King Hamlet’s portrait, the golden substance, could equally accumulate the role of 
touchstone with that of pure entity, but in the case of the portrait there are no indications 
that the miniature is ever affected by the test. Hamlet seems, therefore, to be the quartz in 
this procedure. If Hamlet is the touchstone, then the result of the proof seems to be 
established a priori, since before the test begins we already know what its outcome will be. It 
could be argued that Hamlet’s capacity as a touchstone is what allows him to previously 
possess the key to Claudius’s character and provokes his instability (he is able to see what 
others do not). In this case, it is safer to be the pure substance or the subject to be tested, 
than being the touchstone or the observer, as both are affected by the trial being performed. 
The truth test seems to be a way to amend the Queen’s judgment about Claudius and make 
her understand that, although he appears to be authentic, he is in fact the forgery of a 
husband. Hamlet is, therefore, correcting his mother’s criteria through the presentation of 
what he considers to be visible proof.  
 Just like the use of quartz, the outcome of Hamlet’s test depends on the specific 
relationship between both alloys and Hamlet as a touchstone. It should be noticed how 
Hamlet describes himself as possessing a privileged insight to both his father and Claudius’s 
character. In this case, as in the use of quartz, the bond between the three entities is 
determinant for the procedure to be accurate. In the second illustration, which follows, 
concerning the use of an entity as touchstone, the connection between certain passages and 
their interpreter is also indispensable.  
 In “The Study of Poetry” Matthew Arnold describes a way to rectify our criteria about 
literature, suggesting that the critic must seek a “touchstone method” as a way of avoiding the 
fallacy of historical and personal appreciations and provide poetry’s “real estimate”. Arnold’s 
test has the purpose of helping to identify, against Sainte-Beuve, for whom art, unlike 
politics, was truthful, charlatanism:   
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Charlatanism is for confusing or obliterating the distinctions between excellent and inferior, 
sound and unsound or only half-sound, true and untrue or only half-true. It is charlatanism, 
conscious or unconscious, whenever we confuse or obliterate these. And in poetry, more than 
anywhere else, it is impermissible to confuse or obliterate them. For in poetry the distinction 
between excellent and inferior, sound and unsound or only half-sound, true and untrue or only 
half-true, is of paramount importance178.  
 
 The problem of authenticity in poetry, much similar to some descriptions about 
persons, the CIA would say, resides in the difficulty of evaluating degrees of truthfulness. If 
poems and persons were merely truthful or untruthful it would perhaps be easier to 
distinguish, or at least to categorize them. Charlatanism blurs distinctions, it is something the 
critic may do consciously or not, but that makes him argue in favor of inauthenticity. 
Although one could suppose that testing poetry has as main purpose the evaluation of its 
degree of authenticity, the trial appears as a form to detect fraud and untruthfulness both in 
literary texts and in the way critics write about them. The thought that authors, poems and 
critics may possess inauthentic convictions despite their best intentions differs from other 
cases in which subjects knew they were guilty of something and had to hide their emotions so 
that they would not be caught. But when one is not consciously being untruthful, there might 
not be signals of deception to be found.  
 Moreover, the poem, the entity which could help the critic make accurate judgments, 
may also be only half-truthful, as if the text is bound to describe itself positively so that the 
critic will appreciate it. Such representation implies that only the highest form of poetry is 
authentic about itself, all other texts pretending to be something they are not. In this case, it 
would be necessary to identify signs that a text, intentionally or despite itself, was lying. 
Arnold’s solution to avoid giving too much importance to a certain author’s context 
(historical fallacy) or to our particular taste (personal fallacy) resides in the use of some lines 
as contrast:  
 
                                                           
178 Matthew Arnold, Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold, ed. A. Dwight Culler. Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1961, p. 307. 
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Indeed there can be no more useful help for discovering what poetry belongs to the class of truly 
excellent, and can therefore do us most good, than to have always in one’s mind lines and 
expressions of great masters, and to apply them as a touchstone to other poetry. Of course we 
are not to require this other poetry to resemble them; it may be very dissimilar179.  
 
 The value of the great masters’ lines is taken as self-explanatory, they are prototypes 
which, when compared to other texts, may validate their quality and allow us to do without 
interpretation. To Matthew Arnold, the touchstone consists of a group of passages from 
classic authors, such as Homer, Dante or Shakespeare, who would then be contrasted with 
the lines in appreciation, so that their real value might be understood. The best poetry, the 
one with a high degree of seriousness, would then appear before the critic. This procedure 
seems to possess the ability to bring to light characteristics in the tested poems that the 
critics might ignore, as well as make obvious the signs of their falseness. Interestingly, 
Arnold’s method, like some of the ways used to analyze taciturn objects previously described, 
stems from the assumption that inauthentic literary texts, unlike those that are authentic, 
have hidden secrets. Everyone will, therefore, understand the touchstone passages as Arnold 
intends them to (even if it is unclear whether these lines have already been previously tested 
and proved to be truthful).   
It should be noted how Arnold’s procedure is an illustration of what it is to ostensively 
demonstrate a point of view about a particular text. While explaining the reason why the 
Chanson de Roland deserves some praise, but claiming it does not possess “high poetic 
quality,” Arnold claims: “Let us try, then, the Chanson de Roland at its best”180. Submitting 
poetry to a trial is quoting a passage from it (not one considered plain, but what the critic 
deems to be the very best of the poem). When the exemplification takes place, Arnold refers, 
in a phrase that resembles Hamlet’s procedure: “That is primitive work. (...) But now turn to 
Homer”181. A selection of two lines is quoted, and the author notes how “We are here in 
another world, another order of poetry altogether; here is rightly due such supreme praise as 
                                                           
179  Op. cit., p. 311.     
180 Matthew Arnold, Op. Cit., p. 311.  
181  Op. cit., p. 311.  
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that M. Vitet gives to the Chanson de Roland”.182 The lines are used as if they are self-
explanatory, Arnold does not paraphrase or explain them, but takes them as evidence and 
assumes the reader will be able to conclude the same he did, and see the superiority of one 
passage over the other. Homer’s touchstone lines dismiss the need for justification.  
In this prescription for critical success, Arnold suggests us to “take of Shakespeare a 
line or two of Henry the Fourth’s expostulation with sleep,” or to “Take of Milton that 
Miltonic passage” (...) “add two such lines as” (...), “and finish with the exquisite close to the 
loss of Proserpine”183. These choice of ingredients, representative of what Arnold considers to 
be each author’s most distinguishable features (the Miltonic in Milton), seem to be a figure of 
the critic’s particular taste, as they translate his admiration not only for certain authors, but 
also for certain segments of their work. It seems Arnold is pointing to lines that he 
particularly likes, thus validating the quality of passages in need of critical appreciation. At 
the same time, however, all lines belong to what is generally considered to be the canon and 
their quality would not be easily questioned. Even critics with different literary preferences 
would probably agree with Arnold’s choice of Shakespeare or Dante. This would mean that, 
although one may argue against the use of such method, and even prefer the use of different 
lines, the selection of Arnold’s passages seems, paradoxically, to make perfect sense. 
Somehow, we may disagree with the reasons why he chooses such passages (among the 
important characteristics of the passages are to be found “high seriousness”; “highest poetical 
quality”; “discussion of the matter and substance of poetry”; “style and manner,” “mark, 
accent, high beauty, worth and power; poetic truth, poetic beauty,” “truth and seriousness”), 
as well as with his translation of the lines, but not exactly with the passages.  
To solely use the lines does not, however, produce the required outcome for the proof: 
 
But if we have any tact we shall find them, when we have lodged them well in our minds, an 
infallible touchstone for detecting the presence or absence of high poetic quality, and also the 
degree of its quality, in all other poetry which we may place beside them184. 
 
                                                           
182  Op. cit., p. 311. 
183  Op. cit., pp. 312-313.  
184  Op. cit., p. 311.     
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This passage determines the set of requisites necessary for the method to work, such 
as using expressions of great masters, the interpreter’s mind and the poetry in need of 
contrast. It should be noted how the critic must not only possess the ability to bear the lines 
in his mind, but also to discover them. This would mean that the mind, and not the golden 
passages, is the infallible touchstone. The contradiction in Arnold’s essay relies on the fact 
that he assumes that both the lines and the mind are the touchstone when, in fact, the proper 
use of the basanite relies on the existence of passages that work as a golden alloy, the tested 
substance, and a mind which, as quartz, allows the proof to take place. Arnold considers the 
results of the test to be that of allowing us to form a verdict; it should be questioned if, in this 
reunion of kindred spirits between the subject and its touchstone passages, the outcome 
derives from the test, or from the subject’s prior assumptions, his worldview, particular 
tastes, etc. It would be interesting to understand, for example, if the test ever surprised 
Arnold, if he really thought Burns was an extraordinary poet, but after the proof discovered 
his poems to be merely interesting, or whether Arnold already had an intuition (or even some 
certainty) about the outcome of the procedure. One could, of course, argue in favor of such 
intuition, and claim that, as happens with Hamlet, these interpreters are able to reach 
accurate conclusions due to the fact that they already are good interpreters, which makes 
them capable of finding the adequate alloys.  
Consider how, to point out the obvious, the term “touchstone” is a composition of two 
words, “touch” and “stone”. “Touch” comes from the Old French “touchier, or toucher, 
literally ‘touched’”. The Oxford Dictionary describes it has “To put the hand or finger, or 
some other part of the body, upon, or in contact with (something) as to feel it”185. When one 
wishes to put gold on trial through the use of quartz, the alloy must have contact with the 
stone. In Arnold’s assessment of poetry, the relationship between the critic’s mind and the 
lines is also important, as he must “touch” the passages and be “touched” by them. Such may 
be understood by the fact that Arnold underlines how the student of poetry must learn how to 
                                                           
185  Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins, ed. Julia Cresswell. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
Press.  New York University: School of Law, n.º 4, accessed August, 
2010:  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t292.e5072 
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apply the golden lines in order to understand the passages’ “whole force”:  
 
And I wish every student of poetry to make their [touchstone passages] applications of them 
for himself. Made by himself [the student], the application would impress itself upon his mind 
far more deeply than made by me186.  
 
Without memorization, the student may only understand intellectually Arnold’s 
proposal, he will be unable to reproduce it, as he will not have experienced the lines. Such 
experience may be thought upon in the sense of “being touched” by the lines, being moved by 
them. “Touch” is also "said in fencing to acknowledge a hit made by your opponent and more 
generally in recognition of a good or clever point in a discussion”187, an acknowledgement 
Arnold describes when in contact with good poetry: a poet has “grand, genuine touches”188; 
“at moments he [Burns] touches it [high seriousness] in a profound and passionate 
melancholy”189; or “we may be inclined to prize Burns most for his touches of piercing, 
sometimes almost intolerable, pathos”190. At stake is not only the poet’s ability to move us, 
but also the critic’s skill to recognize such moments in poetry and reproduce them in his 
texts. The critic’s essay would, then, be the exact reproduction of the trial and would have the 
capacity to make us see the results of the method’s application, which, similarly to basanite, 
are supposed to be “in itself evident”.  
Arnold takes his picking of lines to be so exemplary that he never considers there is an 
act of selection implied in the choice. But his procedure does not differ from what most critics 
do when they try to understand if a book they like may be compared to a long lineage of 
books usually thought of as having quality. For example, T. S. Eliot, in spite of his best 
objections to Matthew Arnold, concurs that classics are useful as a standard, arguing in 
“What is a Classic?” that “The value of Virgil to us, in literary terms, is in providing us with a 
                                                           
186  Arnold, Op. cit., p. 314.  
187  Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins, ed. Julia Cresswell. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
Press.  New York University: School of Law, n. 4, accessed August, 
2010:  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t292.e5072 
188  Op. cit., p. 324. Cf. Roland Barthes’ Arnoldian punctum in photography. 
189   Op. cit., p. 325. 
190   Op. cit., p. 326. 
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criterion”191. What differs is the idea that these “golden single sentences”192, as Arnold refers 
to them in the essay “A Friend of God,” constitute a group of lines with an autonomous value. 
John S. Eells Jr.s’ classic study compiles and quotes extensively every reference to the 
touchstone passages in Arnold’s essays, noting how sometimes Arnold misquotes the lines 
and pointing to translation peculiarities (such as the fact that Arnold considers that the best 
Homer translation is the one which attempts to maintain an hexameter measure)193. Eells 
argues that Arnold’s obsession with examples is due to his incapacity to make an abstract 
approach to problems in his essays. Arnold’s empiricist use of quotations may be considered 
a way to display, a posteriori, a group of facts in a specific order. T. S. Eliot would probably 
agree with this point of view, since he makes use of Arnold’s touchstone method when he 
applies quotations as a way to demonstrate arguments in his essays (a point to which I will 
return). In fact, it can be argued that his essays are organized through a progression of 
passages considered representative. From this point of view, both authors believe there are 
facts in need of evaluation, which must be displayed in a proper order and unified within a 
cohesive description. Let me briefly mention how Paul de Man rejected, in his “A Review of 
The Anxiety of Influence,” the idea that some passages have an intrinsic value that does not 
require explanation:  
 
There is an abundance of poetic quotation and, in the case of Milton, Blake, Stevens, Emerson, 
and others, implicit interpretation on an advanced level, but always embedded within the 
argument and without clarifying comment, as if the inferred meaning of difficult and 
ambiguous passages could be taken for granted194. 
 
De Man objects to Harold Bloom’s use of sentences “stated as if they spoke for 
themselves,” pointing out to the disparity between the use of quotation and the need for 
comment. It is considered that Bloom uses the passages in order to sustain his main line of 
                                                           
191   T.S. Eliot, Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode. London: Faber and Faber, 1975, p. 129. 
192  Matthew Arnold, Essays, Letters and Reviews by Matthew Arnold, ed. Fraser Neiman. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960, p. 335.   
193 John S. Eells, The Touchstones of Matthew Arnold. NY: Bookman Associates, 1955. 
194 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight. Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. London: Routledge, 
1993, p. 268. 
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reasoning, but lacks detailed explanations of the quotations. Bloom is, according to De Man, 
presupposing that his assortment of literary examples is self-explanatory, and giving an 
ostensive use to the quotations. To consider that a certain quotation’s meaning may be 
implicitly inferred is to assume that it works as a touchstone and, therefore, that different 
readers will be able to equally understand it. De Man objects to the perspective that the use of 
quotations is less ambiguous than their explanations and attempts to show that a difficult 
passage without a proper clarification is no more than just that, a passage requiring an 
interpretative exercise from the reader. What seems to be in question here is a matter of use: 
not only it is necessary to be able to point out the golden passages, but also to justify the use 
given to those choices.  
It might initially seem that, according to Paul de Man, Bloom shares with Arnold the 
problem of taking passages’ meaning for granted. While, however, in the beginning of 
Arnold’s essay, the touchstone passages and the contrast are presented with no further 
explanations, as the text progresses Arnold starts to describe the reasons why, for example, 
Burns’s poetry does not belong to the category of passages representative of high standards:  
 
We arrive best at the real estimate of Burns, I think, by conceiving his work as having truth of 
matter and truth of manner, but not the accent of poetic virtue of the highest masters195.  
 
Here, too, the interpreter plays an important role, as he needs to distinguish the 
reasons why a certain poet failed the test. Comparison with other poets is used as contrast, 
but the interpreter is required to understand the nature of the difference between those who 
are masters and those who are not. As with Hamlet, pointing to the contrast between 
figures\texts is no longer sufficient as the test must be supplemented with the justification 
for Arnold’s choices. This would mean that the interpreter’s role is no longer merely that of 
selecting and memorizing the lines, he must also be able to account for the results of the trial. 
The strangeness of the procedure derives from the fact that, for Arnold, different interpreters 
are expected to understand similarly the outcome of the proof, as if the poetical verdict was 
                                                           
195  Matthew Arnold, Op. cit., p. 326. 
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clear, but somehow required an a posteriori explanation. Even for those in possession of 
literary touchstones, therefore, part of the critical exercise relies on the interpreter’s ability to 
justify the verdict. One may argue that the contrast between passages always allows for 
truthful verdicts, but that criticism is maintained by each interpreter’s ability to disagree with 
the reasons given to justify the inauthenticity of a certain text. Arnold does not seem to 
contemplate the possibility of error in his justifications. One may, though, agree with his 
conclusion about an author, saying that Burns fails indeed to be a master, but disagree with 
the reasons given (claiming, in Arnold’s terms, that a Burns has poetic virtue, but not truth of 
manner, for example).  
A difference is established between discovering the authenticity of a certain text 
(which may be portrayed as a relatively fast judgment), and being able to give reasons for it 
(an activity that requires time). One might say that literary criticism is characterized by being 
a protracted type of judgment, for its slowness and rationality, for the constitution of 
arguments in an explainable and shared progression. When Arnold argues in favor of the use 
of touchstones in interpretation, he is sustaining the notion that these passages allow the 
interpreter to obtain fast results. Instead of receiving detailed, long and often contradictory 
explanations about a certain state of affairs, the use of a touchstone seems to simplify 
situations that would take a long time to be solved. The Gryphon, in Alice in Wonderland 
enunciated a similar principle: “’No, No! The adventures first,’ said the Gryphon in an 
impatient tone: ‘explanations take such a dreadful time’”196. The Gryphon is opposing 
adventures to explanations, considering the former to be captivating in themselves and the 
latter to be long and devoid of interest. But the Gryphon is also implying that although the 
enunciation time in adventures and explanations may be the same (both take time to be told), 
adventures are easier to understand, whereas explanations claim an extra interpretative 
effort. In what concerns touchstones, adventures would equal the verdict in the basanite. 
Although Arnold’s criticism belongs to the category of explanations taking time to be told 
                                                           
196 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, 1865. London: Penguin 
Classics, 1998, p. 91.  
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(even due to the fact that the critic’s mind requires an extensive learning period until being 
able to choose the so-called golden passages), the presumption that the conclusions about the 
poem are easily perceived by all those observing the outcome of the test makes it seem that 
the adventure\verdict has priority over explanations.  
However, the second part of the procedure requires justification, as if the procedure 
showed us a certain substance is authentic, but failed to explain us why. This represents an 
important difference between quartz and the two illustrations previously discussed. While 
someone wishing to test the authenticity of gold would know how to find quartz and gold, 
both Hamlet and Arnold need to discover the alloys. In Hamlet’s case it would be necessary 
to understand whether he took time to discover both men’s figures (if the paintings were on 
the wall such possibility does not make sense), or if any representation of King Hamlet (the 
authentic substance) and Claudius would have the same effect. In the case of Arnold, the 
critic’s long learning process, along with his intuition, makes him able to select the alloys. 
Both the way Hamlet shows his father’s locket and Matthew Arnold’s golden sentences 
illustrate, as was seen, the search for an irrefutable form of judgment.  
A third, and final, illustration of the use of an entity as touchstone is characterized by 
the thought that, sometimes, adventures really are better than explanations or, at least, allow 
us to overcome problems that had previously appeared unsolvable. Therapy, for example, is 
usually an activity that requires time in order to heal the patient. Imagine, however, an 
expeditious type of treatment based on the medieval judicial ordeal technique, in which the 
doctor would impose upon the subject a task more severe than the problem the patient 
needed to solve. He would, perhaps, prefer to abandon the symptom than to maintain it, and 
be continually forced to perform a punitive task. Picture, for example, a woman troubled with 
severe anxiety causing acute physiological signs such as terribly sweaty hands, who had spent 
years in therapy only to see her symptoms worsen. In such case, each time the woman felt 
anxious during the day, the doctor would make her wake in the middle of the night, go 
downstairs, get the cleaning materials, mop and wax the kitchen floor, only to remove the 
wax the next night (an activity she found abominable). When the task was finished she had 
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permission to return to bed, but next day the procedure would be repeated if she experienced 
the symptoms. Cleaning the floor only to scrub it again night after night would certainly be 
particularly painful. This type of therapy, actually performed by Jay Haley, had the purpose 
to make resistant patients realize that a symptom could be extinguished if they were forced to 
perform a severe ordeal. In the book’s introduction, Haley problematizes his difficulties in 
finding a justification for swift therapy: 
 
At that time there was also no explanation of a rapid therapeutic change because there was no 
theory of brief therapy. It was assumed that if one did brief therapy, one merely did less than 
was done in long-term therapy. Therefore, my directive had no rationale197.  
 
Haley debates the problem of having found a very effective, but theoretically unsound 
way of solving difficult cases. Intuitively, he discovered that patients which had been in 
therapy for years were being healed by this method, which contradicted the thought that the 
treatment required time (Haley later discovered Dr. Milton H. Erickson’s procedure also 
included the use of special ordeals). Unlike other techniques, Haley considers that the body 
may decide to let go of a symptom if that seems less painful than continuing to maintain it. 
While other forms of therapy attempt to rationalize subconscious thoughts and repressed 
emotions (“Her other therapy had been talk, talk, talk and hadn’t changed anything”198), 
Haley seems to have found a non-intellectual way of dealing with patient’s problems. I would 
argue that he seems to consider that his method is an irrational way of fighting persistent 
bodily symptoms, which may help to understand the reason why this is described as a brief 
type of therapy. While explanations require time, as the patient must make sense of his 
symptoms, the body’s physiological response to a threat is usually fast. The type of reaction 
Haley looks forward to seems to be similar to the way the parasympathetic system reacts 
when in peril, an alertness which makes it detect the cause of the threat and then attempts to 
avoid it (the body being, again, depicted as an organ of its own mind).  
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The notion that someone threatened by an ordeal would prefer to abandon his or her 
symptoms reminds us of some of the judicial procedures previously mentioned and the way 
the test is presented could have the effect of making someone confess: “Sometimes the 
person must go through it repeatedly to recover from the symptom. At other times the mere 
threat of an ordeal brings recovery”.199 The punitive function of Haley’s therapy’s has the 
purpose of making patients realize the pains they will have to go through if their symptoms 
persist.  
 
With the ordeal technique, the therapist’s task is easily defined: It is to impose an ordeal 
appropriate to the problem of the person who wants to change, an ordeal more severe than the 
problem. The main requirement of an ordeal is that it cause distress equal to or greater than 
that caused by the symptom, just as the punishment should fit the crime200.  
 
In the judicial ordeal, the method had the purpose of identifying guilty subjects, and 
even though the procedure was painful, it was not perceived as a form of punishment. Haley’s 
therapy, however, is a way of maltreating the body, making the subject accomplish tasks his 
body will dislike (Haley’s first chapter is entitled “The Touch of Penance”). It was seen before 
how basanos named the ordeal. In such a case, the touchstone was the mode of proof itself, 
the test being used to determine someone’s authenticity. Those applying the ordeal would, 
therefore, equal the examiner in the test of gold, while the subject would accumulate the role 
of both alloys (guilt and innocence being evaluated by the kind of marks on the body). Haley’s 
therapy reproduces this notion, as it seems to give the therapist the role of examiner, whereas 
the patient, i. e., quartz, will be subjected to the test. While, in the ordeal, the result of the test 
is to be evaluated by the degree of physical signs appearing on the body, this procedure looks 
forward to the absence of marks (something which could be explained by the fact that, in 
judicial ordeals, subjects do not possess prior signs on the body, which made their later 
appearance relevant). The positive outcome of the therapy, therefore, is considered to be the 
abandonment of the patient’s symptoms, i.e. the women who stops having sweaty hands is 
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healed, a sign that the method worked. Conditions for the ordeal must be previously 
established:  
 
The selection of an ordeal is done by the therapist, preferably with the client’s collaboration. 
The ordeal must be severe enough to overcome the symptom, it must be good for the person so 
that he benefits by doing it, it must be something he can do and will accept in terms of its 
propriety, and the action must be clear and not ambiguous. It should have a beginning and an 
end clearly established201.  
 
The agreement between parties as to the nature of the procedure helps to warrant that 
it will be accurately performed, that it is not a form of self-punishment, that somehow the 
person will benefit from it (being forced to do exercise; to clean the house; to read Dickens 
through the night, just to mention some of the possible chores). This is another interesting 
point in Haley’s therapy: while the assignments are punitive to the body, it is considered that 
the subject ultimately profits from their execution. There is a partitioning between what is 
good for one’s body and mind. Even exercise, which is supposed to be good for the body, 
must be performed until the muscles get sore, in a way that will provoke pain. This means 
that, in the long run, the subject will benefit from the exercise, but that his body will dislike 
the experience.   
It should be questioned, when thinking about some of the other procedures 
previously mentioned, whether the outcome of the therapy is previously determined. Haley 
holds the view that it is necessary to persuade his patients of the certainty of the result: 
“When someone believes that nothing can be done to help her and all experts are stumped, 
it’s sometimes a good idea to offer a guaranteed cure”202. This guaranty is not described as 
the promise of a cure, which would be unethical, but something “used to persuade the client 
to follow the directive that sets up the ordeal”203. Interestingly, although in this case the 
conclusion of the procedure may not possibly be determined a priori, one of the parties, the 
patient, considers it so, while the other, the therapist, is not certain it will work, but has high 
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expectations about it. The asymmetrical relationship established between patient and 
therapist, a condition for the method to work, is thus irrevocably linked to the belief of one 
the parties regarding the certainty of the procedure. When the method works patients realize 
that, if the symptoms ever return, they will merely have to repeat the ordeal (the patient 
forced to read during the whole night to fight insomnia, for example, prepared himself by 
buying Dickens’ collected works). When the procedure worked the first time, it confirmed the 
patient’s beliefs about the validity of the method, and he will deem the results to be always 
determined beforehand.  
Apart from the performance of tasks considered to be an ordeal, the therapist itself 
may be the test:  
 
Any act that is defined in one way by the client can be redefined in a less acceptable way by the 
therapist so that it is something the person doesn’t like. For example, something the client 
describes as vengeful can be redefined as protective and encouraged by the therapist. Or an act 
that the client defines as independent of the therapist can be redefined as done for the 
therapist, thereby reframing it in such a way that the person would rather not continue do it. 
Another class of ordeals is the confronting techniques used by some therapists. When a 
therapist forces the client to face what the client would rather not face, and the client has 
sought out this painful experience, it can be classed as an ordeal procedure. Similarly, insight 
interpretations that the client doesn’t like are an ordeal to experience. In such cases the 
therapist itself, rather than a specific act by the therapist, becomes an ordeal for a person, and 
the ordeal must continue as long as the person has the problem204.  
 
 “Ordeal” is a metaphor for a group of procedures the therapist may attempt, all 
having in common the fact that the patient will dislike them. Redefining each subject’s 
perspective, as well as providing insightful interpretations that the person will loathe, are 
forms of ordeal. The therapist, in this case, is transformed into the task the patient would 
prefer not to perform: he is the test, as the patient will prefer to renounce the symptoms in 
order to avoid hearing the doctor. In this case, the ordeal is not harmful to the body and the 
distinction between mind and body does not seem to work, as it appears both the patient’s 
body and mind react subconsciously. If, in the first examples, the ordeal was a mode of 
performing actions, when the therapist is the ordeal the method is based on justification and 
on the patient’s reaction to the explanations given. The role of justification is not, however, 
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explanatory (the therapist does not aim at the person’s comprehension of his symptoms, as in 
other forms of treatment), but confrontational.  
Both Matthew Arnold and Hamlet make a move from ostensive pointing to 
supplementing that act with a description. From this point of view, ostensive quoting and 
justification seem to be procedures which work similarly. If quoting is considered the ability 
to point to an object and name it properly, to provide a justification, in this context, means to 
be able to explain clearly the conclusions derived from a certain test to others. While quartz 
allows for a verdict about the authenticity of a substance, the merit of Arnold’s procedure, 
despite his best intentions, is that of allowing the dialogue to be maintained. This is another 
distinction between quartz and both illustrations, as the use of the stone dismisses all other 
types of explanation. In Haley’s therapy, however, justification itself acquires the role of 
ordeal, as it is something the patient would prefer not to hear and which possesses a punitive 
character. 
It was seen how Hamlet and Matthew Arnold assume that some entities may be used 
as touchstones. But the accuracy of their test depends upon the intimate association between 
object, the entity being applied as the golden alloy, and the interpreter, here seen as the 
touchstone. In Haley’s therapy, in spite of the fact that the entity which is deemed to be the 
touchstone is the patient, the ordeal requires skill and depends on the therapist’s ability to 
understand him, to find the proper type of method and to maintain it during the required 
amount of time: “Like any powerful means of changing people, the ordeal is a procedure that 
can cause harm in the hands of the ignorant and irresponsible who rush off to make people 
suffer”205. It could be argued that the therapist’s skill relies on his ability to use the patient as 
quartz during a certain amount of time, a use that will stop being necessary the moment the 
person is cured. Consequently, the patient is not, contrarily to what happened in the two 
previous illustrations, a touchstone.  
The next chapter deals with interpreters considered to be a criterion in themselves. In 
this case, the mode of proof seems to take place in their bodies, which makes them be 
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singularly perceptive. But they also suffer physically the consequences of such procedures. 
According to these modes of proof previously described, intentional objects may be 
understood or unmasked through the act of pointing. However, they assume that pointing 
provides a standard of truthfulness and that to show a certain feature is to have found an 
object’s true meaning. To assume that these entities are intentional is to consider that they 
may be explained through the use of facts that seem to do without interpretation. Therefore, 
such a model of understanding seems to be motivated by a need for certainty that aims at 
contradicting the concept of interpretive openness. Perhaps Frances Glessner Lee 
characterized this best by repeating the police apothegm, “Convict the guilty, expose the 
innocent, and find the truth in a nutshell”. 
  
Chapter III 
Being a Touchstone 
Desdemona: – O, fear interprets. 
Shakespeare, Othello 
  
William Moulton Marston is the inventor of the systolic blood pressure test, an 
important procedural component of what would later be the polygraph. He also created 
“Wonder Woman,” the bouncy heroine whose weapon of choice, the Golden or Magic Lasso, 
had the purpose of forcing those captured into obeying and telling the truth. There are 
interpreters who resemble this super heroine, in their ability to adopt or devise modes of test 
useful to help them distinguish types of entities. In their rare and seemingly effortless 
capacity to read individuals, of being a touchstone for particulars, let us call them 
“Arnoldian”. The following pages represent such figures or modes of interpretative insight, 
illustrated in particular techniques of literary criticism; in the figure of Madame Merle and, 
later in the novel, Isabel Archer in Henry James’ The Portrait of a Lady; in modes of proof 
such as the polygraph; and in some forms of torture.  
In previous discussions, the concept of “interpretation” has been applied in its 
broadest sense, that of a universal practice, while methods of resolution of problems such as 
the ordeal have been treated as homologous to literary criticism. The strategies used by these 
modes of proof to determine truthful answers, and to restrain interpretation, have been 
surveyed. But the fact that multiple forms of analysis have been placed along a continuum, as 
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well as the general sense given to the word interpretation, appear to imply that the technical 
use of the term has somehow been lost. In this tale, one recognizes the story of how the 
concept, in its origin a technique that had the purpose of clarifying the veiled truth of 
Scripture, was progressively transformed into a worldview, and is now, demotically, on the 
loose. “Interpretation,” once a word particular to Biblical exegesis and literary studies, is 
nowadays applied as that which allows us to understand a variety of cultural practices and 
fields of knowledge. In fact, the conversion of a technical skill into a way of reading the world 
made all forms of ascribing sense “an interpretation.”  
From this perspective, interpretation came to name something everybody does in 
their daily rounds and which may not necessarily require a particular talent or special 
aptitudes. Understanding the reason why one’s neighbor appears to be suddenly upset, the 
working of the subway in a different country, explaining a given text, or realizing whether a 
suspect seems guilty, are generally seen as ways of making sense which vary in their degree of 
specialization. This text is an attempt to reflect on such impulse to interpret and the need 
some interpreters feel to restrain it. In fact, one way to describe these modes of proof, as well 
as certain literary criticism, is to consider that they differ from other ways of reading the 
world in their claim to limit interpretation, as if they wished to return to a time and a place in 
which the concept was not generalized.  
1. The Taming of Interpretation 
Critics such as T. S. Eliot have pointedly characterized their discomfort with uses of 
“interpretation” as a term of art. In his preface to G. Wilson Knight’s The Wheel of Fire, Eliot 
explains how “it has taken me a long time to recognize the justification for what Mr. Wilson 
Knight calls ‘interpretation’”206. The word, in inverted commas throughout the essay to 
expose this particular use as a neologism, aims at depicting the way qualified judges, i.e. 
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scholarly readers, analyze texts. To constrain the use of the concept to its technical sense207, 
as Eliot does, implies that those wishing to interpret must possess particular skills and 
master a group of specific procedures. To understand which would, precisely, be such 
dexterous uses, and what distinguishes them from more general ways of understanding, is 
the question Eliot’s preface aims to answer.  
A shift of interest in the analysis of literature is signaled here, as if Eliot had captured 
in his essay the moment in which a pregnant term of art was being created. In fact, the 
concept is nowadays so widespread that it is difficult to conceive of a time in which 
interpretation was not pervasive. Eliot’s preface oscillates between the disinclination with 
this notion and the acceptance of Wilson Knight’s analysis, in which he “has insisted upon 
the right way to interpret poetic drama”208. Knight is said to describe each Shakespeare’s play 
according to its internal pattern and visual imagery, formal criteria and aesthetic principles, 
instead of comparing it with similar works, author’s intentions, or attempting to comprehend 
its value as standard. The book, whose publication Eliot had arranged with Oxford University 
Press, presents a distinction between “criticism,” a judgment of value, an analysis of plot or 
character, and “interpretation,” the “comprehension of a set of correspondences” according 
to each play’s theme and imagery.  
The demarcation Eliot alludes to indicates a particularity, according to which 
“interpretation” would be the activity of pointing to and describing patterns intrinsic to the 
text, and criticism the discovery of elements extrinsic to it, such as placing a given poem 
among other works belonging to the standard. The dichotomy, previously described, between 
inside and outside finds here a different expression. In order to describe the pattern one must 
see it or understand it, which suggests that, in Eliot’s version of Wilson Knight, an insightful 
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critic is capable of perceiving the interior of the text (he appreciates a certain poem’s imagery, 
i.e. a skeleton made noticeable in the critic’s writings, an exoskeleton, then). The fact that 
various interpreters may, and in fact do, determine numerous patterns in the same text 
would perhaps help to understand that the description of the poem’s imagery is, in itself, a 
matter of interpretative choice – something Wilson Knight would not deny. One would thus 
be tempted to say that to determine a pattern is the activity of characterizing different 
configurations in a text through time – an endeavor that would vary according to its 
interpreters’ beliefs and interests. However, as Eliot makes clear, the idea that a text 
possesses an inside is always accompanied by the hope that the interpreter is able to expose 
it.  
 
It is also the prejudice or preference of any one who practices, though humbly, the art of verse, 
to be skeptical to all ‘interpretations’ of poetry, even his own interpretations; and to rely upon 
his sense of power and accomplishment in language to guide him. And certainly people 
ordinarily incline to suppose that in order to enjoy a poem it is necessary to discover its 
meaning, a meaning which they can expound to anyone who will listen, in order to prove that 
they enjoy it. But for one thing the possibilities in meaning of ‘meaning’ in poetry are so 
extensive, that one is quite aware that one’s knowledge of the meaning even to what oneself 
has written is extremely limited, and that its meaning to others, at least so far as there is some 
consensus of interpretation among persons apparently qualified to interpret, is quite as much 
as part of it as what it means to oneself209.  
 
Eliot’s account, a valuable lesson for readers such as the narrator in Henry James’ 
short-story “The Figure in the Carpet,” underlines a peculiar error in interpretation, i. e. the 
presumption that enjoying a poem is determining its single meaning. Interpretation seems to 
be accompanied by the idea that a text possesses a mystery in need to be solved, the content 
of which is difficult to understand. The presumption of inner secrecy, so often mentioned in 
previous chapters, is visible when Eliot, despite himself, confesses he was “tempted to use the 
word ‘secret’ as an alternative to ‘pattern’, but that I remembered the unlucky example of 
Matthew Arnold”210. If, on the one hand, “interpreting” a text would mean clarifying these 
difficulties and making it accessible to others, on the other hand it seems erroneous to 
assume that a single interpretation would comprise the whole meaning of a poem. Proficient 
                                                           
209  Op. cit., p. xviii. 
210  Op. cit., p. xvii. 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 176 
 
interpreters, according to Eliot, must separate the “class of poets, not unknown to any age, 
which has all of the superficial qualities, and none of the internal organs, of poetry”211. In 
such case, error of judgment is a result of mistakenly considering the exterior is in fact the 
interior, i.e. deeming the superficial qualities to be the internal organs.  
To pin down a sole sense is to ignore the fact that texts contemplate the possibility of 
various, and sometimes contradictory, interpretations. Although sensibly refusing the 
existence of univocal interpretations, Eliot describes the advantages of reducing the number 
of possible understandings of a text. The passage also rejects the notion that each reading 
may instigate a multiplicity of meanings, sustained by opposite views of the world. The 
liminal, definitional legitimacy of multiple interpretations will, of course, ignore the 
possibility of error. Notice how the identification of an interpretive fault presupposes the 
existence of a text that the mistake violates or transforms, as well as of someone able to 
detect it. Interestingly, showing an error does not always entail opposing it to a correct 
interpretation, although that may sometimes occur, but to contrast it with the text itself, 
which is an admission that it exists as an entity. It is unclear, in descriptions favorable to a 
differentiation between interior and exterior, whether pointing to an error would be 
obtaining access to the inside or the outside of the text (assuming they may be distinguished). 
On the one hand, showing a word or expression implies it will do as public, visible proof, and 
therefore belongs to what would be considered the exterior of the text. From such 
perspective, unlike discovering a pattern, rectifying an interpretation would not entail 
accessing this hidden secret. On the other hand, it could be presumed that evidence of a fault 
is to be mainly found within what would be considered the poem’s inner structure 
(something that would be a part of the text, and would therefore be depicted as its interior). 
Revising a faulty interpretation, thus, presupposes previously mentioned skills such as the 
capacity to observe and to point to a word or expression, considered evidence, in order to 
clarify its meaning.   
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In fact, one way to justify the existence of specialized interpreters is the necessity to 
uncover interpretative faults. Spotting a mistake presupposes the existence of interpretation 
as a tool, and opposes it to more general ways of viewing the world, while it reinforces the 
idea that certain persons are more capable than others at these tasks. The thought that  
mistakes must be corrected also validates the idea that one must be properly taught in order 
to interpret correctly. If one accepts the description of interpretation as an activity of experts, 
then understanding a poem shares procedures with other types of specialized modes of proof, 
and may be differentiated from non-technical forms of understanding the world. A 
particularity in examinations with the purpose to detect deception helps to enlighten this 
point. Although the instrument we call polygraph is the center of this technique for 
evaluating persons, the test depends, as shown earlier, on other critical elements of the 
process, such as the pre-test interview, the reply to a previously established group of 
questions and, lastly, the chart’s interpretation212. This usually involves the appraisal of the 
physiological reaction to relevant and comparison questions. The examiner, who analyses the 
charts, is responsible for it. Is this a technical interpretation of affairs?  
Analysis and interpretation often appear as interchangeable concepts in James Allan 
Matte’s book about Psychophysiological Detection or Deception, the accepted scientific term 
to designate polygraph evaluations. A scientific chart contains four different physiological 
records. Paraphrasing the author’s words, respiration patterns are recorded through two 
different pens at the top of the chart – one characterizes thoracic and the other abdominal 
breathing –; galvanic skin conductance is documented in the middle of the chart; and, lastly, 
cardio activity is registered at the bottom of the page, revealing transformations in blood 
pressure, pulse rate and pulse amplitude213. Those looking closely will, however, find a 
difference between the task of reading each separate chart, identified as “analysis,” and what 
is considered to be the general “interpretation” of results.  
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In the chapter “Analysis, Interpretation and Quantification of Physiological data,” 
each section concerning a specific chart is referred to as “Breathing Analysis;” “Galvanic Skin 
response \ Conductance Analysis” or “Cardio Analysis”. On occasion, the author uses the 
term “interpret” to refer to the way a polygraph examiner reads the trace on a chart (using 
phrases such as “In order to properly interpret the GSR\GSG tracing”214). But for the most 
part, “interpretation” is the expression used when physiological data as a whole is considered, 
i. e. when several charts are taken into account together. While analysis is deemed a partial 
account, interpretation allows the polygraph examiner to have a full comprehension of the 
test; it is considered the specialized capacity to analyze, compare, and evaluate the group of 
charts, thus permitting a conclusion to be reached about the suspect.  
Interpretation is perceived as a tool allowing for a comprehensive view of the 
examination. Such broad understanding of the term may not, nonetheless, be associated with 
the perspective of those who think about the concept in its more general sense. In this mode 
of proof, interpretation is what allows for conclusive results to appear, putting a stop to a 
multiplicity of hypothesis; it is being used as a valuable instrument, restricting a world of 
possibilities, controlling results and allowing us to acquire certainty regarding the outcome of 
the test. Thus, the demand for skilled examiners: 
 
In addition to those who graduated from unaccredited polygraph schools whose curriculum 
may lack adequate physiology training, many earlier graduates of accredited polygraph schools 
have failed to supplement their initial limited knowledge of physiology in spite of continued 
advances in forensic psychophysiology. Thus many “polygraphists” are “technicians” who 
interpret chart tracings by memorizing known tracing patterns without knowing the 
physiological cause for the particular pattern analyzed. This can lead to errors in interpretation 
that otherwise could have been avoided215.  
 
The charts consist in the visible exteriorization of the subject’s physiological reactions 
to the questions posed. To an amateur user of the polygraph, or in non-specialized arguments 
about the mode of proof, evidence is assumed to be self-explainable. Visible results of deceit 
are supposedly so clear that everyone will reach equal conclusions when looking at them  
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(analysis would be so obvious a task as determining whether a certain arm has been burned 
in the ordeal, a known ancestor of the test). To a professional, however, the capacity to make 
sense of what was brought to light depends on a technical understanding of the investigation, 
which is a result of study and education. The degree of knowledge about physiology 
distinguishes real polygraphists from mere technicians, those who have memorized the most 
common patterns appearing in the charts, but who are unable to understand the 
physiological causes of a certain tracing. In this passage, as well as in others in the book, 
interpretation is a tool handled by those well acquainted with human physiology, the 
polygraph as an instrument, and the group of questions posed. An expert polygraphist is able 
to understand what caused a pattern, to describe it accurately and to provide a verdict.  
In polygraph examinations, interpretative error may derive from insufficient 
knowledge, the incapacity to properly understand the causes giving origin to a pattern or to 
read accurately the charts. A difference between Eliot’s characterization of Wilson Knight’s 
ability to determine the Shakespearean pattern and the interpretation of the charts derives 
from the fact that, in polygraph tests, the chart is seemingly visible for all to see. The register 
is, itself, a pattern, which, unlike its hardly fathomable existence in a literary text, has been 
brought to light during the evaluation. But not only the requisite to clarify the pattern is part 
of the procedure, but also understanding the pattern, itself, is as complex as the analysis of a 
Shakespearean sonnet. Let me quote, as an example, a passage aiming to explain what one 
sees in a chart: 
 
A PVC results in a sudden drop in blood pressure and blood volume. In the top tracing the PVC 
occurs at almost regular intervals without specific stimulus thus is regarded as uniform 
distortion, whereas in the bottom tracing the PVC occurs only on a specific stimulus thus is 
regarded as a reaction216.  
 
Knowing that PVC stands for “premature ventricular contraction” does not help much 
to understand the differentiation between a “uniform distortion” and a “reaction,” the 
reasons that make one or the other appear, and their importance to the general 
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comprehension of the chart. It could be argued that this is due to the fact that these terms 
require explanation. “Uniform distortion” is portrayed as a “series of equal but 
nonconforming breathing cycles interspersed within an average tracing segment”217, which 
means that the subject may be attempting to control his breathing cycle, giving origin to a 
seemingly normal chart. Usually, as Matte explains, breathing rates below ten cycles a minute 
indicate that the suspect is controlling respiratory patterns (“normal breathing rates ranges 
ten to twenty-four cycles per minute”218). It may now be perceived that mastering the term 
does not simplify the interpretative task. Learning the terminology is, nonetheless, the easy 
part, and it does not make us skilled interpreters. Notice figure XII-38 in the book and its 
explanation, quoted bellow:  
 
 
 
                 
 
 
Figure 1: Analysis of a breathing pattern. 
 
 
Question #35 above reflects significant suppression followed by hyperventilation signifying 
that both the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems activated on this relevant question. 
The neighboring control question #47 reflects mild suppression with no evidence of a relief 
pattern. Therefore, a score of -2 (D) or deception is given to this Spot in the breathing 
tracing219. 
 
Those knowing that subjects experiencing fear of detection tend to suppress breathing 
cycles during inhalation (“this results in either sustained, ascending, descending or 
suppressed breathing cycles of less than average amplitude on a stable baseline”220) may 
understand why deception (score – 2) was given to this Spot in reply to question 35. Fear 
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220  Op. cit., p. 373. 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 181 
 
activates the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems in relevant questions (those where 
pertinent information is asked), as opposed to what happens in control questions (those not 
significant to the test, and used to compare results). When the polygraphist equates this 
result with those presented in the other charts, in which similar patterns of duplicity were 
found, he obtains a verdict of deception. The chapter dedicated to the analysis of the charts, 
which a lay user may read carefully and repeatedly in order to try to make sense of each 
graphic and its description, substantiates Matte’s account concerning the necessity to have 
specialists analyzing the results. Proof, in polygraph examinations, is self-evident, but only to 
those capable of seeing it. One relying merely on observation and assuming it will be 
sufficient to learn the procedures will be unable to comprehend the charts.  
Interestingly, a persistent self-taught interpreter of the registers will, at some point, 
understand what is being shown, but such feat is to be accompanied by the absolute 
persuasiveness of every description. Without formal education, every analysis appears to 
make perfect sense and one is not able to detect faults, misinterpretations or to deconstruct 
the author’s argument. The relationship between the facts appearing on the charts and each 
commentary about them is, to an untrained reader, indistinguishable. The thought that one is 
able to concur with what is being presented, but not to diverge, is representative of the limits 
of our interpretative skills. Such particularity does not depend, as some persons would argue, 
on lack of knowledge of the specific vocabulary, but on the inability to provide reasons to 
what one is observing. As the author suggests, learning physiology, taking certified polygraph 
courses and reading the manuals could solve the problem, an indication that correct 
interpretations are obtained when one becomes an expert.  
In this case, and to a non-skilled interpreter, it is quite easy to appreciate how 
showing something only works with those capable of understanding what is being 
highlighted. Returning to Eliot, to differentiate “reading” a text and “interpreting” it, as the 
author does, implies the existence of a category of specialized interpreters, skilled in the art 
of understanding literature. This is the reason why numerous meanings, in order not to be 
erroneous, may only exist within a limit judged accurate by those “qualified to interpret,” i. e., 
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in possession of particular skills of analysis. Such activity presupposes a technical sense given 
to the term “interpretation,” characterized in the preface as the pursuit of those wishing to 
comprehend both the poem’s surface and its core, and not bind the comprehension of a text 
to the discovery of its meaning: “But our first duty as either critics or ‘interpreters’, surely, 
must be to try to grasp the whole design, and read character and plot in the understanding of 
this subterrene or submarine music”221. Interestingly, Eliot characterizes the common field 
between critics and interpreters to be that of grasping the whole design (the exterior frame?), 
through the comprehension of this subterrene music (a poem’s interiority?).  
 
“Reading” a poem without interpreting it would be knowing what the poem is about, being 
able to describe it, and to understand its own language, as “I can tell nothing from the fact that 
you enjoy Shakespeare, unless I know exactly how you enjoy him”222.  
 
Thus, the importance of describing evidence and proof to support a line of reasoning, 
of using a poem’s vocabulary to define it, and of being able to portray that set of relations 
within its structure, of comprehending “recurrences of mood and theme”223. This is the 
reason Eliot claims to have benefited from Wilson Knight’s book, as “his essays enlarged my 
understanding of the Shakespeare pattern;” “which, after all, is quite the main thing”224. 
Resisting interpretation would thus imply “to limit his criticism of poetry to the appreciation 
of vocabulary and syntax, the analysis of line, metric and cadence; to stick as closely to the 
more trustworthy senses as possible”225. In Eliot’s essays, his own mode of reading is made 
clear and one notices how the argument is organized through an ostensive display of passages 
considered representative. Take, for example, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” 
where the author presents what he considers to be the resemblances between several critics’ 
                                                           
221   T. S. Eliot, Op. cit., p. xxi. 
222   Op. cit., p. xvii. 
223   Op. cit., p. xx. 
224   Op. cit., p. xx. Notice Eliot’s comment, in his essay about Dante, written a few years before the preface: “We 
do not understand Shakespeare from a single reading, and certainly not from a single play. There is a relation 
between the various plays of Shakespeare, taken in order; and it is a work of years to venture even one individual 
interpretation of the pattern in Shakespeare’s carpet”. T. S. Eliot, “Dante,” 1929, Selected Essays, 1932. London: 
Faber and Faber Limited, 1980, p. 245.  
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interpretations of Shakespeare and their personal views, to then propose a Shakespeare 
"under the influence of the Stoicism of Seneca"226. Before quoting Othello’s ultimate speech, 
Eliot comments how he “always felt that I have never read a more terrible exposure of human 
weakness – of universal human weakness – than the last great speech of Othello”227. The 
monologue is then cited and followed by the commentary:  
 
What Othello seems to me to be doing in making this speech is cheering himself up. He is 
endeavoring to escape reality, he has ceased to think about Desdemona, and is thinking about 
himself228.  
 
 
There is no appreciation of vocabulary or syntax, no commentary on metric or cadence. 
And, still, Eliot seems to have been able to stick closely to those trustworthy senses, in his 
exemplification of what may be considered insightful criticism. In Othello’s monologue, 
commonly understood as the expression of the utmost despair, Eliot finds unredeemed 
egotism. Some pages later, part of Hamlet’s final speech is quoted, after which Eliot 
comments: “Antony says: ‘I am Antony still,’ and the Duchess, ‘I am Duchess of Malfi still’; 
would either of them have said that unless Medea had said Medea superest?”229. Again, 
metric and cadence, vocabulary and syntax are ignored, as the commentary concerning the 
quotation serves not only the purpose of grouping Hamlet’s last words, and, thus, Othello’s, 
with those of Antony and the Duchess of Malfi, but also of showing their common model, 
Seneca’s Medea. In this form of reading, as opposed to interpreting, one discovers Eliot as an 
Arnoldian, for whom part of the critic’s skill consists in his ability to choose passages in a 
text. In The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism, the author argues: 
 
But Arnold had real taste. His preoccupations, as I have said, make him too exclusively 
concerned with the great poetry, and with the greatness of it. His view of Milton is for this 
reason unsatisfying. But you cannot read his essay on The Study of Poetry without being 
                                                           
226 T. S. Eliot, “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” 1927, Selected Essays, 1932. London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1980, p. 128-129.  
227  Op. cit., p. 130. 
228   Op. cit., p. 130.  
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convinced by the felicity of his quotations: to be able to quote as Arnold could is the best 
evidence of taste230. 
 
 
Although Matthew Arnold’s view of Milton remains unsatisfying (i.e., his general 
understanding of the author seems be at fault), his capacity to quote indicates not only his 
taste, but also his talent as a critic. Reading a text well, from this perspective, would imply 
not only the capacity to point to errors or mistakes in other’s criticism, but also to quote 
passages from the text itself, thus showing it to others. In Eliot’s sentence one understands 
how presenting a passage implies not only the act of selecting it well, but also the existence of 
a category of interpreters capable to comprehend the reasons why it has been elected. 
Showing only works if others understand what is considered evidence and why (from this 
perspective, understanding criticism, using Eliot’s language, would be being able to 
comprehend the reasons why something is being highlighted). Eliot’s words are a 
demonstration of his recognition of Arnold’s ability, as well as of his own skill. Notice briefly 
how, in Eliot’s essay on Dante, another instance of an ostensive organization of an argument, 
and before quoting the Divine Comedy, the author observes:  
 
There is a well-known comparison or simile in the great XVth canto of the Inferno, which 
Matthew Arnold singled out, rightly, for high praise; which is characteristic of the way in which 
Dante employs these figures231.   
 
 The passage in question is one of Arnold’s touchstones, which Eliot quotes to reveal 
the quality of Dante’s imagery, the simile being applied “to make us see more definitely the 
scene which Dante has put before us in the preceding lines”232. Singling out the passage, in 
this case, has the purpose of making us see what Dante desired, which involves 
understanding the technical use of the simile, but also of comprehending the reason why 
both Arnold and Eliot have highlighted it. A difference between both critics would 
theoretically reside in the fact that Eliot does not feel the need to theorize or to contrast 
                                                           
230  T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry & the Use of Criticism – Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in 
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golden passages and oppose them to the poetry being evaluated. And, still, on occasion, and 
returning to Eliot’s essay on Othello, one discovers his own appreciation for golden alloys: 
 
When Dante says 
 
  La sua voluntade e nostra pace 
 
it is great poetry, and there is great philosophy behind it. When Shakespeare says 
 
 As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods; 
 They kill us for their sport 
 
It is equally great poetry, though the philosophy behind it is not great233. 
 
Here one finds Eliot as a practical Arnoldian, contrasting touchstones. Quotation is a 
form of evidence, as if the citations are self-explainable, thus allowing for general claims to be 
made about them. But only certain readers may perceive the lines’ quality, or authenticity (in 
Eliot, acknowledgment is restricted to those able to understand other’s quotations and to 
choose their own alloys234). The selection of quotations in Eliot shares the double nature of 
proof in polygraph examinations. On the one hand, both the quotations and the answers to 
relevant questions are described as evident. Something in their nature distinguishes these 
alloys from more mundane passages or replies, as if they clamor for attention. On the other 
hand, only experts may choose the citations or understand the relevant replies. This ability to 
elect quotations shares characteristics with the capacity to detect interpretative faults: both 
are described as possessing an obvious character, but only experts may spot them.  
For Eliot, Wilson Knight’s book, unlike other attempts in the art of interpretation, has 
the merit of not deriving from the erroneous presumption that each text possesses a secret, 
inner meaning:  
 
                                                           
233   T. S. Eliot, “Shakespeare and The Stoicism of Seneca,” p. 136.  
234  Eliot’s perspective about poets as artists may not be developed here, but his use of Arnold’s expressions to 
characterize them must be made clear: “There is for each time, for each artist, a kind of alloy required to make the 
metal workable into art; and each generation prefers its own alloy to any other”. See T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry 
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 I do not think that Mr. Wilson Knight himself (…) has fallen into the error of presenting the 
work of Shakespeare as a series of mystical treatises in cryptogram, to be filed away once the 
cipher is read; poetry is poetry and the surface is as marvellous as the core235. 
 
This passage, one of the most important in the essay, identifies interpretation as a 
term synonymous to words such as “to clarify” or “to enlighten,” something to be applied to 
cases in which meaning is somehow lacking and must be illuminated: “To interpret, then, or 
to seek to pounce upon the secret, to elucidate the pattern and pluck out the mystery, of a 
poet’s work, is ‘no less an instinct’”236. The expression “plucking out the mystery,” which, as 
was seen in the first chapter, quotes Hamlet’s rejection of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s 
attempts to sound him237, characterizes the need to decipher other entities. Still, as was seen, 
Hamlet was reacting against his friends’ lack of skill and comradeship and not arguing, as his 
test to Claudius proved, against the existence of mysteries in need to be solved. Polygraph 
charts would thus be grouped with modes of interpreting Shakespeare as a treatise in 
cryptogram, methods of analysis sharing the assumption that unique solutions may be found 
in order to solve the problem at hand.  
In Eliot’s objection to interpretation as a mode of solving mysteries, something 
favorably perceived by the aforementioned modes of proof, lies an important difference 
between literary criticism, and, for example, the analysis of a polygraph chart. Criticism 
generally aims at describing correctly a certain poem or narrative, to find a suitable 
interpretation of a text, even if language is no longer believed to be the carrier of truth. On 
the contrary, the aforementioned methods of testing are expected to provide a true verdict; 
they require a definite solution. In fact, unless there are technical deficiencies with the 
apparatus, the data resulting from the polygraph test are portrayed as truthful. The title of 
Matte’s book, the polygraph’s Bible, reads as follows: Forensic Psychophysiology Using the 
Polygraph, Scientific Truth Verification, Lie Detection. Words such as forensic and 
                                                           
235   Op. cit., p. xxii.  
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237 The passage reads as follows: “Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you \ make of me! You would play 
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psychophysiology lead us to a world of rational and accurate results. But it is the term 
“scientific truth verification” that characterizes the idea that the results obtained by the test 
correspond to the truth itself, verified and validated by scientific procedures.  
The need for a knowledgeable examiner derives from the fact that mistakes might be 
made in the reading of the charts. This is the reason why those arguing in favor of the 
polygraph tend to sustain that personal interpretation, which could cause errors in the 
analysis of the data, is being controlled by a rigorous set of factors. The relationship between 
facts and their interpretations is rationalized, in an attempt to make them indistinguishable. 
One is not implying, of course, that these examiners ignore the differentiation between facts 
and the judgment one makes about them, but characterizing the pretension for uniformity 
between the data and its interpretation. Polygraphists appear to share Eliot’s concerns about 
the impulse to interpret and the need to put a stop to it, thus theorizing, in a scientific 
language, the importance of “empirical data,” “conversion tables” and “validation studies”. 
Notice how, in polygraph examinations, clarification of a fault is possible when we point to 
the graphics, oppose them to the polygraph examiner’s conclusions, and redescribe them.  
 
In chart interpretation, the forensic psychophysiologist (FP) must not allow a significant 
reaction in one tracing to influence his\her evaluation of that same relevant question in the 
other tracings238.  
 
Being unable to see the charts as a whole pattern, allowing for a single tracing to 
influence the outcome of the test, must be avoided. This is the reason why a numerical 
scoring was designed with the purpose to “attain an objective measure” in chart 
interpretation. Quantification results from the evaluation of “the relevant question versus the 
neighboring control question”239, which produces a set of values going from the maximum 
truthful score to the maximum deception score. The analysis of each chart is the first step in 
the evaluation, followed by the tallying of scores, allowing interpretation to be objective: 
“when all scores are tallied, a conclusion regarding truth or deception must be made from 
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this tally by means of a conversion (conclusion) table based upon empirical data supported 
and refined through validation studies”240. While analyzing a poem was previously described 
as the capacity to explain it to others, reaching a conclusion in a polygraph test may be 
exposed as the aptitude to reach a truthful or untruthful verdict and being capable to justify 
it. Numerical quantification, therefore, is represented as the tool allowing interpretation to be 
systematic, conclusive and, most of all, restricted.  
Some forms of literary criticism, though, do present similarities with polygraph 
charts; in the way they quantify data in order to obtain maps of connections between 
characters. Consider the work of Stanford’s Literary Lab and Franco Moretti’s explanatory 
essay “Network Theory, Plot Analysis”. The author uses quantified data to bring to light a 
series of maps with the purpose to clarify connections, or networks of relations, between 
characters of plays such as Hamlet or Macbeth. According to Moretti, this allows critics to 
discover information which otherwise could go unnoticed, such as the fact that Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern never speak with each other or the centrality of Horatio in the play. 
Moretti’s maps seem to have the advantage of being a new way to present data and generate 
fresh interpretations about the studied works:  
 
Figure 2  
 
                                                           
240  Op. Cit., p. 398.  
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 189 
 
One might be confronted with Moretti’s maps before or after reading the essay which 
accompanies them. Either way, knowledge is required for one to make sense of what is being 
observed (as happens in the case of the polygraph). Knowing the plays, as well as their plot 
and characters, for example, would obviously be the first requirement for one to read the 
map. But this knowledge alone does not help us to see what Moretti is trying to show. In fact, 
the traces seem bewildering, and without understanding what are we supposed to be looking 
for, it is difficult to read the map. From this perspective, although one might later look into 
the maps and find other type of evidence in them, they may not be considered entirely 
independent of Moretti’s explanations. An example would be the realization that, unlike 
other studies in the same field, these maps register explicit connections between characters, 
i.e. the way two characters speak with each other and not only their presence in the same 
scene. Without the essay to clarify the enigma it would be difficult, though not impossible, for 
the reader to reach such conclusion.  
 
(…) once you make a network of a play, you stop working on the play proper, and work on a 
model instead: you reduce the text to characters and interactions, abstract them from 
everything else, and this process of reduction and abstraction makes the model obviously 
much less than the original object – just think of this: I am discussing Hamlet, and saying 
nothing about Shakespeare’s words – but also, in another sense, much more than it, because a 
model allows you to see the underlying structures of a complex object. It’s like an X-ray241.  
 
Moretti’s models relate to this thesis in more than one way. The author is implying 
that there is more to a play than its language, which is why ignoring, even if for a while, 
matters such as tone or style, allow us to focus on the text’s “underlying structures”. In this 
search for an X-ray, the author takes further the implications of T. S. Eliot’s theory about 
Wilson Knight, as he seems to be able to detect a pattern in Hamlet (even though Eliot would 
probably object to the idea that Shakespeare’s words could be ignored). It is assumed that 
without the excesses (i.e. language) the plot of the play and the relations between characters 
appear and may be described in a new light, which is why reducing the play to a model has 
the purpose of making matters simple, less enigmatic. The benefits of working on a model 
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instead of in an actual play also brings to mind Glessner Lee’s dioramas, as there is a 
distortion in the relation between the original object and the model that, as seen, also took 
place in Lee’s nutshells. At the same time, in this aim for objectivity, the maps’ use of data 
may equally be contrasted to the physiological records described in polygraph charts. In this 
case, an important difference between polygraph registers and the maps resides in the fact 
that while the charts have the purpose of obtaining the truth, i.e. to put an end to 
interpretation, these maps help us see the plays in a new light, they aim to generate new 
interpretations242. Another difference between polygraph charts and Moretti’s essay has to do 
with the fact the polygraph registers are deemed a form of exteriorization of what lies inside 
the person. In the network theory, though, the idea of interior is rejected:   
  
Or take the protagonist. When discussing this figure, literary theory usually turns to concepts 
of “consciousness” and “interiority” – even Woloch’s structural study takes this path. When a 
group of researchers applied network theory to the Marvel series, however, their view of the 
protagonist made no reference to interiority; the protagonist was simply “the character that 
minimized the sum of the distances to all other vertices”; in other words, the center of the 
network. (…) So, speaking of Shakespeare’s characters “in general” is wrong, at least in the 
tragedies, because these characters-in-general don’t exist: all there is, is this curve leading 
from one extreme to the other without any clear solution of continuity243. 
 
It appears that an important consequence of ignoring language in favor of structure is 
the possibility of overlooking characters as we usually describe them. Reading a set of maps 
will show us nothing about Hamlet’s interiority (i.e. his character), but much about the 
importance of his relations of power within a network. As Moretti will also explain, the 
protagonist is important: “Not for what is “in” it; not for its essence, but for its function in the 
                                                           
242 Regarding Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, it should perhaps be mentioned that someone observing the play on 
stage would obviously notice that they do not speak with each other (whether they would give it relevance or not 
would be a different question). When one considers, as the author does, that each speech represents an action 
(and seeing two of the studied works are theatre plays) then the similarity between these maps and actors’ 
movements on stage acquires relevance. Moretti does mention it, when he claims that “when we watch a play, we 
are always in the present: what is on stage, is; and then it disappears. Here, nothing ever disappears. What is done 
cannot be undone”. The difference between a stage play and the maps would consist on the fact that they allow us 
to look into the structure once and again, they remain as an interpretative tool to be used when necessary. 
Perhaps the same happens in the case of the records in a stage manager’s prompt book (in the case of stage 
directors who are keen on having the actors movements well determined in space), where researchers also benefit 
from what the author calls “the advantage of thinking in terms of space rather than time”. In fact, part of the stage 
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apart) during the play, who speaks to whom, etc.  
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stability of the network. And stability has clearly much to do with centrality, but is not 
identical to it”244. This perspective is made clear when one observes figure number 3.  
 
 
Figure 3 
 
This figure appears in the context of a series (Figures 19 to 21), in which important 
characters are gradually removed. The maps are drawn to make us notice there are three 
central figures in Hamlet, as characters concentrate near Claudius, Hamlet and Horatio. This 
is surprising to the author, in the sense that Horatio “has a function in the play, but not a 
motivation. No aim, no emotions – no language, really, worthy of Hamlet. I can think of no 
other character that is so central to a Shakespeare play, and so flat in its style”245. When 
Hamlet or Claudius are removed, according to Moretti,  
 
(…) peripheral characters are affected, but the network as a whole not much (…) But if we 
remove, first Hamlet, and then Horatio (Figures 19-21), then the fragmentation is so radical 
that the Ghost and Fortinbras – which is to say, the beginning and the ending of the play – are 
completely severed from each other and from the rest of the plot. Hamlet no longer exists. And 
yet, Horatio is slightly less central than Claudius in quantitative terms (1.69 versus 1.62). Why 
is he so much more important in structural terms?246 
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The explanation for Horatio’s importance, and even his flatness, is related with 
Shakespeare’s half-intuition about his importance in the play. Horatio represents the flatness 
of the State’s discourse and his space is that of “ambassadors, messengers, sentinels, talk of 
foreign wars, and of course the transfer of sovereignty at the end – all this announces what 
will be soon called, not Court, but State”247. Horatio therefore represents the new state, this 
being the reason for his importance. From this point of view, when they ignored Horatio’s 
language and focused on his relation with others, the maps were able to discover new things 
in the play. But, as often seen by critics, and mentioned in the first chapter, Horatio is a 
central character, in the sense that it is up to him to properly narrate the story that took 
place. He is the main testimony for the narrative, so it makes sense to realize that without 
him there may not exist continuity between the beginning and ending of the play (without 
Horatio, there would be no play). The maps do allow us to visualize Horatio’s relations with 
others, but, obviously, a reader of the play could discover the same information. When 
replying to other critics’ objections about the necessity of a network theory, Moretti explains 
that “I did not need network theory; but probably needed networks. I had been thinking 
about Horatio for some time – but I had never ‘seen’ his position within Hamlet’s field of 
forces until I looked at the network of the play. ‘Seen’ is the keyword here”248. The map is 
useful as it allows Moretti to make sense of ideas (intuitions) he had been thinking about, 
without being able to fully give them meaning. One wonders, though, if this means they show 
Moretti what he was looking for (they clarify his previous thoughts on the subject). If so, are 
these maps a useful tool for critics in general, or for those devising them? Will other critics 
find Moretti’s maps enlightening and will they be able to find other sets of relations in them?  
In the polygraph, understanding the charts would, as seen, make us able to determine 
the truth. Matters are not, however, that simple. Part of the polygraph examiner’s task 
                                                           
247  Op. cit., p. 7. 
248  Op. Cit., p. 11. Moretti seems to be incurring in what Claude Lévi-Strauss, in “Structuralisme et Critique 
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simplement reçu de l’une et ce que l’autre y met”. Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie Structurale. Paris: 
Librairie Plon, 1973, p. 323-324.  
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 193 
 
involves the ability to understand if the guilty person is attempting to deceive the test 
purposefully, which, one would say, is an interpretation of the subject’s intentions. In this 
case, the assessor aims to limit his personal views through the understanding of the subject’s 
possible techniques of countermeasure and the respective development of a group of 
countercountermeasures (a term of art). Common physical mechanisms of deception are the 
contraction of the anal sphincter muscle, which may increase respiratory amplitude, “curling 
toes, right\left thigh contraction, right\left forearm push, right\left heel press, right \left 
palm press, right\left elbow pushed down”249, biting of the tongue, tensing of the jaw, among 
others. This set of techniques aims to cause “distortion of the physiological tracing, or pain, 
which can cause a physiological reaction and\ or distortion”250. These countermeasures may 
invalidate accurate results or produce an inconclusive polygraph examination. The interest of 
the countermeasures employed by the guilty suspect resides in the fact that deception is 
focused on the effort to disrupt the correspondence between facts and their interpretations. 
While the labor of the polygraph examiner resides mainly in the attempt to obtain 
interpretations close to the data, the deceitful suspect wishes to increase the gap between the 
information in the charts and the possibility to interpret them well. A subject deliberately 
attempting to distort results is said to “prevent the forensic psychophysiologist from 
obtaining interpretable charts”251 and inconclusive data are taken as denying the possibility 
of interpretation, i. e. the ability to reach an accurate verdict. The subject appears to be 
refusing the polygraphist’s access to his interior, using exterior factors such as muscle 
contraction in order to do so. In this case, the charts exemplify the subject’s exterior action 
and not his inner reactions.  
To prevent the mentioned physical attempts to deceive the test, a motion chair has 
been developed, which traces the subject’s every move, recording it, so that the examiner may 
later associate the person’s movements with the relevant questions, to see if there was an 
                                                           
249   James Matte, Op. Cit., p. 538. 
250   Op. Cit., p. 537. Other practices to deceive the test involve self-hypnosis, dissociation, use of drugs or alcohol. 
For each of these measures there are countercountermeasures, such as drugs tests.  
251  Op. cit., p. 379. 
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effort to deceive. Being able to interpret accurately the movements on the chair, in this case, 
is the aptitude to attribute a correct intention of duplicity to the subject. The suspect’s words 
do not have interpretative value, and saying truthful or untruthful things only matters in the 
sense that the answers allow for the appearance of physiological data. The chair longs to 
catch the exterior efforts to deceive. Interestingly, every aspect of the suspect’s behavior, 
except his words, is a subject of analysis, as the polygraphist attempts to measure involuntary 
reactions that are difficult to feign. But, as critics of the polygraph have accurately noticed, 
fear of the examination may give origin to the same movements as those appearing in 
countermeasure techniques. In this sense, interpretation is a matter of making a (subjective) 
choice, a deliberation concerning the intentions of the suspect and of avoiding the possibility 
of error.  
To conclude this point, both literature and the polygraph require skilled aptitudes, 
such as knowing how to observe, point, and to detect interpretative faults. Noticing a mistake 
in polygraph examinations entails the capacity to read a chart and to follow an explanation; 
while Eliot portrays the skill of identifying a quotation, learning how to quote, and 
comprehending the reasons that lead others to choose their own golden alloys. In both cases, 
acquiring technical language, which may require some work, may be considered the artless 
part of the procedure. Mastering a technique, however, implies the difficult ability to disagree 
with an explanation and to provide reasons for it. The capacity not to be persuaded by other 
persons’ justifications and to discover interpretative faults reveals that one has finally 
acquired comprehension and individual skill.  
Although both polygraph charts and quotations of poems seem self-evident, they 
ought to be distinguished. In order to understand a chart one must know, for example, that 
cardio thoracic pressure increases when one experiences fear of detection, contrary to what 
happens with respiratory patterns, which decrease. Polygraph registers, as seen, are only self-
evident to those capable of understanding them. Quotations of poems, however, do not 
appear to require such expertise, in the sense that everyone may read them and understand 
their words (one does not necessarily have to know what metaphors or alliterations are to 
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comprehend a certain poem – figures of style used in daily language). And, still, the capacity 
to interpret accurately a poem does result from technical knowledge, from having read many 
poems and their interpretations before, a point to which I will return.  
Matters differ, of course, in the polygraphist’s necessity to determine a verdict. In 
order to do so, the examiner must eliminate a number of hypotheses and choose a single one. 
The determination of a verdict makes his interpretation of affairs accessible to everyone, but 
the reasons why such ruling was chosen are often unclear to those unable to follow the charts. 
In a context of pandemic interpretation, both polygraph interpreters and literary critics are 
here portrayed as specialized exegetists, whose procedures require the use of technical 
protocols (more or less rationalized). The insistence on having qualified judges and on the 
development of their skills is a way of saying that not everybody is an adequate authority, and 
that these ways of producing evidence differ from more general practices of assigning sense. 
“Arnoldians,” from this point of view, would be specialized interpreters, those applying a set 
of specific techniques with the purpose to understand, describe and, in some modes of proof, 
solve, particular problems.  
2. Intuition without conviction 
 Arguing in favor of the technical sense of interpretation in cases in which a rigorous 
set of protocols has been established seems simpler than when discussing authors for whom 
procedures have a certain degree of vagueness. Recognizing a problem, knowing what to ask, 
how, as well as when, to do it, applying or creating a specific vocabulary, could, in fact, be  
described as either specialized or general interpretative skills. Everybody may accept the 
need to conduct an inquiry in order to clarify something, and to keep repeating and 
reformulating questions until the needed information has been found. Still, it will be seen 
how particular interpreters distinguish themselves in the ability to confront the studied 
entities and pose them accurate questions. In order to do so, they must possess a particular 
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insight regarding the object of knowledge, which one does not generally find in non-
specialized exegetists. This capacity to ask is accompanied by the development and 
systematization of a particular vocabulary, which will be learnt by other interpreters aiming 
to reach a similar outcome.  
The importance of asking fitting questions will surely be seen in Psychophysiological 
Detection. Understanding the reasons leading to the formulation of interrogations in these 
examinations would be a thesis on its own, but it is relevant to refer how part of the 
polygraphist’s skill consists in his ability to, departing from the pre-test interview and from 
the case facts, devise the test. While the interrogation and its analysis aim at being objective, 
it has been difficult to find a foolproof assembly of questions. In fact, the lie detector’s 
evolution was accompanied by the development and systematization of a group of queries 
with the purpose of diminishing the margins of error of the test and avoid complex 
interrogations that could give origin to ambiguous results252. The difficulty in asking 
                                                           
252 Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) was the author of the first experiences with the technique of word association, in 
1879, in which a sequence of questions was presented to a patient, who had to associate a thought to each word. 
The premises of the test would be later used in methods such as the Control Question Test. Nowadays, 
polygraphists may choose among numerous techniques of suspects’ interrogation. The most common are the 
Relevant-Irrelevant Test, The Comparison Question Test or Control Question Test, and the Guilty Knowledge 
Test. William Moulton Marston first devised the Relevant-Irrelevant Test, later used by John Larson and 
Leornarde Keeler in crime investigation. This method, often used, is no longer applied. The RIT uses a series of 10 
to 15 questions, alternating relevant and irrelevant questions. The series of questions is twice presented in a 
different order, with a small pause between each group. The test was later considered unsound, due to the fact 
that innocent subjects fearing an erroneous accusation could react similarly to the relevant questions. 
The Comparison Question Test is often used in crime investigation, civil litigation, and in national security. There 
are several variations to this model, such as the Control Question Technique, devised by John Reid in the forties; 
the Backster Zone Comparison Test, authored by Backster, who remodeled the Reid test in 1962; the Utah 
Probable-Lie Test and the Utah Directed-Lie Test. The CQT test is used to evaluate the suspect’s reactions to 
relevant questions about the crime, as opposed to neutral questions. This is the reason the test may not be applied 
to persons with lack of knowledge of the crime (due to the fact that they were inebriated or experienced loss of 
consciousness, among other reasons). Questions are directly posed and require an affirmative or negative answer. 
The test includes typically two to four relevant questions in a sequence of ten to twelve questions including other 
themes. Variations upon the sequence of questions depend on the model of test being used.  
The Concealed Information Test \ Guilty Knowledge Test differs substantially from other techniques. It is not an 
attempt to realize if the suspect is telling the truth, but to understand if he has a reaction to the mentioning of 
facts about the crime only a suspect could know. This test has two components. In the Peak of Tension Test, 
developed by Leonarde Keeler in the thirties, the examiner asks a key question. The Guilty Knowledge Test uses a 
series of questions of multiple choice, and for each relevant question there are several neutral control questions. 
The main presupposition is that the subject will react physiologically to the relevant questions, which are not of 
public knowledge. To effectively conduct the crime, a series of data only known to the suspect must have been 
collected.  
For a detailed account see James Allan Matte, Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph, Scientific Truth 
Verification, Lie Detection. Lancashire: J. A. M. Publication, 1996. Ken Alder, The Lie Detectors: The History of 
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appropriate questions results from the need to obtain what examiners call “the intended 
interpretation,” i.e. assurance that the suspect understands correctly what is being asked, and 
that the corresponding physiological reaction will take place. In this case, the examiner must 
be objective regarding the procedure, ignore his personal interpretation or intuitions about 
the case, in order to be able to be close to the facts. In the Arther Technique, or Specific 
Accusation test, the suspect’s behavior is analyzed during the examination and then 
contrasted with the reply to the relevant questions (in a procedure of analysis of results which 
follows the Reid technique). A specific trait of this method lies in its systematization of Four 
Golden Rules and Ten Commandments, which are worth analyzing.    
 
The Four Golden Rules 
 
“I must always ask myself two questions regarding each and every crime question”. 
 
1. Should This Issue Even be Asked? 
Presuming the answer is “Yes” to the above question, then the Second Golden Rule takes 
effect.  
2. Is The Proposed Crime Question Properly Worded? 
(In addition to the above two Golden rules of Crime-Question Wording, there are two others:) 
3. Every Crime Question Must be Emotionally Charged.  
An emotionally charged crime question is obtained in two ways: 
First: Using an explosive “Verb”.  
Second: Keeping the question short. 
The main way to keep a question short is to eliminate prepositional phrases. Each 
prepositional phrase makes a question longer, can confuse the listener, and introduces a new 
case fact.  
If a prepositional phrase is truly needed, if possible limit it to just one and if possible have it at 
the beginning of the question. 
4. Never Count Upon My Fantastic Pretest Interview to Make Up for a Poorly Worded Crime 
Question253.  
 
 
Clarifying the interrogation is one of the purposes of the golden rules. Non-experts in 
polygraph examinations, either favorable or unfavorable to the test, have sometimes the idea 
that, if the polygraph as an instrument is accurate, other factors are not important. Still, if 
one does not know what to ask – for example, if the case facts are erroneous –, the 
examination will be unable to provide accurate test results. The golden rules epitomize two of 
the polygraphist’s main concerns: identifying the relevance of what is being asked, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
an American Obsession. Mankato: Free Press, 2007. Murray Kleiner, ed, Handbook of Polygraph Testing. 
London: Academic Press, 2002. 
253 James Allan Matte, Op. Cit., p. 456.  
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wording the questions properly, in order to make sure that the adequate physical reaction 
surfaces in the charts. Form and content are differentiated, as they entail two distinct 
apprehensions. What is being asked must be close to the facts, preferably in a way that 
eliminates eventual differentiations between the crime and the question, as if they were one 
and the same. How to ask or properly word the query must be clear and straightforward so 
that the subject understands it without doubt (so that a correlation exists between question 
and answer). The creation of short, direct, questions shares the same objective. In this search 
for absolute correspondence, it is however unclear if explosive verbs are being used due to 
the fact that they represent explosive crimes (thus the correspondence between facts and 
words, i.e. questions) or to the need to obtain equally explosive reactions. One is tempted to 
maintain that if all goes well and according to the rules, the explosive crime will be 
represented in the question, thus giving origin to the expected explosive reaction. The 
purpose is, of course, the establishment of a line of continuity between crime, question, reply 
and physical manifestation. This sequence is characterized by the progression from a 
complex or obscure situation that makes the polygraph evaluation necessary to its 
illumination through clear questions and charts. Although an explosive verb may accurately 
represent the crime, if the suspect is innocent the expected physical reaction will not be 
found, and this line of continuity will not take place. 
 
The Ten Commandments 
 
1. Each crime question must deal with only one issue. Never use the words and or or. 
2. Regardless of how the person answers, never ask a question that implies guilt. That is, never 
use as a crime question a “Are you still beating your wife?” type of question. 
3. Never unintentionally ask a crime question that gives away the key to a good Know-Solution 
Peak-of-Tension test. 
4. Remember that very likely at least some of the case facts may be wrong.  
5. Is it possible that the liar can answer this crime question truthfully? 
6. Is it possible that a truthful person will lie to one of the proposed crime questions? If, so, 
NEVER ask it! The reason is that some truthful… have tried to “beat the lie detector” when 
such a question is asked, thus misleading the expert into thinking the person was lying.  
7. Ask only four crime questions during any one session. 
8. Word the questions so that they flow smoothly.  
9. Make sure that even if the person had a minor part in the crime, he will be lying to at least 
one of the crime questions.  
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10. Each word used in every question must be completely understood by the person. The best 
way to assure that he understands is to use the very terms and verbs he used254.  
 
Probably the most interesting aspect of these commandments, apart from the Biblical 
heading indicating a claim to truthfulness, is how, in the author’s wish to advise fully, a 
portrait of everything that can go wrong with the examination is depicted. The previous 
distinction between what and how is again represented, but in this case content and form are 
interchangeable. In order to obtain a singular reaction, prepositional phrases, “and” and “or,” 
are, of course, to be eliminated. This is due to the fact that, if more than one aspect of the 
crime is portrayed, how does one know what the subject is reacting to?  
To these commandments, one would add the concern over the reasons that lead a 
subject to answer. The polygraphist should, therefore, also beware of “why” a suspect is 
answering in a certain way, as truthful subjects attempt to lie and guilty subjects may reply 
truthfully to some particularity of the crime (either because they didn’t participate in that 
aspect of it, or because the question was not worded properly). The polygraphist must 
therefore be prepared to understand and attribute intentions of deceit or innocence to the 
subject, which do not solely depend on the replies given or the ability to read the charts. To 
these worries, one may add the concern over the sequence and number of questions posed, 
previously systematized in the test, and to which the polygraphist must obey. Wording the 
questions smoothly, something which one could consider a somewhat subjective task, is 
portrayed as a straightforward assignment. This effort to structure how and what to ask, as 
well as in what sequence, appears to be an attempt to rationalize the appearance of surprise, 
either in the form of the suspects’ replies, or of his behavior.  
Questioning has been described as the specialized capacity to know what and how to 
ask someone in order to later obtain surprise and, then, a verdict. But another interesting 
particularity in these investigations was left unmentioned, namely the fact that the subject’s 
own vocabulary must be used in order to assure the highest degree of comprehension during 
the inquiry. On the one hand, those concerned with polygraph evaluations develop a complex 
                                                           
254 Op. cit., p. 457.  
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terminology, which, one presumes, is the best suited to name the various aspects of the 
procedure. This is the reason why one encounters symptomatic questions, super dampening 
effects, tri-zone indication remedy tables which “detect and remedy any zone comparison 
technique defect”255. On the other, for the sake of clarity, questions must follow the subject’s 
vocabulary, which means that, in order to devise the test, the examiner must have learned a 
complex terminology, but also be able to reproduce the suspect’s terms and to apply them to 
specific questions. Interrogation is thus a form of comprehension of the facts of the case, the 
polygraph as instrument and the subject’s testimony in the pre-test interview.   
Creating a specific vocabulary, being able to transform existing terms into a precise 
terminology, and knowing how to describe other persons’ concepts using their own words, 
are indicative of an expert’s interpretative capacity. Designing a vocabulary implies 
understanding the meaning of certain words or expressions, being able to use them in the 
proper context and to then reshape them into other terms.  It seems to require, shall we say, 
conviction. 
Authors such as Stanley Cavell rework several such notions into their own 
philosophical language. Take, for example, the notion of “conviction,” which, like any other of 
Cavell’s stipulated terms, is rephrased in different books through time, an instance of the 
transformation of what Emerson calls “intuitions” into “tuitions”256. In the introduction of 
Disowning Knowledge, a collection of essays about Shakespeare, Cavell explains how it was 
not until the end of The Claim Of Reason, a book whose finale consists in a description of 
Othello, that he was able to “claim that tragedy is the working out of a response to 
skepticism”257. The author further explains that in The Claim of Reason he touches “a certain 
vision of film comedy”258, a vision that will be later converted in books on film comedies and 
melodramas. This is the reason why, gradually, in his books and in the work of a lifetime, his 
                                                           
255  James Allan Matte, Op. Cit., p.702.  
256  See Lawrence F. Rhu, Stanley Cavell’s American Dream – Shakespeare, Philosophy and Hollywood Movies. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2006, p. 140.   
257 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 1979. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.5.  
258 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, 1983. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, p. 6. 
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intuitions on skepticism, films, plays and philosophy are progressively transformed in 
tuitions in each new book. And, more importantly, why Cavell ends up creating his own 
technical terms, thus redefining, in the context of his books, words such as “acknowledge,” 
“skepticism” and, of course, “conviction”.  
Incidentally, pointing, in the modes of proof previously described, was deemed a way 
of showing evidence that restricts personal interpretation and allows interpreters to share 
accurately their judgments with other persons. On the contrary, an example given by Cavell 
helps to argue that pointing as a mode of proof has limitations even when perceptive critics 
are present, while allowing to better understand the notion of “conviction”. In “Aesthetic 
Problems of Modern Philosophy,” Stanley Cavell discusses an excerpt of Don Quixote, quoted 
by Hume in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”. In the episode, Sancho tells the story of two 
kinsmen with great knowledge of wine, who were called upon to give their judgment about a 
good vintage. They both taste it, and reflect on the experience. One says the wine is good, 
even if he recognizes faintly the savor of leather; the other, while also enjoying it, declares 
that the wine tasted of iron. They are both ridiculed on account of their opinions, but in the 
end an old key with a leathern thong is found at the bottom of the barrel. Cavell uses this 
story to explain the relationship between evidence discovered in a given text and criticism. 
For the author, either kinsman’s point could have been verified even if the key had not been 
found at the bottom of the barrel, for it was up to each to prove they were right. The critic 
must make us see, hear or taste the proof he is describing, he who has to produce evidence 
about a given text, as well as show: 
 
his [the critic’s] ability to produce for himself the thong and key of his response, and his 
vindication comes not from his pointing out that it is, or was, in the barrel, but in getting us to 
taste it there259.  
 
The philosopher appealing to everyday language turns to the reader not to convince him 
without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, against himself. He is saying: 
Look and find out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say (…)260.  
 
                                                           
259  Stanley Cavell, Must we Mean What we Say?, 1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 87. 
260  Op. cit., p. 95-96. 
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This account, unlike others described, does not represent the critic’s task as that of 
exteriorizing the work of art’s concealed nature, and does not oppose or differentiate the 
interior from the exterior. He is not revealing an inner frame, or pointing to objective 
characteristics of the object, but describing what grounds his conviction. It does not even 
matter if the thong and key were actually in the barrel, as long as the critic is able to make us 
experience them. The author deems both kinsmen’s interpretations correct, instead of 
portraying, for example, the case of a third individual who, after experiencing the wine, finds 
in it a flavor of both leather and iron. Such analysis, which to a polygraph examiner would be 
the truthful interpretation, is not considered. To Cavell, the purpose of the critic is to make 
the reader experience the test himself and for evidence to appear the critic must have 
“conviction” regarding a given work of art, a concept of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In 
The Claim of Reason, Cavell explains how it is not a mode of proof, but my sense that I make 
sense261 or a way of discovery about certain things that we cannot fail to know in a given 
period262. Literary appreciation need not be factual, and aesthetic disputations may not be 
solved only by means of argumentation, they can also be determined by the critic’s 
convictions, intuitions and beliefs. It represents a type of knowledge that underlines the 
importance of a comprehension based on experience.  
 
The more one learns, so to speak, the hang of oneself, and mounts one’s problems, the less one 
is able to say what one has learned; not because you have forgotten what it was, but because 
nothing you said would seem like an answer or a solution: there is no longer a question or a 
problem which your words would match. You have reached conviction, but not about a 
proposition; and consistency, but not in a theory. You are different, what you recognize as 
problems are different, your world is different263.  
 
This passage appears in the essay after a discussion about Wittgenstein and his 
comparison between methods and therapies which, according to Cavell, made him ponder 
about “the progress of psychoanalytic therapy”. The relevance of the quotation relates with its 
description about how knowledge is not revealed in the ability to justify what one has learned 
                                                           
261  Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 20. 
262 Op. cit., p. 17. 
263  Stanley Cavell, Must we Mean What we Say?, p. 86. 
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– the facility to provide answers or solutions –, nor in the relation between a certain problem 
and one’s capacity to represent it in words. Comprehension is perceived when one has 
reached conviction, an understanding of the term that differs from our own individual beliefs 
about something. The concept also diverges from what would be considered the polygraph 
examiner’s personal intuition that a suspect is guilty. Such perception would be described as 
a case of intuition about a proposition, which is grounded on a method and on the adoption 
of objective criteria. For example, the polygraphist’s insight regarding the suspect is revealed 
in the determination of a verdict, which is the same as providing an answer or a solution. 
Cavell’s “conviction” is not exposed as the faculty to establish a theory, but in the recognition 
that one is somehow different, and, as quoted, so are the problems one is now capable of 
identifying.  
Such capacity is that of knowing what to ask a certain entity in order to understand 
the type of theoretical problems it raises. This concern is central in Cavell’s philosophy and 
accompanies the development of his own particular terminology. Asking questions does not, 
evidently, appear in the form of the systematization seen in polygraph evaluations. There is 
not a sequence of questions to be followed, nor a strict distinction between what to ask and 
how to do it. Sometimes, as mentioned in Must We Mean What We Say?, the question is not 
even clear at first, and the philosopher must ask himself repeatedly what is he looking for264. 
This Socratic thought that certain entities, our bodies, hold a forgotten knowledge that may 
be brought to light if the proper questions are inquired is portrayed as the illustration of 
philosophy itself.  
At the end of The Claim of Reason, this mode of asking is made clear, first, in the 
enunciation of a series of questions about Othello, which the essay does not look forward to 
solving: “Is Montaigne’s attitude fully earned, itself without a tint of the wish for exemption 
                                                           
264  Stanley Cavell, Must we Mean What we Say?, pp.20-21: “It sometimes happens that we know everything there 
is to know about a situation – what all the words in question mean, what all the relevant facts are; and everything 
is in front of our eyes. And yet we feel we don’t know something, don’t understand something. In this situation, 
the question “What is X?” is very puzzling, in exactly the way philosophy is very puzzling. We feel we want to ask 
the question, and yet we feel we already have the answer. (One might say we have all the elements of an answer.) 
Socrates says that in such a situation we need to remind ourselves of something. (…) And the point of the question 
is this: answering it is sometimes the only way to tell – tell others and tell for ourselves – what the situation is”.     
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from the human? Or is it Shakespeare’s topic of the sheets and the handkerchief 
understandable as a rebuke to Montaigne, for refusing a further nook of honesty?”265 Such 
articulation of questions is followed by what the author refers to as the expression of his 
conjecture, discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, about how under the incidents in 
Othello are particular events in witch trials. These conjectures are the result of “two thoughts, 
or perspectives, with which to survey one’s space of conviction in the reading I have started 
with Othello and from which perhaps to guide it further”266. Conviction is what makes the 
discussion start. It may be seen as the exemplification of questions about a certain play, as 
well as the raising of conjectures about it, with the purpose of leading others to experience 
the possibility that the events in the play are as described. This is seen as the beginning of the 
discussion, and not its ending. From this perspective, getting to know something and 
recognizing it as a problem implies understanding what may be solicited of it, which specific 
difficulties it raises and finding a way to describe it better, but not to solve it entirely. And it 
is not a coincidence, as Richard Elridge notices, that The Claim of Reason ends with the 
formulation of a question about the nature of philosophy itself, as well as of its relation with 
literature, “But can philosophy become literature and still know itself?”267, a debate which 
calls for discussion but is finally left unsolved.  
Another of Shakespeare’s figures, Touchstone, the court’s fool in As You Like It, 
seems to beckon here. The thought that expert modes of proof require adequate judges is 
problematized by Touchstone, a figure who, albeit being irrational, is able to “speak’st wiser 
than thou art aware of” (II, iv, 53)268. The fact that Touchstone, a character that has no 
counterpart in Shakespeare’s main sources, is a fool would explain his lack of reasoning, but 
                                                           
265 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 494.  
266 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 494.  
267 Op. Cit., p. 496. See Richard Elridge, Stanley Cavell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 109.  
268 William Shakespeare, As You Like It, ed. Juliet Dusinberre. London: Arden Shakespeare, Thomson Learning: 
2007. Quotations follow this edition.  
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 205 
 
his name269 denotes the object capable of bringing forth the authenticity of pure metals. The 
jester’s thoughtlessness is highlighted in occasions in the play where he is given an 
unrestrained opportunity to explain his view of the world, such as in his conversation with 
Corin, the shepherd. Touchstone’s lesson about good morals in the court and in the country is 
indicative of his inaptitude in dealing with a specific vocabulary, while showing the limits of 
his skills as an expert.  
 
Corin: Besides, our hands are hard.  
Touchstone: Your lips will feel them the sooner – shallow again. A more sounder instance, 
come.  
Corin: And they are often tarred over with the surgery of our sheep, and would you have us 
kiss tar? The courtier’s hands are perfumed with civet.  
Touchstone: Most shallow man! Thou worm’s meat in respect of a good piece of flesh indeed! 
Learn of the wise and perpend. Civet is of a baser birth than tar, the very unclean flux of a cat. 
Mend the instance, shepherd.  
Corin: You have a too courtly wit for me, I’ll rest.  
 (As You Like It, III, ii, 57-58) 
 
When Corin makes an effort to show Touchstone’s judgment might be erroneous 
(shepherds have dirty, greasy hands, so it is unclean to kiss them), the fool replies that 
courtiers’s also sweat. Corin tries to contrast both types of hands, but Touchstone is always 
able to find, in what appears to be a triumph of logical reasoning, the courtly equivalence to 
the shepherd’s objections. Opposing civet to tar does not appear to be an example of a 
discussion that promotes a multiplicity of meanings, and Corin’s protests seem reasonable to 
all except Touchstone. Pointing to faulty conclusions, in this case, does not help the 
shepherd, who is not an experienced critic, and is merely able to notice the inconsistencies in 
Touchstone’s reasoning. Had he been a literary expert, in Eliot’s sense, he might have been 
able to notice, for example, Touchstone’s use of legal terms in lines such as “Shallow, shallow. 
A better instance, I say. Come” (III, ii, 54-55). The repeated allusion to the word “shallow” 
has the purpose of showing Corin’s superficial character, as well as his lack of depth in 
                                                           
269  Most critical editions argue that Robert Armin, and not William Kemp, played Touchstone in the play. This 
would help to justify the differentiation between this articulate fool and previous clowns, a creation that would 
find its peak in King Lear. Nick De Somogyi, in his introduction to the play, notices that Robert Armin was both a 
trained goldsmith and a comic dramatist, who had written for himself the part of Tutch, the clown in Two Maids 
of More-Clark. This would explain the choice of name for the character. See Shakespeare, As You Like It, introd. 
Nick De Somogyi. London: Nick Hern Books, 2003, p. xxx. 
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reasoning. But, as noticed in the Arden edition, “shallow” is also “a lawyer’s term for unsound 
proof”270. The same happens with the term “instance” used to portray Corin’s inability to find 
what Touchstone considers serious, and persuasive proof271. It appears that Corin is receiving 
not only a lesson on good morals, but also on how to argue well, as may be perceived in the 
use of expressions such as “Mend the instance, shepherd” (III, ii, 65). And still, the 
conversation presents the contrast between someone who is able to apply legal terms, but 
reasons in an illogical form, and someone who presents his ideas in a simple, but sensible, 
way. In this case, and despite of Touchstone’s patronizing tone towards Corin, error does not 
seem to be a product of a misunderstanding of words or expressions, but of the fool’s inability 
to accept that the shepherd’s arguments may be valid. At the same time, Corin’s inability to 
recognize Touchstone’s terms and mode of reasoning makes him unable to ask questions and  
impugn the fool’s reasoning. After this discussion, one could hardly argue in favor of either 
Touchstone or Corin as being specialized interpreters. Asking something to others appears to 
require a sort of understanding that neither of them possess.  
Such a grand debate seems to show that, contrary to what Touchstone sometimes 
assumes, he is not a wise man, but merely someone who spent enough time in the company 
of knowledgeable persons to parrot a certain way of saying things. Acquiring a specialized 
vocabulary without understanding how to use it is not, though, representative of an 
interpretative skill272. One is tempted to argue that the fool is only repeating ideas he had 
heard before when listening to Celia’s and Rosalind’s discussions (Touchstone’s presence 
during the young ladies’ debate about the relation between Fortune and Nature, in the second 
scene of the first act, would be an example). If most of Touchstone’s philosophical notions 
reproduce previous conversations, without advancing them in any significant fashion, that is 
                                                           
270  Juliet Dusinberre in William Shakespeare, As You Like It, ed. Juliet Dusinberre. London: Arden Shakespeare, 
Thomson Learning: 2007, p.239, n.54.  
271  Michael Hattaway, in William Shakespeare, As You Like It, ed. Michael Hattaway. Cambridge: New Cambridge 
Edition, 2000, p. 130, n. 34. 
272  The Arden editors contend that this discussion, as well as others in the play, suggests that the comedy was to 
be represented for an audience familiar with legal terms, such as the students of law at the Inns of Court. For a 
detailed account of Shakespeare’s use of legal terms see: B. J. Sokol, Mary Sokol, Shakespeare's legal language: a 
dictionary. NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005. 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 207 
 
the reason why they always appear to be foolish, even if partially correct. At this point, 
although the jester is named touchstone, he does not appear to be a specialized interpreter, 
but merely someone who is making general, and for the most part erroneous, interpretations 
about the world. 
In fact, if one’s conviction is the source of the valued capacity to judge other entities, 
what to say of the supposed quality of Touchstone’s judgments? Critics have neglected or 
diminished the importance of Touchstone’s capacity to accurately value other entities. For 
example, Harold Bloom, who considers Touchstone to be a minor figure, and “the least 
likeable of Shakespeare’s clowns”273, notices the disparity between the fool’s wit and that of 
Rosalind: 
 
That harmony extends even to her presence in As You Like It, since she is too strong for the play. 
Touchstone and Jaques are poor wits compared to her, and Touchstone truly is more rancid 
even than Jaques. Neither is capable of this wise splendor, typical of Rosalind’s glory274.  
 
 
I suspect that the dramatic point of both Jaques and Touchstone is how unoriginal they are in 
contrast to Rosalind’s verve and splendor, or simply her extraordinary originality275. 
 
To Bloom, Rosalind, a figure only comparable to Hamlet, exceeds all others in the play. 
This judgment is a good starting point, as it allows us to consider Touchstone’s importance as 
the instrument used to acknowledge Rosalind’s originality. It is a fact that, when in her 
presence, Touchstone’s aptitude to make truthful commentaries about those surrounding 
him is recognized. For example, at the beginning of the play, Rosalind threatens him: “Speak 
no more of him; you'll be whipped for taxation one of these days” (I, ii, 67). She is referring to 
Touchstone’s remark about a knight who swears by his honor without having it, a depiction 
of Celia’s father and the way he unlawfully banished Rosalind’s progenitor276. The accuracy of 
the characterization, which annoys Rosalind and leads her to defend her cousin, makes 
                                                           
273  Harold Bloom, “Introduction,” William Shakespeare’s As You Like It, ed. Harold Bloom. Philadelphia: Chelsea 
House Publishers, 2004, p. 3.  
274  Op. cit., p. 1.  
275  Op. cit., p. 12.   
276  “No more was this knight swearing by his\ honour, for he never had any; or if he had, he had sworn it away 
before ever he saw those pancakes or that mustard” [I, ii, 75-78]. 
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Touchstone reply: “The more pity that fools may not speak wisely what wise men do 
foolishly” (I, ii 85-86). In this commentary, he seems to be showing he has some idea that he 
was right, and has been unfairly cautioned.  
One could assume Touchstone to be more insightful than he shows, but his ability to 
notice the truth in others seems to be accompanied by the erroneous idea that this is an 
intellectual, and not an intuitive, capacity. Although Touchstone would like to be a wise man, 
he appears to be merely in possession of the capacity of an irrational piece of quartz. 
Rosalind’s reply reads as follows: “By my troth, thou sayst true. For since the little \ wit that 
fools have was silenced, the little foolery that wise men have makes a great show” (I, ii, 87-
89). It does not make much sense, as the Arden edition recognizes, to consider that Rosalind 
is now defending Touchstone, although she seems to pity the fact that fools have been 
silenced. The point of interest here, however,  lies in her own characterization of the little wit 
of fools, which contradicts Touchstone’s self-portrait as an unacknowledged wise man. 
Although unable, in a lengthy discussion, to be sensible, Touchstone is considered 
accomplished at identifying bad poems. Consider the episode in which Rosalind appears 
reading Orlando’s lines. Touchstone mocks her, making up certain rhymes of his own, and 
then commenting:  
 
This is the very false gallop of verses: why do you  
infect yourself with them?  
 (As You Like It, III, ii, 110-111)  
 
 Rosalind accurately perceives the genuineness in Touchstone’s judgment of Orlando’s 
unsophisticated rhymes, which leads us to believe that he is not only an able authority of the 
character of others, but also very capable at estimating poetry. This is a skill Rosalind 
recognizes, thus apologizing: “Peace, you dull fool, I found them on a tree” (III, ii, 112). The 
fact that Touchstone judges the lines immediately after hearing them, and that Rosalind was 
enthusiastically quoting them, contrasts with his reproduction of contents in previous 
discussions. Although an inaccurate theorist, he appears to be a good evaluator, efficient at 
identifying that “Truly, the tree yields bad fruit” (III, ii, 113). At this point, Touchstone’s 
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judgments, when in the presence of Rosalind, have twice proved accurate. The Duke senior 
was indeed dishonest and Orlando’s poems are not what Arnold would consider to be 
Shakespearean golden passages. To Rosalind’s reply, Touchstone comments: “You have said, 
but whether wisely or no, let the forest judge” (III, ii, 118-119). The sentence consists, as the 
editors make clear, on the jester’s observation to the audience, capable of judging who is the 
funnier, whether him or Rosalind. But it also represents Touchstone’s knowledge that 
Rosalind’s wit may be compared to his, and that although he is a fool, he is not a judge. Let 
me parenthetically acknowledge Dover Wilson’s perspective. In his introduction to the 
Cambridge edition, the author comments Touchstone’s function in the play: 
 
And in As You Like It as in Lear this part of the Fool is to help insanity or sentimentality back 
to sense: to be the 'touch-stone,' the test of normal, all the more effective for being presented 
in jest, under motley. 'Lord! what fools these mortals be!' Our Touchstone, transformed from a 
'roynish clown' into a mundane philosopher from the moment he reaches the forest, knows 
what he knows and why he must mate with Audrey. He gives us his reasons none too 
delicately: but we have proved his character, his tenacity in faith, and his grossest reasons 
(they are not so gross, after all) help marvellously to unsentimentalise a play which might 
easily have lost itself in sentiment, to recall its waywardness, to give it to us for the thing it is, 
so bewitching and yet so forthright, so honest, so salutary277. 
 
“Touchstone” is here used in the sense of a “test of normal” and the author argues that 
the fool’s purpose in the comedy is that of putting sentimentality into place. Touchstone’s 
bawdy descriptions about the nature of love do, indeed, contribute to unsentimentalise the 
narrative, and he may be portrayed as a test to other’s normality – as Corin and Audrey – in 
the sense that his unreasonable words bring to light the authenticity of their characters. Still, 
touchstones were seldom used to test normality and often applied to assess the genuineness 
of some entities, and there is no valid reason to suppose that Shakespeare was not applying 
the term in this restricted sense. Returning to the beginning of this text, Bloom is correct to 
assume that the jester’s purpose is that of acting as Rosalind’s foil, but fails to understand 
that a stone without someone to conduct and interpret the examination is unable to provide 
accurate judgments.  
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A distinction must be made between certain interpreters, whose uncommon abilities 
make them particularly insightful, such as Rosalind or Hamlet, and an irrational object like a 
touchstone, which requires someone to administer the test and observe the results of the 
process. One should not be misled into thinking that Touchstone knows what he is doing, as 
if, in this play, he is the polygraph, and Rosalind the examiner. This is the reason why 
Touchstone, when accompanied by Corin, is deemed to say nothing more than nonsense, and 
why Jaques is merely able to see in him a material fool. But when near a shrewd interpreter, 
such as Rosalind, Touchstone is capable of providing valuable opinions about others. Observe 
how the young lady, in the aforementioned passage, may not like Touchstone’s appreciation 
of her uncle’s character, but recognizes his judgment to be accurate. Even the amount of talk 
varies in both situations, the episodes with Corin and Audrey being characterized by long 
pieces of speech, while the conversations in which Rosalind is present consist mostly in short 
exchanges of words278. The content of Touchstone’s sentences when near Rosalind is 
esteemed because she is able to understand and value his words, distinguishing the sense in 
his nonsense.  
Being intuitive, or just a lucky, interpreter (saying things others find truthful without 
knowing or understanding it), does not include someone into the category of articulate 
exegetists. Touchstone appears to possess intuition, but not what Stanley Cavell or Michael 
Fried would call “conviction,” this ability to judge that is a result of knowledge and education.  
 
My conviction, or evidence, is in something of the reverse state. Given my intuition of the 
occurrence of skepticism in Shakespeare, it is from him that I would have to learn, were I an 
historian, what to look for to give his history. In calling my guiding theme an intuition I am 
distinguishing it from a hypothesis. Both intuitions and hypothesis require what may be called 
confirmation or continuation, but differently. A hypothesis requires evidence and it must say 
that it constitutes its evidence (…). An intuition, say that God is expressed in the world, does 
not require, or tolerate, evidence, but rather, let us say, understanding of a particular sort279. 
 
                                                           
278 When Celia, Rosalind and the jester enter the forest, for example, Touchstone’s words are sensible, and short, 
remarks: “I care not for my spirits if my legs were not weary”; “For my part, I had rather bear with you than bear 
you. Yet I should bear no cross if I did bear you, for I think you have no money in your purse”; “Ay, now I am in 
Arden, the more fool I!, When I was at home I was in a better place, but travellers must be content” (II, iv, 2-16). 
279 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, p. 4. 
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Notice how conviction and evidence are firstly interchangeably used, a mode of 
thinking which would lead to despair a polygraph examiner longing for scientific procedures. 
When conviction appears, it allows us to know what to look for (i.e. the sources of it) and to 
understand when it has been found. To an examiner, on the contrary, hypotheses require and 
constitute evidence itself. Conviction is thus a form of proof, which results from intuition, 
and which is expressed in the comprehension about a given work. But it does not excuse the 
critic from having to explain what he sees; on the contrary, it allows him to perceive what 
others do not: “The best critic will know the best points. Because if you do not see something, 
without explanation, then there is nothing further to discuss”280. It is interesting to note that, 
unlike what happens in the other cases, explanation must appear post festum, after one has 
had conviction regarding a certain work of art; although to ostensively point to something is 
not deemed a way of knowing. Someone making an aesthetic judgment has to be prepared to 
“say in its support: don’t you see, don’t you hear, don’t you dig?”281. This nudge is, one would 
argue, a form of ostension, but one in which it is not important to have a specific referent. 
Showing is a way of making us see, hear and appreciate the sources for one’s conviction. This 
presupposes a privileged relationship between the critic and the object of art to which I will 
return.  
A point of contact between Touchstone’s appreciation of Orlando’s lines and both 
Cavell’s and Fried’s essays resides in the fact that they are all required to make a decision 
about recent works of art (in the mentioned essay, as well as in “Music Discomposed,” Cavell 
attempts to comprehend atonal music, while Fried’s book aims to judge contemporary 
paintings). The fact that one is assessing modern poems, music or paintings implies that 
there is not a differential of correction, a valuable criteria with which to judge. The way 
Michael Fried, avowedly drawing on Cavell, defines the way certain works’ “compel 
conviction,” is of interest here. A footnote in the essay “Art and Objecthood” clarifies his view 
on the subject: 
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Moreover, seeing something as painting in the sense that one sees the tacked-up canvas as a 
painting, and being convinced that a particular work can stand comparison with the painting 
of the past whose quality is not in doubt, are altogether different experiences: it is, I want to 
say, as though unless something compels conviction as to its quality it is no more than trivially 
or nominally a painting. That suggests that flatness and the delimitation of flatness ought not 
to be thought of as “the irreducible essence of pictorial art”, (…) but rather as what, at a given 
moment, is capable of compelling conviction, of succeeding as painting282.  
 
A mutual relation of understanding is represented in the evaluation of the work of 
authors such as Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski and Frank Stella. The author argues against 
the idea that characteristics such as flatness and its delimitation should matter when 
deciding whether to include a work in the category of paintings, while also criticizing those 
for whom a painting should be compared with other works in the past belonging to the 
canon, so as to make a choice concerning their quality. Paintings, true works and not those 
who are only trivially so, are characterized by their capacity to compel conviction, and this is 
the feature that settles upon their nature. This is a result of the observation of a given 
painting, as well as of those preceding it. The painting’s nature of having the capability to 
compel conviction is not portrayed as an immutable essence, but as an essence “that 
therefore changes continually in response to the vital work of the recent past283. Most of the 
entities defined, if not all of them, have, until this moment, been portrayed as wishing to 
disguise themselves. This is the reason why interpreters must uncover and systematize ways 
of bringing their true natures to light. But the paintings Fried is describing “confront the 
beholder,” and this is a condition to enable a conviction about them. Such capacity 
presupposes the object of art’s wish to make itself known (his presence), as well as the critic’s 
longing to discover it. A polygraphist, or any other examiner in the studied methods of proof, 
would probably long for such entities’ demand to be acknowledged, and argue that 
interpretation must be less complex when both interpreter and interpreted long to relate to 
each other. And, still, something in the nature of these evaluations makes it a complex type of 
judgment.   
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Something is said to have presence when it demands that the beholder take it into account, 
that he take it seriously – and when the fulfillment of that demand consists simply in being 
aware of the work and, so to speak, in acting accordingly284.  
 
Notice how, in Fried and Cavell, conviction precedes the capacity to explain, but 
follows the observation of the work of art (and derives from the understanding of a long line 
of works). Thus, when we are before a certain painting, we must decide if it has quality, but 
without following a model or having systematic criteria. From this perspective, it could 
equally be considered a form of conversation, of exchange of thoughts between both critics. 
There is a subjective aspect in these appreciations, which examiners in other modes of proof 
would deem inappropriate, that both Cavell and Fried embrace. When both authors argue in 
favor of the capacity of both the work of art and its critic to experience presence, they are 
distinguishing themselves from other techniques aiming to reveal the nature of a certain 
entity. This is a relationship of empathy and common longing to know and be known. But 
among the skills one may hope to master it is difficult to understand how to acquire or 
cultivate conviction. Returning to Cavell, only some persons possess conviction, and it is 
defined as a result of education, knowledge, and a particular sensibility that could perhaps be 
defined as the capacity to establish a relation of presence between the subject and the work of 
art, and which is defined as being a touchstone: 
 
But one could say that feeling functions as a touchstone: the mark left on the stone is out of the 
sight of others, but the result is one of knowledge – it is directed to an object, the object has 
been tested, the result is one of conviction285.  
 
Feeling is the touchstone in the procedure. Interestingly, the mark left on the stone is 
out of sight, as would happen if the key and thong in the barrel could not have been found, 
but still had been experienced by the critic. The fact that the author considers a test has taken 
place is equally important, the verification of authenticity takes place in the relationship 
between object and critic, the test is one of conviction, and the result is knowledge. In this 
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touchstone, so different from others described, criticism has to create its own mode of 
persuasion, which has a temporal dimension, as is extended through time, and varies 
according to the modern art being created. Both Cavell’s and Fried’s notion of a fidelity test 
presuppose a series of previous arguments in which the test works, but also a prospective use 
for it. What is asked is that those wishing to acknowledge a work of art be able to, bearing in 
mind the difficult nature of their object of investigation, adapt their skills and use their past 
experience to detect what was hidden. “Touchstone” has not acquired importance as a term 
of art in Cavell’s books, and it may not be considered an expression with a similar value to 
that of “conviction”. The word is referred to in many of the author’s books in its common 
sense, as an exemplification of value. Nevertheless, in Philosophy – The Day After 
Tomorrow, the word is again paired with the term experience (Fred Astaire’s sequence in 
Minelli’s The Bandwagon is depicted as “a checkpoint, or touchstone, of experience”286). And 
although there is no further reflection on the subject, one is left with the wistful hope that 
this intuition about the term might have been developed further, so as to make sense, for 
example, of what would the difference be between a “touchstone of feeling” and one of 
“experience”, as well as if there was an evolution from one term to another.  
To conclude, both the polygraph test and the concept of conviction stem from the idea 
that something is concealed in the studied entity, which may be revealed in the test. In the 
case of the polygraph examiner, there is an attempt to systematize interpretation, and 
examiners platonically assume that if a truth is concealed in the subject's body, and the 
correct answers are asked, then the truth must surface. In order to do so, interpretation, as 
will be seen, must be asymmetrical. On the contrary, to both Cavell and Fried, conviction is 
the result of a joint effort to know the entity, which also wishes to reveal its identity as a work 
of art. The relationship between entities must be at the same level, which requires an effort 
from the interpreter, who must study and acquire indispensable knowledge allowing him to 
reach the entity. Conviction is possible when one recognizes certain things as problems, when 
the critic reaches the capacity to understand the type of questions a certain entity poses. This 
                                                           
286 Stanley Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 22. 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 215 
 
ability to interrogate the work of art is, thus, both a result and an effect of conviction, which 
will be made clear in the critic’s writings and in the elaboration of a particular vocabulary 
with which to describe the acknowledged entity. The studied Arnoldians have been defined as 
possessing a group of capacities, among which one finds the ability to observe, to point and to 
identify mistakes. It may now be perceived how one may add the capacity to ask questions 
and an intuition that is, in fact, a conviction about the object, the result of education and an 
extensive process of learning.  
3. The Touchstone of Touchstones 
Let me recall the following usage of “touchstone” in Henry James’s The Portrait of a 
Lady. Isabel Archer, “a young person with many theories,” describes Madame Merle as a 
“rare, superior and pre-eminent” woman. Isabel, dazzled by her friend and considering her a 
model, has somehow the (correct) intuition that others might not succumb to Madame 
Merle’s charms. For example, her friend Henrietta would certainly not “subscribe” to her, for 
reasons Isabel cannot accurately explain. And yet, according to Isabel, the opposite reaction 
would be found on Madame Merle’s part, which would certainly do justice to Henrietta in a 
unique tactful way:  
 
She appeared to have in her experience a touchstone for everything, and somewhere in the 
capacious pocket of her genial memory she would find the key to Henrietta’s value287.  
 
 Isabel is not only invidious of Madame Merle’s talents and singular experience of life, 
but also of what seems to be her uncanny ability to evaluate others, a skill partly due to the 
fact that she possesses the required qualities – such as intelligence and intuition –, which 
allow one to be judicious. The assumption that some of us may be understood if the proper 
key is found, which Isabel shares, for example, with Hamlet, is always accompanied by the 
thought that chosen persons are in possession of the said key. Madame Merle has a particular 
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quality that distinguishes her from most human beings and makes her the more capable to 
assess them. Her experience is a touchstone.  
The presupposition guiding Isabel is that different witnesses to Madame Merle’s 
talent would reach equal conclusions, and validate her rulings, as she is doing. In this 
touchstone method there is no space for personal interpretation, as Isabel’s companion is 
stating and analyzing facts truthfully. Such autonomy means that Madame Merle relies 
mainly on herself and on the information she is able to gather, testing the evidence, and 
finding modes of proof that work. This sovereignty in interpretation is accompanied by the 
fact that others, as Isabel, testify as to her aptitudes. Madame Merle does not name herself a 
touchstone; others do it for her. Moreover, simple ocular inspection will not help those who 
are attempting to understand the whole scope of Madame Merle’s verdicts. This is described 
as an interior process, made public only when, and if, she decides it to.  
If Madame Merle’s experience is the touchstone, then it is the surface she allows 
others to scratch in an attempt to determine their value. Persons leave a visible mark on 
Madame Merle, which she will use to compare with other individuals in order to ascertain 
each person’s authenticity. These impressions are stored in this interpreter’s memory and her 
experience is improved with each encounter, meaning that her natural abilities are enhanced 
in time. Equally relevant is the faculty of being in a good position to recognize the value of 
others:  
 
’That’s the great thing,’ Isabel solemnly pondered, ‘that’s the supreme good fortune: to be in a 
better station for appreciating people than they are for appreciating you’288.  
 
Madame Merle placed herself in a position where she enjoys a good perspective of the 
human condition. This, which Isabel relates to an aristocratic essence, makes for an 
asymmetrical relationship between Madame Merle and other humans. She will evaluate 
others better than they will evaluate her. In this sense, Madame Merle’s method may be 
compared with the unequal nature of interpretation in polygraph examinations, since, as 
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seen, the lie detector examiner must be in a privileged position towards the examinee, and 
generally possess some knowledge of the suspect, which will be confirmed, or not, by the test. 
This perspective helps to bring to light some particularities in polygraph examination, which 
may perhaps be considered an attempt to systematize the polygraphist’s intuition. But in this 
case, in order to do so, interpretation must be asymmetrical. The disparity between examiner 
and suspect is favorable to the assessor, which controls the test, the type of questions asked, 
and the final outcome. David Lykken notes how, in evaluations that follow Reid’s method, it 
is considered that the examiner is the true lie detector, since he is in fact interpreting the 
charts289. According to Reid’s school, the examiner’s training, associated with his experience 
and the ability to observe and judge, makes him the real polygraph. Lykken analyses Reid’s 
studies on the determination of the validity of the polygraph test and the Control Question 
test. In these studies, identical polygraph charts were given to different examiners, which 
served to prove that distinct persons interpret the results in a similar way. However, as 
Lykken states, the results are only conclusive in the sense that they show that examiners 
trained by the Reid school read the charts identically. Lykken notes that even the defenders 
of the Backster method, who attempt to avoid the subjective conclusions of clinical evaluation 
through a numerical account of the results, compromise the apparent objectivity of the 
method when they support those who argue that the examiner is the lie detector. As the 
author contends, the apparent objectivity of the instrument and questions is invalidated the 
moment the examiner is placed at the center of the decision. 
David Lykken’s analyses have been considered partial, since the author is publicly 
opposed to the polygraph. A perhaps less tendentious perspective is sustained by John F. 
Sullivan290, an enthusiastic defender of the polygraph for more than 30 years. Sullivan 
characterizes the importance of the polygraph examiner’s education and his previous 
preparation, as well as the necessity of being experienced in the execution and interpretation 
of the test, and, no less than the aforementioned, his intuition. The author argues that the 
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discovery of the guilty ones through the use of the polygraph has more art than science 
(according to his perspective, 92% of art and 8% of science). From this characterization it 
may be understood how the examiner must possess qualities that, if properly developed, 
make him a better lie detector.  
Although those who argue for the polygraph emphasize its objectivity, if we consider 
that the center of the analysis does not lie in the polygraph charts per se, but on the 
examiner’s ability to decode them, we may understand how interpretation has a relevant role 
in the process. Polygraph examinations depend, as most evaluations, on subjective factors, 
such as the examiner’s experience, his ability to judge others, his mood on the day of the test, 
and so on. It is also necessary to consider that as humans, polygraph examiners are 
constrained by preferences and prejudices that make them occasionally partial. Not all 
examiners are alike and the intuitive ones, which were properly trained and have experience, 
make better judgments. Similarly to what happens with a literary critic, the continuous 
exercise of the polygraph examiner’s abilities makes him improve. This does not mean, of 
course, as some of those who argue for the polygraph sustain, that the test is almost infallible. 
As noted, in the polygraph the interpretative act lies in the clarification of the charts. 
Moreover, this asymmetry is what allows the test to work. If examiner and suspect 
were on the same interpretative level, the results would not be the same. In fact, this is a 
point of view the examined could explore in order to attempt to balance the outcome. As the 
KGB knew, examiners could determine the test’s result. Thus, the KGB advised their spies 
working for the CIA to “to get a good night’s rest, and go into the test rested and relaxed. Be 
nice to the polygraph examiner, develop a rapport, be cooperative, and try to maintain your 
calm and be as relaxed as you can”291. Being relaxed allowed them to attempt to control the 
physiological results of the test but, more importantly, it enabled them to develop an 
affectionate bond with the examiner, making him ignore dubious data, or decide to repeat the 
test if it gave a positive result. If examiner and examinee liked each other there was a chance 
                                                           
291  Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, Report of Investigation: The 
Aldrich Ames Espionage Case. Darby: Diane Publishing, 1994, p. 19. 
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the relationship between them interfered in the test’s results, and the double spy would be 
able to go unnoticed.  
Being an Arnoldian, in this particular case, means to be the right adjudicator of other 
entities’ qualities and flaws, to possess particular talents, to improve with experience and to 
be in a good position to judge. Part of Madame Merle’s skill at testing others derives, as 
stated, from the fact that she maintains an asymmetrical rapport with them. This unequal 
relationship requires, conversely, that those being tested occasionally feel they are Madame 
Merle’s equals, that she condescends in elevating them to her level, or in lowering herself to 
theirs, so that a proper conversation is maintained. Isabel, for example, feared that, if Lord 
Warburton had been present, he would be unable to keep a secret of the fact that he had 
proposed, and had not been accepted, by her:  
 
He had excellent ways, but she [Isabel] felt sure that if he had come to Gardencourt he would 
have seen Madame Merle, and that if he had seen her he would have liked her and betrayed to 
her that he was in love with her young friend292.  
 
The point here is that these characters are more likely to disclose their secrets to those 
who appear to appreciate and are interested in them. Perhaps it could be argued, as happens 
in some of the modes of proof described in previous chapters, that the tested subject is 
required to admire or fear those judging him, to recognize some sort of superiority, but also 
to have the illusion that, on occasion, a communion is possible that will make them relate to 
each other, and willingly reveal information about themselves. A relevant difference between 
the polygraph examiner and Madame Merle lies in the fact that evidence seems to be outside 
the examiner and although his decision determines the outcome of the test, it may be 
considered that this is different from cases in which the interpreter is described as being 
physically connected with the judgments being made. The examiner considers that it is the 
presence of the polygraph as an instrument that helps him reach a truthful outcome. 
Madame Merle is, of course, an obvious example. She is evidence for the authenticity of 
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others and the evaluation process is characterized as if taking place in her body, scratched by 
others in order to obtain accurate judgments.  
It was mentioned that Madame Merle, single-handedly or through the help of her 
chosen Lasso, has the capacity to lead persons to say things they would have preferred to 
keep to themselves. The technique to make Isabel loquacious, for example, may be perceived 
both in Madame Merle’s meticulous and progressive handling of Isabel and on this heroine 
failed attempt to resist it:  
 
She preferred for the present to talk to Isabel of Isabel, and exhibit great interest in our 
heroine’s history, sentiments, opinions, prospects. She made her chatter and listened to her 
chatter with infinite good nature293.  
 
Compelling Isabel to be chatty implies a parsimonious choice and use of words on 
Madame Merle’s part, who gladly relies on what the young lady is willing to tell her. The 
inclination for making Isabel a topic, which she appreciates, is Madame Merle’s way of 
getting to know Isabel better than she does herself, of realizing her past, present and future 
hopes, of training herself in the understanding of her character. Instead of being talkative, 
Isabel’s companion assumes that it is always best to know more about others than letting 
them glean information about us. This is an example of how skill is required, and used, to 
make others fluent without having to say much oneself. That Isabel has the feeling she is 
being sounded may be perceived through her averseness to share relevant information, such 
as her relationship with Caspar Goodwood and Lord Warburton. That Madame Merle is 
accomplished at the task of making James’ heroine conversational despite her best judgment 
is understood when “we have seen that the girl had compunctions at having said so much”294 
or:  
 
The gates to the girl’s confidence were opened wider than they had ever been; she said things 
to this amiable auditress that she had not yet said to any one. Sometimes, she took alarm at 
her candour: it was as if she had given to a comparative stranger the key to her cabinet of 
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294 Op. cit., p. 224. 
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jewels. These spiritual gems were the only ones of any magnitude that Isabel possessed, but 
there was all the greater reason for being carefully guarded295.  
  
Madame Merle is indeed very able at obtaining the key to the character of other 
persons. The relationship between Isabel and her companion is, however, complex: the 
young lady attempts to resist it; feels flattered that such a distinguished friend chose her as a 
theme; but never discloses her full story296. Isabel has a certain intuition that she is under 
scrutiny, but she does not realize entirely either the purpose or the consequences of such a 
test. This is a case where Isabel, witness of the proof without realizing it, is also the tested 
subject. Simultaneously, she does not understand, it would be impossible for her to know, 
that what she leaves unsaid Madame Merle is able to fully know, either because others told 
her so, because of her perceptiveness, or owing to the fact she devised the plan herself.  
It takes a long time for the heroine to comprehend that Madame Merle’s show of 
sensibility is a way of taking advantage of other persons, which means that understanding 
Isabel is knowing how to manipulate her, just like determining Henrietta’s value was to 
discover her usefulness. Notice how, regarding Henrietta, Isabel avows: “Madame Merle was 
too humorous, too observant, not to do justice to Henrietta, and on becoming acquainted 
with her would probably give the measure of a tact which Miss Stackpole couldn’t hope to 
emulate”297. The keyword here is, of course, “tact,” which Isabel is applying in the sense of a 
faculty of perception, the diplomacy of knowing what to say and who to say it to, but to those 
acquainted with Madame Merle it indicates the way she handles others, as if an individual 
tactic was devised for each person.  
                                                           
295 Op. cit., p. 207. 
296  The following quotations show Isabel’s attempts at being careful: “I am bound to confess, though it may cast 
some discredit on the sketch I have given of the youthful loyalty practiced by our heroine toward this 
accomplished woman, that Isabel had said nothing whatever to her about Lord Warburton and had been equally 
reticent on the subject of Caspar Goodwood” (Op. cit., p. 223). Notice, also, the following passage: “She mentioned 
to this fortunate woman that Mr Osmond had asked her to take a look at his daughter, but didn’t mention that he 
had also made her a declaration of love”. (Op. cit., p. 339). At this point, Isabel does not realize that Madame 
Merle knows everything about Osmond’s proposal. At the end, Isabel has at least the satisfaction of not having all 
revealed: ‘I certainly never told you anything of the sort.’ \ ‘You might have done so – so far as the opportunity 
went – when we were by way of being confidential with each other. But you really told me very little; I’ve often 
thought so since’. Isabel had thought so too, and sometimes with a certain satisfaction. But she didn’t admit it 
now.” (Op. cit., p.  443).  
297   Op. cit., p. 211.  
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In Madame Merle’s technique, being insightful is not solely a matter of obtaining 
information about others, but also a form of making them instruments to one’s pleasure or 
necessity. In a conversation with Gilbert Osmond, she contends: “I don’t pretend to know 
what people are meant for’, (...) ‘I only know what I can do with them”298. Contrary to what 
Isabel assumes, principled concerns are not to be found among the traits that characterize 
Madame Merle’s clear discernment. Madame Merle’s use for Isabel, as the Countess of 
Gemini conveys, may be explained in her wish to give Pansy both a mother and a dowry. 
Pleasing Osmond could equally be part of the plan, finding someone he could develop into 
another art form, in addition to his many objects. This is not, however, the full extent of 
Madame Merle’s intentions. One could wonder whether Isabel, who has proved to be 
insightful, but immature, is being groomed so as to later become a standard; whether, when 
Madame Merle decides Isabel is to suffer at the hands of Osmond, she has the purpose of 
giving her the experience in life that is, so far, lacking, namely, the ability to discover things 
about persons and objects that those who have not grieved are unable to understand.  
In this portrait of the intricate relationship between Madame Merle and Isabel, a 
mentor longs for a pupil. The rapport between them is, however, reciprocal, as Isabel often 
conveys the wish to become an interpreter modeled after Madame Merle. The story of 
Isabel’s growth into adulthood depicts her drive to become a standard, the discovery of the 
implications of being so, and the suffering that accompanies it.  
  
She found herself desiring to emulate them, and in twenty such ways this lady presented 
herself as a model. ‘I should like awfully to be so!’ Isabel secretly exclaimed, more than once, 
as one after another of her friend’s fine aspects caught the light, and before long she knew she 
had learned a lesson from a high authority299.  
 
 Isabel grants that not all aspects of her companion’s talents may be simultaneously 
perceived, but she does not find this uncanny. In the mind of James’s heroine, or at least in 
her description of Madame Merle’s observant being, the capacity to examine others is an 
aesthetic quality, associated with her general sensibility to all matters, such as the gift to play 
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the piano or the knowledge of every important book. Those “superior spirits”300, as Isabel will 
later define Serena Merle and Gilbert Osmond, distinguish themselves from common persons 
in this sensitivity that Isabel craves to acquire301. Notice how Isabel promptly acknowledges 
Gilbert Osmond, thus displaying her own intuition in the recognition of his value:   
 
She had never met a person so fine a grain. (…) such shyness as his – the shyness of ticklish 
nerves and fine perceptions – was perfectly consistent with the best breeding. Indeed it was 
almost a proof of standards and touchstones other than the vulgar: he must be so sure the 
vulgar would be first on the ground302.   
 
To Isabel, standards and touchstones possess a fine perception, which is the reason 
why Osmond’s nervousness seems to be a characteristic of his good intuition and best 
breeding. Isabel seems to share this insight into the value of objects and persons, the proof of 
great culture and knowledge. The expertise is seen as the capacity to not be easily surprised, 
to have the sensibility to find quality in the objects others ignored, and to severely judge 
entities lacking the appropriate standards. Although Isabel is observant when she notices 
Osmond’s distaste of vulgarity, only later will she be able to realize the disgust that 
accompanies it, how it is supplemented by the desire “to extract from it some sort of 
recognition of one’s own superiority”. And even then Isabel will dwell upon how, “On the one 
hand, it was despicable, but on the other it afforded a standard”303. Acknowledging talent 
does not, by itself, brand Isabel as a good interpreter. We are often able to appreciate 
qualities in others without possessing them ourselves, and valuing a skill does not imply the 
same degree of competence as executing it. For Isabel to be the touchstone of touchstones 
another set of conditions, which will be described, is required. For now, what distinguishes 
the young lady is the wish to become like her guardian, her training of particular skills, and, 
of course, the fact that she possesses an intuition waiting to be developed.  
                                                           
300 Op. cit., p. 269. 
301  That Isabel is acquainted with the notion of giving a use to others is made clear even before her marriage, in 
Rome, when Gilbert Osmond asks her how well does she know Lord Warburton, to which Isabel replies: “‘Well 
enough for all the use I have for him’. [Gilbert Osmond] ‘And how much of a use is that?’ [Isabel] ‘Well, I like to 
like him’. (Op. cit., p. 325).  
302 Op. cit., p. 286. 
303  Op. cit., p. 461. 
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It is in this ambition for criteria and in the ignorance of the perils of leading an 
aesthetic life that, for Dorothea Krook, in The Ordeal of Consciousness in Henry James, lays 
the problem of Isabel’s choices and the way she is corrupted by them. Although Krook’s title 
mentions the mode of proof discussed in previous chapters, it seems only meant to illustrate, 
in a commonsensical fashion, that of a painful experience, the growth of consciousness in 
Henry James’s characters. I would argue, however, that it is erroneous to deflect the 
possibility that an ordeal is indeed taking place in The Portrait of a Lady, one where pain 
and suffering are part of a test with the purpose of distinguishing the authenticity of Isabel as 
a standard. Consider Dorothea Krook’s characterization of the term “touchstone”: 
 
Isabel herself never becomes fully conscious of this taint in herself; she does not to the end see 
it face to face, she knows it only by its effects. But the reader is expected to see it, and to give it 
the weight that is due to it. The sense of beauty is one thing, aestheticism, the 'touchstone of 
taste' (as James is to call it in a later work), is quite another thing. For aestheticism seeks 
always to substitute the appearance for the reality, the surface for the substance, the 
touchstone of taste for the touchstone of truth, that truth which in the life of man (Henry 
James comes more and more to insist) is in the first instance moral and only secondarily and 
derivatively aesthetic304.  
 
The opposition between morals and taste, which is not our main concern here, is 
indeed exposed in the novel. Isabel is influenced by her appreciation of the beautiful and 
every so often she chooses it over what is good. Still, the author is using the idea of a 
“touchstone of taste” as mentioned in The Golden Bowl. One of the reasons Krook fails to 
understand the description of touchstone in The Portrait of a Lady derives from the fact that 
she does not analyze the passages in which the concept appears, focusing on the relation 
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between Isabel and those who court her, and ignoring her rapport with Madame Merle305. In 
The Portrait, the differentiation between a touchstone of taste and a touchstone of truth, 
perhaps exposed in the character of Madame Merle, cannot be found in Isabel. Even if the 
novel argues in favor of a moral, as opposed to an aesthetic life, the touchstone the young 
lady seeks to reach is univocal; it is an appreciation of quality and of truth, both of which will 
be found at the end of her quest. The difference between Isabel and Madame Merle lies 
precisely in the fact that the young lady realizes, with Osmond and, later, with the revelations 
about her companion, that the criterion of taste is not enough for life.  
When considering Madame Merle, moreover, a distinction must be made between the 
life she chooses to lead, in which she seeks for the beautiful, but ignores or despises ethical 
standards in her relationship with other persons, and her own value as a touchstone. 
Madame Merle’s appreciation of those surrounding her encompasses their entire beings, 
                                                           
305 Dorothea Krook’s essay focus on the relationship between Isabel and those who court her, describing in detail 
the reasons that lead her to ignore Lord Warburton and Caspar Goodwood, and to later choose Gilbert Osmond. 
On the one hand, such resolution is motivated by Isabel’s wish to develop her mind and knowledge, while desiring 
that her money could favor someone as Osmond. On the other, her appreciation for the beautiful leads her to long 
for an exquisite husband. In this weakness for an aesthetic perfectionism lies the reason why Isabel will 
disappoint herself, as well as Osmond, and in it one may find her own responsibility for the course of events. For 
the author, neither character is entirely beast or angel, nor should one overlook the fact that both loved each other 
dearly before their married life began. In the failure to correspond to these great expectations lies their mutual 
disappointment. Isabel chose Osmond, ignoring that his aestheticism was a substitute for vanity. She also 
concealed the full extent of her own convictions, and the way she was not willing to abdicate them in his favor. In 
Krook’s words, while Lord Warburton appreciated Isabel’s remarkable mind, Osmond despises the moral and 
provincial upbringing of her ideas. So, although Osmond loved Isabel, he believed he would be able to suppress 
her own thoughts. It is the inability to do so that will make him despise his wife, as the mere fact that Isabel 
disagrees with Osmond is an offense upon his person. Osmond was indeed looking for, in Isabel, a reflection of his 
own intellect, a supplement to his art of conversation and general knowledge, instead of someone with a mind of 
her own. For Osmond, Isabel’s fine qualities would serve his purposes; she was meant to be the privileged 
interlocutor to his thoughts, encouraging them with keen remarks, mirroring his good taste in all matters. The 
point is not, I would sustain, so much the fact that Isabel goes against Osmond’s standards, but the notion that 
she is not willing to abdicate the search for her own criteria. Although Isabel finds, in Osmond, qualities that 
would serve her own education, she soon discovers he is not the model to follow. She understands, at some point, 
that Osmond’s egotism inhibits true understanding, that he is partial and invidious, which makes her ignore his 
advice, returning to Madame Merle as standard.   
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which is why she is such a consummate interpreter306. Although Madame Merle does not lead 
an Arnoldian life, she is an Arnoldian, which is why it does not make sense to consider, after 
Krook, that her interpretations substitute appearance for reality, or the surface for the 
substance. On the contrary, her accurate evaluations show the capacity to say things about 
others that they recognize as truthful.  
Among the qualities Isabel appreciates in Madame Merle are, in fact, her general 
sensibility and appreciation of the character of others. But, as she ages, Isabel’s reasons for 
being taught by Madame Merle differ and even if she will later impose a limit upon what 
Osmond is allowed to teach her, the aspiration to equal Madame Merle is maintained after 
the young lady marries:  
 
There were hours when Isabel would have given anything for lessons in this art; if her brilliant 
friend had been near she would have made an appeal to her. She had become aware more than 
before of the advantage of being like that – of having made one’s self a firm surface, a sort of 
corselet of silver307.  
  
Isabel’s many theories, her enthusiasm for life, the willingness to fulfill all things, no 
longer inspires her. Troubles, the young lady decides, must be kept to herself, so as to avoid 
the pain of confession. She now longs for what is Madame Merle’s mode of living through 
knowledge and wisdom: “The best way to profit by her friend – this indeed Isabel had always 
thought – was to imitate her, to be as firm and bright as she”308. At this point, she already 
knows better than to search for instruction in her friend, and doubts as to whether she would 
be of use in “periods of refined embarrassment”. The desire to follow a model has been 
                                                           
306 To differentiate taste and truth in an interpreter is to ignore the influence of Arnold’s concept of touchstone in 
James’s novels and criticism. Observe how, when The Portrait of a Lady was published in 1880-81, James had 
already written an essay praising Arnold’s literary criticism, published in the North American Review in 1865. 
Years later, in 1884, a second essay follows, in which Arnold is given the title of “general critic”. The influence of 
Arnold’s concepts in Henry James’s body of work has often been described. For example, the notion of touchstone 
is portrayed in James’s essay, “The Science of Criticism”. In Arnold, as was seen in the previous chapter, truth and 
beauty may not be individuated. True poetry, which belongs to the class of the excellent, has the capacity to do us 
good and the true critic possesses the ability to detect both qualities in a poem. For a detailed account see Henry 
James, Susan M. Griffin, The Art of Criticism: Henry James on the Theory and the Practice of Fiction. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986. Henry James, “English Writers, Matthew Arnold,” Literary Criticism, vol. 1. 
New York: The Library of America, 1984, pp. 711-731.   
307  Henry James, Op. cit., p. 432. 
308  Op. cit., p. 432.  
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replaced by the determination to do so. In addition, for someone now acquainted with 
disgusts and revulsions, the idea of possessing a corselet of silver is appealing. The garment, 
with the genuineness of silver, its brightness and firmness, exemplifies how Madame Merle 
was able to give herself an air of authenticity that has the further purpose of protecting her. 
In this Pygmalion narrative, therefore, Isabel gives the role of educator to Madame Merle 
who, carefully and progressively, takes the young lady under her wing and settles upon her 
destiny.   
In order to be a reliable barometer to others, Isabel would have to own a set of 
features that could be properly schooled. In fact, one way to characterize Madame Merle is to 
say that her perceptiveness is not an act of will, as the requisites to be an insightful 
interpreter depend upon a combination of factors, such as intuition, memory, education, the 
capacity to learn from experience, and to have suffered. The ability to recognize skill in 
others, as Isabel did in Madame Merle and Gilbert Osmond, is a first indication of her 
perceptiveness. Another group of conditions, such as having that talent validated, as when 
Ralph sees her admiring the paintings at Gardencourt’s gallery –  “She was evidently a judge; 
she had a natural taste; he was struck with that”309  –, would be the second requirement. Still, 
a specific experience of life is required:  
 
‘I judge more than I used to’, she said to Isabel, ‘but it seems to me one has earned the right. 
One can’t judge till one’s forty; before that we’re too eager, too hard, too ignorant. I’m sorry for 
you; it will be a long time before you’re forty. (…) I want to see what life makes of you. It may 
pull you about horribly, but I defy it to break you up310.    
 
The advice, which may at first seem banal, holds simultaneously a theory of life and a 
veiled threat. Supposedly, the right to evaluate others comes late in life, after one is softened 
by experience. The contradiction in Madame Merle’s words resides in the fact that, both in 
Isabel’s case and in her companion’s, life will moderate eagerness and ignorance, but will also 
toughen them terribly. In fact, the authority to assess is accompanied by the fact that in order 
to be a standard one must have grieved.  
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Observe how, at times, the affinity between the interpreter and the person being 
tested also leads the judged one to understand facts that the other would wish to conceal. 
Isabel, for example, is able to comprehend things about Madame Merle that she would have 
liked to suppress. In this case, Madame Merle’s experience at changing subjects and Isabel’s 
unworldliness will make her incapable to realize the full extent of her intuitions. One of them, 
however, reveals a characteristic that she will share with Madame Merle:  
 
‘I’m afraid you’ve suffered much’, she once found occasion to say to her friend in response to 
some allusion that had appeared so far.  
‘What makes you think that?’ Madame Merle asked with the amused smile of a person seated 
at a game of guesses. ‘I hope I haven’t too much the droop of misunderstood.’ 
‘No, but you sometimes say things that I think people who have always been happy wouldn’t 
have found out.  
‘I haven’t always been happy’, said Madame Merle, smiling still, but with a mock of gravity, as 
if she were telling a child a secret. (…) 
I flatter myself that I’m rather stout, but if I must tell you the truth I’ve been shockingly 
chipped and cracked. (…)311.  
 
Madame Merle had to suffer in order to notice life’s complexities. Unlike some cases, 
portrayed later in the chapter, in which sorrow derives from the activity of interpreting other 
persons, Madame Merle’s grievance precedes the moment in which she became an insightful 
interpreter and it is described as a condition for her intuition to develop. If suffering is 
mandatory, then it is natural for Madame Merle to wish it for her pupil, hoping the vessel will 
hold, and not break entirely. In fact, there are recurrent allusions in the book to Isabel’s 
happiness and the way “that the unpleasant had been even too absent from her 
knowledge”312. She was, as portrayed, “too young, too impatient to live, too unacquainted 
with pain”313. The importance of suffering is indispensable for one to grow as an interpreter 
and it is what enables Isabel to possess the discernment of both a judge of persons and 
objects and to become the evaluator she wished to be in the first place. Observe how the 
                                                           
311  Op. cit., p. 214.  
312 See also: “It appeared to Isabel that the unpleasant had been even too absent from her knowledge, for she had 
gathered from her acquaintance with literature that it was often a source of interest and even of instruction”. Op. 
cit., p. 49. 
313   Op. cit., p. 71. 
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ability to read others was a form of art not entirely mastered by the young lady until the very 
ending of her education:  
 
(…) she had not read him right. A certain combination of features had touched her, and in 
them she had seen the most striking of figures314. 
 
Isabel read all this as she would have read the hour on the clock-face; she was perfectly aware 
that the sight of interest in her cousin stirred her husband’s rage as if Osmond had locked her 
into her room – which she was sure he wanted to do315.  
 
The reason why Isabel’s insight failed when evaluating Gilbert Osmond for the first 
time may only be understood in her lack of experience as an interpreter, in the fact that she 
had the facility to assess taste, but not the capacity to understand an evil she had not yet 
experienced. She is able to identify and to acknowledge Osmond’s delicate mind, his 
refinement, but not his loathing of others. Marriage provides that understanding, and she is 
now able to apprehend Osmond as if he were a clock, to comprehend the set of emotions he 
reveals, as well as those he attempts to conceal, to make sense of their relationship, and to 
fear him for it. She recognizes not only his visible emotions, but also the intentions he 
conceals, as what he would do to her if he could. And, perhaps unwillingly, the young lady 
becomes very much like her tutor.  
 
She [Isabel] liked her [Madame Merle] as much as ever, but there was a corner of the curtain 
that never was lifted; it was as if she remained after all something of a public performer, 
condemned to emerge only in character and in costume316.  
 
And thus it seemed to her [Isabel] an act of devotion. She concealed it elaborately; she was 
perpetually, in their talk, hanging out curtains and arranging screens317.  
 
Although Isabel is perceptive in realizing she is observing a show whose curtain is 
never fully drawn, she does not, at first, understand the need or purpose of the 
representation. The way Madame Merle has perfected herself up to a point in which she 
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315  Op. cit., p. 465. 
316  Op. cit., p. 350. See also: “With all her love for knowledge she had a natural shrinking from raising curtains 
and looking into unlighted corners. The love of knowledge in her mind coexisted with the finest capacity for 
ignorance”. Op. cit., p. 220. 
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appears to be faultless is admired. Later, when Isabel’s friends come to visit and she must veil 
the truth about her married life, hanging curtains and arranging screens proves to be an 
elaborate and exhausting task. Caspar Goodwood sadly notices that she is now 
“imperturbable, inscrutable, impenetrable”318. His characterization reveals Isabel’s 
accomplishment at building her own silver corselet: “you’re somehow so still, so smooth, so 
hard. You’re completely changed, you conceal everything”319. She has become a touchstone, a 
being apart from others, which is why she may not be entirely understood or assessed. This is 
the narrative of how one, possessing fine talents, longed to be instructed and to become a 
standard. It is equally the story of how, after the education process is completed, Isabel is 
finally able to give meaning to a group of first impressions she had failed to comprehend 
fully. The young lady will be able to return to what had seemed to be Madame Merle’s 
ambiguous remarks, “a note that sounded false”320, the sensation that the ties connecting her 
friend and her husband were more profound than she had thought, to the way Osmond hates 
her, to the realization of who her benefactor was (Madame Merle’s final lesson). Although she 
will understand, as the Countess of Gemini suggests, that she is “a woman who has been 
made used of”321, I would say that Isabel was able to obtain, as she had wished, the ability to 
accurately comprehend other persons and to be a valuable judge of character. In Portrait of a 
Lady, therefore, embodying a criterion implies the ability to redefine, after an education 
through suffering has taken place, our thoughts about others. Initial impressions are merely 
partially accurate, and may not be fully comprehended before the interpreter has time to 
mature. Explanation is seen as the relinquishment of a personal point of view, which occurs 
when one is finally at a better station for appreciating others, and has gained a 
comprehensive perspective. 
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4. Those Exhausted by Success 
 
Every command leaves behind a painful sting in the person who is forced to carry it out.  
Elias Canneti, Crowds and Power 
 
 When the set of Arnoldians was described in the preceding pages, an important aspect 
of the relationship between these interpreters and their elected entities was overlooked. This 
rapport between parties, often prolonged through time and occasionally the result of a subtle 
negotiation, may affect the interpreter and make him acquire particularities of his objects of 
study. When such experience occurs, the analyzed entities seem the source of a series of 
secondary effects, for lack of a better expression, on their assessors. It will be seen how some 
interpreters intentionally seek for such bodily rapport, in the hope that it will help to enhance 
comprehension. Other times, the consequences of the test distress interpreters; they are an 
involuntary side effect, arduous to prevent, even years after the examination is over. Such 
relationship illustrates a bond between the evaluator and those being analyzed that may help 
improve or restrain interpretation, but also make it an extraordinarily difficult task to 
perform. In this point, as in others, Arnoldians differ among themselves. Each skilled activity 
gives origin to a series of distinct traces in their interpreters, some more pleasant than others, 
a result of the technical procedures they perform through time.  
In preceding pages, interpretation was characterized as a technical tool; a set of 
procedures, which vary on their degree of rationalization, was contemplated; and the 
possibility of having conviction regarding a particular object was deemed a way of knowing it. 
The following relation between entities, though, may be difficult to include in such a technical 
argument. For instance, in the case of those who appear to acquire features of their studied 
entities, it is mandatory to understand if this enhances their interpretive skills, if there is a 
required degree of engagement, and, finally, how does the process work. It is also necessary 
to comprehend whether this negotiation between entities has a public or a private dimension. 
If private, one must realize if the previously described mechanisms for interpretation, as 
pointing, are able to characterize it. To introduce the topic, a recent review in The New 
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Yorker helps to clarify the perhaps debatable, but quite simple thought, that technical 
interpreters may absorb features of their objects of knowledge: 
 
When he is not taking on trends on modern thought, Professor X is shrewd about the reasons 
it’s hard to teach underprepared students how to write. ‘I have come to think,’ he says, ‘that 
the two most crucial ingredients in the mysterious mix that makes a good writer may be (1) 
having read enough throughout a lifetime to have internalized the rhythms of the written 
word, and (2) refining the ability to mimic those rhythms.’ This makes sense. If you read a lot 
of sentences, then you start to think in sentences, and if you think in sentences, then you can 
write sentences, because you know what a sentence sounds like322.  
 
Internalize is, of course, an important word, but one which will not be literally 
understood. The important presumption is the description of how one who reads a lot of 
phrases ends up thinking in sentences, being eventually able to write them. In literary 
criticism, this type of gradual acquisition, perhaps similar to Madame Merle’s improving 
capacity to judge other persons, does not mean that critics embody certain phrases or that 
these are engraved in their minds. It does mean, however, that those who have had a 
particular practice of reading will be able to show their writing skills, as opposed to those 
who had a limited experience and may have difficulties in writing. This is a case in which 
comprehension requires both experience, through time, of what is being studied, and the 
capacity to reproduce aspects of it. It could, of course, be sustained that this case exemplifies 
merely a unidirectional relation between readers and their books, and perhaps it is so. It is 
unclear, in many of the cases discussed, whether this type of acquisition derives from the 
entities in evaluation or from the way each interpreter projects their own image in the mirror. 
Some of these secondary effects appear to be entirely personal and subjective, in which case 
one should attempt to comprehend if these interpreters are evaluating their own emotions or 
stipulating a state of affairs.  
There are, of course, those who appear to be immune to such a type of relationship. 
Would T. S. Eliot’s explanation about how the poet may be compared to a filament of 
platinum be representative of a different species of Arnoldian? “Tradition and Individual 
Talent,” which in so many ways precedes Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence, focuses 
                                                           
322  Louis Menand, “Why We Have College”, The New Yorker, June 6, 2011, p. 79.  
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on the relation between the work of a certain poet and the art that existed before him. The 
arrival of the new work of art transforms “the existing monuments” and creates “conformity 
between the old and the new,” while feelings and emotions influence poets.  
 
He must be aware that the mind of Europe – the mind of his own country – a mind which he 
learns in time to be much more important than his own private mind – is a mind which changes, 
and that this change is a development that abandons nothing en route, which does not 
superannuate either Shakespeare, or Homer, or the rock drawing of the Magdalenian 
draughtsmen323. 
 
Magdalenian draughtsmen, a reference to the Paleolithic caves in Dordogne where Eliot 
had spent a Summer in 1919324, appears side by side with Shakespeare and Homer, 
monuments representing the mind of Europe. A point of interest in this description is related 
with the idea that the mind of the canon maintains its strength through the acquisition of 
particular works. This collective intellect, modified by each new work of art, supersedes that 
of the individual artist, changing continually in order to acquire new pieces of knowledge 
without leaving others behind. In this case, there is no distinction between the supposed 
interpreter and its entity of choice, as a progressive agglomeration takes place which 
transforms the pre-existing order of things. Such mind, unlike, as will be seen, the poet’s, is 
not immune to the relation between works of art. It has a public nature, visible in its various 
instances. At first sight, this denial of an interiorized collective mind finds its equivalent in 
the refusal of “the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul”325 of the poet. 
Poetry is not the result of a specific and interior personality. This would mean that what one 
may presumably call the mind of the canon, composed of its various works of excellence, 
finds its parallel in the mind of the poet, made public through his work. But Eliot rejects this 
notion, favoring the thought that the poet is the medium in which “impressions and 
experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways”326. This blend is thus an internal 
process. Notice how in the interiority of impressions of the poet, which contrast with Eliot’s 
                                                           
323   T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode. London: Faber and Faber, 1975, p. 39. 
324   Cf. Modernism – An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 153.  
325   Eliot, Op. cit., p. 42 
326  Op. cit., p. 42 
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portrait of the mind of the canon, lies an unacknowledged difference between individual and 
collective minds:  
 
“(…) but we are to remind ourselves that criticism is as inevitable as breathing, and that we 
should be none the worse for articulating what passes in our minds when we read a book and 
feel an emotion about it, for criticizing our own minds in their work of criticism”327.  
 
In this description (the citation follows a brief discussion, which introduces the essay 
on the nature of French criticism) lies an unrecognized relation of continuity between poets 
and those with the responsibility to understand and place creations amidst the mind of the 
canon. Criticism is characterized as being something which “passes through our minds” when 
one reads a book or feels an emotion about it. Both thoughts and emotions possess an 
interior nature, in a process that appears to be more similar to that of the individual poet 
than to the public mind of the canon. But one can only suppose that the mind of the critic 
must progressively acquire, through extensive reading, some of the particulars of the mind of 
the canon. The critic’s specific activity will later be probed; for now, the well-known 
argument favoring the depersonalization of the poet, and his relation to the sense of 
tradition, is portrayed.  
 
The analogy was that of the catalyst. When the two gases previously mentioned are mixed in the 
presence of a filament of platinum, they form a sulphurous acid. This combination takes place 
only if the platinum is present; nevertheless the newly former acid contains no trace of 
platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected: has remained inert, neutral, and 
unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively operate 
upon the experience of the man itself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more completely 
separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will 
the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material328.  
 
The poet is the touchstone that undergoes the test, but goes unaffected. In this 
impersonal theory of poetry the focus is on “the relation of the poem with other poems,” the 
poet being the vessel where the process takes place, but which is left “inert, neutral and 
unchanged”. Eliot compares the catalyst, a substance that increases or diminishes the rate of 
a chemical reaction without undergoing a change, to what happens in the mind of the artist. 
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The poet is the receptacle, or the filament, while his feelings and emotions constitute the 
gases that will be combined into the “new compound” which composes the work of art. 
Without the poet the chemical reaction may not take place. A peculiar and somewhat 
contradictory divorce occurs between the private experiences of the man who suffers and the 
creating mind. Such separation does not, however, correspond to a strict division between 
experiences (corresponding to the body) and poems (those belonging to the activity of the 
mind). On the contrary, the organism of the poet functions as a whole, one in which passions 
are transmuted and digested in the mind able to separate private experiences from poetical 
growth. The fact that Eliot uses the catalyst as a metaphor, though, leaves unclear whether 
the poet is a technical reader of the work of others. Implicit in the description is the idea that 
not everyone possesses the ideal characteristics to become a catalyst. The fact that only some 
may be vessels for the creation of poetry appears to signify that they require the type of 
characteristics portrayed (knowledge of the writings of others, intuition, and, in this 
particular case, the capacity to be a filament of platinum). 
The visible repercussion of the process is the existence of a work of art, representative 
of the chemical reaction. This procedure could equal Madame Merle’s judgments, but in her 
case suffering was a requirement for accurate evaluations to appear, and her perfection as a 
touchstone depended thoroughly on a private experience that left its mark. Likewise, the 
asymmetry between her and those subject to evaluation, which, as seen, is a condition in 
some of these modes of proof, does not appear to exist in the case of the catalyst. On the 
contrary, he must empty himself, and not be affected by previous works of art. An interesting 
particularity of Eliot’s catalyst resides precisely in this rejection of the centrality of experience 
of life: “The experience, you will notice, the elements which enter the presence of the 
transforming catalyst, are of two kinds: emotions and feelings. The effect of a work of art 
upon the person who enjoys it is an experience different in any kind from any experience not 
of art”329. At stake are not the poet’s private affairs or his daily life, but his ability to 
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experience previous works in a combination of emotions and feelings, made visible in a 
particular use of phrases or images, used to compose that final result.  
 
The last quatrain gives an image, a feeling attaching to an image, which ‘came’, which did not 
develop simply out of that precedes, but which was probably in suspension in the poet’s mind 
until the proper combination arrived for it to add itself to. The poet’s mind is in fact a 
receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there 
until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together330.  
 
Although the poet remains neutral, he does, after all, incorporate characteristics of the 
diverse particulars at his disposal, and this acquisition is fundamental for the process to be 
successful. The assimilation of particulars, which lie dormant until the moment of the fusion, 
is only momentary and outdone once the reaction has taken place. Unlike the mind of the 
canon or Madame Merle, entities that work through the accumulation of other works or 
particular judgments, the poet stores impressions until the reaction takes place. When Eliot 
distinguishes the poet’s personal experiences from this acquisition of particulars, he is 
making clear that the poet is not projecting his personal views on the phrases or images at his 
disposal. On the contrary, he must appropriate and rework things exterior to himself. There 
is a difference between these particulars, which must be momentarily stored, and the test 
itself, which leaves the interpreter unharmed.   
At the same time, the acquired phrases and sentences must not be faithfully 
reproduced; they have only the function of serving the chemical reaction. Interestingly, an 
asymmetry now appears to be portrayed, but one which is a result of the importance of the 
fusion over the poet’s mind, and the reason why this depersonalization is defined, in a 
sentence that reminds us of Henry James’s characterization of the critic, as “a continual self-
sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality”331. It could, of course, be asked if this sacrifice 
                                                           
330 Op. Cit., p. 41. 
331 In “The Art of Criticism” Henry James states the following: “When one thinks of the outfit required for free 
work in this spirit, one is ready to pay almost any homage to the intelligence that has put it on, when one 
considers the noble figure completely equipped – armed cap-à-pie in curiosity and sympathy – one falls in love 
with the apparition. It certainly represents the knight who has knelt through his long vigil and who has the piety of 
his office. For there is something sacrificial in his function, inasmuch as he offers himself as a general 
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could be depicted as a negative effect of the fusion, i.e. of the procedure itself, whether the 
gradual extinction of one’s personality is, or not, a positive thing. To some, it could be a 
necessary side effect, a requirement if one wants to be a creator and, in this case, the ending 
would justify the means. From this perspective, poets would be those willing to sacrifice their 
personalities in order to be vessels to their works.  
A difference between catalysts and touchstones concerns the fact that those using 
quartz to evaluate the authenticity of gold are conducting an exterior process, whereas the 
catalytic chemical reaction is interior, takes place in the poet’s mind. But, just as the alloy is 
made visible on the stone, the results of the test may be perceived by those examining results, 
i.e. the products of the poet’s mind, his writings. At the same time, both touchstones and 
catalysts require someone to observe and judge the results of the process. This assessment, 
done by critics or specialized readers, presumes the Arnoldian ability to value the artist: “you 
must set for him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead”332. The poet must know he 
will be judged, although not amputated, by the standards of the past: “It is a judgment, a 
comparison, in which two things are measured by each other”333. This comparison, Eliot’s 
test of value, has an obvious relationship with the evaluator’s task in a touchstone test. But 
the critic must also be able to understand: 
 
If you compare several representative passages of the greatest poetry you see how great is the 
variety of types of combination, and also how completely any semi-ethical criterion of ‘sublimity’ 
misses the mark. For it is not the ‘greatness’, the intensity, of the emotions, the components, but 
the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place, 
that counts334. 
 
Those who appreciate this moment of fusion, recognizing both technical excellence and 
the emotion in the life of the poem, are the specialized readers. Instead of judging through 
criteria of sublimity, one should be able to perceive the intensity of the artistic process, the 
pressure under which the fusion takes place. A good critic is thus able, when he reads a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
332 Op. cit., p. 38. 
333 Op. cit., p. 39 
334  Op. cit., p. 41. 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 238 
 
particular poem, to perceive that moment of fusion, to recover what has taken place. It is the 
access to that hidden reaction which is brought to light in the critical activity. He is, 
therefore, the examiner in the touchstone process who is able to return to the moment of the 
test, see the alloys and justify the result of the procedure. The line of continuity, previously 
described, between the poet’s mind and the critic’s may now be understood, as he must have 
access to that moment of fusion.  
In the case of Eliot’s catalyst, although the poet remains unchanged after the reaction 
takes place, it may now be understood how he had to acquire, even if only momentarily, a 
group of particulars to be used in the reaction. Without them, a successful fusion would not 
have been possible. Simultaneously, the critic’s skill lies in this capacity to understand the 
moment in which the fusion took place, and to give it meaning. Now, picture, instead, a 
therapist who starts experiencing bodily symptoms as a result of his professional activity, the 
most common reactions being muscle tension, sleepiness, yawning and tearfulness, but also 
stomach disturbance, loss of voice, nausea and so forth. Would the acquisition of these 
symptoms be a signal that the therapist had gained insight into his patient? And would this 
mean that therapy was progressing and that the patient was on his way to being cured? In a 
situation of bodily-centered counter-transference, the second illustration of this rapport 
between interpreters, contrary to what happens with the catalyst, the therapist’s acquisition 
of somatic symptoms does not necessarily entail therapeutic success. It may, however, be 
representative of the particular knowledge of the person in need of interpretation. The 
following quotation, which summarizes the state of the art of current investigations, 
introduces this issue.   
 
“Bodily-centred” counter-transference is a little-discussed manifestation of counter-transference 
where the therapist is spontaneously aroused by the client material through a physical medium 
(Field, 1989). There is little documentation about these somatic reactions to client material. 
Therefore, the processes underlying body-centred counter-transference are not fully 
understood. Stone (2006) and Wosket (1999) described the therapist as having a “tuning fork” 
vibrating with the client’s psychic material through the unconscious to describe the process of 
somatic reactions. It is suggested that the use of the therapeutic tool, or “self” via postural 
mirroring, can induce body-centred counter-transference. Postural mirroring of clients is the 
result of a therapist’s unconscious automatic somatic counter-transference (Rothschild & Rand, 
2006). Postural mirroring and the resulting body-centred counter-transference can be a very 
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useful way to gain insight into the client’s emotional and physical processes. Mohacsy (1995) 
explored the idea that non-verbal behaviour could give a greater insight into the internal world 
of the client335. 
 
 It should perhaps be mentioned that literature on the subject concurs that such 
manifestations must be further studied, in order to systematize specific problems that derive 
from this type of counter-transference. Researchers need to realize, for example, whether 
these symptoms occur more in some therapists than others, due to factors such as age, sex or 
the counselor’s experience. So far, body-centered counter-transference appears to be more 
severe in therapists treating serious trauma patients, such as victims of abuse. Differences in 
the personal meaning of body-centered counter-transference must equally be evaluated, as 
well as the degree of assistance that supervisors may provide. Still, an important premise in 
this research deals with the idea that verbal communication leaves unsaid much of what is 
important in a therapeutic process. In the interaction between patient and therapist 
knowledge is gained, from the perspective of both interlocutors, in the evaluation of bodily 
reactions. As in other cases discussed in the thesis, the body’s responses are deemed more 
truthful than verbal communication, as they are not subject to the “unpremeditated 
manipulation of language that we use in everyday negotiation between outside reality and 
our inner emotional life336. The patient pays attention to his therapist’s behavior, in order to 
learn if he is bored, if the session has reached its ending, etc. Likewise, the counselor must 
acquire information from his patient’s behavior in order to attain what Mohacsy calls the 
“states of the body,” which “can go beyond internal ‘states of mind’” and provide a better 
comprehension of the patient’s inner feelings.  
An unmentioned presumption of this phenomenon as a form of knowledge appears to 
be the idea that the attempt to get into someone’s inside may be more successful if my inside 
experiences the same. Common sense would say, in fact, that when we experience something 
we are better able to comprehend it. There is, however, a pretension to truthfulness in some 
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descriptions of the phenomenon that must be evaluated, as following arguments do not 
appear to result from common sense, but from the idea that one’s interior experiences may 
be more meaningful than words, as they allow us to restrain personal interpretation. The 
discourse about intentionality, discussed in previous chapters, is here substituted for the 
dichotomy between conscious and unconscious. Therefore, whereas one’s words are subject 
to manipulation and deceit – they are conscious –, interior feelings and their respective 
bodily representation, because unconscious, are potentially truthful.  
The body appears to be unintentionally reliable in the case of Lady Macbeth, as 
represented in her relation with the Doctor. Returning briefly to the beginning of act V, the 
physician depicts his patient the following way: “A great perturbation in nature, to receive at 
once / the benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching” (V, i, 9-10). A few moments later 
he will claim: “Her eyes are open,” while the Waiting-Gentlewoman concurs: “Ay, but her 
senses are shut” (V, i, 23-24). If Lady Macbeth was able at one point to conceal the crime (to 
shut her moral eyes), while her senses were alert to the various possibilities of the crime’s 
discovery, she is now sick from the effort, with her eyes wide open, but her senses locked, her 
body making her reenact the crime repeatedly. The visible aspects of the crime are Lady 
Macbeth’s enunciations and, more importantly, what the Freudian Waiting-Gentlewoman 
portrays as being “an accustom’d action” (V, i, 27), that of washing repeatedly the hands. For 
the doctor, this corresponds to a perturbation in nature, a sentence that can mean that it is in 
her constitution, to be sick, or that her character’s faults produced an unbalanced nature, 
which could not cope with the horrors of the done deeds:  
 
Unnatural deeds 
Do breed unnatural troubles: infected minds 
To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets.  
(Macbeth, V, i, 68-76)  
 
After hearing Lady Macbeth’s confessions, the Doctor’s mind understands how 
unnatural deeds, such as murder, cause abnormal problems, like a mind dissociated from the 
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body337. The infected mind is unable to confess and has to discharge its secrets to deaf 
pillows, an object that will not denounce the crime, but will also not allow for cure. Lady 
Macbeth has an excess of unmediated secrets, emotions that were not properly formulated 
and the impossibility to bring them forward. She abhors the idea of discussing her story and 
of submitting it to interpretation; her aim is that of concealing emotions, burying them, and 
not appeasing them over a conversation. Still, the Doctor, through observation, the analysis 
of her public behavior and the repetition of the night of the murder, has unmediated access to 
the crime itself. Lady Macbeth’s body appears to speak a truth that its owner is determined to 
conceal. More importantly, the play illustrates, avant la lettre, concern over the therapist’s 
own body. Lady Macbeth’s illness exemplifies the effects the interpreted entity may provoke 
on those endeavoring to understand her and the negative consequences a patient may have 
on the Doctor, an often-neglected victim of the couple’s evil doings:  
 
My mind she has mated, and amaz’d my sight. 
I think, but dare not speak. 
 (Macbeth, V, i, 68-76)  
 
This Doctor, whose mind has been mated, sight amazed, and who dares not speak, 
could perhaps be portrayed as an illustration of bodily counter-transference, an episode in 
the life of the analyst as “deaf pillow”. Lady Macbeth’s deeds provoked a transformation in 
the Physician, which alters his senses. Others could, with good reason, argue that the 
Doctor’s incapacity to speak is due to practical reasons, as he could be put on trial for 
treason. Still, he is burdened by her secrets and portrays that ailment by describing physical 
symptoms. Here, a differentiation important to the present thesis is being depicted, which 
concerns the distinction between understanding something and being able to solve it. In 
previous cases, to comprehend and to make a verdict, for example, were deemed one and the 
same thing. Failure to provide a sentence was a sign that something had been left untold and 
it would not be considered an accurate form of comprehension. Similarly, Eliot’s poet was 
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thought of as being accomplished when the fusion took place. With Macbeth’s Doctor, and in 
bodily counter-transference in general, one may comprehend a patient, i.e. being able to 
make a diagnosis, but this does not necessarily mean curing him. The Doctor’s case is more 
troublesome, as Lady Macbeth’s reenactment of the crime helps him understand the cause of 
her illness, but the knowledge at his disposal does not allow for the type of diagnosis that 
would help to choose a course of treatment. In Macbeth, the interpreted entity refuses to be 
understood and the one making the verdict fears what he has found and does not know 
enough to provide the diagnosis and respective treatment. Secondary effects are unwanted, 
but nevertheless occur.  
If this Doctor were a modern psychoanalyst, he would be able to rely on recent 
research about the effects therapy may cause on those practicing it. Firstly, it should be noted 
that, in the case of therapy, physical bodily symptoms are the result of the relationship 
between patient and therapist, i.e. of an agreement made between interpreters with the 
purpose to heal one of them. Neither, we may suppose, is being forced into therapy and the 
counselor has the choice to end the sessions if he finds they are being harmful (this is a 
relevant difference from other cases which will be portrayed). The fact that the therapist 
starts suffering from a series of somatic bodily symptoms is the result of his interpretative 
activity, which may derive from what the patient is consciously or unconsciously projecting, 
and from what the therapist is also consciously or unconsciously absorbing. An important 
particularity lies in the fact that researchers portray these symptoms as being of potential 
benefit for the therapeutic process, as they allow the therapist insight into his patient. The 
negative aspect of this bodily relation consists, of course, in the fact that, if not properly 
controlled, it may lead the counselor to suffering and even burnout.  
According to these studies, the reason why such effects appear is due to the special 
relation between the doctor and the patient, which presupposes that there is a connection 
(psychological or physical, between both entities). Such connection has taken place when, 
somehow, the therapist realizes he or she is different or reacting singularly to the test itself. It 
could, of course, be questioned if the therapist previously possessed those symptoms, and the 
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extent to which they aggravate during the sessions. What matters here, nonetheless, is the 
fact that therapists consider these physical sensations to be either a reproduction of their 
patient’s bodily symptoms or of therapy itself.  
Susie Orbach’s books characterize this type of experience, described as an important 
part of the process of cure, as it may help to enlighten the therapist about his patient. The 
idea that the subconscious of two persons may communicate through their bodies, and 
without their full knowledge, is of a certain anthropologic interest. Herta, a German 
musicologist born in 1942, grew up with a series of eating disorders, which were a constant 
source of concern for her family. Her mother categorized her as Jude, due to the fact that she 
was very skinny, the implications of the term being only acknowledged by Herta years later. 
Susie Orbach, whom she looked for in New York after hearing one of her conferences, 
characterizes her as being “deeply somatic and her career and her mothering was hampered 
by chronic pains caused by ulcerated colitis”338. Herta had had an early menopause in her late 
30s, which contributed to make her uncomfortable in her body, a source of pain and grief. 
From time to time, however, she had periods of “well-being in her body but these felt to her 
to have a quality of unreality about them”339. In her article, Orbach claims: “The aspect of her 
therapy I want to highlight centers around the work on her body and my body”340. While 
rationalizing Herta’s case, the author comments:  
 
But while I was thinking this (…), I simultaneously had the experience of becoming deeply and 
comfortably into awareness into my own body and how very much at ease I feel with it. I was 
quite struck by this. (…) But beyond this unusual and rather pleasurable with my own body 
awareness in the session, it was as though Herta – in her desperate need to create a body ego 
for herself that could take on the functions she needed in order to deconstruct her False body 
– had created for herself, via me, a stable contented body that was in the room341.  
 
                                                           
338  Susie Orbach, “Countertransference and the False Body,” in Winnicott Studies: The Journal of Squiggle 
Foundation, ed. Laurence Spurling, Spring 1995, p. 8.   
339  Op. Cit., p. 8. 
340 Op. Cit., p. 8. In this case, Orbach followed Winnicott in considering that “before the True Self can come to 
analysis, the therapist must talk with the False Self about the True Self”. Winnicott’s notion of true and false selves 
considers that, for example, in a somatic patient, the true self may come to light in therapy, recognize the 
existence of a false body, that with which the patient is uncomfortable, in an attempt to make true self and 
painless body coexist. 
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 Secondary effects are pleasurable, as the therapist suddenly feels quite confortable in 
her own body. In another book, where the same case is discussed, Orbach characterizes this 
feeling as “a deep physical pleasure, as though I were a purring cat”342. This process, which is 
not considered entirely rational or irrational, is believed to be induced by the patient in need 
of a secure body. Herta, without her recognition, projects an “unconscious transmission” 
which is absorbed by the therapist’s body. Orbach’s interior will then find itself in the need to 
exteriorize, or just communicate, these feelings, so that she is able to intellectualize them, 
thus applying them in therapy: “her [the therapist’s] body, her emotional state, become a 
stethoscope-like instrument for hearing what might be askew”343. During therapy, thus, both 
women discuss this projection of an exterior body in the therapist, which proved that Herta 
was capable of construction and not only of destruction, a hope that she would be able in the 
future to rebuilt her own body.  
 Interestingly, Orbach does not contemplate the possibility that she, as therapist, could 
be construing a secure space for her patient. Other reasons leading the author to experience 
positive feelings about herself are also not taken into consideration; they are deemed the 
result of a causal relation between patient and therapist with the purpose to help the patient. 
This would not be a case in which the therapist acquires features of the patient, but one in 
which he absorbs a feeling of well being that the patient would like to have. One cannot help 
but questioning if Orbach’s sensations are indeed a result of the therapeutic process or a 
consequence of her own particular mode of describing affairs. By this I mean that it is not 
unusual for someone who accompanies a depressive friend for a prolonged period of time to 
find himself depressed after a while, or why certain persons make us feel secure, joyful or 
irritated. Ultimately, this is the reason why we choose and are chosen by others as friends 
and companions. But the attempt to find a causal explanation for our feelings when others 
are present, and one that depends mainly on unconscious forces, appears peculiar.  
                                                           
342 Susie Orbach, Bodies: Big Ideas, Small Books. NY: Picador, 2003, p. 63. [Kindle edition] 
343 Op. cit., p. 62. 
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  Orbach could, of course, claim that the validation of the procedure takes place when 
the patient gets better. Although the process may be described as interior (inner feelings are 
transmitted from the patient to the therapist) it is validated when both the interior and 
exterior signs of disease disappear. At the same time, although the chapter that portrays 
Herta’s case is called “Speaking Bodies,” Orbach’s description helps to show how this type of 
talkative entity requires a skilled interpreter in order to be fully understood. In this point 
resides, perhaps, the strangeness of the description, as Orbach’s therapeutic method appears 
to rely on the idea that one may found in “Orbach 1” a skilled interpreter (able to talk with 
Herta and to give meaning to her problems) and in “Orbach 2” a body (a skilled, but 
unconscious interpreter) capable of helping her patient be cured. In this case, only some of 
the strategies of interpretation previously surveyed may be applied. One of the reasons is due 
to the fact that these feelings are entirely personal, since although both women discuss them 
in therapy, only one of them experiences them: “When that occurs, I know there is a fair 
chance that I am receiving an unconscious transmission of some physical state that cannot be 
easily felt by the person I am working with”344. If the other person cannot experience 
Orbach’s emotions and, ultimately, if the tool of pointing as a way of showing is not a 
requirement, then one may doubt if we are in the company of a subconscious transmission, 
or in the presence of a skilled interpreter, capable of curing his patients, but establishing 
erroneous causal relations for doing so. In this relationship between entities, thus, 
interpreters appear to seek a particular moment in which comprehension is made clear. Both 
conscious beings (or bodies, in Orbach’s language) are in a struggle for self-recognition, the 
therapist attempting to understand her own body, and the patient trying to overcome her 
diseased self, in a rapport that will transform both. The understanding between parties is 
described as either provoking pleasure or some degree of pain. This type of conflict between 
selves, without therapeutic purposes, is materialized in the third illustration of this problem, 
which represents the bond between the torturer and his victim.  
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 Those who twist others in order to give meanings a proper sense are, of course, 
torturers. Bodies turn, swirl and contort in order to make the truth appear. The torturer’s 
task, which he often shares with an accomplice physician, is to be able to extend pain for a 
long period of time, without killing the suspect. As long as the correct amount of pain is 
exercised, truth will supposedly become visible from inside the body. It was seen before how 
the Greek word basanos (Βάσαυος) means touchstone, test, ordeal and torture. But the word 
was equally applied to designate torturers. To assume the torturer is the touchstone means it 
is also his body, and not only the suspect’s, the place where the test occurs. The torturer’s 
body is scratched with the test, and this is how he, and those who observe the process, is 
supposedly able to distinguish true confessions from false ones. In torture, unlike other 
modes of proof, there is not a previous agreement between parties regarding the necessity for 
proof. One of the entities knows he will have to provide a judgment about the other, who 
fears both the test and its executant. Moreover, this type of negotiation may result from a 
choice made by the torturer himself, due to his elected line of work, or be the consequence of 
a selection made by others. When this is the case, both the torturer and the tortured enter in 
a relationship against their will, having to perform a role they did not particularly wished for, 
and which has no constructive results.  
Torturers may thus be described as those who, like Madame Merle, seem to be in a 
better position to appreciate others, a feature which, as shall be seen, ultimately contributes 
to their burnout345. This asymmetry between torturer and victim, a condition for procedures 
                                                           
345 An important particularity in this form of test derives from the idea, important in some modes of 
indoctrination, and different from the previous description of therapy, that interpretation is improved if my 
outside experiences the same as the outside of those under torture. A brief excursus on this subject helps to 
understand how the torturer’s education requires a group of conditions in which the infliction of pain plays an 
important role. The case of torture in Greece has been often studied, since it was one of few in which torturers 
(both officers and soldiers) were taken to court and testified. In his important book, Mika Haritos-Fatouros’ 
interviews sixteen former military policemen who worked during the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). 
The author evaluates the indoctrination of torturers, contending that it was a complex process in which natural 
cruelty had but a small role, whereas willingness to obey was violently taught. Future officers and soldiers were 
not chosen arbitrarily, but among those who came from conservative and nationalist families. Their training was 
designed to inculcate a conservative ideology and the sense that they belonged to a selected elite, the “greater” 
Greeks by opposition to the “lesser” Greeks. At the same time, they were chosen from poor families, to whom 
financial benefits and social privileges were encouraging. Then, the training began. The indoctrination had the 
purpose to modify each recruit’s behavior and was painfully taught. Recruits were trained to obey without 
question to illogical or violent orders (“overlearning”). They would be tortured so that it became an everyday act 
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to take place, leads to the notion that torturers are autonomous in their interpretations. They 
consider themselves a necessary instrument to find the truth about a given state of affairs and 
assume they are self-sufficient interpreters. The ambition of being autonomous in 
interpretation, of providing verdicts or judgments that do not need further commentary or 
interpretation, is best described by Bruno (a false name), a civil policeman and former 
warden in a prison during the latter part of Brazil’s military period, who was known to have 
overseen and participated in torture:  
 
‘in operations ‘sometimes we’d get intoxicated from our work’ and do things that should not be 
done. Bruno says he ‘felt like a demigod’, a kind of high that came from ‘dictating the rules’.  
Bruno says that he now realizes that ‘all such intoxication is negative’ because it causes the 
policemen to be ‘irritable, aggressive, prone to having problems at home and drinking’”346. 
 
“Intoxication” is responsible for Bruno’s wrongdoings, like torture and murder, that 
should not have been done and which Bruno never mentions. He illustrates a “sense of high” 
and the feeling of being a demigod. Curiously, feelings responsible for torture are also to 
blame for the policemen’s family and drinking problems. Bruno is describing the sensation of 
autonomy and self-sufficiency that comes with being a touchstone. But this autonomy has 
implications: the sense of supremacy, of empowerment, frequently brings torturers or 
members of death squads together, but it also has side effects, namely, isolation from society 
and from family. Although torturers enjoy a sense of autonomy, they also suffer from it, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(torture began in the cars which took them to the training camp), and they would watch others torture prisoners, 
being occasionally asked to take part in the beatings (a process named “desensitization”). Simultaneously, older 
servicemen flogged and degraded the freshmen in a practice known as “role modeling”. Soldiers were subjected to 
intimidation and punishment (“negative reinforcement”), but also to material and social gain, meant as “positive 
reinforcement”. Indoctrination appears to have the purpose of serving to eliminate or to diminish the degree of 
engagement between subjects, so that the enjoyment of the master is highlighted, while his understanding of the 
dependence upon the tortured is diminished. Paradoxically, this attempt to eliminate the degree of engagement 
between subjects is accompanied by the necessity of a negotiation between parties. Torture, itself, is a relation 
between two persons, a factor that has always implications for the interpretative activity and which ultimately 
causes this type of secondary effects. A somewhat philosophical presumption appears to lie behind this 
indoctrination process, namely, if the torturer learns to understand (through his pains and those of his colleagues) 
the moment in which the he can no longer endure suffering, he will be able to pinpoint that instant in others. The 
identification of a truthful confession would require the comprehension of the moment of fusion, that in which the 
suspect could no longer endure pain and would thus tell the truth. Pointing to that moment, in some cases that in 
which the subject signs a confession, and having something to show for it, would represent the torturer’s 
interpretative success, which would mean that the procedures would have worked. Cf. Mika Haritos-Fatouros,  The 
Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture. NY: Routledge University Press, 2003.    
346 Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, Philip G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers – Police Torturers and 
Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, p. 221. 
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they have to deal with the difficulty of being alone in interpretation and with a relation of 
dependence towards the tortured subjects. Therefore, this sense of supremacy has the 
negative side of bringing with it feelings of loneliness and the wish to be liked. It is not a 
coincidence that the degree of burnout is diminished in cases where torturers have a 
consistent network of family and friends. But the fact that their job is more often than not 
secretive makes them unable to share the burden of their daily tasks.  
A famous section in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit helps to understand such 
feeling of intoxication, i.e. the effects of a struggle between conscious selves on the examiner. 
The section “Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness” characterizes the struggle 
for self-recognition between conscious selves, which were equal prior to the test. Desire for 
self-assertion, which motivates both consciousness to fight each other, is the “union of the ‘I’ 
with itself”347, both I’s seeing their reflection on each other, and thus depending on each 
other for their own recognition. Out of this “trial by death” two entities emerge: “The one is 
independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence 
is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter, the 
Bondsman”348. In this attempt for independence, both conscious selves gain their identity: 
the master seemingly independent, and existing for himself, while the slave appears to exist 
for the master and thus depends on him. Death is not the result of this trial by death, due to 
the fact that the master needs the slave to acknowledge him as winner and as an independent 
consciousness, while the slave prefers subjugation to death. As Hegel maintains, “a form of 
recognition has arisen that is one sided and unequal”349. This is a (first) difference between 
the master/slave dialect and torture procedures, as torture automatically distinguishes those 
conducting the evaluation from those who will be judged. The asymmetry between subjects 
does not result from the trial by death, as both individuals were equal as free subjects. 
Moreover, unlike the master\slave trial by death, the torturer knows before the test takes 
                                                           
347 Leo Raush, David Sherman, Hegel's Phenomenology of Self-consciousness: Text and Commentary. Albany: 
Suny Press, 1999, p.89.  
348 George W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. J. B. Baillie. N. p.:Digireads Publishing, 2009, p. 89.  
349 Op. cit., p. 89.  
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place that he will have to avoid the death of the tortured subject. His identity as a conscious 
self, therefore, is not acquired after the procedure, it has been initiated during the 
indoctrination process, and will be developed and transformed each time the test takes place. 
From this perspective, the torturer equals Sisyphus, as each time he overcomes a new self 
during the struggle, another appears, and he sees himself in the position of having to repeat 
the procedure all over again. In this particularity, he finds both enjoyment and pain.  
Observe how, after the struggle takes place, Hegel’s slave is portrayed as “a 
consciousness whose nature is to be connected to thinghood, to independent objects, the 
things it will be working on”350; whereas the master, having the slave as intermediary 
between things and himself, is able to fully enjoy them: 
 
To the master, on the other hand, by means of this mediating process, belongs the immediate 
relation, in the sense of the pure negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment. What 
mere desire did not attain, he now succeeds in attaining, viz. to have done with the thing, and 
find satisfaction in enjoyment. Desire alone did not get the length of this, because of the 
independence of the thing. The master, however, who has interposed the bondsman between it 
and himself, thereby relates himself merely to the dependence of the thing, and enjoys it without 
qualification and without reserve351.  
 
This enjoyment of the master differs from that of the torturer, in the sense that the 
master is able to relish his relation with things and their negation after the struggle has been 
conducted and he has won it. On the contrary, the torturer’s intoxication is a result of the 
activity of torturing, his pleasure derives from this struggle between consciousness, as he 
finds enjoyment in the activity of dominating the other. Another possibility is to consider 
that, as both subjects are unequal prior to the test, through the perpetration of pain the 
torturer is exercising his power as master, finding enjoyment in his own independence as 
opposed to the dependence of the tortured.  
At the same time, Hegel’s idea that the two entities are struggling for their self-
assertion could be considered an interesting portrait of torture, and one in which it is not the 
truthfulness of the confession that matters, but the struggle itself between individuals. In the 
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Brazilian case, in which torture played the role of identifying and annihilating the opposition 
to the dictatorship, this struggle between both consciousnesses represents opposite sides of 
the political spectrum. At the same time, the master’s enjoyment is the result of the fact that 
he was able to interpose the slave between things and himself, thus deriving pleasure from 
things without the negative consequences. The master\slave relation through the mediation 
of objects, such as the chains used for the enslavement, finds its equivalent in the objects 
used to torture the victim, which not only interpose a distance between the torturer and the 
tortured, but also avoid the master’s personal aches (without objects, the torturer would have 
to rely on modes of inflicting pain such as beating, which also hurt him352). In this enjoyment 
the master will also find pain: 
 
In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth 
of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; for, 
just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come 
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent but rather a 
dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of self-existence as his 
truth; he finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness, and the fortuitous 
unessential action of that consciousness353.  
 
When the slave is able to overcome fear (described as inward and mute) he will be able 
to understand his own essential nature, as well as to know spiritual freedom, as “the truth of 
the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsmen”354. While 
the master’s consciousness exists always in his mediation with things, the slave is able to 
relate with the things themselves without intermediaries. In the slave, “through work and 
                                                           
352 Steve McQueen’s movie Hunger illustrates how torturers also suffer the physical effects of their job’s violence. 
McQueen’s movie depicts the story of Bobby Sands, an IRA volunteer who was arrested by the British authorities 
and led the Irish prisoners hunger strike in 1981. The film begins by portraying one of the prison officers, Lohan, 
and the way his hands’ knuckles are injured. Lohan appears frequently throughout the movie and his hands are 
shown at different occasions, always bloody and injured, an evidence of the prison’s violence towards IRA 
prisoners, but also to those who apply the punishments and which find themselves with a body unable to heal. 
Interestingly, Lohan is surrounded by silence throughout the movie (he never speaks): his pain being the invisible 
side of this procedure. In McQueen’s movie the torturer’s open wounds contrast the previous examples of clear 
torture. The prison guard is presented as a person doing a particular difficult job, which requires him, for 
example, to check out his car for hidden bombs each morning, but also as someone responsible for the violence 
taking place. Yet, violence also occurs in his own body, leaving scars difficult to heal. Cf. Hunger, dir. Steve 
McQueen. Icon Entertainment, 2008. DVD  
353 Hegel, Op. Cit., p. 90. 
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labour (…) this consciousness of the bondsmen comes to itself”355. The master’s 
consciousness, thus, realizes at some point that it exists only in relation to the bondsman, 
which is the reason why it will never be fully self-sufficient. He understands that the power of 
controlling this state of existence is something negative, as it implies domineering the other 
and keeping him as his subordinate. It is this recognition that his existence is linked with the 
tortured self that leads the torturer to feel the aforementioned secondary effects.  
Whereas the master has to keep a slave imprisoned, the torturer, as Sisyphus, lives a 
constant struggle with a multiplicity of other selves (the various tortured subjects), whom he 
has to battle in order to maintain his status and remain an independent consciousness. 
Collateral effects derive not only from the necessity of having to perpetually dominate 
another consciousness, but from the realization of the dependence between beings. This 
enslavement is highlighted when the torturer realizes that his body is replicating the subject’s 
pains, something that may happen both during the procedure and after it. This type of 
collateral effects that derive from torture may have serious implications to the torturer’s 
health. In Rithy Pahn’s extraordinary documentary S21: The Kmer Rouge Killing Machine, 
torturers are interviewed by one of the camp’s survivors, reenacting their experiences as 
guards, torturers and members of the killing squads. Houy, one of the guards, testifies that he 
currently feels shame and on two different occasions mentions physical signs. In the 
beginning of the documentary he claims the following: “I wanted to return to the army. I’d 
rather have died. Death was certain there. Better to die at the front. But they wouldn’t let me 
go (…). Stop it I have a headache. I’m sick all day long. I can’t eat a thing”356. Later, he 
affirms: “I was young at the time. I didn’t think so far ahead. I was hot-blooded. I did what I 
was told. I was told to compete, so I did, to take someone to be killed, I did. As long as was 
obeying Angkar. Today when I think about it, it was against the law. I’m ashamed of myself. 
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But I don’t think about it. When I think about that, I get a headache. So when someone comes 
to get me to go out to eat and drink, I get drunk, come home, go to sleep”357.  
Although it is unclear, in this case and in so many others, whether the shame felt by 
the torturer would be the same if the political regime had not changed, the main point 
appears to be the fact that these symptoms are neither desired nor controllable. Bruno’s 
intoxication is here substituted by the term “hot-blooded,” a synonym expression 
characteristic of the master’s enjoyment, accompanied by the previously mentioned pain. In 
fact, as Edward Peters claims: “So often have the effects of torture on the victims been the 
focus of discussion that its effects on the torturers have been neglected”358. Job burnout, the 
emotional response to chronic stress at work, may be analyzed according to the following 
characteristics: emotional exhaustion; depersonalization, considered a “negative, cynical, or 
excessively detached response to other people and the job,” a “sense of ineffectiveness and 
failure”. Although Houy’s interpretative activity is no longer maintained, collateral effects 
still appear and the only recognized way to make them momentarily disappear is through 
alcohol, which numbs the conscience, or depersonalization (as if the master was wishing to 
annihilate itself). It could now be understood how the torturer’s consciousness, unable to 
sustain the pain resulting from torture, anesthetizes itself so as to avoid the confrontation 
with the other consciousness (during torture) and the regrets imposed by it (after torture has 
taken place). This process that affects the torturer’s body and makes him suffer the negative 
and degrading consequences of being a touchstone for others is a relevant argument against 
official applications of torture by the State and a powerful objection to those who argue in 
favor of the legal uses of torture.  
The fact that the victims were submitted to pain and that this type of suffering was 
mandatory during the procedure is represented in the torturer’s acquisition of elements of 
the test itself. In this case, he does not absorb characteristics of the subject in evaluation, but 
gains pain, which could be portrayed as the main feature of the test itself. From this 
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perspective, torturers share, with the Doctor in Macbeth, the negative effects of their 
interpretative activity. They are, as Freud would say regarding Lady Macbeth, wrecked by 
success. The moment in which they fulfill the desire of annihilating the subject brings them 
both a short-term pleasure and an enduring pain, with which it is difficult to cope.  
To conclude, it should be noted that in the aforementioned cases, the identification of 
what Eliot names the moment of fusion, which I would consider to be another important 
particularity for interpretative success, is always a justification, a posteriori, of something 
that happened before. From this perspective, although interpreters believe this discovery is of 
importance, the moment itself may never be fully understood, given that they end up 
determining the reasons that justify their particular interpretations of affairs. This does not 
mean, though, that these descriptions are necessarily erroneous. On the contrary. There 
seems to take place, in all of these modes of proof, a moment of intuition or insight that plays 
an important role in the determination of the proof’s outcome and which, ultimately, helps to 
explain why some examiners are so much better than others. This insight, or conviction, is 
accompanied by education, which may appear in the form of experience, as happens with 
Madame Merle, or with specific training. Such preparation may teach interpreters to apply 
certain techniques, as happens with the polygraph or with torture, or may have the purpose 
of making them acquainted with methods used for the interpretation of literary texts. 
Techniques are thus used with the purpose of describing, translating or justifying each 
interpreter’s insight. Consequently, there is a relationship between each interpreter’s 
conviction, his education, the technology at his disposal, and experience.  
This idea that a moment of fusion has been identified and the belief in the procedure 
as a way of obtaining the truth is, however, accompanied by the thought that interpretative 
success is always to be accomplished. Skilled interpreters may not see themselves as an 
exception to the rule, and assume that everyone following these technical procedures will be 
able to reach a similar outcome. Failure to distinguish skilled interpreters from those who 
follow a method but lack conviction sets the difference between accurate interpretations and 
determinations of affairs. These methods do indeed promote results, in the sense that 
  Being a Touchstone 
 
 254 
 
polygraph evaluations, torture procedures and the medieval ordeal require a sentence, 
whereas literary critics see themselves in the position of having to justify their beliefs about a 
certain book. Interpretation, for one explanation has been chosen among many, has been 
tamed, and the possibility of having indefinite multiple hypothesis is denied. In this 
validation of results, interpreters are thus able to put an end to intricate problems, therefore 
concluding their quest for certainty. Their personal cost for doing so, not to mention ethical 
problems deriving from the use of some of these methods, as seen, varies.
  
 
Final Remarks  
 
Why do we put things together as we do? Why do we put ourselves together with just these 
things to make a world? What choices have we said farewell to? To put things differently, so 
that they quicken the heart, would demand their recollecting.  
 Stanley Cavell, Philosophy The Day After Tomorrow 
 
 In previous pages, the dichotomy between interior and exterior, inside versus outside, 
was often portrayed, and each interpreter’s technique for understanding other entities has 
been depicted as a form of exteriorizing what these bodies appear to conceal. Such capacity, 
which for the purpose of this discussion may be designated as “mousetrapping,” names 
Hamlet’s ability to devise the pantomime, allowing him to sound Claudius’s conscience, 
Glessner Lee’s police investigators’ method to observe and to point to what others failed to 
perceive, Cavell’s philosophical questioning regarding the sources of his conviction, the use of 
the polygraph, the application of torture, among others. According to this perspective, to 
exteriorize is to bring something to light, a portrait Freud would find accurate. This 
exteriorization, however, has a public nature; Gilbert Ryle would deny the existence of such 
hidden interiority, maintaining that these interpreters are, in fact, studying visible bodily 
signs and determining a causal relation between those signs and a certain interpretation of 
affairs. Ryle would claim that these interpreters’ main talent lies in their capacity to observe 
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others’ public behavior, saying, and rightly so, that Hamlet’s exercise consisted on the 
evaluation of Claudius’s enraged face, that Lee’s investigators scrutinize visible clues, and so 
on.  
 At this point, “mousetrapping” appears to designate two contradictory perspectives, 
which this text will attempt to reconcile, in its discussion of Freud’s “Contribution to a 
Questionnaire on Reading,” and Ryle’s last letter to Daniel Dennett, whose PhD thesis he had 
supervised years before.  
 When asked to name ten good books, Freud states the following:  
 
You ask me to name ‘ten good books’ for you, and refrain from adding to this any words of 
explanation. Thus you leave to me not only the choice of the books but also the interpretation of 
your request. Accustomed to paying attention to small signs, I must then trust the wording in 
which you couch your enigmatical demand359.  
 
 To the author, as the request is not accompanied by a detailed explanation, then its 
wording must be put on the couch so that the enigma may be solved (reading these words, 
one imagines Freud’s interlocutor sharing T. S. Eliot’s concern over the need to tame 
interpretation). Underneath this description lies the idea that requests, words, and body 
expressions are riddles waiting to be deciphered and that a causal explanation may be found 
for every symptom of one’s concealed desires or fears. Small signs, those Freud regularly 
interprets in his patients, are the expression for what we are unable to acknowledge about 
ourselves, the body being sometimes a subject of its own mind. Trusting the wording of the 
request is considered a similar procedure to that of the interpretation of the body of a patient, 
a particularity that brings Dora’s case to mind, as described in “Fragment of An Analysis of a 
Case of Hysteria”. It is impossible to thoroughly explain Freud’s famous characterization of 
the failure to treat Ida Bauer, the eighteen-year-old girl who ended her treatment eleven 
weeks after it had started. But one does not resist, due to its close relation with some of the 
aforementioned procedures, quoting his description of the analysis of the body’s behavior, 
                                                           
359  Sigmund Freud, “Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading” (1907), in Jensen’s Gradiva and Other Works, 
transl. James Strachey, vol. IX, Standard edition. London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-
Analysis, 1973, p. 245-246.  
                
                            Final Remarks    
 257 
 
especially as it illustrates Freud’s causal understanding of symptomatic acts:  
 
When I set myself the task of bringing to light what human beings keep hidden within them, 
not by the compelling power of hypnosis, but by observing what they say and what they show, 
I thought the task was a harder one than it really is. He that has eyes to see and ears to hear 
may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with 
his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore. And thus the task of making conscious 
the most hidden recesses of the mind is one which it is quite possible to accomplish360.  
 
 The author is exemplifying what has been portrayed as the somewhat difficult task of 
exteriorizing something out of someone’s body. Freud is attempting to deal with the technical 
difficulties originated by patients’ inaccurate descriptions of themselves and the problems 
tormenting them (thus, a fragment of analysis). Their conscious and unconscious 
repressions, the loss of memory or its falsification, makes the task of the physician rather 
difficult, which is why procedures to make thoughts emerge must be found (an ambition 
shared by the practices problematized in the thesis). In this case, observation is deemed the 
faculty that allows the understanding of each person’s hidden secrets. To Freud, unlike some 
of the situations portrayed, such as Claudius’s, these are cases in which the patient is not 
necessarily lying or concealing something, as body signs may unveil what the subject does not 
know or want to acknowledge about himself. This is the reason why the signs of nervousness 
that betray the silent patient may be analyzed:  
 
I give the name of symptomatic acts to those acts which people perform, as we say, 
automatically, unconsciously, without attending to them, or as if in a moment of distraction. 
They are actions to which people would like to deny any significance, and which, if questioned 
about them, they would explain as being indifferent and accidental. Closer observation, 
however, will show that these actions, about which consciousness knows nothing or wishes to 
know nothing, in fact give expression to unconscious thoughts and impulses, and are therefore 
most valuable and instructive as being manifestations of the unconscious which have been able 
to come to the surface361.  
 
Things we do without knowing it, automatically, unconsciously or when distracted, 
those we tend to explain as being accidental or indifferent, are the expression of the 
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unconscious, of its thoughts and impulses. As in the procedures discussed, the fact that the 
subject does not recognize them makes them valuable clues to understand one’s behavior. To 
Freud, however, unintentional bodily signs and unintentional verbal enunciates (such as the 
slips of the tongue discussed in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life) have the same 
importance. Let me parenthetically mention that, from this perspective, one could consider 
the confession of the Greek slave under torture to be a slip of the tongue, which would be the 
reason why it was deemed more valuable than other testimonies. At the same time, Paul 
Ekman’s theory about micro expressions, discussed in the first chapter, could at first sight be 
considered the modern account for these things we do without noticing, but to which a 
reason may be found. Despite eventual similarities between authors, two main differences 
should be mentioned: on the one hand, Ekman’s method presupposes that with proper 
training one may look at another person’s face and expeditiously determine a given 
expression. To Freud, however, the understanding of the behavior of the body takes place in 
therapy and must be interpreted in time:  
 
For on that day she wore at her waist – a thing she never did on any other occasion before or 
after – a small reticule of a shape which had just come into fashion; and, as she lay on the sofa 
and talked, she kept playing with it – opening it, putting a finger into it, shutting it again, and so 
on. I looked on for some time, and then explained to her the nature of a ‘symptomatic act’362. 
 
They [symptomatic acts] are sometimes very easy to interpret. Dora’s reticule, which came apart 
at the top in the usual way, was nothing but a representation of the genitals, and her playing 
with it, her opening it and putting her finger in it, was an entirely and unembarrassed yet 
unmistakable pantomimic announcement of what she would like to do with it – namely, 
masturbate363.   
 
 The fact that Dora had never worn a necklace is seen as unusual behavior, to which a 
singular explanation may be found. This understanding that her conduct is unusual is merely 
possible due to the fact that previous sessions had taken place. On the other hand, to Freud, 
more importantly than saying that Dora is playing with her necklace is the attribution of a 
meaning to the action, a sense that the patient generally does not recognize and which may 
be found during therapy. Freud’s interpretation of Dora’s behavior has been exhaustively 
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criticized, even though he considered it “very easy to interpret” (this is a case in which the 
pantomime being represented does not have an unmistakable value). Still, this example helps 
to illustrate how, for Freud and unlike Ekman, the symptomatic action is a symbol for 
something else. This is the reason why, in Freud’s case, although all may be analyzed and 
have a meaning, Rieff highlights how in his method: “it is not the thing itself, but a 
representation of it, that is being interpreted”364. For example, events, jokes and dreams are 
not to be considered in their original forms, but as daily events described by each of us or by 
patients in their sessions:  
 
In this light, the endless stream of talk on which psychoanalytic treatment is carried becomes 
the opposite of a liability, as some have urged; the value of therapy is just its prolonged 
opportunity for the patient to formulate his emotion. Mediated as talk, emotion may be brought 
before the tribunal of interpretation and appeased365.  
 
 In therapy, every bodily sign, every intentional word and slip of the tongue may identify 
one’s visible or hidden intentions, emotions, concerns, etc., but without treatment, their 
meaning may be difficult to understand. Rieff is pointing to a discrepancy between the 
emotions we feel and our ability to formulate them. As said, time and a “stream of talk” are 
necessary for sentiments to appear before the patient and the doctor. If emotions are 
appropriately caught during therapy, then they appear before the tribunal of interpretation 
and may be pacified (a lesson Lady Macbeth would have benefited from). Another important 
distinction between Freud and Ekman (as well as procedures such as torture or the medieval 
ordeal), thus, lies in the fact that for Freud symptomatic acts acquire importance within a 
description, whereas for Ekman someone who flinches does it for an unequivocal reason, 
which the interpreter may immediately determine. It may now be understood how in 
psychoanalysis it is not the bodily sign itself, but its representation during therapy that gains 
significance.  
 A problem with this description lies in the fact that the causality of these symptomatic 
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actions is prized as an expression of someone’s subconscious, which at times ignores the 
possibility that some bodily signs may indeed happen without a reason. The idea that they 
may have a motive, although sometimes a concealed one, is predominant, even when Freud 
considers the possibility that “the existence of such an origin and the meaning attributed to 
the act cannot be exclusively established”366. The thought that the subject himself may not 
know the necessary causes for his troubles makes matters more troublesome to those 
attempting to refute such explanation of the appearance of bodily symptoms (something 
accentuated by the notion that a patient who does not accept his therapist’ explanation may 
be resisting to treatment). This type of causal explanations may be extraordinarily persuasive 
and very difficult to object to, due to the fact that the analysis of every visible sign is 
understood as a representation of something that is well hidden in the recesses of the mind. 
 Freud’s technique, his tribunal of interpretation, as Rieff names it, shares with other 
methods the fact that an important part of its procedures consists in the attempt to make 
proof appear. These cases differ from ordinary courts, in the sense that the tribunal is not 
devised to provide a verdict after the defense and the accusation present their cases, since the 
investigation and the sentence are frequently interchangeable. Often, those wishing to 
determine a state of affairs are those gathering the evidence, so repeatedly considered an 
attempt to tame interpretation. But, as seen, the understanding of proof depends on 
observation, the capacity to describe it, and the comprehension of a certain context. Freud’s 
search for a meaning in each of his interlocutors’ words exemplifies his interpretative 
method. Returning, once again, to the letter:  
 
You did not say ‘the ten most magnificent works (of world literature)’, in which case I should 
have been obliged to reply, with so many others: Homer, the tragedies of Sophocles, Goethe’s 
Faust, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth, etc. Nor did you say ‘the ten most significant books’, 
among which scientific achievements like those of Copernicus, of the old physician Johann 
Weier on the belief in witches, Darwin’s Descent of Man, and others, would then have found a 
place. You did not even ask for ‘favourite books’, among which I should not have forgotten 
Milton’s Paradise Lost and Heine’s Lazarus367.  
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Interestingly, the author is interpreting his interlocutor’s request as a literary critic 
would, analyzing several possibilities concerning the meaning of “good books” in order to 
determine a single one. Magnificent works are thus distinguished from the most significant, 
which, of course, include scientific achievements, and differ from one’s favorites books. This 
categorization consists in the attempt to thoroughly define a term to then circumscribe its 
use, thus validating a given interpretation. More importantly, the questionnaire exemplifies 
what Philip Rieff characterized as Freud’s capacity to make interpretation independent from 
a therapeutic use. Everything is put to its disposition – dreams, memories, day-to-day events, 
relationships, etc. –, as “the psychologically trained man (in or out of the therapeutic 
regimen) lives alert to the interpretative opportunity”368. Thus, Freud’s reply to the 
questionnaire does not merely exemplify the task of a psychologist occupied with the 
attribution of intentions to signs, words or expressions, but, as said, a form of interpretation 
that has spread, and according to which all may be subject to analysis. For those accepting 
this description, we are constantly putting everything and everybody on the couch, searching 
for concealed causes in their visible actions (psychologists would be the specialists in the 
subject). This idea that all is subject to interpretation makes, as seen in previous pages, some 
interpreters look for entities or methods of analysis that allow them to reach accurate 
conclusions about something and to find entities which they consider to be touchstones to 
the comprehension of others.   
 Although Freud is not engaging in self-analysis, he does appear to be over-interpreting 
what could be considered a simple request, as well as his own reply to it:  
 
I think, therefore, that a particular stress falls on the ‘good’ in your phrase, and that with this 
predicate you intend to designate books to which one stands in rather the same relationship as 
to ‘good’ friends, to whom one owes a part of one’s knowledge of life and view of the world – 
books which one has enjoyed oneself and gladly commends to others, but in connection with 
which the element of timid reverence, the feeling of one’s smallness in the face of their 
greatness, is not particularly prominent369.  
 
In his decision to consider that the word “good” must be highlighted, Freud finds the 
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explanation for the riddling request. Notice how the procedure presents similarities with 
other methods portrayed in the thesis, in which quoting a passage was a form of giving it 
importance in a description. Choosing a term to define the request is a way of justifying 
Freud’s uncanny choices. It would be interesting to question whether “good” has the value of 
the symptomatic actions previously portrayed, a word being unintentionally used and thus 
more valuable to the understanding of the request. Good books are thus depicted as being 
similar to a kind of friend, even though, when one ponders about it, this definition of a friend 
could appear peculiar and somewhat egotistical (those in which “the element of timid 
reverence, the feeling of one’s smallness in the face of their greatness, is not particularly 
prominent”).  
 Once the meaning of “good books” is determined, Freud claims to proceed to their 
enunciation: “I will therefore name such ‘good’ books for you which have come to my mind 
without a great deal of reflection”370. Two different explanations could justify this decision. 
On the one hand, listing the books without overthinking could better express his inner 
appreciation for them (as if it were a type of automatic writing). Therefore, choosing some 
books over others reveals things about Freud that he could wish to conceal, allowing his 
(hidden) mind to be made clear and interpreted by others. But such choice is equally 
representative of what he aims to show, which is ultimately the reason why he decides to 
enumerate some books and not others. At the same time, the assumption that his 
interlocutor is using the adjective “good” without a specific intention, that good could merely 
characterize relevant works, those one particularly likes or considers fundamental, is not 
contemplated. For Freud, although one may not have pondered about the term, it may 
nevertheless be representative (a presumption a polygraph examiner would find accurate, 
when concerning the register of emotions appearing in the charts).  
 Ten works are listed: Multatuli, Letters and Works; Kipling, Jungle Book; Anatole 
France, Sur la pierre blanche; Zola, Fécondité; Merezhkovski, Leonardo da Vinci; G. Keller, 
Leute von Seldwyla; C. F. Meyer, Huttens letzte Tage; Macaulay, Essays; Gomperz, 
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Griechische Denker; Mark Twain, Sketches. The first thing that comes to mind is the atypical 
nature of the list. After having been undecided between Homer, Shakespeare and the Greek 
tragedies, Freud appears to have chosen an eerie group of authors. Even in the case of Mark 
Twain, Freud opts for the Sketches instead of other most relevant books. Those knowing that 
the author used some of these works to write well-known essays, such as that on Leonardo da 
Vinci, could perhaps presume that good books for Freud are those useful as food for thought. 
The letter reaches its end with the conclusion that:  
 
You have touched on something, with your request to name for you ‘ten good books’, on which 
an immeasurable amount could be said. And so I will conclude, in order not to become even 
more informative371.  
 
 Freud recognizes that his interlocutor made him ponder about each choice, that he led 
him to discover things about his relation with the abovementioned books, and that this 
Questionnaire tells us things about him. Touching something, in this case, is not exactly 
portrayed as the result of a skilled activity (Freud’s description represents the request as a 
hunch, which, when properly interpreted, allows his interlocutor to obtain some knowledge 
about him). In the aforementioned methods or interpreters, however, to touch is often used 
to reveal the skilled activities of observing something, accurately pointing to it, and being 
able to insightfully describe it. In this case, “to touch”, or “to mousetrap”, would thus name 
the skilled interpretative activity conducted by Freud’s interlocutor, who, drawing on an 
insightful request, and equipped with the proper methods for comprehension, would retrieve 
the concealed meaning out of Freud’s list.  
 The discussion of different examinations in previous chapters could point to this use of 
the term, in which case the objection that these methods are indeed observing and 
commenting observable bodily proof is plausible. For example, if, for Freud, the 
interpretation of the list could help us discover concealed things about one’s self, Gilbert Ryle 
would say that the items do not allow us access into some internal part of our beings. The 
choices we make represent things we like for specific reasons, which is why pondering about 
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them requires understanding and the act of describing the motives which lead us to them 
(that immeasurable amount of talk). “Internal” and “inner” are terms the author particularly 
dislikes, as may be perceived in his writings:  
 
When Mozart was audibly and tentatively humming a new note-sequence, did his ‘mental’ 
intentions, tastes, ingenuities, patience, ennuis, dodges, inventiveness, tactical and strategic 
savvy, etc. etc. not get exercised merely because (careless chap!) he was humming aloud and 
not as-if-humming in his head? Or can ‘mental’ cover things that are overt? And then does 
‘Mentalese’ cover your and my chattings in English, calculating on the backs of envelopes, 
frowning, scratching our heads, toying with clay? (Incidentally, the idea of Fodor that we each 
do, or might, have our private “Mentaleses” (which Locke mildly rejects) is what L.W.’s 
‘private languages’ offensive was an offensive on, though L.W. surely did not know his Locke. 
Knowing Russell would have been enough. Or his Fodor. But we are now in 1976!372 
 
Ryle’s letter, the perfect counterpoint to Freud’s Questionnaire, comments a review 
on Fodor that Dennett had sent to Mind. Ryle claims to have liked it, even though, for 
reasons he has now forgotten, he is anti-Fodor. Ryle is rejecting, as described in his book The 
Concept of Mind, the assumption that we are vessels with hidden contents. For the author, 
bodies do not hold a hidden interiority, they do not contain one’s secrets and do not lead a 
separate life from that of the mind. In fact, mind and body are indistinguishable, i. e. there is 
no ghost inside the machine. This is the reason why there is no “inner life” and nothing going 
on in one’s head (thus, his refusal of cognitive psychology). Paraphrasing Ryle’s 
characterization of “mentalese”: if “internal” is being used to name non-external things and 
events merely because they are “imagined-as-heard-seen-uttered”, then Dennett, even 
though denying Descartes, is reproducing his notion of mental (i. e., what takes place in 
someone’s mind, such as mental images, soliloquies or humming a tune). Beliefs, desires, 
attitudes and intentions are not mental states, but a form of speaking about others. In his 
denial that “mental” covers things that are overt, Ryle strikes a cord, as chatting in English, 
calculating and, to what concerns us here, frowning, may not be described in Mentalese. The 
argument, made clear in Ryle’s writings, concerns the denial that frowning is something that 
takes place inside one’s head:  
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I hear and understand your conversational avowals, your interjections and your tones of voice; 
I see and understand your gestures and facial expressions. I say ‘understand’ in no 
metaphorical sense, for even interjections, tones of voice, gestures and grimaces are modes of 
communication. We learn to produce them, not indeed from schooling, but from imitation. We 
know how to sham them by putting them on and we know, in some degree, how to avoid giving 
ourselves away by assuming masks373.  
 
In the section on “Emotions”, Ryle names and distinguishes feelings, moods, motives, 
inclinations, agitations, and so on. According to the author, we do understand things about 
others when we analyze their tones of voice and gestures, but we are able to make sense of 
what we see due to the fact that we have observed the way other persons behave. Physical 
signs do not represent interior feelings or streams of consciousness, but rather reproduce a 
learning process, according to which we mimic the reactions of other persons (we learn about 
anger, sadness, etc., by observing those emotions). Therefore, as seen in the second chapter, 
if a police investigator wonders whether someone is guilty, he should observe the suspect’s 
(public) behavior, to conduct a proper investigation, interrogate friends and family, search 
for political convictions, etc. In what we say and do lies the explanation to our actions. Ryle 
is, of course, right when he argues that most of the things sometimes described as being 
hidden are, indeed, visible. To observe, to ostensively show something, to describe and to 
justify our thoughts are public forms of examination. Ryle denies, however, the possibility 
that we may conduct an inquiry regarding other persons’ inclinations (something which 
represents the problem our examiners attempt to solve):  
 
I discover my or your motives in much, though not quite the same way as I discover your 
abilities. The big practical difference is that I cannot put the subject through his paces in my 
inquiries into his inclinations as I can in my inquiries into his competences. To discover how 
conceited or patriotic you are, I must still observe your conduct, remarks, demeanour, and 
tones of voice, but I cannot subject you to examination-tests or experiments which you 
recognize as such. You would have a special motive for responding to such experiments in a 
particular way. (…) The tests on whether a person is conceited are the actions he takes and the 
reactions he manifests in such circumstances374.  
 
 This passage puts the understanding of motives and abilities side by side, as both may 
be understood through the observation of someone’s behavior. In order to comprehend 
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another person’s inclinations I must pay attention to their words, actions and tones of voice; 
whereas to appreciate competences I may conduct a similar type of observation but, in 
addition to it, I am able to test skills. This capacity to devise a series of examinations in order 
to assess competences is something we do on a daily basis: understanding if someone has 
learned to read, write, calculate or cook, involves testing them and observing the results. 
Particular descriptions of the polygraph, however, contradict the thought that we may test 
others’ abilities, but not their inclinations. Take, for example, a polygraph examiner wishing 
to realize whether a double spy is patriotic. Although the test’s results are not without 
interpretation (they require the capacity to ask questions, to observe and to analyze the 
charts, as well as a certain amount of intuition) the examination may help to uncover things 
that the subject wishes to conceal. These may or may not be related with the examination, but 
are definitely inclinations. CIA polygraph examiners have argued that, in compulsory 
examinations to the Agency’s employees, they have obtained more information about a 
subject’s sexual inclinations and the use of forbidden substances than they have caught 
double spies. In such cases, the outcome of the test would not be the intended result, but it 
would be a way to test an inclination. Diplomats, spies, actors and, Ryle would say, 
hypocrites, are artful at deceiving others because they are trained to control and to feign 
emotions. But does the fact that they are able to mimic these sentiments, contrary to what 
Ryle maintains, point to a correlation between our feelings and their visible expressions?  
  
But though agitations, like other moods, are liability conditions, they are not propensities to 
act intentionally in certain ways. A woman wrings her hands in anguish, but we do not say that 
anguish is the motive from which she wrings her hands. Nor do we inquire with what object an 
embarrassed man blushes, stammers, squirms or fidgets. A keen walker walks because he 
wants to walk, but a perplexed man does not wrinkle his browns because he wants or means to 
wrinkle them, though the actor or hypocrite may wrinkle his brows because he wants to appear 
perplexed375.  
  
 The author sustains that it is difficult to attribute causes to agitations, namely to 
assert that a certain agitation had an interior cause, such as an itch or a qualm, etc. The fact 
that these are not intentional actions (only actors and hypocrites wrinkle their brows to 
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appear perplexed) leads Ryle to consider that a causal relation may not be determined 
between anguish and the way a woman wrings her hands. The same happens with moods and 
feelings, in the sense that none may be described as motives and thus no causal explanation 
may be suited to portray them:  
 
Feelings, in other words, are not among the sorts of things of which it makes sense to ask from 
what motives they issue. The same is true, for the same reasons, of the other signs of 
agitations. Neither my twinges nor my winces, neither my squirming feelings nor my bodily 
squirmings, neither my feelings of relief nor my signs of relief, are things which I do for a 
reason; nor in consequence, are they things which I can be said to do cleverly or stupidly, 
successfully or unsuccessfully, carefully or carelessly – or indeed to at all. They are neither well 
managed or ill managed; they are not managed at all, though the actor’s winces and the 
hypocrite’s sighs are well or ill managed376.  
 
 Ryle’s thesis (which would be indeed a good objection to those who argue in favor of 
the use of torture and the polygraph) sustains that, if feelings are not intentional, then it does 
not make sense to describe them using the language of motives. If one is unable to manage 
bodily sensations and physical signs (instead of those deliberately faking them) then it makes 
no sense to claim that they appeared for a reason, that they were skillfully managed. The 
same can be said for other expressions that we apply to characterize activities in which 
attention is required. In this context we might hark back to Hamlet’s mousetrap. Hamlet’s 
way of testing Claudius is based on the assumption that the fact that these bodily signs are 
not intentional is precisely what makes them accurate. As seen in this case, a twinge, a wince, 
or a bodily movement reveals hidden intentions, feelings one does not wish others to discover 
or uncovers things one does not know. What Claudius can’t manage in himself, Hamlet would 
say, is more truthful than what he controls. Although Hamlet would probably contradict the 
thought that body signs are always causal and unequivocal, the idea that none of them may 
be explained does not appear to be sensible. Reasons may indeed be credited to emotions (we 
do tend to find a posteriori explanations for feelings or emotions we did not at first know 
how to formulate). The fact that something is not intentional does not necessarily mean that 
a cause may not be determined in order to later explain it.  
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 Ryle himself provides the explanation we have been looking for, when he claims that 
when we look for the criteria we use to class bodily sensations such as a dull load in the 
stomach, if the pain is related to loss of appetite and nausea, then perhaps it is due to 
indigestion. So, Ryle is claiming that some bodily pains have a reason, an argument I would 
apply to the rest of the sensations, moods and agitations he was previously describing. As the 
author maintains: “The answer is that we learn both to locate sensations and to give their 
crude physiological diagnoses from the rule of thumb experimental process, reinforced, 
normally, by lessons taught by others”377. This perspective is in agreement with what has 
been portrayed in the thesis, in the sense that, as the author claims, bodily feelings are not 
self-explainable, we must test them, and find an accurate way to describe them. But the idea 
that we may discover causal explanations for them helps to consubstantiate the thought that 
they may indeed be justified.  
 Returning to Ryle’s refusal of the idea that we may test inclinations, the author 
maintains that sometimes an “experimentum crucis” may be needed in order to identify a 
hypocrite or a charlatan:  
 
All that we need, though we often cannot get it, is an experimentum crucis, just as the doctor 
often needs but cannot get an experimentum crucis to decide between two diagnoses. To 
establish hypocrisy and charlatanry is an inductive task which differs from the ordinary 
inductive tasks of assessing motives and capacities only by being a second order induction378.  
  
 I would argue, although Ryle would most likely disagree with the thought, that these 
procedures are a form of conducting the experiment he is describing. We do learn to identify 
charlatans and hypocrites with experience, through observation and in time, and the task of 
assessing their motives reproduces the strategies we use with other persons. Still, skilled 
judges, experts in this type of determination, are more efficient than most of us. Part of their 
talent consists in the capacity to devise small tests that will lead them to correct assumptions, 
in their capacity to learn with experience, to be suspicious and to improve in time. In fact, 
Ryle’s argument about examiners is in accordance with this perspective: “It is a truism to say 
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that the appreciations of character and the explanations of conduct given by critical, 
unprejudiced and humane observers, who have had a lot of experience and take a lot of 
interest, tend to be both swift and reliable; those of inferior judges tend to be slower and less 
reliable”379. Good observers are here portrayed as those who are critical but unprejudiced, 
who possess experience and take an interest (a feature which had not been described and yet 
is of extreme importance). In his distinction of unstudied versus guarded talk, Ryle 
characterizes the problem interpreters in this thesis are dealing with. 
 
No sleuth-like powers are required for me to find out from the words and tones of voice of your 
unstudied talk, the frame of mind of the talker. When talk is guarded – and often we do not 
know whether it is or not, even in the avowals we make to ourselves – sleuth-like qualities do 
have to be exercised. We now have to infer from what is said and done to what would have 
been said, if wariness had not been exercised, as well as to the motives of wariness. Finding 
out what is on the pages of an open book is a matter of simple reading; finding out what is in 
the pages of a sealed book requires hypothesis and evidence380.  
 
 As the author maintains, we often are unable to determine the type of talk we are 
dealing with, which is why these sleuth-like qualities – and I argue that not everybody is in 
their possession –, are used to differentiate types of persons. Frame of mind, an expression 
Ryle uses often but which is never fully characterized in his book, stands for something the 
author would refuse to be interior. But in this sentence, as in others, frame of mind could be 
substituted for what our other exegetists would claim to be someone’s inner moods or 
intentions. In fact, despite themselves, Freud’s portrait of Dora’s public behavior and Ryle’s 
denial that sleuth-like powers are required for us to understand one another are very similar. 
Both would find, in a speaker’s signs of wariness, the explanation for what is said and done. 
At the same time, Ryle’s example of literature does not appear to be sensible in his argument 
that opening a book and reading its pages is sufficient for those wanting to describe it. It was 
seen, throughout the thesis, how to characterize the contents of a book also requires 
intuition, the formulation of hypotheses, and the gathering of evidence. At the same time, 
when the book is sealed, one may not understand what it is about, although we may indeed 
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formulate hypotheses. Reading books and identifying charlatans is, from this perspective, 
very similar.  
Freud and Ryle thus seat on opposite sides of the table. Skilled interpreters such as 
Hamlet or Madame Merle, however, distinguish themselves in their capacity to understand 
when to attribute a causal intention to a bodily sign or a verbal enunciate. Comprehending 
and analyzing physical signs and words is placed at the same level, as both express things we 
wish to say or to conceal, which may be expressive or have no particular importance. Certain 
body signs do indicate moods and, just like some of the things we say, are important to help 
us understand one another. It is not uncommon for one to be hearing another person’s words 
while observing his face in order to see if he means what he says. But this does not imply, as 
Freud claims, that certain physical expressions may always be understood as symptomatic 
actions pointing to hidden intentions. However, it does not indicate, as Ryle would maintain, 
that no justifications might be found for the things we do without a reason. Sometimes, I 
would say, we do have impulses and feelings that may be described as things that impel us to 
act, and the language of motives may describe not only our unintentional actions, but also 
our involuntary body signs.  
 If the several arguments in this thesis prove anything is that interpretative virtue is a 
mean between two extremes. All physical signs are interpretable, in the sense that they may 
be described and that we may find reasons for them. This does not, though, suggest that all 
body signs are causally motivated. And it does not entail that all physical expressions are 
riddles waiting to be solved, although we may later attribute a single sense to explain the 
appearance of someone’s sweaty hands, and that meaning may prove to be accurate. 
Simultaneously, even though a unique explanation may determine the sense of a visible 
expression, body signs do not have an unequivocal value. The appearance of a certain 
emotion, by itself, tells us nothing about a certain situation. This is the reason, I would claim, 
why polygraph examiners attempt to register multiple records in a chart, which they 
afterwards complement with a detailed description, a result of the comparison of the 
physiological results with other type of data (such as the subject’s movement on the chair). As 
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seen, only someone with lack of knowledge of the procedure would assert that the polygraph, 
as an instrument, is the center of the procedure. These interpreters’ skills consists in learning 
how to differentiate relevant and irrelevant expressions, a somewhat similar activity to that of 
distinguishing what Ryle describes as unstudied and guarded talk. 
 At this point, a parenthesis is perhaps justified, in order to state that although these 
activities are interpretative techniques, their procedures and skills are not interchangeable, in 
the sense that a literary critic does not possess a torturer’s skill, that a polygraph examiner is 
not a torturer, and vice versa. Torture, its repellent nature notwithstanding, is a technical 
endeavor, one which is learnt by trial and error, and in which skill is required. Saying so 
implies that, as in other specialized interpretative activities, some torturers are better than 
others in their chosen dismal chore: more able at obtaining confessions, distinguishing 
authentic testimonies from false ones and at punishing suspects without killing them (an 
important, but often ignored, aspect of torture). Under immense pressure, both before and 
during torture procedures, few are able to keep their thoughts to themselves (even if studies 
show that trained professionals and those with strong religious beliefs are able to resist 
torture for a prolonged period of time). Claiming that torturers may be deemed exegetists 
implies that truthful confessions may appear under torture. The talent to ask questions and 
to detect errors, the proficiency to know when to stop an examination, to determine for how 
long the suspect should rest before submitting him again to the test, is a highly specialized 
tool. Moreover, understanding when a suspect under torture is telling the torturer what he 
longs to hear, and distinguishing such fabricated testimony from a truthful confession also 
entails skill. It was equally seen how, like other interpreters, torturers acquire features of the 
test, be those feelings of pleasure or interpretative pains. Placing these procedures side-by-
side with literary criticism does not equal saying that critics are torturing their texts (even if 
some criticism does appear to torture its authors), submitting them to the polygraph or to the 
ordeal. Each practice is in possession of particular skills, and the way each interpreter devises 
his mousetrap has been distinguished throughout the dissertation. These practices are, 
nonetheless, comparable in the sense that they are expert techniques that depend mainly on 
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the individual talent and knowledge of their interpreters. Although some of these skills may 
be taught (acquiring a vocabulary, following an explanation and, in the case of the polygraph 
and torture, learning the basic workings of the instruments), talent depends largely on the 
development of a group of personal capacities (Isabel Archer’s case comes to mind). Gifted 
interpreters tend to be the exception and not the rule. This is the reason why using these 
modes of proof as a general method for comprehending the truth does not appear sensible. 
When in the hands of remarkable interpreters, they do allow for the resolution of 
interpretative problems, which otherwise could go on forever. But, unfortunately or not, 
talent is the exception and not the rule.  
 Maintaining that these techniques are a form of exteriorizing reactions/emotions does 
not equal saying that all emotions are alike, that they are interior, or that the exterior is 
always revealing someone’s interior. “Interior” assembles hunches, dispositions, moods, as 
well as emotions and stuff we think but do not say. The term thus refers to things one feels 
and thinks, which may or may not be acknowledged at first, but that are not said out loud. 
These emotions or thoughts are invisible in the sense that someone will have to recognize or 
exteriorize them in order to give them meaning. The expression does not imply, therefore, the 
existence of an interiority such as that portrayed, for example, in Marjorie Garber’s 
descriptions of the soliloquies in Shakespeare’s plays. As seen in Richard III what Gloucester 
says to the other characters, to the audience, and his actions are equally visible, and may be 
similarly interpreted. And it does not refer to what Susan Orbach considers to be the 
concealed behavior of her body. I would claim that the moment she feels the sensation of 
wellbeing, the instant she finds a causal explanation for it and describes it to others, she has 
acknowledged something she did not know how to clarify and, thus, exteriorized it. Another 
example would be a hunch, which typifies something that may not be immediately explained, 
although one can later make sense of it in order to define it. Just like a physical sign, a hunch 
may impel us to act, and it is sometimes truthful, in the sense that it may help us reach an 
accurate conclusion about someone or something. A final illustration would be reading a 
book and knowing how to explain its story but, in Eliot’s terms when discussing Wilson 
                
                            Final Remarks    
 273 
 
Knight, failing to recognize its pattern. This would be to understand it’s “interior”, but failing 
to bring to the fore something in it.  
The cases exposed sometimes appear to characterize the unexpected behavior of the 
body over the mind. This is the reason why a bleeding corpse, God’s intentional object, was 
seen as an entity without a conscience but capable of accusing its killer (something, a 
Freudian would say, its mind would approve). At the same time, in Haley’s therapy, the 
dislike of the subject’s body for certain tasks appears to be a significant factor contributing to 
his cure, whereas examiners value unintentional body signs appearing in the polygraph 
charts. It was seen that to describe a certain situation or a person through the concepts of 
mind and body is not sufficient. In cases representing a self with a divided conscience, i.e. 
with a body trying to tell the truth about a crime its owner wishes to conceal, the mind seems 
to be a divided entity (part of it wishing to protect the liar, and part of it feeling remorse and 
desiring to accuse itself). In such situations, two minds and two bodies appear to have 
contradictory impulses, which the person (the third entity in this divine trinity) struggles to 
control. It was equally observed how several different selves evolve through time, cases in 
which the strict division between mind and body would not make sense. “Exterior”, thus, is 
everything we may see and recognize: body signs, the polygraph charts, the confession 
obtained in torture, the visible signs of poison in a murder victim, the chosen quotations in a 
text, Richard III’s soliloquies as well as public actions.  
 “Exteriorization” thus names the group of tests and techniques allowing exegetists to 
obtain a group of interpretable results, without which a verdict, a conclusion or a justification 
would not be possible. It names activities that have the ability to make visible things that 
previously appeared to be obscure. The way Glessner Lee’s police investigators learn the 
technique of observation was, for example, deemed a form of exteriorization of what had 
been unseen. I would thus like to claim that “mousetrapping” is something similar to the 
technique of flexing the heel with a spur so that a horse starts to run. Spurring the horse 
(which in some methods would be equivalent to giving an incentive and in others to pure 
physical coercion) is a way of pressuring the subject so that physical reactions appear and 
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may be registered. Although spurring the horse makes him run, it does not presuppose a 
hidden interiority or the revealing of an inner self. Spurring the horse would be, if one wishes 
to use Ryle’s terms, a form of experimentum crucis, but one that denies Ryle’s idea that we 
may not test inclinations.  
 Observe how, if taken literally, the previous comparison is a faulty one, in the sense that 
all horses, and not merely those who are guilty, run when they are spurred. This would mean, 
when translated to our procedures, that these methods would have the capacity to initiate a 
causal reaction, but that the results of each response would not differ among themselves. And 
it was, of course, seen that this is not the case. “Mousetrapping”, then, must be portrayed as a 
skilled form of pinching to which only some entities answer. Response varies immensely, 
depending on the form of testing and on its objectives. Every so often, interpreters wish to 
prove someone’s culpability, in which case the test aims to identify a deceitful testimony, an 
inauthentic entity, or a charlatan. In other situations, authenticity is at stake. Identifying 
guilt and innocence, authentic versus inauthentic, could be deemed matching procedures, 
and in a certain sense, they are. What distinguishes them is the outcome they aim to obtain, 
whether spurring will make the guilty horse or the innocent one run.  
 Hamlet described it best when, during The Mousetrap, he sought Claudius’ uneasy 
assent: “Let the galled jade wince, \ our withers are \ unwrung.” (III, ii, 37-38). The Arden 
edition explains how “a galled jade is a horse which is rubbed sore, especially on the withers 
through an ill-fitting saddle”381, and directs us to the OED, in which “wince” and “winch” are 
considered different forms of the same word. “Wince” is defined as “2. To start or make an 
involuntary shrinking movement in consequence of or in order to avoid pain, or when 
alarmed and suddenly affected”382. The Arden notes also quote Lyly’s Eupheus: “None will 
winch excepte shee bee gawled, neither any bee offended vnless shee be guiltie”383. Hamlet’s 
characterization illustrates, obviously, his wish to deeply affect Claudius (whose guilt makes 
                                                           
381 Cf. Harold Jenkins in Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden 
Shakespeare, 1990, p.302.  
382 The Oxford English Dictionary, 1933, vol. XII. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. 
383  Cf. Harold Jenkins in Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, 1982. New York: Routledge, The Arden 
Shakespeare, 1990, p.302. 
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him sore). But it also helps us redescribe the example of the horse, and to understand that 
sore horses have reason to move, as they are impelled to avoid pain. Hamlet’s remark 
highlights, as do our examples, the idea that a skilled interpreter must possess both the 
ability to realize if a horse is sore, due to an ill-fitting saddle, and to apply pain in the tickling 
point, thus making him move. Granting “mousetrapping” is being defined as the application 
of a method to which the analysis of results follows, but causing the reaction and interpreting 
its outcome are not, as will be seen, different procedures.  
 Before continuing, notice that if “mousetrapping” may be seen as the equivalent to 
pinching somebody in order to obtain a physical reaction, although a polygraph examiner is 
under the impression that he is searching someone’s inner soul, his capacity lies instead in 
the ability to start a causal reaction (which is a form of obtaining both physical signs and 
verbal enunciates). In this sense, “mousetrapping” is a technical procedure, synonymous to 
putting someone or something to the test, which sometimes implies conceiving a form of 
evaluation, and at other times entails the application of a method or a form of understanding. 
At this point, it could be argued that if the interpreter’s aptitude consists in producing causal 
reactions, then the skill of analyzing these expressions does not appear to be required, in the 
sense that the interpreter does not need to distinguish causal signs from unmotivated ones 
(the test would do all the work). This is not, of course, the case.  
Manipulating the stone, similar to the procedure of someone who wishes to test the 
quality of gold and uses quartz to do it, implies devising a test (or a series of tests), 
conducting it, observing and interpreting its results. The exteriorization described consists, 
thus, in the elaboration of a form of evaluation, which, as seen, varies immensely, and that 
allows interpreters to gather the proof they need in order to obtain an interpretation. 
Nonetheless, conducting the test and interpreting its outcome may not be thought upon as 
distinct activities, in the sense that devising the examination already entails knowing where 
to search, how to point ostensively, and in what way to judge the results obtained. Spurring 
the “galled jade” involves knowing how to ride, how to spur, when to do it, as well as being 
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able to predict how fast and in which direction will the horse run384. As seen, interpretation 
entails this set of activities (that are in fact one and the same), which require proper training 
and having conviction about given entities. This is the reason why “mousetrapping” 
something or someone is considered, more than making an entity visible, giving it 
importance in the context of a description. Although these procedures do seem to be a mode 
of obtaining visible reactions, they must be subject to analysis (i.e. to interpretation), for 
others may disagree with the results and validate them differently. Knowing how to spur the 
horse does not imply knowing one will win the race, even if that may sometimes happen. In 
                                                           
384 Dissent about the use of the whip in horseraces recently led the British Horseracing Authority (BHA) to 
regulate the number of times jockeys may use it. Let me briefly sum up the discussion. In “A Review of the use of 
the whip in Horseracing,” the BHA imposed that: “a maximum of seven strokes in flat races and eight over jumps 
may be applied, whereas the whip may only be used five times after the last obstacle or in the final furlong”384. 
Severe penalties were to be enforced on those failing to comply with this new regulation. Jockeys threatened to 
strike. Christophe Soumillon was initially forced to forfeit his winner's percentage after winning the Qipco 
Champion Stakes at Ascot, for stroking his mount six times in the final furlong; whereas Richard Hughes gave up 
his riding license in protest over the regulations.  
 Under pressure, on October the 21st, the BHA softened whip rules and lifted Soumillon’s penalty. The new 
regulations read as follows: “jockeys can use the whip seven times in flat races and eight times over jumps; the 
additional restriction of a maximum of five strikes in the closing stages is lifted; jockeys exceeding the limit by one 
strike will be suspended, exceeding the limit by more than one strike will mean the jockey forfeits share of prize 
money”384. At first sight, these adjustments appeared to be a response to the jockeys’ main objection regarding the 
limitations of the use of the whip in the final furlong. As jockeys need to push their horses on the final steps of the 
race, it makes no sense to regulate the use of the whip at this stage of the race. Although the BHA new policies 
would solve this problem, the issue is not yet solved, as jump jockeys threaten to keep protesting384.  
 The jockeys’ main argument is of a technical nature. What appear to be sensible rules, such as “showing the 
horse the whip and giving it time to respond before hitting it” are, jockeys claim, of difficult execution during the 
race. In order to win the race, they need to be able to use the whip, and to do so is more often than not an intuitive 
act. Taking the time to ponder the number of times one has used the whip before reaching the final furlong may 
actually lead the runners to lose the competition. Jockeys are arguing that knowing when to strike, how and where 
to do it (e. g. the BAH regulations claim the whip arm must be above shoulder height) should be professional 
decisions, based on experience and on intuition. Resolutions such as these are, naturally, what makes jockeys 
professionals and sometimes winners.  
 The BAH’s attempt to adjust the use of the whip by counting the number of times it is being used, by 
determining how, where and when to do it, is an attempt to reply to the jockey’s technical arguments with a set of 
procedural advices on their own. It is also, of course, the reason why angry jockeys claim they are being fined on 
technicalities. Jockeys probably know best what to do in order to win a race, so claiming their skills will not be 
undermined by this new set of rules will only have the obvious effect of making them angry. The problem here is 
that an ethical discussion on animal’s rights is being debated as if the matter were a technical issue. Animal Aid 
(and the BAH’s report) present evidence that the use of the whip is harmful and that jockeys have abused it in the 
past (as seen in the first chapter the whip is one of oldest instruments of torture, and it is difficult not to notice the 
uncanny similarities between rule (D)37 – Whip Specifications – and regulations for torture instruments). When 
Animal Aid claims the whip should be banned, the argument is of an ethical nature, and it may not be refuted 
through the use of technical terms (a good illustration of this is the article “A jockey whipped me 'as hard as I'd hit 
a horse' and it didn't hurt”384). The BAH’s attempts to rationalize the issue using the jockeys terms is, I suspect, 
bound to fail. The discussion should not be focused on whether and how does the whip work (it obviously does), 
or on the amount of pain it may provoke (reports prove horses are wounded), but on whether it is legitimate to 
strike a horse in order to win a race.  
1 “Responsible Regulation: A Review of the Use of the Whip in Horceracing”, Bristish Horseracing Authority, 
September, 2011, accessed 26th October, http://www.britishhorseracing.com/whip-review/WhipReview.pdf.  
2 “BHA Announces Adjustmens to Whip Rules”, British Horseracing Authority, 21 st October, accessed 26st 
October, http://www.britishhorseracing.com/whip-review/  
3 Cf. “Anger over new whip rules leads to threat of protest at Towcester race course”, Northampton Chronicle, 26 
October, accessed 26 October, 
http://www.northamptonchron.co.uk/news/local/anger_over_new_whip_rules_leads_to_threat_of_protest_at
_towcester_race_course_1_3180688. 
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this sense, a skilled interpreter may have accurate expectations regarding the consequences 
of his activity, but the result of the method is not determined a priori.  
Let me add to this description of “mousetrapping” that the term names the practice 
(pornographic websites are particularly hospitable to this type of device) of launching a series 
of pop up ads which prevents users from leaving the webpage:  
 
This practice is known as “mousetrapping” (or “selling exist traffic” in the industry), and a 
mousetrapped user who tries to leave a sexually explicit site is automatically forwarded to 
another such site. (…) Technically, mousetrapping refers to a process enabled by Java script (a 
scripting language for Internet browsers) in which the closing of one window automatically 
directs the user to another Web page. The second Web page can do the same, so that 
attempting to exist the second page spawns a third page, and so on385.  
 
In this technical sense, “mousetrapping” is a way to lure the viewer of the site, so that 
he remains trapped and is unable to leave the page. One-time visitors will be bombarded with 
numerous banners and pay-per-click links (the presumption appears to be that the site will 
not be able to count with repeat visits from the same user, so it is more profitable to resort to 
deception). In this technique to entrap visitors, even though technical skill is a requirement 
and someone’s exterior is being revealed, the purpose is not that of discovering something or 
of testing others. More importantly, the algorithm is neutral towards his users, who are 
arbitrarily chosen. Once the first step has been given, every user is randomly ensnared, which 
is the reason this procedure differs from others previously mentioned. Remember how in the 
polygraph, for example, specific questions had to be devised in each evaluation: although the 
same general method was applied, each subject underwent a different inquiry.  
Determining the truth in a nutshell is the capacity to find the entity, or the group of 
entities, capable of enlightening us, of being the starting point for a discussion. These tests do 
not allow us to obtain irrefutable facts, but they do begin a process that, if properly 
conducted, will allow for understanding. This is the reason why “mousetrapping” does not 
entail pinching someone arbitrarily, or in a random place. As mentioned, part of the 
                                                           
385 Dick Thornburgh, Herbert Lin, National Research Council (U.S), Committee to Study Tools and Strategies for 
Protecting Kids from Pornography and Their Applicability to Other Inappropriate Internet Content, National 
Research Council (U.S.) , Youth, pornography and the Internet. National Academic Press, 2002, n. p.  
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interpreter’s skill entails his conviction about where and how to make the scratch on the 
stone or to spur the horse. There are, as observed in the thesis, numerous differences 
between the aforementioned procedures and literary criticism, as critics do not generally 
need to formulate specific tests (even if a number of methods which are based on this 
assumption may be enunciated). Conducting an experiment, in the case of literary criticism, 
implies having an intuition and contrasting it with the text so that a group of conclusions may 
ensue. Talent is, as seen, perceived in the ability to select a series of quotations in a text, 
which exemplify the critic’s thoughts, afterwards systematized in a justification. In literary 
criticism, highlighting a passage does not necessarily mean that it was previously hidden, but 
it does imply that a certain critic saw in it what others failed to acknowledge, that he gave it 
importance, and knew how to find a justification for it. Highlighting a passage implies 
making it visible to others, but also letting them understand the implications of such a choice 
in an argument. Disagreeing with previous analysis and being able to spot mistakes are 
equally important parts of a critic’s professional activity.  
 It may now be perceived how, in this discussion of the existence of self-explainable 
proof, of entities capable of diminishing our uncertainties and golden sentences, importance 
is gradually given to a group of technical procedures and particular interpreters. Arnoldians 
are, therefore, skilled exegetists, those able to distinguish significant quotations, emotions 
and words, capable of giving a meaning to each person’s behavior and enunciates. From this 
perspective, good interpreters, in possession of a series of particular talents, are those able to 
highlight meaningful signs, pointing to them, describing them and justifying the reasons for 
their claims. These interpreters and their methods tend to proceed by trial and error, gaining 
the evidence that will help them reach a certain verdict. This is the reason why better 
interpreters are more able at finding the truth, interpreting a text, understanding other 
persons’ intentions. The skill of Arnoldians does not rely in the use of the method alone (as 
sometimes they wish us to believe), or solely in the capacity to produce a reaction, but in their 
intuition about someone, and the capacity to learn with experience. Being an Arnoldian, from 
this perspective, implies one has acquired a certain knowledge about himself and other 
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persons; that one’s descriptions tend to be more accurate and to improve with time. 
“Mousetrapping” is not, consequently, the mere act of scratching the stone, but the ability to 
do so knowingly.
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